Plato at the Foundation of Disciplines: Method and the Metaxu in the Phaedrus, Sophist, and Symposium

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Abstract

This paper situates the interpretation of Plato in its 2500-year trajectory toward a significant change in the mid-twentieth century, away from the attempt to establish Plato’s metaphysical doctrines to a recognition of the intrinsic value of their literary-dramatic dialogue form. I discuss the lingering presence of doctrinal interpretation in the Nietzschean-Heideggerian tradition of Plato interpretation as it manifests in Derrida’s reading of Plato’s Phaedrus. I then give two examples of the transformative power of attention to the literary-dramatic structure of the dialogues in the work of two quite different but mutually confirming kinds of contemporary Plato interpretation, those by Catherine H. Zuckert and William Desmond, respectively. The Plato that emerges from their work confirms the growing recognition that the tradition of Platonism does not represent the thinking embodied in Plato’s dialogues.

Keywords: Plato, Platonism, Socrates, doctrine, interpretation, dialogue, drama, character, method, logic, inquiry, discourse, genre, eros, metaxu, the between, metaxology
In a 1996 essay entitled “The State of the Question in the Study of Plato,” the American Plato scholar Gerald A. Press offers a remarkable overview of the 2500-year history of scholarship and interpretation of the works of Plato. Focusing on the traditions of interpretation of the Platonic dialogues themselves, Press notes the unique difficulty they present in comparison to any other body of work in philosophy, as compared to the comparatively straightforward structure of the philosophical treatise that, in more recent times, dominates the genre of philosophical writing from Aristotle to Aquinas, Descartes and Spinoza to Kant and Hegel, and onward to Husserl and Wittgenstein. Nor are Plato’s dialogues even comparable to those of other writers of philosophical dialogues like Cicero, Hume or Berkeley, whose characters are mere masks and mouthpieces for opposing doctrines and points of view. Rather, Plato’s works can be compared more readily to certain of the pseudonymous writings of Kierkegaard or Nietzsche, where, through the adoption of fictional authorial voices, the writer makes it difficult to ascertain any decided philosophical views on the part of the author himself. However, no philosopher in the history of philosophy has maintained the kind of thorough anonymity, throughout the entire body of his work, that Plato has with regard to personal philosophical views and commitments, a fact the more striking given his founding rôle in the tradition of philosophy in the West. Other than in a handful of personal letters, some of debatable authenticity, not a single time in his 35 formal writings does Plato, with any degree of certainty, step out from within or from behind the many characters that populate his dialogues to speak discernibly in his own voice. Not even through the character of his teacher Socrates, who appears in 33 of his 35 dialogues, does Plato unambiguously reveal his own philosophical commitments or doctrines.

In the history of Plato scholarship, Press argues that interpretation of the dialogues is consistently organized around overcoming and dispelling Plato’s persistent authorial anonymity. “Throughout most of its history,” Press (1996) writes:

Interpretation of Plato has oscillated between two poles. For the most part, it has been what may be called dogmatic or doctrinal; that is, it has been assumed that Plato's thought consists of a more or less systematic body of doctrines which it is the primary function of the dialogues to communicate along with the arguments that Plato believes to show the truth of these doctrines. The crucial point is that the focus of such interpretations is – even (and especially) when the interpreters disagree – on discovering Plato's doctrines. The other pole, the skeptical, emphasizes the inconclusive endings of many dialogues, Socrates' perpetual questioning, and the wealth of inconsistencies, ambiguities, and apparently weak or invalid arguments, and claims that Plato does not have any settled doctrines, but always remains in doubt or open to further inquiry and argument. It is worth noting that, as an anti-dogmatic position, the skeptical is nevertheless defined by the concept of dogma and is, therefore, essentially dogma-centered. (p. 508)

After a thorough canvassing of the shortcomings and contradictions of the dogmatic and skeptical approaches, Press describes a fundamental shift in Plato scholarship in the mid-twentieth century, away from preoccupation with the presence or absence of Plato's supposed doctrines to the literary implications of his sustained anonymity in the dialogues, that is to say, from the attempt to read the dialogues as if they were disguised treatises to reading them as a philosophical-literary genre that draws on dramatic form, employing a unique blend of literary and philosophical technique and intentionality. “One could sum it up by saying”, Press observes, “that the question had changed [by the mid-twentieth century], from something like”:
What were Plato's doctrines and how did they develop, as revealed by analyzing the arguments alone in the dialogues taken to be essentially treatises?

to something like

Should we take literary and dramatic aspects of the dialogues into consideration in trying to understand Plato's thought? (p. 511)

By 1965, for instance, Stanley Rosen, one of the most generative of Plato interpreters in English of his generation, observes as a given that most students of Plato now accept in principle that “the dramatic structure of the dialogues is an essential part of their philosophical meaning” (pp. 452–453). Nevertheless, the millennial sway of doctrinal Platonism persists well into contemporary Plato interpretation, even among those who readily agree that Plato himself was no representative of the Platonism that came to represent him, that such doctrines as those, for instance, of the Forms and of knowledge as anamnesis, are not consistently defended in the dialogues, and that the Socratic irony in the dialogues, recognized, for instance, by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, may extend in any given passage or dialogue as a whole to the authorial persona of Plato, embedded as it is in the many levels of dramatic structure, character and narrative voice. One of the most instructive examples of such an admixture of persistent Platonist doctrinalism in readings that show genuine awareness of the importance of literary structure in the dialogues is in a pivotally important monograph-length essay by Jacques Derrida on Plato from the late 1960’s, entitled “Plato’s Pharmacy,” an essay central to the formulation of his career-long projects of grammatology and deconstruction. Demonstrating over the 100+ pages of “Plato’s Pharmacy” a comprehensive familiarity with the full range of the Platonic corpus, as well as his characteristically nuanced engagement with the texts, Derrida focuses on the notion of pharmakon in Plato’s Phaedrus, and its use in the myth of the invention of writing by the god Theuth that Socrates relates toward the end of the dialogue. It is useful to recall here Derrida’s interpretation of the notion of pharmakon in this monograph as an illustration of the persistence of doctrinal readings of Plato even in conjunction with advanced levels of recognition of the literary and dramatic properties of the Platonic dialogue.

In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates is engaged with the student of rhetoric Phaedrus in a discussion of rhetorical argumentation and the qualities that make for a successful speech, whether in oral or written form. At the opening of the dialogue, Phaedrus is engaged in the memorization of a speech by his teacher Lysias, with Socrates eager to hear it. After doing so, Socrates is persuaded by Phaedrus to provide a better speech than Lysias’s on the same topic. After Socrates provides not one but two speeches on opposing sides of the issue in question, he attempts to draw Phaedrus toward a recognition of the necessity of philosophical dialectic as a determining factor in the composition of effective speeches. After doing his best to convince Phaedrus of the greater importance of philosophy over rhetoric, Socrates concludes with one of the mythic stories that play such a conspicuous and perplexing role in Plato’s dialogues. The story he relates to Phaedrus of the invention of writing by the Egyptian god Theuth (or Thoth) is designed to provoke a better understanding on the part of Phaedrus of the nature and greater importance of dialectic in the pursuit of truth, which after all, Socrates has argued, should be the genuine goal of any speech worthy of its purpose. In the story Socrates relates, Theuth presents his invention of the gift of writing to the Thamus, king of the Egyptian gods, saying: “‘O King, here is something that, once learned, will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memory; I have discovered a pharmakon [translated into English here as “potion”] for memory and for wisdom” (274e). However, Thamus
criticizes Theuth’s invention of writing in the following words: “O most expert Theuth, . . .
since you are the father of writing, your affection for it has made you describe its effects as
the opposite of what they really are. In fact, it will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of
those who learn it: they will not practice using their memory because they will put their trust
in writing, which is external and depends on signs which belong to others, instead of trying to
remember from the inside, completely on their own. You have not discovered a pharmakon
for remembering, but for reminding; you provide your students with the appearance of
wisdom, not with its reality” (275a). Socrates goes on to underline to Phaedrus that spoken
discourse is crucial to the nature of dialectic, that a teacher, mindful of the philosophical
purpose of communication, will choose to speak to his students in person, face to face, rather
than commit to writing words “that are as incapable of speaking in their own defense as they
are of teaching the truth adequately” (276c). “The dialectician,” Socrates emphasizes to
Phaedrus, “chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it discourse accompanied by
knowledge . . . . Such discourse makes the seed forever immortal and renders the man who
has it as happy as any human being can be” (276e–277a).

Derrida’s interpretation of the Phaedrus in “Plato’s Pharmacy” turns on the ambivalence of
the notion of pharmakon, capable as it is of signifying either “medicine” or “poison.”
Because a pharmakon can be either helpful or harmful, medicine or poison, its meaning is
dependent on context. But this is inherently lacking because it pre-dates the laws of
philosophical discourse, the logic of both the excluded middle and of contradiction, so it is
dangerously unreliable and “impure” in Plato’s eyes – Derrida argues – in the pursuit of truth.
Its equivocal vacillation must be contained. Referring to the play of opposed meanings as a
“game”, Derrida observes:

“It is part of the rules of this game that the game should seem to stop. Then the
pharmakon, which is older than either of the opposites, is "caught" by philosophy, by
"Platonism" which is constituted by this apprehension, as a mixture of two pure,
heterogeneous terms. And one could follow the word pharmakōn as a guiding thread
within the whole Platonic problematic of the mixture. Apprehended as a blend and an
impurity, the pharmakōn also acts like an aggressor or a housebreaker, threatening
some internal purity and security . . . . The purity of the inside can then only be restored
if the charges are brought home against exteriority [e.g., of writing] as a supplement,
inessential yet harmful to the essence, a surplus that ought never to have come to be
added to the untouched plenitude of the inside. . . . In order to cure the [logos] of the
pharmakon and rid it of the parasite, it is thus necessary to put the outside back in its
place. This is the inaugural gesture of "logic" itself, of good "sense" insofar as it
accords with the self-identity of that which is: being is what it is, the outside is the
outside and the inside inside. Writing must thus return to being what it should never
have ceased to be: an accessory, an accident, an excess. (p. 128)

By identifying the pharmakon as a vehicle in Plato’s discourse of the containment of
ambivalence by a univocal logic of non-contradiction, Derrida finds as the underlying
mechanism of the arguments carried in the Phaedrus by Socrates the presence of a doctrinaire
Platonism, an ontology or logic of being which holds referentiality firmly in place as a
polarity of meaning, as non-contradiction and non-equivocity. As attentive as Derrida can be
to the literary and dramatic elements of the Phaedrus and the many other dialogues which he
cites at various points in this long essay, Derrida reads Plato after the fashion of Heidegger
(1998), and before him of Nietzsche, who had founded their entire interpretations of the
history of Western philosophy on the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics, of being as presence, identity, or inwardness, or in Nietzsche’s terms as nihilism (Rosen, 1988).

Derrida does not encompass, in the argument of “Plato’s Pharmacy”, the textual and hermeneutical layer constituted by Plato’s authorial distance from the myth of the origins of writing given in the *Phaedrus* to the character of Socrates. The irony that resonates through the textual layers, however, is palpable. Socrates, both in the historical record and in Plato’s literary characterization, is the philosopher who writes nothing, and we meet him in the text of the dialogues rendered by the philosopher that we know only through his writings . . . writings, what is more, that he casts in a dramatic structure in which he renders anonymous his own philosophical voice. Derrida reads Socrates’s teaching in the *Phaedrus* in the traditional doctrinal fashion to be the teaching of Plato himself, since this supports his Heideggerian-inspired critique of the ontotheological structure of metaphysics, of being as presence, extended in Derrida’s own adaptation of Heidegger’s analysis toward the deconstructive hermeneutic of a grammatology that sees within the Western tradition a systematic bias toward the priority of the presence and immediacy of speech over the absence and delay of writing. In a recent article entitled “Derrida and Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle,” leading Derrida scholar Michael Naas gives to “Plato’s Pharmacy” a pivotal place in the lifelong trajectory of Derrida’s writings, proposing, he writes “to make a claim that . . . among all of Derrida’s engagements with Ancient Philosophy a single figure, Plato, and a single dialogue of Plato’s, the *Phaedrus*, indeed a single scene within that dialogue – Socrates’ critique of writing – played a central and unparalleled role in Derrida’s work from the beginning right up until the end” (p. 231).

I have taken time to demonstrate in some detail the persistence in Plato scholarship of the long tradition of doctrinal interpretation well into the current period in which the literary structure of the dialogues is given priority. However, the instance of Derrida’s reading of Plato is more than a mere case of hermeneutical controversy, since the interpretation of Plato in the Nietzschean-Heideggerian tradition purports to be an interpretation not merely of Plato alone, but rather of the whole tradition of Western philosophy. Moreover, such interpretation includes the founding differentiation of disciplinary boundaries between the discourses of philosophy, religion, literature, and politics, so conspicuous in the text of a dialogue like the *Phaedrus*, but also by implication of those of history, mathematics, and the sciences across the body of the Platonic dialogues as a whole. The import and traditional authority embedded in these disciplinary boundaries persists in the kind of scholarly and hermeneutical traditions that we find in the interpretation of a figure like Plato, so that to observe fundamental changes in such hermeneutical models, has, with respect to our reception of thinkers of the stature of a Heidegger or a Derrida, more at stake than a mere point of technique or correctness in Plato interpretation.

1 In “We Other Greeks” (2010), Derrida describes his close involvement with Heidegger’s thought throughout his reading of Plato and development of grammatology and deconstruction: “I constantly had to thematize an explication vis-à-vis Heidegger (and from the beginning a deconstructive explication – interior and exterior, and thus always folded onto itself . . . – having to do in particular with his “epochal” framing of the history of philosophy and of the history of being, his interpretation of Nietzsche, of Aristotle, his way of situating the Greek and the Greek language, *theos* and *theion*, the principle of reason, *mimesis* (and also truth, and, most especially, *khôra*)” (pp. 21–22).

2 See Heidegger’s attribution to Plato of a founding misdirection of “truth as correctness” in his “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth” (1998): “The ambiguity in the determination of the essence of truth can be seen in a single sentence taken from the section that contains Plato's own interpretation of the “allegory of the cave” (517 b7 to c5). . . . From now on this characterization of the essence of truth as the correctness of both representation and assertion becomes normative for the whole of Western thinking” (pp. 177–178).
My intention in the above is to have cleared the ground for the appreciation of the gains achieved in the work of the following two representatives of the literary-dramatic approach to the interpretation of the Platonic dialogues. The works, respectively, of Catherine Zuckert and William Desmond embody two quite different but mutually reinforcing approaches to interpretation of the work of Plato. In her 2009 *Plato’s Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues*, Catherine Zuckert achieves a comprehensive new reading of the whole structure of the Platonic corpus. In jettisoning two principal theories attached to the traditional doctrinal reading of the dialogues, namely, the theory stemming from the early nineteenth century with Schleiermacher of the development of Plato’s thought in three distinct stages, and also the philological and stylistic analyses that attempt to demonstrate that development at the textual level. Zuckert challenges both of these longstanding and still widely followed models in arguing for a fundamentally different approach to the presence or absence of an organizing principle within the dialogues as a whole. Beginning from the pervasive role of the character of Socrates throughout the Platonic corpus, Zuckert looks to internal evidence in each of the dialogues for the stage it represents in the life of Socrates, beginning with his early years as a student of philosophy in the *Parmenides*, to his mature role as a teacher in such dialogues as the *Republic*, to his eventual trial and death at the hands of the governing class of Athens, in the *Apology* and the *Phaedo*. She argues that the dialogues demonstrate convincing evidence that Plato’s goal in those dialogues in which Socrates appears is to represent and communicate the life of his teacher as a philosopher up to and including his own understanding of his death as presented in the *Phaedo*. She does not claim that the historical references and details within the dialogues are intended to be precisely accurate – the dialogues are works of dramatic fiction after all – but, rather, that they are designed to show the unfolding thought of Socrates over his philosophical lifetime, and are focused on Socrates as a character who embodies true philosophy, rather than as a holder of philosophical doctrines. Zuckert emphasizes that, consistent with the dramatic form of the dialogues, “Plato only shows; he does not state or say anything in his own name” (p. 7). However, she writes, if we look at “the dramatic dates (the indications Plato gives of the time at which readers are to imagine the dialogue having taken place, not the much later and more speculative time of composition) . . . we see that the dialogues represent incidents in one overarching narrative. They depict the problems that gave rise to Socratic philosophy, its development or maturation, and its limitations” (p. 7). Taking as point of departure Socrates’s own account of the four stages of his development as a philosopher given in his final hours in the *Phaedo*, Zuckert undertakes systematic readings of the 35 dialogues, exploring how a focus on the character of Socrates positions each dialogue in relation to the overall narrative of the philosophical thought and practice of Socrates, contributing to a coherent reading of each dialogue, while shedding light on what can and cannot be reasonably surmised regarding Plato’s authorial intentions.

With regard to what Aristotle attributes to Plato with respect to that most contentious Platonic doctrine of the ideas or forms, Zuckert argues that Plato does not ascribe to Socrates anything beyond its status as an hypothesis, that is, its mere persuasiveness or probability, and its superiority to other existing explanations of knowledge, while at the same time admitting to its incompleteness: in particular, Socrates acknowledges his inability to explain how particular things participate in the Forms that make them intelligible. Zuckert explains:

Socrates’s hypothesis [of the Forms] explicitly abjures any consideration of the archē or its consequences. Participation in the ideas explains only why things are as they are. It does not explain how any thing or set of things comes to be . . . . His argument about
the ideas is explicitly presented not merely as provisional but as an incomplete account of the character of the whole. (p. 189)

This provisional nature of the key Socratic theory of the forms underwrites Zuckert’s emphasis that, as Socrates argues in major dialogues, such as the *Symposium*, the *Republic*, and the *Phaedrus*, philosophy is an erotic pursuit of wisdom; the philosopher is wisdom’s lover, not its possessor, since that claim is proper only to a god, not a human being (278d). In the *Symposium*, Socrates declares that the only thing he understands is “the art of love” (177e), relating that he was taught that art of love by a Mantinean priestess by the name of Diotima, who emphasized that the erotic nature of knowledge is that it avoids choosing between opposing terms, like ugliness and beauty, good and evil, knowledge and ignorance: “Correct judgement,” he learned from her, “has this character: it is in between (metaxù) understanding and ignorance” (202a). As Zuckert glosses this important passage: “Diotima persuaded Socrates to change his understanding of eros by asking him to examine his own opinions, the way Socrates later asks his interlocutors to examine theirs. She thus provided him not only with the content of his knowledge (*ta erōtica*) but also, by means of example, with the method of acquiring it” (pp. 192–193).

This emphasis on the erotic desire in and for philosophy foregrounds the temporal, spatial, embodied character of the philosopher, that the love of and desire for knowledge arises out of awareness of a lack of wisdom, of the inherently temporal and mortal condition that, as Heidegger was to explore, defines and circumscribes our situated-ness as human beings as *Dasein*, there-being. The conceptual description of this erotic condition as the *metaxu*, the between, informs the whole approach to philosophy by William Desmond, whose relationship to Plato is that of a creative philosopher rather than as the interpreter we find in Zuckert. In a career so far spanning 40 years and showing no sign of flagging, Desmond has unfolded an original philosophical corpus, grounded in his early work on Plato, an approach he names *metaxology*, the logic of the between. He has written (to my knowledge) only a single essay exploring detailed interpretation of a Platonic dialogue, a remarkably original reading of the *Sophist*, early in his career, preferring he comments in a recent interview to think from out of Plato’s work rather than within the detailed exegesis that characterizes the kind of specialized Plato scholarship that tends to dominate the field. I can give here only a brief example of the Platonist thinking that characterizes the impressive sweep of Desmond’s philosophical enterprise.³

In the early essay on the *Sophist* just mentioned, a dialogue in which Socrates is present but does not participate, Plato gives the leading rôle to an unnamed philosopher, a student of Parmenides, visiting Athens from Elea. The Eleatic Stranger chooses the young and untrained student of philosophy, Theaetetus, as his interlocutor, in an attempt, as the title of the dialogue indicates, to capture more precisely the difference that marks the sophist off from the philosopher, a difference that Socrates has often tried to define in earlier dialogues (by “earlier” of course, in Zuckert’s sense, I mean earlier in Socrates’ life, not Plato’s). Desmond emphasizes that the Stranger’s choice not to debate with Socrates arises because the Stranger does not want a serious opponent who will engage him in genuine debate, preferring Theaetetus because he will allow him to turn the exchange into as much of a monologue as possible, choosing as he does the eristic logic of division to chase down the precise characteristics of the sophist.

³ For a representative sampling of Desmond’s work, see Desmond (2012). And for explication and critical commentary, including a bibliography of Desmond’s work to 2007, see Kelly (2007).
The Stranger’s argument founders on the ontological question of whether the non-being that is the opposing term to being has any status, is an empty signifier, or has a strange kind of existence of its own. This question raises the issue of the metaxu, the between that Socrates has described in the Symposium. Desmond argues that the silent presence of Socrates to the dialogue of the Stranger with Theaetetus is meant by Plato to accent the contrast to Socrates’ character as a philosopher, as one who grasps that the nature of the between-ness of such opposing terms as being and non-being is not responsive to the eristic method used by the Stranger, whom Desmond points out:

insists that terms [like “sophist”] have a fixed, univocal meaning, separable from their opposites . . .. Socrates on the other hand has no method, for there is no techne of talking . . .. The contrast between Socrates and the Stranger, then, is intimately connected with the meaning of Plato’s philosophical art. This seeks to mediate between the logical and the artistic, the conceptual and the imaginative. (pp. 401–402)

Desmond’s reading of Plato’s work places it between the literary and the philosophical, neither wholly one nor the other, both literary and philosophical, so as to enable a portrait not of philosophy but of the erotic pursuit of philosophy, of how the philosopher lives from out of his or her inquiry, rather than from a set of doctrines or methods they hold to or oppose. In being both literary and philosophical, and in being neither in their later opposing sense, Plato’s work stands at the origin of Western academic traditions, demonstrating that truth has no generic or discursive property or exclusivity, but rather inheres in the way genres and discourses are used as modes of inquiry, not as claims to the possession of univocal, non-provisional, non-revisable truth.

Conclusion

My purpose in this essay is to point to the generativity of an epochal change in the understanding and interpretation of the Platonic corpus. The long tradition of Platonist doctrinalism, however, persists in its powerful hold over the way philosophy is constructed as a discourse and a discipline, even among many modern and late modern philosophers who grasp the vital need for a new understanding of philosophy, and of its rôle among the disciplines.
References


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