New Naturalism of Herzog and Deleuze

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Abstract

This article reviews distinctive elements of Werner Herzog’s naturalism and endeavors to analyse it within a philosophical framework that has Gilles Deleuze’s ideas as primary referent. Deleuze’s discussion of Stoic philosophy, specifically the concept of quasi-causality, will be a critical mainstay for this reading of Herzog. The axial objective is to determine how an immanent construction of reality, or what I will call genesis, is the subject matter of both Herzog’s speculative and imaginative naturalism and Deleuze’s pluralistic realism. This notion demands that we direct our attention to the manner in which Herzog’s protagonists are all mad in a way, all the while focusing on how this madness helps to forge the distinctive characteristics of his aesthetic creation. As a result, we find in Herzog a peculiar kind of agency, different from rational or causal agency. Here, drives and impulses inform decisions and incite the characters to take action. Consequently, I aim to demonstrate the existence of an affinity between this agency in Herzog and the notion of quasi- causality in Deleuze’s reading of the Stoics.

Keywords: Herzog, Deleuze, naturalism, quasi-causality, destiny
Herzog’s Naturalism

Nature is one of Herzog’s most obvious obsessions, so ascribing a kind of naturalism to him is uncontroversial. It’s also not difficult to find that nature for Herzog is not a spectacular scene to be watched from a safe distance. It is not beautiful but cruel, chaotic, and out of our control. He has an unequivocally non-romantic, which is to say practical view of nature.

To give just a few examples, let us consider the films that have Klaus Kinsky as the leading actor. The characters Aguirre and Fitzcarraldo are each in some way dissolved in the Amazonian jungle, which is depicted as extremely wild and infinite. In these movies (Aguirre, Wrath of God and Fitzcarraldo) violence is also essential, a devastating violence that is depicted as basic, organic and natural. The cruelty of Aguirre, for example, is entwined with the irrational cruelty of jungle and nature. These films picture a conflict, but it would be inappropriate to characterise it as one occurring between human and nature, as some commentators propose. It is nature that is unconsciously and indiscriminately brutal, so no one can reasonably be held responsible for its violence. The death of individuals is part of the life of nature, that’s why the Herzogean heroes never fear death.

This view of nature is prevalent among the Hellenistic philosophers, from whom I want to borrow the concept “living in harmony with nature”. For Epicureans, Cynics and Stoics, naturalism is a way to eliminate the fear of death. To do this, instead of assuming the life/death dichotomy, they postulate only one power that encompasses both, so death is just one of the aspects of universal life. Stoic naturalism is a kind of materialism in which the body itself is alive. This goes against the Platonic tradition, which includes Aristotle, that believes in bodily inertia and that life and movement come into the body from without. Epicureans and Stoics reject all incorporeal causes because, in their view, it is the body that is animate and dynamic. We will see that for them “the incorporeal” originates in bodies and is the result of the actions and passions of bodies. While for Aristotle there should be an incorporeal, unmoved mover as the true cause of all corporeal causalities, for the Stoics bodies are true causes. But according to Plato and Aristotle, who search for a stable foundation to explain the changing being, true causes are incorporeal and bodies are effects. According to the Stoics, who deny this, bodies are causes and the incorporeals are effects. In each case there is the underlying idea that the world is, in fact, alive. Emile Brehier, in his reading of the Stoics in La Théorie des incorporels dans l’ancien stoïcisme, says:

The whole world, with its organization, the hierarchy of its parts, and its evolution that flows from one conflagration to another, is a living being. Even the mineral, with the cohesion of its parts, possesses a unity analogous to the unity of a living entity. So, one can say, the change in being is always analogous to the evolution of a living entity. (Brieher, pp. 4–5; my translation)

Viewed through such a lens, the death and life of one living entity such as an individual is merely a negligible fragment of a much greater life. This makes Stoics and Cynics somewhat indifferent toward the death of relatives. They are apathetic and cruel in accordance with nature. Nature is a thoughtless, indifferent animal. In their view, when one is passive regarding

nature, this does not make one apathetic. This passivity actually provides human beings with passion, as will be seen.

Herzog’s protagonists also look cruel in the way that they are in harmony with nature. This cruelty is tied to madness. Madness is an aspect of the wildness of nature, and not only are Herzog’s heroes all madmen in this positive sense, what is more, Herzog’s art itself is a kind of madness.

Now the question is: what do cruelty and madness have to do with art and artistic creation? To deal with this question, we first need to consider that if we live in harmony with nature, our artistic activities should be part of nature’s arts. But what is this natural art? For this, let’s take a look at the Cave of Forgotten Dreams, which is a documentary about 28,000 year-old cave paintings. Herzog tries to prove that these paintings have all the requisite elements to be considered as art in the modern sense. The question that arises during the movie is: who painted the cave walls? Was it human or animal? Interestingly, there seems to be no such distinction for Herzog. In the documentary, an interviewer says: “The painter is the spirit’s hand” (Herzog, 2010). And the spirit is nothing other than nature. Herzog also explains this point in the documentary with a reference to the concept of dreams. The narrator describes the ancient paintings as “dreams from 28,000 years ago” (Herzog, 2010). So, ostensibly, we can see their dreams as works of art in the cave. In the quasi-documentary Where the Green Ants Dream, the native Australians put forward an idea that we live in the dreams of green ants. One can conclude that it is the spirit or nature that is dreaming, and the world is the realization of its dreams.

To see how this natural art is related to madness, we need to consider the creativity and passion of a critical Herzog protagonist, Kaspar Hauser, in The Enigma of Kaspar Hauser (in German: Jeder für sich und Gott Gegen Alle). This film is a cinematic version of the story of a boy who lived the first seventeen years of his life in a cellar and had no contact with humans, except a so-called father who fed him and taught him a few things. Bruno S., a non-actor who spent much of his youth in psychiatric hospitals plays the role of Kaspar. He came directly from non-human to human life, and so can play, quite appropriately, the role of intermediary between internal and external nature. The film mainly aims to depict Kaspar’s sensitivity as a replacement for his absent rationality. He didn’t learn to concentrate with his mind, and so he thinks with his body, his impulses and drives. His way of using language is specifically a sensible or poetic one. This film is about the creative power of madness and its relationship with the poetic way of thinking, set against the stupidity of scientific rationality. Madness is a genuine pathway to poesis, to creation. Therefore, mad nature and rational culture have the same essence, which is life and creativity. Kaspar says in the movie: “I have only life. There is nothing else in me” (Herzog, 1974), which can be translated as: I have only drives and impulses in me. For Herzog, like for Nietzsche, reason is set against life, as it is a reduction of life’s powers. He wants to emphasize bare impulses through the repetitive movements of Kaspar’s body. Displaying Kaspar’s inner nature together with external nature leads us to consider the latter as a force endowed with the capacity to propel human beings. This power shows itself in language, which seems to be a continuation of the character's corporeal drives.

Consequently, there is no essential distinction between body and language, because a “word” is a “thing” that we internalize as our own, even though it has arrived in us from the outside. But language only works in the medium of a favourable "outside". We can see this symbolically in the last speaker of a language in Where the Green Ants Dream, who gives a testimony in a
court. No one can understand or translate his talk, and what he says is incommunicable. But communication, as we shall see, can occur with corporeal drives and impulses.

Herzog also internalized this view in his career as a filmmaker. He made both documentary and feature movies, but his documentaries are famously fictional and his feature movies are somehow documentary. Here, we can see how the border between reality and fiction blurs. Fiction belongs not only to the human culture but also to nature. What we can do is part of what nature can do. Our obsessional phantasms and dreams are counterparts of the mad power of repetition in nature. A documentary is, like a feature film, the realization of a dream, and more radically, reality is the realization of dreams. This point is interestingly noticeable in the use of the term “einhbildung” in the German version of Aguirre; Wrath of God, when someone sees a ship on the top of a tree. Einbildung means imagination but it contains the morpheme bilden, which means creation or construction. Herzog, later in Fitzarraldo, actualized this unity of imagination and construction.

In all his work Herzog constructs reality as film. His productions are true stories, but not in relation to pre-existing facts. They are true in and of themselves. The filmmaker is not a passive sensor before reality, but constructs reality out of his dreams and phantasms. Observation is intervention, in the sense that it makes something new, so that a documentary adds something new to reality and so modifies it. So, filming a natural event adds something to the event. This is the dialectic of nature by which it constructs itself infinitely. Reality itself is fictional and imaginative, because it is restless and productive. The infinite diversity of nature comes from its fictional attributes.

Sense and Genesis in Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense

In the history of philosophy, this view of naturalism can be found amongst others in ancient Hellenistic philosophy, Spinoza (one can also think of Schelling), and Nietzsche. In contemporary philosophy, Gilles Deleuze provided a synthesis, so that we can find in his works a complete and complex philosophical version of naturalism that is appropriate to this discussion. The most apposite text for our purposes is Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense, where I will focus on his reading of Stoic philosophy.

Deleuze’s central discussion in this text has to do with the genesis of reality, not its essence. The logic of sense, set against the logic of essence, deals with genesis, not existence. This genesis is considered to be immanent, which according to Deleuze means that there is no pre-existing pattern for the genesis of reality. Cosmos comes to existence out of chaos. This view of genesis or “chaosmosis” should help explain the “immanent” construction of reality or nature.

To consider the genesis of reality instead of its essence as the subject of philosophy, Deleuze needs to add a new category to the realm of things. He borrows an ontological distinction from ancient Stoic philosophy between corporeal bodies that exist and incorporeals that subsist. If beings are bodies, incorporeals are not beings, even if they are somethings. Following the Stoics, Deleuze states that incorporeals are the way of being, or the mode of presentation of being.
Now, one important incorporeal is the sayable (lekton), which is the linguistic sense. When I say something about something, the sense of my statement is neither the object that I’m talking about nor my statement itself. An utterance is a body which says something about another body. The sense of the utterance (sayable) is not itself a body, but is a way of being of a body.

In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze develops this Stoic theory to define sense as the way of being as well as effect. Referring to an ancient example, when the scalpel cuts the flesh, the first body produces upon the second a new attribute, that of being cut. The attribute is always expressed by the verb, which means that it is not a being, but a way of being. Being cut is the effect of the meeting of scalpel and flesh. Here there are two bodies and one incorporeal effect, like in linguistic communication in which there are two bodies and incorporeal sense. So, sense is a kind of effect of the meeting of two bodies.

In other words, bodies are causes and the relation between bodies is causality. Senses are not causes, but effects. Bodies are causes in relation to each other, but they are causes of somethings of an entirely different nature, namely incorporeal effects. Effects are the effects of causality. And since they have ontological status as somethings, Deleuze calls them event-effects or simply events that can be expressed only by verbs. They are the change that occurs when two bodies meet together.

Sense is different from common sense and good sense, which are the products of sense. Sense first is nonsense and then becomes common or good. Deleuze in *The Logic of Sense* provides a reading of logical and literary works of Lewis Carroll to show the role of nonsense in the constitution of sense. When something remains identical with itself, it has a pre-existing meaning. When it changes, it attracts our attention and so produces a new sense. That’s why Deleuze makes an identification between sense and event, and use the term sense-event. Events have priority over substances, so that sense has priority over meaning.

The result is that ontological nonsense is the origin of sense. Things make sense when they suffer or enjoy change, and this change is the effect of actions and passions of bodies, which expresses the internal relationship of bodies, or what Deleuze calls the mixture of bodies. A body affects another body, and there is an effect with a different nature as a result of this corporeal affection. Deleuze uses topological terminology to explain this interaction; bodies are depths and incorporeals are at the surface, where the becoming and change occur. The changes occur at the surface of things.

Considering the relationship between sense as nonsense and changes at the surface of the bodies, we can say that reality becomes (or grows), with the help of superficial dreams or what Deleuze calls phantasm. They are not bodies but the effects of their becoming. So, phantasm is another name for event, where meaning finds its origin in sense as nonsense. Deleuze states,

The phantasm . . . represents neither an action nor a passion, but a result of action and passion, that is, a pure event. The question of whether particular events are

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2 In the contemporary standard literature about the Stoics, the English translation of *Lekton* is sayables (Cf. Long and Sedley, 1987, for example). Emile Brehier in his influential study, *La Theorie des incorporels dans l’ancien stoicism* (Paris, Vrin, 1928), translated it to “exprimable” and Deleuze follows his terminology. The English translation of *Logique du Sens* considers “expressible” and not “sayable” for this term. Here, I follow the standard terminology.

3 This example comes from Sextus Empiricus; Cf. Long and Sedley, 1987, pp. 333 and 340.
real or imaginary is poorly posed. The distinction is not between the imaginary
and the real, but between the event as such and the corporeal state of affairs which
incites it about or in which it is actualized. Events are effects . . . Freud was then
right to maintain the rights of reality in the production of phantasms . . . (Deleuze
1990, p. 210)

The result of the interaction of bodies is not itself a body but an effect or an image. Bodies are
always in interaction and so produce images tirelessly. In this way, reality produces phantasm
without stop. Without this phantasm or ontological dream, reality is something still and dead,
and so is an illusion. Dreaming is the way reality constructs itself endlessly. Construction and
making sense are the same activities. Changes occur on the points where the things make sense,
and are the ontological communication between bodies. Phantasm as the production of
obsessional images is a natural instrument of communication and making sense.

Causality and Destiny
As mentioned above, the origin of this realism of sense is the Stoic ontological distinction
between bodies and event-effects. Stoics, in Deleuze’s reading, provide a naturalist ontology
that has ethical consequences, and this combination of ontology and ethics is crucial for
understanding Herzog’s thought. The key concept here is quasi-causality and its relation to
destiny. Bodies are causes and the relationship among them is causality. They are causes in
relation to each other, but causes of somethings of an entirely different nature, namely
incorporeal effects. Effects are the effects of causality. The relationship between effects, which
are events, is not causality, but is called by Deleuze quasi-causality.

Now, the question is that what is this link between effects or events? It is not a causality because
causality is the link between bodies and effects or events are not bodies. It is not also necessary
in a way in which an individual necessarily belongs to its general class, because events are
singular. Deleuze with a reference to Clement of Alexandria states that the link between the
effects is not a causality but is like a causality: “The Stoics say that the body is cause in the
proper sense, but the incorporeal in the metaphoric sense, and like a cause” (Clement of
Alexandria, Stromates, VIII, 9; Deleuze, 1969, p. 115, my translation)⁴. This “quasi-causality”,
which is Deleuze’s translation of “like a causality” or causality “in the metaphoric sense”, is
the causality of incorporeal sayables, and is the subject of logic which deals only with the
sayables. Deleuze emphasizes that quasi-causality “assures the full autonomy of the effect”
(Deleuze, 1990, p. 95), and irreducibility of sense. The quasi-causality is essentially different
from causality. It shows the power of production (via pretention) in the realm of sense.
Although events are effects of bodies and so dependent on them, they hold a relation among
each other which assign a kind of independence to them. Events are effects of bodies but the
logical connection among events is not the effect or the image of causality. Quasi-causality is
an “ideal cause”, or as Clement calls it, a “metaphoric” cause.

But why it is “like a causality” (quasi-causality) and what kind of relation is it, if not a
causality? Here, Deleuze refers to the Stoic view about fatalism and co-fated events in Cicero’s
De Fato. The relation between events or effects is independent from corporeal causality and
and can be understood by what Cicero calls “confatalia”. Deleuze discusses this concept in
“Twenty-Fourth Series of the Communication of Events” in The Logic of Sense, where he
states, “the Stoic paradox is to affirm destiny (le destin), but to deny necessity” (Deleuze, 1969,

⁴. The English translation contains an unfortunate mistake in this case, to translate “mataphorique” to
p. 198; 1990, p. 169). Destiny is what makes the events compatible or incompatible one another, which one is co-fated with the other and which one is not. So, there is a double causality at work here. The relation among bodies is causality which is a necessary relation. There are effects as the results of this causality, and these effects enjoy a kind of autonomy, regarding the internal link among themselves.

To show that this quasi-causality is destiny or co-fatality, Deleuze refers to how Chrysippus in the Cicero’s text transforms “hypothetical propositions into conjunctives or disjunctives” (Deleuze, 1969, p. 199). Hypothetical or conditional propositions are about concepts, while conjunctives or disjunctives are about facts or events. Chrysippus transforms Chaldean astrological propositions because he believes that astrology deals with events not concepts. Hence, instead of “if it is day, it is light”, we have, “this is not the case both that it is day and it is not light”. The first proposition expresses causality while the second denotes quasi-causality in the form of incompatibility. Chaldean astrology is confused in considering the relation between facts and events as causal. Stoic astrology in Deleuze’s reading is a modification in introducing quasi-causality and co-fatality instead of causality and necessity. In consequence, we have Stoic astrology as a philosophical attempt to think of a different and new relation between events. Deleuze states that

the relations of events among themselves from the point of view of an ideational or noematic quasi-causality, first expresses noncausal correspondence, alogical compatibilities or incompatibilities. This was the strength of the Stoics to follow this path: according to what criteria are events copulata, confatalia (or inconfatalia), conjuncta, or disjuncta? Astrology was perhaps the first great attempt to establish a theory of alogical incompatibilities and non-causal correspondences”. (Deleuze 1969, p. 200; 1990, p. 171)

Quasi-causality is a relation like causality between co-related events (copulata). In the relation of causality, there is an internal necessity. Fate (in Chaldean astrology, for example) comes from somewhere exterior, from someone who makes the decision to relate the events, someone like God. In this sense, fate is a special kind of causality. But the Stoic co-fatality considers God as an internal, immanent decision maker. The events are fated, because they are co-fated by each other.

This brings us to the discussion of Stoic epistemology and the problem of knowledge. The necessary relation between bodies is the subject matter of Stoic physics. Here, one can possess a complete knowledge of the relation that is causality. Physics deals not only with bodies, but also concepts, because causality occurs between bodies considered in a closed system. On the contrary, logic deals only with the facts or events. There is no complete knowledge about the totality of events, so the knowledge here is always partial. Thus, the Stoic astrologer feels something like causality between events, a quasi-causality, and has to suggest a decision based on this feeling. Michael Bennett, in his study about quasi-causality, referring to another study by Suzanne Bobzien, considers quasi-causality as a relation in which an event (being cut) causes (partially, say “quasi”) another event (being in pain) (Bennett, 2014, p. 10). He uses also the term conditioning for the relation among events. Some events condition the others without defining them. He concludes that the causality of language to set a contract is nothing

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5 Deleuze relates this Stoic concept of compatibility to the Leibnizean concept of compossibility, and takes use of his own peculiar reading of Leibniz to understand the Stoic concept of quasi-causality (Deleuze, 1969, pp. 200–202).
else than this quasi-causality, like when “a judge’s statement transforms the accused into the convict, or attaining the age of majority transforms a child into an adult” (Bennett, 2014, p. 16). Hence, quasi-causality means to establish a relation through a decision (made by a judge, for example), in the condition in which there is no physical ground to make the decision. Now, we can understand how the quasi-causality of events has priority over the causality among bodies. All necessary rules are established arbitrarily, but not by an all-knowing agent. They are established by a singular aleatory point, a paradoxical element, what the Stoics call “blitur”. This exercises a kind of activity (quasi-causality) to the incorporeal events, which according to Michael Bennett, puts Deleuze’s reading of the Stoics against the dominant view in the Stoic scholarship that incorporeality depends on corporeality (Bennett, 2014, p.5).

The ethical aspect of this conception is about the will of the Stoic sage to do something or to make a decision. In a closed system of concepts or objects there is no need to make a decision, because it’s organized by necessity. In the open system of events, lack of knowledge necessitates decision-making. Stoic logic is in a very close relation with ethics, because it deals with making decisions in the condition of lack of complete knowledge. The Stoic sage is different from a philosopher or a wise man. Instead of being profound and serious, he or she plays joyfully on the surface and makes decision with the paradoxes: “The Stoic sage ‘identifies’ with the quasi-cause: he sets up himself at the surface, on the straight line which traverses it, at the aleatory point which traces or runs through this line . . . The sage waits for the event, that is to say: he understands the pure event in its eternal truth, independently of its spatio-temporal actualization . . . Identifying with the quasi-cause, the sage wants to ‘corporealize’ the incorporeal effect . . .” (Deleuze, 1969, pp. 171–172; 1990, p. 147).

This embodiment is what I referred to with the will and making decision. The event comes through the decision of the Stoic sage. He or she is the quasi-cause of the embodiment of the event. This is a move from one will to another, from “I will” to “it wills in me”. The Stoic sage is not a director, but an actor who makes his actors act. There is no all-knowing element, in this system.

So, the quasi-causality is the causality of event as not-known, as something “yet-to-come”. Conceptually, it’s in a place between contingency and necessity. It is not pure not-knowing, but a knowledge of not-knowing. It is a will, but not against the event or what the Stoics call “nature”. “The quasi-cause does not create, it ‘operates’, and wills only what comes to pass” (Deleuze, 1969, p. 172; Deleuze, 1990, p. 147). It is not a director, but an actor, an actor who acts without direction: “This is how the Stoic sage not only comprehends and wills the event, but also represents it and, by this, selects it, and that an ethics of the mime necessarily prolongs the logic of sense” (Deleuze, 1969, p. 173; Deleuze, 1990, p. 147).

We can find the best examples of the Stoic sage in Herzogean heroes, Aguirre for instance, or better yet, Kaspar Hauser. Apart from the fact that for many reasons Kaspar is very far from being a person, here I’d like to focus on a dream-like story Kasper recalls at the end of the film on his deathbed:

I see a caravan coming through the desert . . . across the sands. And this caravan is led by an old Berber tribesman. And this old man is blind. Now the caravan stops . . . because some believe they are lost . . . and because they see mountains ahead of them. They look at their compass, but it’s no use. Then their blind leader picks up a handful of sand . . . and tastes it as though it were food. My sons, the blind man says, you are wrong. Those are not mountains you see . . . it is only
your imagination. We must continue northward. And they follow the old man’s advice . . . and finally reach the City in the North. And that’s where the story begins. But how the story goes after they reach the city, I don’t know. Thank you all for listening to me. I’m tired now. (Herzog, 1974)

The leader is the so-called decision maker. He should not make decision based on something, if so, that base is the decision maker, not the leader. Making decisions based on nothing is just like throwing dice, and this is exactly what a Stoic sage does. He makes decisions based not on knowledge, but on not-knowing, or in a Socratic way, knowledge of not-knowing. He believes in destiny, and is sure that his decision, whatever it is, is consistent with it. He is the actor who plays a role, but not based on a prescript. This is the meaning of documentation, specifically Herzogian documentation in his feature films. In this sense, Herzog is not a director in a conventional way, but is an actor who makes his actors act. Deleuze states, “The actor is always acting out other roles when acting one role” (Deleuze, 1969, p. 176; Deleuze, 1990, p. 150). Herzog is a professor, but not a professional. He, as a Stoic sage, is an amateur in the whole period of his career as a filmmaker. It is in this sense that he is our teacher. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze describes a teacher in terms of heterogeneity:

We learn nothing from those who say: ‘Do as I do’. Our only teachers are those who tell us to ‘do with me’, and are able to emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures for us to reproduce (Deleuze, 2004, p. 26).

The teacher should act together with the pupil and makes him act. The actor is one who stimulates another actor to act, an event who makes other events act, or rather they are the other events which act in him and through him. It is neither active nor passive, but a positive force which can be called passion.

Herzog and Deleuze, in different ways, make an infinite ontology based on this not-knowing. There is no all-knowing element in Herzogian and Deleuzean systems. We know just what we know, so what we don’t know is absolutely not-known. The conclusion is that the cosmos is a layer in the chaos. Any order comes into existence out of a disorder and is itself a disorder for another order. One can consider this temporally or topologically. From the topological perspective, each layer is composed of infinite layers. We know things just on our scale, and there is an infinity of scales in both directions, inferior and superior.

From Sense to Dissensus
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze explains the relationship between events, also as a vibration or resonance between series. The series of events are in a kind of tension, vibrating in phase with one another. This relationship is very different from causal relations between bodies. In a vibration or resonance, the bodies manipulate or intervene in each other, what is called in physics the interference of waves. In “Plato and the Simulacrum”, which is an appendix to The Logic of Sense, Deleuze states:

There is indeed a unity of divergent series insofar as they are divergent . . . it {chaos} is the power of affirmation, the power to affirm all the heterogeneous series – it ‘complicates’ within itself all the series . . . Between these basic series, a sort of internal resonance is produced; and this resonance induces a forced movement, which goes beyond the series themselves” (Deleuze, 1969, p. 301; Deleuze, 1990, pp. 260–261, italics in original)
Deleuze’s ontology is based on the priority of events over substantial bodies, or destiny over necessity. Reality or nature is an infinite series of events vibrating or resonating with each other. There is always violence in vibration and resonance, “a forced movement”, which makes decision-making possible in an undecidable domain. The organization of nature is dynamic and disorganized compared to the previous organization. There is no harmony in nature, if we define harmony as a pre-existing pattern. The Stoic notion of living in harmony with nature involves violent, because nature itself is disharmonized. Cosmos is originally chaos, and the harmony of nature turns out to be the unity of divergent series or heterogeneous elements.

At this stage I’d like to recall Simon Critchley’s characterisation of David Bowie as another madman who transformed his mad dreams into art:

Music like Bowie’s is not a way of somehow recalling human beings affectively to a kind of pre-established harmony with the world. That would be banal and mundane, literally. Rather, Bowie permits a kind of dewatering of the world, an experience of mood, emotion, or Stimmung that shows that all in the world stimmt nicht—i.e., is not in agreement or accord with the self. (Critchley, 2014, p. 38)

And elsewhere in the same work,

The sound of Bowie’s voice creates a resonance within us. It finds a corporeal echo. But resonance invites dissonance. A resonating body in one location—like glasses on a table—begins to make another body shake and suddenly the whole floor is covered with broken glass. Music resounds and calls us to dissent from the world, to experience a dissensus communis, a sociability at odds with common sense. Through the fakery and because of it, we feel a truth that leads us beyond ourselves, toward the imagination of some other way of being. (Critchley, pp. 40–41)

Herzog, in a documentary about the production of Fitzcarraldo called Burden of Dreams, says:

There is no harmony in the universe. We have to get acquainted to this idea that there is no real harmony as we have conceived it. But when I say this I say this full of admiration for the jungle. It is not that I hate it. I love it, I love it very much. But I love it against my better judgement" (Burden of Dreams, Les Blank)

Or could we say against his common sense?

The Stoic way of living in harmony with nature is to join the vibration of series in the chaosmos and betray the rule of nature, because nature is not in agreement or accordance with itself. Aguirre, when he kills a traitor, says “I am the great traitor. There can be no greater” (Aguirre, Wrath of God). Betrayal is the new rule of nature, if power governs. Convincing is a lie, power is the truth beneath it. Accordance between forces is nothing but the internal conflict of nature, or natural dissensus. This is the meaning of Aguirre’s essential disobedience. He lives as he rebels until death. To be heathen is to experience the wrath of God, while to believe is to experience his mercy.

This is how reality constructs itself, and Herzog, in his way of filmmaking, tries to be part of this immanent construction, someone like a Stoic sage. Reality constructs itself violently, in
the resonance and vibration of its parts. Immanent creation is necessarily violent. And Herzog’s cinema is violent, as nature in his movies is violent. It’s not in harmony with us, and we love it. There’s no depth or height in nature, no reason for this love of nature. This love is the Nietzschean *Amor Fati*, which is willing the event as well as love of fate.
References


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