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Introduction

The heterogeneous academic background of the contributors to this volume not only celebrates the spirit of inclusion and diversity that guides The International Academic Forum (IAFOR), as reflected in this journal, but also reveals how stimulatingly comprehensive and innovative the journal’s scope has become. As will come into view when perusing its index, this issue is nurtured by ideas that originate not only from within the arts and humanities, but also from without the confines of its conventional spaces. The wide-ranging scholarly scope and diverse analytical methodology results in a thoroughly synthetic compendium that reflects a new, panoptic conception of the humanities’ role in contemporary culture.

Our initial contribution is Mark Lukasiewicz’s Keynote Address, delivered in November 2018 at The IAFOR Conference on Heritage & the City – New York (HCNY), Hofstra University. Therein he affirms that increased participation and voter enthusiasm, in and of itself, would be considered by most committed lovers of democracy as a “good” – as a positive development, reflective of positive trends in our society. But he adds that we cannot celebrate increased participation in our democracy in isolation. He goes on to consider other trends in this election – including the rapid spread of demonstrably false information, the adoption of previously extremist views and so-called “conspiracy theories” by mainstream participants in the process, and the frightening increase in nationalist, misogynistic, racist, and even overtly violent rhetoric.

In “The Framework of Subjectivity as Object of Consciousness in the Question of Personal Duties and Rights”, Do Kien Trung and Bui Van Mua focus on the binary formed by the exclusionary terms “nature” (the external world) and “subjectivity” (the internal world of the thinking being), and ask why this has been the only available tool to describe the one reality that conflates both concepts, that of the self. Is it the codicillary nature of language that has frustrated our efforts in this regard? Their article focuses on the long and arduous struggle with this complex issue and with the effort to align its multifaceted components in order to attempt a pragmatic interpretation of the self and its existence.

Ikram Hili writes on an eminent figure of the New York School, Frank O’Hara, who devoted his creative energy to a vibrant and vivid rendering of a disordered yet compelling city: New York. Hili analyses how New York’s frantic atmosphere speaks to O’Hara’s imagination, fuels his aesthetic verve and, in a synergetic manner, feeds on it, gleaning order/meaning from the poet’s words. He argues that, in this respect, O’Hara’s poetry can be construed as a rejection of an established literary order, embodied in the rigorous dictates of New Criticism, but most importantly, as an outburst of meaningful disorder that finds strong resonance in life within NYC. Such disorder liberates the poet from feelings of vacuity and loss amplified especially by post-war anxiety.

JungHui Lee and Tomoko Tanaka focus their study on the switching behaviour exhibited by Zainichi Koreans (ethnic Koreans living in Japan who have effectively managed to maintain their Korean nationality and have been granted the status of tokubetsu ejusha [“special” permanent residents] by the Japanese government). They analyse how these individuals alter their behaviour according to the different cultural contexts in which they find themselves, and aim to identify the mechanism underlying the links between perceived discrimination, internal conflict, and switching behaviour.

In his article, Paul Rastall identifies and explores the nature of a number of “explanatory gaps”
between our conception of physical reality and our cultural understanding, in particular our understanding of language and experience of reality. He further provides some suggestions to address those gaps.

Anders Greenspan argues that while Ernest Hemingway is often viewed as one of the United States’ greatest writers, the heterogeneous features of his life experience can surprise readers who are simply familiar with his literary production. Although he officially served as a correspondent in World War II, Hemingway wrote only five articles during his time in Europe in 1944 and 1945. Much of his time away from writing was spent participating in irregular warfare. The author analyses that time in Hemingway’s life and acquaints the reader with its particulars.

Edilberto C. Cruz gives us an intertextual study of Haruki Murakami’s *Norwegian Wood*; his analysis aims to substantiate a number of important analogies between the novel’s theme, plot, setting and characters and those of *The Catcher in the Rye*, *The Great Gatsby* and *The Magic Mountain*. The study also illustrates how intertextuality is achieved through adaptation, translation and dialogue, all the while exposing undertones of literary theories such as postmodernism, existentialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism that foster creative interaction between reader and narrative.

In “Reintroducing Aliguyon Using Vogler’s Adaptation of the Monomyth Through Game Development”, Trisha Marie Cajita, Dana Isabelle Campos, Gabrielle Villapando, Lorenzo Gutierrez, and Jeyson Taeza explain their intention to regenerate the enthusiasm for Philippine folk epics by developing a video game based on an Ifugao epic called *Hudhud hi Aliguyon*. They describe how the work will follow the process called the *modified waterfall model*. Furthermore, in order to create a structured narrative, the epic is analysed and tabulated according to Vogler’s adaptation of the monomyth; this is done in order to more accurately determine the appropriate composition of Aliguyon, the main character.

Finally, Reymond Njingti Budi, in “Colonial Administrative Integration of African Territories: Identity and Resistance in Nigeria’s Southern Cameroons, 1922–1961”, argues that British administrative policy in Africa, and particularly in Cameroon, was generally misguided. *Encyclopedia Britannica* lends support to this perspective, declaring that “British rule was a period of neglect, and this, coupled with the influx of numerous Nigerians, caused great resentment. […] At independence, French Cameroun had a much higher gross national product per capita, higher education levels, better health care, and better infrastructure than British Cameroons”. The main focus of Budi’s analysis centres around the claim that this state of affairs is likely the result of the decision to administer the British portion of Cameroon as a constituent part of Britain’s Nigerian colony.

My own “Editor’s Essay” rounds out the contents of the present issue. It is hoped that the reader will find pathways to new insights into the cultural, philosophical, social and political issues of our time.

Alfonso J. García-Osuna
Editor
Alternative Facts: The Shifting Realities of Community, Media and Public Opinion
Keynote, The IAFOR Conference on Heritage & the City – New York (HCNY),
Hofstra University, November 2018

Mark Lukasiewicz, Hofstra University, USA

It’s my great honor to talk to you this afternoon, and to join my colleagues in welcoming the International Academic Forum to Hofstra University. We are very proud of Dr Rodney Hill’s participation in your organization, and I am truly delighted to see you all here on our beautiful campus.

I am speaking to you just a few hours after we learned the results of a truly momentous election, an election in which early voting took place at record levels, and the overall voter turnout appears to have also set records for a midterm election. In my own school, the Lawrence Herbert School of Communication, 200 students of radio, television, journalism and other disciplines came together to produce four hours of live television, radio and internet coverage of the election, ending just after midnight this morning – reflecting their generation’s deep interest in their own futures.

Increased participation and voter enthusiasm, in and of itself, would be considered by most committed lovers of democracy as a “good” – as a positive development, reflective of positive trends in our society. But we cannot celebrate increased participation in our democracy in isolation. We must also consider other trends in this election – including the rapid spread of demonstrably false information, the adoption of previously extremist views and so-called “conspiracy theories” by mainstream participants in the process, and the frightening increase in nationalist, misogynistic, racist, and even overtly violent rhetoric.

It is in that context that I want to speak to you about media and communication, and the delivery of facts, opinion, and “alternative facts,” into the bloodstream of American and global politics. And I would like to encourage you to think of these questions within the context of your broader theme – “Heritage and the City.”

It is a truism that “the city” – metaphorical and physical – is intrinsically tied to democracy. It was Athens, after all, arguably the most notable city of ancient times, that gave birth to the concepts and ideas that we most associate with democracy. And “city” and “community” have always been part of the same idea; the notion of shared physical and social space, the elevation of the common good through shared values and resources.

For a long time, various forms of communication and media have also grown to become an indispensable part of the social fabric of cities and communities. But now, it could be argued that media and communication have become a net negative to community and democracy – that the very freedom of communication that underpinned the emergence of so many societies into democracy, may now prove the undoing of democratic societies around the world. The key change, in my view, the monumental shift that we are only just beginning to understand and confront, is the wholesale movement of “community” from the brick and mortar world, to the digital world.

I am sure all of you have heard of “Craigslist.” This game-changing website burst into
existence in 1996 as an online marketplace for goods and services. A decade ago, founder Craig Newmark described it as “an online community of shared information, services, activities and ideas.” Even in 2006 it had more than five billion – that’s billion with a “B” – page-views each month. Mr. Newmark said the community had developed a culture of trust. Notably, one of the most dramatic innovations of Craigslist was a robust “personals” section – the first massively adopted online dating and matchmaking forum.

Ask almost any print journalist working in the early 2000’s about Craigslist, and they will undoubtedly point to the role Craigslist had in decimating a prime revenue source for most newspapers: classified advertisements. It’s fair to point out that if Craigslist had not been first to this task, some other web entrepreneur would undoubtedly have filled the gap. Classified ads were doomed one way or the other. But Craig Newmark’s invention undoubtedly hastened the trend – and dozens of newspapers shuttered their newsrooms as a result.

But even in those early days of Craigslist, Craig Newmark became something of a canary in the coal mine, as he began speaking and writing about how fragile the “culture of trust at Craigslist” could be in the online community he had created.

This was Craig, writing in Nieman Reports. “Beginning in early 2004, we noticed a surge of web-based efforts in our online forums to smear political candidates ... what was most disturbing is that the folks doing this would ‘spamvertise’ political talking points, even ones known to be fraudulent. Those who posted these notices would occasionally pretend to be different people, and post the erroneous information again. In this way, this decentralized network of posters would keep information in circulation ... What’s troubled me is that disinformation campaigns and information warfare appear to be amplified by the Internet. When the scent of bad information can taint a relationship built on trust, this poses problems for the Web.”

And the disintegration of trust – in our leaders, in our institutions, in the press and media – is a key feature of what is happening today. What Craig Newmark observed as a disturbing aspect of the Internet, has become perhaps its defining characteristic. Remember, his words of caution and concern were spoken the same year Twitter was just launched – and a year before the introduction of the iPhone.

Today, Craig Newmark is an active supporter of independent journalism. The CUNY Graduate School of Journalism is named after Craig and he has been generous, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars, in his support of that school and many other efforts to bolster journalism in this troubled time. Craig is right in pointing out how critical shared “trust” is to successful communities and cities. And as I mentioned a few moments ago, the disintegration of trust, in many directions, is probably the most disturbing trend we are witnessing today.

As an almost 40-year veteran of mass media, I’ve had the privilege of working with many talented journalists, and I have had the awesome responsibility of guiding programming – sometimes for hours or days at a stretch – that reached tens of millions of viewers worldwide. For most of my career, the major media organizations in the United States shared a common set of values and broadly similar codes of ethics. By and large, we all did our best to abide by the maxim of the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who famously said “You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts.” This shared base of commonly held beliefs and knowledge had, I believe, a profound effect on American society, and injected a positive cohesive force at many times when society could easily have been fractured.
Some might argue that this era was defined by monolithic corporate control of media and journalism, and a certain “group think” that ignored issues and concerns that existed outside the Washington beltway and New York society. But think about it: when the major American networks, as a group, began to cover the Vietnam War in an aggressive, and independent way, America paid attention, and Americans began to demand an end to that conflict.

When American journalists brought their cameras to Alabama and Georgia and Mississippi, to bear witness to the peaceful protests of African Americans – and the violent reactions in those states – they provided the shared basis of facts that allowed John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson to move forcefully to begin righting a century of wrongs. When President Kennedy was shot to death in Dallas, the entire American community mourned together – on television. Another set of shared experiences, shared realities, enabled by shared media.

Let me dig deeper into that time: were there extremists who celebrated the death of Kennedy, or the murder of civil rights workers in the south? Of course there were. But without the modern tools of social media, these fringe players in our cities and societies had to rely on risky strategies to connect with each other. They could not be anonymous – they had to meet in person or speak one-on-one in telephone conversations to share their extremism and build their hate.

In immunology, there is a concept called “herd immunity.” In a nutshell, the theory is that when an animal herd – or in my metaphor, a city or society – when that “herd” is immunized to the degree of 70 or 80 percent, the prevalence of the herd’s immunity causes the potential for infection even among the non-immunized 20 or 30 per cent to decrease. The shared immunity of the many protects and affects the non-immunized few. When it comes to extremism, I would argue that the shared reality and shared facts of mass media in the latter half of the 20th century provided us with a significant degree of that “herd immunity” in opinion and information. As that shared experience grew stronger – with the growth of television as a dominant medium – the Ku Klux Klan crumbled; social equality improved; popular concern for the environment turned into political action; an unpopular war was brought to an end; and in a variety of ways our cities and communities made progress on issues and challenges that had bedeviled them for generations.

But in the past decade, the explosion of interaction on the Internet, and particularly social media, has turned the tables on that construct. Those “non-immunized” 20 or 30 percenters are now able to connect electronically. Entirely new communities have formed, nationally and globally, aligned to shared beliefs and ideologies that could never have gained a foothold in prior times.

A young journalist named Ryan Broderick graduated from our Communication School seven years ago; today, he is deputy global news director of Buzzfeed, based in London. For the past month, he covered the final weeks of the presidential campaign in Brazil, where as you know, another long-ruling party has fallen to an extremist, nationalist candidate. Ryan has spent much of his brief career exploring the rapidly changing nature of the Internet and the interactions that increasingly characterize it. In the wake of Brazil’s election, he wrote this: “I’ve been to 22 countries, six continents, and been on the ground for close to a dozen referendums and elections. I was in London for the UK’s nervous breakdown over Brexit, in Barcelona for Catalonia’s failed attempts at a secession from Spain, in Sweden as neo-Nazis tried to march on the country’s largest book fair. And now, I’m in Brazil. But this era of being surprised at what the Internet can and will do to us is ending. The damage is done. I’m
trying to come to terms with the fact that I’ll probably spend the rest of my career covering the consequences.”

Ryan Broderick is as attuned as anyone to the extremists experiencing rebirth in the dark corners of the web, on Reddit or 4Chan or Twitter. But increasingly he is focusing his attention not on them – but on the companies that enable them. Quoting Ryan again: “This new darkness lives almost exclusively on our smartphones and almost always involves exploiting an American company’s platform. Roughly 70% of smartphone users have an Android phone; the remaining 30% are on Apple. There are 2 billion monthly active Facebook users, 2 billion monthly active YouTube users, and 1.5 billion monthly active WhatsApp users. The way the world is using their phones is almost completely dominated by a few Silicon Valley companies. The abuse that is happening is due to their inability to manage that responsibility.”

I do not mean to suggest that I am here to argue that we should aim to “make mass media great again,” or to cast ourselves back into a pre-internet age. But I agree with Ryan Broderick that the damage being done to our societies by this new dynamic is undeniable. The manifest inability – some would say unwillingness – of the major players in social media to confront these issues is a real problem. The insistence of Mark Zuckerberg and his peers that they are merely technologists, offering a platform to the world for its use, belies they enormous responsibility they bear for where we are today.

Our physical communities made progress in the 20th century in controlling extremism, promoting civility and enforcing civil rights. Now much of that progress is at risk of being undone by a wild west of social media platforms, where extremism is celebrated and rewarded, “going viral” is the highest achievement, and facts – well, facts just don’t matter. What good does it do for each of us to shun and isolate extremists in our midst, if those same people can find each other – support each other, and egg each other on – by connecting online?

I was one of the millions of Americans who were shocked and terrified by the images of fascist, white nationalist marchers parading through a university campus in Charlottesville, Virginia last year. They gathered by their hundreds. Ask yourselves: is there any way this gathering of racists from across the country could EVER have been organized without social media?

Just a few days ago, a middle-aged white man burst into a yoga studio in Florida, shooting two women dead and wounding five more. His motivation? He was a rabid misogynist and a self-identified “in-cel” – or “involuntary celibate.” This is an entirely new community of frustrated, angry, woman-hating men who have connected online, built each other up, and moved each other to violence. The Florida shooter, it turns out, posted multiple violent, sexist and threatening messages and videos on Twitter and YouTube. Helpfully, those platforms closed his accounts only after he had committed murder.

Recently, another wild and thoroughly debunked story has rocketed through social media. Namely, the unfounded accusation that billionaire Jewish philanthropist and activist George Soros had funded and initiated the immigrant caravan making its way to the US border. USA TODAY painstakingly traced that particular lie, from its origins with an anti-semitic writer in North Carolina with 6,000 followers on Twitter just a few days after the caravan first left Honduras, when she posted about the caravan and simply added the word “Soros.” On the
same day, identical posts spread to six pro-Trump Facebook groups within 20 minutes. Within three days, the combined following of accounts mentioning both Soros and the caravan had expanded to 2 million people. Within four days, the Soros non-connection broke into the mainstream; a member of Congress posted a video to Twitter raising the question of a Soros connection to the caravan. Another day passed, and another influential voice joined the bandwagon: Donald Trump Jr. And within a few days yes, the President himself was tweeting about Soros funding the caravan. And Ann Coulter. And numerous other so-called conservative “influencers.” In short order, reports USA Today, the single posting from an anti-Semitic account had metastasized into a disinformational cancer, posted by 43-thousand accounts with a combined 125-million followers. Within just two weeks, the combined reach of this wholly manufactured lie was 98-million on Facebook and 274-million on Twitter. It was not much longer before police intercepted the first of many pipe bombs sent to George Soros and other prominent critics of Donald Trump.

There is another way in which the shared experience of community has been undermined in the last decade, and that is the radicalization and tribalism of news media. The major broadcast networks in the United States continue to hue, for the most part, to the ethics and ideals of the latter 20th century. Watch ABC News, NBC News or CBS News and you will generally see similar coverage, similar story choices, and a broad consensus on the facts. The same can be said of our shrinking collection of major newspapers. But the broadcast networks are no longer where the action is in digital and video journalism. The cable news networks are the new “influencers” and in that realm the reality has radically changed. Viewers of Fox News experience an entirely different world than viewers of MSNBC. There is either (A) a dangerous caravan infiltrated by terrorists and convicted murderers and drug dealers about to attack the southern border or (B) there is a shrinking and bedraggled group of oppressed asylum seekers, mainly women and children, struggling to move north but still hundreds of miles from the US border. There is either (A) a dramatic improvement in the lives of working Americans thanks to the Trump administration’s tax cut or (B) a dramatic improvement in the lives of the wealthiest Americans, at the expense of working men and women.

Just a few days ago, two of the most prominent anchors of one of those networks saw nothing inappropriate in appearing on stage at a rally staged by President Trump and speaking enthusiastically on his behalf. One of them even pointed at his colleagues on the press riser, journalists from his own newsroom, and called them FAKE NEWS as the crowd jeered.

This world of two realities is becoming a defining characteristic of our politics, and sadly, our civic life ... and last night’s election results bore that out, as democrats grew their strength in suburban and urban areas, while republicans grew in rural areas. Each of our political tribes circled its wagons. Were we to transplant Rome to modern times, there would be not one Roman forum, but two competing forums.

As you all undoubtedly heard, the reality of this new media order was confirmed by Kelly Ann Conway, one of Donald Trump’s closest advisors, in an infamous television interview early in the Trump Administration. Confronted with facts by my former colleague Chuck Todd, she declared “You have your facts, and we have ... alternative facts.” What has made all of these trends, and all of these phenomena, so disturbing, is that they are now beginning to visibly and rapidly erode the norms that have underpinned our civic life for decades. My former colleagues in the news media are still trying to figure out how to respond to what is happening, and how to stem the rapid decline in trust they are experiencing from the public.
But there is no question that the traditional tools simply do not work.

Confronted with a President, and his acolytes, who lie frequently, strategically, and shamelessly, journalists have been aggressive in their fact-checking and declarative exposure of falsehoods and exaggerations. But Brad Heath, an investigative journalist who has had a hand in fact-checking and debunking lies told by President Trump, has identified the problem with his own work: “One of the ways lies ... spread – a way fantasy mutates into fact – or at least a subject of debate – is when the Press reports that they’re false.” If a student burst through our door right now and declared that the world was flat, we would all – rightly – ignore him. But if Donald Trump declares the world to be flat – it is dutifully reported and debunked. But it’s becoming clear that debunking from a thoroughly discredited press is not effective. It is even counter-effective – spreading a lie rather than suppressing it.

Ezra Klein, a veteran political journalist and editor-at-large at VOX, puts it bluntly and alarmingly. “I’m a political journalist,” he says. “I believe in my profession. But right now, I’m worried we’re failing. I’m worried we’re making American politics worse, not better. We’re getting played by outrage merchants and con artists and trolls and polarizers who understand this world better. We’re being used to fracture American democracy, and I don’t think we know how to stop it."

Ezra’s assessment is not only sobering – it’s chilling.

I do not come before you with answers to these challenges. But as you contemplate Heritage and the City, I hope you will reflect on the profound role of cities as harbors of freedom and justice, of creativity and progress. I hope we will – with time and perhaps with the help of some of the students we are teaching today – find ways to address these disturbing trends and reconnect with the civic virtues and democratic ideals that have been our strength for many generations.

Thank you.

1 Mark Lukasiewicz is Dean of the Lawrence Herbert School of Communication at Hofstra University. He is a veteran producer, journalist, and media executive who has spent his professional career telling important stories to worldwide audiences and helping media organizations deal with transformational change.

Most recently, he was senior vice president of specials at NBC News, planning and supervising coverage of major breaking news events such as the death of Osama bin Laden, the visit of Pope Francis to the United States, and presidential elections and debates from 2004 to 2016. Also at NBC, he served as NBC News’ first vice president of digital media, and later as executive-in-charge of the NBC News Group Transformation Project, a multiyear redesign and reimagining of technology, workspace, and workflow across NBC Universal’s news platforms.

Before NBC, Lukasiewicz spent 11 years at ABC News where he was executive producer of Good Morning America, senior producer of World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, and senior producer of Primetime Live with Diane Sawyer and Sam Donaldson. In his decades-long career, he has produced numerous live and long-form programs, winning 10 Emmys, two Peabody Awards, and the Grand Prize of the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Awards, among other journalism and international film festival awards. He has also taught video storytelling at the Columbia Journalism School, and has been a featured speaker at professional conferences in the United States and abroad.

A native of Canada, Lukasiewicz began his career as a reporter and columnist with The Globe and Mail and later as a senior producer with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). He earned a BA in economics (with honors) from the University of Toronto.

Retrieved from the Hofstra University bio:
https://www.hofstra.edu/academics/colleges/soe/soe_deansoffice.html
The Framework of Subjectivity as Object of Consciousness in the Question of Personal Duties and Rights

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Abstract

Philosophy, in general terms, perceives the human being as both the subject and the object of cognitive processes. As subject, acknowledging the existence of subjectivity is a prerequisite for establishing a conceptual framework, a sort of pragmatic guide to the perceived phenomena we conceptualize as “reality”. The requisite first step is the recognition of the human being as an entity with a capacity for perceiving and analyzing external physical phenomena. As the object of this cognitive process, philosophers also acknowledge the existence of an autonomous, separate nature in human beings. A normative system of structures and categories serves to describe the process of perception, rendered as a current that flows from within only to return as a frame of reference for the internal morphology of the self. So, from a critical standpoint, only subjectivity can provide diagnostic potential to the theoretical framework that allows us to describe reality. Consequently, the quest to answer the question of human nature and its station within reality can only be embarked upon subjectively. The ensuing inquiry, then, needs to revolve around whether the self has an inherent, autonomous nature, independent of its material environment. Can such a thing as an autonomous self even exist? Such a discussion marshals the issue inevitably towards a debate on praxis: has the binary formed by the exclusionary terms “nature” (the external world) and “subjectivity” (the internal world of the thinking being) been the only available tool to describe the one reality that conflates both concepts, that of the self? Has the codicillary nature of language frustrated our efforts in this regard? The long and arduous struggle with this complex issue bespeaks the effort to align its multifaceted components in order to attempt a pragmatic interpretation of the self and its existence. This article will focus on that effort.

Keywords: the self, self-consciousness, Richard Rorty, duty, rights, language
Creating the “Self” by Creating in Language

Wise men in Ancient Greece inaugurated philosophical thought with questions about the universe, the absolute cause of reality and the nature of the human being. Rhetorical questions such as, “who am I; where did I come from; what is the cause of the universe?” represented the first steps taken by humankind to overcome the mysteries and inadequacies of myth and generate the analytical tools required to speak of these subjects in a standardized and rational manner. Moreover, they were also attempting to establish the criteria for assembling a theoretical context for “the self,” one in which human beings, as “the knowing subject” (Rorty, 1979, p. 9), created meaning from the vantage point of their subjective acumen. Evident from the start was the fact that the world is not what it is as a result of human beings’ representations of it, that is to say, it was intuited that reality existed independently of our capacity to perceive and represent it.

Religions, philosophies and the natural sciences have endeavored to grasp the fundamental nature of the world, including human nature, by constantly fashioning apposite language systems. After every significant revolution in philosophy or science, revolutions that provide us with newfangled vocabularies, we are inclined to suppose that mankind is taking another step toward unveiling the fundamental nature of reality. This is because people generally suppose that the nature of the world/reality already exists in many layers and that our mission (in the thinking process) is to “get through” those layers step by step by using an increasing number of explanations and descriptions that will allow us to reach that “true” nature. However, I’d postulate here that, because we use language as our indispensable tool for these endeavors, we only expand our understanding of the different, various, and contingent appearances of reality (that is, of the way it appears to the human subject), an effort that does not allow us to “reach its true nature” because reality – the world – has no “nature”. That word is a simple presupposition from our standpoint that injects a semblance of meaning to the world. Science, or the way we try to explain the world/reality “in the broadest possible sense of the term” (Nielsen, 2006, p. 128) is the way we analyze our descriptions of the world/reality. Yet what we often take as a significant discovery regarding an external object is in actuality activated and sustained by something that resides in the structures and organization of our minds; such discoveries might have gained common currency because the strict rules under which the experience of that object is even conceivable exist in our selves a priori. It is the description of our story, the understanding of our language, the discovery of us, “the knowing subject” that is so often performed and described as “science”. As Karl Popper has pointed out: “The history of science, like the history of all human ideas, is a history of irresponsible dreams, of obstinacy, and of error” (n.p.). Subjectivity reigns: In the social arena, this kind of thinking can be rendered as a set of questions about ethical and political issues, such as “what is good?; what is bad?; what are the duties of a citizen? Can these questions even receive a relatively objective answer? If your answer is “yes”, your understanding is based on the Platonic idea that the nature of things already exists and that our mission is just to discover or “reach” it.

Richard Rorty disagreed with the Platonic perspective. For him, the world does not have any “meaning.” The world exists for itself and by itself only. Before and after human existence, the world was and will remain as it is. Thus, when we talk about the “truth” or “nature of the world,” we are diving into a debate that revolves around language systems and the subjective views of human beings. Popper insists:
Truth cannot be out there – cannot exist independently of the human mind – because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but the descriptions of the world are not. Only the descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own – unaided by the describing activities of human beings – cannot. (n.p.)

We explain the world via our language systems and create its meaning through our worldviews. Cognition of objects such as a rock by a river presupposes a subjective set of values that depend on systems of human awareness and the conditions under which one experiences the rock, as Kant (Prolegomena, para. 17) would have it. This rock by the river does not have any meaning or any ultimate cause: it is just a rock on the riverbank, a small part of the world with its variety and contingency. We, the “knowing subject,” look at that rock and ask questions about its presence, such as, “where does it come from; what does it look like; and for what tasks can we employ it?” A romantic writer may compose a poem about how this rock’s sadness is a relevant metaphor for his or her lonely life. In this sense, we do not discover the “nature” of the world/reality, but rather “create” our “self” via the way in which we explain reality. At times our perception of reality is altered, as in the case where the moon is low on the horizon and we see it as being farther from us than when it is high in the sky. The “reality” is that it is the same size, but for some as yet unspecified reason our minds “bend” reality in order to satisfy some subjective need to alter its dimension.

The way we make meaning of the world is one of the three elements that are referred to here as the practical elements that create “the self”; the other two are the physical and the cognitive elements.

The denotation of the concept “the self” is more definitive than the concept “human”. We can understand a human as “a member of the primate genus Homo, especially a member of the species Homo sapiens, distinguished from other apes by a large brain and the capacity for speech.” (The Free Dictionary by Farlex, n.d.)

The self is not as vague as all that. It refers to a specific person who was born and grew up in a particular social context and identifies his/her characteristics within concrete parameters that are inherent to particular circumstances. Therefore, “the self” is the product of the individual’s interfaces with reality and its complex social relations. In this sense, “the self” is not a purely free and unconcerned object. The development, contours and manifestations of “the self” come from reality and are affected by the specific reality in which it is formed. “The self” understands reality via its language and its particular vocabulary. This particular language and its symbolic meaning-conveying structures do not belong to reality in itself. It is one of the various modes used by the “knowing subject” to describe reality and represent existence. Therefore, human language presupposes the intrusion of subjectivity and personality into the description; it also depends on the historical circumstances within which that particular language was formed. For instance, it would not be possible to explain accurately the United States’ presidential election, with its vocabulary of words such as “democratic”, “freedom”, “Constitution”, “the tyranny of the majority”, “electoral college”, “senators”, and so on. to a person who lived in the Middle Ages. The difference in the way of thinking and the manner of forming judgment is the result of the dissimilarity in language systems formed in very different historical and social circumstances.
The Question of the “I” as the Object of Self-Consciousness

The question of human nature has been one of the paramount critical issues in philosophy from ancient to modern and postmodern times. Different philosophical responses do not entirely answer that question, but rather suggest new interpretations and a return to that same question from different critical perspectives. Beyond that fundamental question lies a series of ancillary questions, such as: What is human nature? How can we understand it? and even the more radical inquiry: Is there something called nature?

Questions sometimes contain answers. When we ask, “Who am I?” or “What is human nature?” we have to assume that there is an “I” or a “human nature” that actually exists. It is the same conundrum pointed out by Parmenides, who declares that once we ask the question “What is nothingness?” we have already assumed its existence, we have reached a consensus that something called “nothingness” exists, and we are actively involved in the search for it. Consequently, as a result of our query, the foremost property of “nothingness” is no longer “nothingness”. So this begs the question: does the “I” exist before I enquire about its nature? This question of the “I” is not about the “I” as subject. The “I” becomes an object about which “I” am asking a question. Thus, there is an obvious critical line drawn between a speciously pre-existing “I” (object) and the “I” (subject) who raises the question about it. So, derived from this fundamental understanding, terms such as “self”, “subject” and “consciousness” are constructed to rationally explain the existence, intuitively obvious, of the “I.”

Heidegger, who has considerable influence on Rorty, avoids using these words because he considers that they misrepresent phenomenal reality; they imply that we are always aware of ourselves, that we ourselves are an object of reality, and that we are fully aware of objects. Along with them, the words “soul” or “spirit” are just one more aspect or stage of a human being. Moreover, as soon as the human being was defined as a rational animal (ζῷον λόγοϛ ἔχων – zoon logon echon) in the construal of ancient Greek philosophers, “reason” and “rationality” were attributed to humans as intrinsic characteristics that distinguish us from other objects. So it follows that the discovery of absolute reason is the way to uncover human nature and identity. Nietzsche and Heidegger further argue that reason may be purely theoretical and that human behavior and its associated cognitive strategies are governed and significantly conditioned by non-reasoning dynamics. So it follows that human nature depends on a “relationship with being” and not solely or even primarily on reason.

The answer to the questions “what is human?” and “what is human nature?” begins with an initial recognition of the existence of human nature. That recognition inevitably leads to different trends in the interpretation of human nature. Human nature, according to recognized critical tendencies, is the reflection of the fixed, immutable existence in humans, one that admits that there is also an insensate external reality that is independent of human subjective consciousness. The nature of reality is traceable by trailing the physiognomy of human nature, given that human nature is a small universe that replicates and reflects the universe (as a whole). Modern philosophers (or as Rorty calls them, the “Platonic-Kantian philosophers”’) have pushed the human “self” outside the scope of its individualized existence toward the realm of the object. Overcoming the limited scope of the individual in order to properly identify the nature of reality is a process whereby an individual must liberate its “self” in order to redeem the self that exists as “the true self”, that is to say, a self that belongs to reality and is not a distinct, separate entity. This process will be finished when that “self” returns to itself and defines itself as the authentic image of a broader reality.
In that process, reason acts as a starting point and referential frame for determining whether the search for the nature of reality is right or wrong and whether the proposed answer to the question of human nature is convincing or not.

Similarly, when we ask the question “Who am I?”, the first step is to admit that there is such a thing as an “I” that antedates my query, so it follows that we can ask questions about it. However, the “I” cannot adequately answer the question of its existence without tackling the tricky question of what caused it: “Why is there an ‘I’ in the first place?” That inevitably leads to the second question: “Where does the ‘I’ come from?” So, if we replace the word “I” with the words “human nature,” we must admit that the interpretation of the nature of reality is the quest for the answer to the first question.

In other words, we can understand the “I” as “a thing” that does not exist outside of our justifications for the “I”. When we say the “I” as an available presupposition, it is thought to be available “before” our justifications for the “I.” However, the “I” is completely meaningless outside of its narratives. The “I” is both independent of and dependent on subjective explanations. So, it would be more convincing if we focused on the notions of “self” instead of “I.” The “self” is understood as the place of concentration of will, emotion, and self-evaluation. The “I-self” is the self-concept of the knowing subject.

However, the “I-self” does not stand independently if it lacks a sense of self-concept. This sense comes from two sources: first, the “I-self” perceives its value system through a “mirror image” of itself. Moreover, the “Me-self” is a copy of the “I-self” on the object; the “I-self” separates itself and observes, evaluates itself as an object outside itself.

The process of the “I-self” separating itself in order to understand the self-concept concerning the “Me-self” will form “subjectivity.” “Subjectivity” can be felt like a relatively independent object. It is the sum of the perceptions, evaluations, and characteristics of the “I-self” and its relationship with others. In a conversation, understood as a space for expression, subjectivity is defined as the set of behavioral patterns, interactions that are influenced by personal emotions, attitudes, and perceptions.

“Subjectivity” can be interpreted through characteristics:

- of judgment, based primarily on emotional impressions and personal views rather than external reality.
- of one’s perceptions, views, feelings, beliefs, and desires. It is often used to denote personal views, as opposed to knowledge and beliefs based on reality.
- of events that happen in the mind and are governed by personal prejudices.
- that belong to the knowing subject concerning the object.
- that come into existence and exist in the mind of the knowing subject and are not necessarily compatible with any object outside of the mind.

To determine human nature and the nature of reality is to answer the question of the knowing subject as well as to answer questions about the object with which the subject is interacting. Of course, if the answer to the questions “Who am I?” and “What is my essence?” is not forthcoming, the cognitive subject will not be able to advance to the next step, which is to explain the object (of reality) because it is not possible to answer the question of the object when we cannot determine the answer to the more fundamental question of who we are. When we interpret an object of reality, we assume that the object exists and that it has a
nature that will be subjected to our interpretation, that is, to the criteria of elucidation that is dependent upon our subjective gaze. If the “I” does not “know who I am,” in the process of perceiving the object, there can be no coherent explanation for the object. The central assessment centers around the question “what does the object’s existence mean to the self?” Heidegger is very interested in this fundamental question:

Does the table that I think I see before me exist? Does God exist? Does mind, conceived as an entity distinct from body, exist? These questions have the following form: does $x$ (where $x$ = some particular kind of thing) exist? Questions of this form presuppose that we already know what “to exist” means. We typically don’t even notice this presupposition. But Heidegger does, which is why he raises the more fundamental question: what does “to exist” mean? This is one way of asking what Heidegger calls the question of the meaning of Being. (Wheeler, 2018)

However, this leads to the another question, which in substance is a revised version of the initial question: If we recognize that there are two such things as human nature and a nature of reality, then the question is: are they invariable, fixed for us to find, or are they unpredictable and contingent?

This framework leads to the next conflict, based on the question of the self and human nature. It may be illustrated thus: if we affirm the contingency and variability of the self, it means that we indirectly admit that “there is a possible existence of contingency and variability as a characteristic of the identity of the self”, and the identification and interpretation of that contingency will also be the process whereby we affirm that “there is an identity that already existed in each object.” Therefore, whether affirming or negating the existence of an existing identity, the process of argument would lead us back to the starting point. So, are we making ourselves difficult?

Let’s get back to the way Wittgenstein commented on the language game because the way we pose the question on the self is merely a language game, a game only meaningful to human beings. We are accustomed to having differences and distinguishing between different things in the world as well as in thought. On the contrary, with Wittgenstein there are no such rigid relationships. Games are born, played, ended, forgotten, and new games emerge. Their common ground is the materials of life. Rather than reestablishing the order of concepts and events, Wittgenstein sets out another principle: the continuous regeneration of new structures in the world as well as in thought. These structures define neither the world nor thinking in a lasting way but are only valid for every slice of life and every aspect of thought. Here, there is no standard rule that only cases can be specified in specific contexts. The cases that appear in practice show commonality, as, for example, games that have a particular “topic”. There are countless different types of things called “symbols”, “words”, “sentences”, and so on. This manifold is not something fixed, brought back once but a series of typical cases that are classified as “topics”: for example, order/follow orders; describe or measure an object; create an object based on the description; report a happening.

Thus, language game rules have a new look: they guide the game, but only in the game itself, in the “transformation” of reality, and this “transformation” responds to rules, content and cogency. A concept system is formed as a “thinking cage” of the subject to “capture” the objects. The structure and content of this system are the foundations and rules that the subject takes as the fulcrum to initiate the cognitive process. However, once the subject starts to take
this system to “capture” the objects, he/she cuts things out of the flow of time and space and separates them in his/her cognitive range. At this moment, the language game begins in a particular dimension with “he/she” acting as the subject, the things or events as the object, all dependent on a concept system that acts as a cognitive tool and a way to identify the subject itself.

**How Does the Term Subjectivity Answer the Question of Duty and Rights?**

In 1957, the Soviet spy Rudolph Abel was arrested in New York City. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison for violating US security. Attorney James B. Donovan, the defense counsel for Abel, was pressured by public opinion as well as by his colleagues. The polarization and hatred between the capitalist and communist ideologies in the Cold War posed for Donovan a self-question: Who am I?; Who is Abel?, and What is my duty? That is also the question that his colleagues asked him: Why did you help a spy, an enemy of America? Donovan’s answer that day was not only valuable in the context of that dialogue but also useful for philosophical interpretations: “I do not care if he is a spy or not. However, I am a lawyer, and Abel is my client. And with a democratic judiciary, he must be judged fairly”. That is to say, Donovan did not define Abel as an abstract entity. He also did not seek the common, fundamental answer to the question “Who is Abel?” As a cognitive subject, Donovan cut Abel out of the flow of space and time, and “captured” Abel by using his concept system.

Donovan “planned” to define Abel as a subject in his narrative, not in other people’s. Thereby, Donovan defined himself. Abel could be a hero from the perspective of the Soviet government, and the enemy from the perspective of the American public. However, from Donovan’s reference system in that space-time slice, Abel is his client, and Donovan is a lawyer.

The question “Who is Abel?” is similar to the question “What is human nature?” The answer cannot come only once and be similar in all cases. The content and meaning of the question depend on the person who poses the question.

However, this interpretation is the beginning of a series of other questions. If Donovan planned Abel as a client to whom he was responsible under a fair and unbiased justice system, what was the foundation (in other words, starting point) for Donovan to build a “thinking cage” (a concept system) to “capture” the object “Abel”? What is the “bridge” between Donovan’s and Abel’s value system? How do these two values find correspondences? And if Donovan expects Abel to be treated fairly, then the objective that Donovan is pursuing is the outcome of an impartial trial grounded upon the foundations of a just society built on a transparent judiciary… or is it Donovan’s personal need to pursue his own values?

Patricia Rohrer analyzes Richard Rorty’s ideas on the purpose of individual action and community action in “Contingency, Irony, Solidarity”. Rohrer praises Rorty for extending the purpose of human behavior not only to the satisfaction of material interests. She also agrees with Rorty that the confrontation between the goal of the community (towards justice) and the purpose of the self-creation (towards personal happiness) will be resolved in a common value system of meaning and human dignity.

Self-creation is based on two essential prerequisites: first, the individual must be aware that there is no solid, unchanged foundation upon which to build a correct reference; second, the individual must be free to choose his or her identity without fear of harm from the
community’s value system. That is, individuals are free to construct a value network to pursue their own meaning based on the contingency of events experienced by the individual as well as by personal experiences that can only be felt personally.

Rohrer, however, argues that the value of an individual would be meaningless if there were no moral connection with those external systems of reference.

[...]

Based on Charles Taylor’s view of the identity of the self, Rohrer points out the contradiction in Rorty’s interpretation of the relationship between individual and community values. In the face of many different choices, the individual is free to select the tendency of action and justification that is appropriate for the purpose he/she is pursuing, so long as it is not detrimental to others. That is, whether he or she wants to or not, that individual must release him/herself from the realm of self-value that interferes with the value of others in order to create a dialogue.

At this moment, the “I-self” no longer sees itself in others, but others have “penetrated” into the “I-self.” The “I-self” has corrupted itself concerning others. That is, the individual is no longer free to choose his or her tendency, but that choice depends on how the “I-self” frameworks itself in a wider dimension. Moreover, individuals cannot plan a network of values and meanings for themselves without general premises. These preconditions, the “knowledge platform”, will define the characteristics of the “thinking cage” and the network of values and meanings that individuals are creating.

Returning to the example of the Abel case, at first glance we may assume that Donovan is pursuing his personal values without being affected by the external environment, and that he had planned to target Abel in a specific space-time context so that his defense of Abel acquired a meaningful sense for himself. However, without a social foundation with its structural, systemic, and historical preconditions, Donovan could not implement his cognition and planning process. That is, the immediate presence of a universal value system buttressed by democracy, justice, truth, human rights and human dignity that has been assembled and justified by reason is a mandatory reference for Donovan’s “free choice”. In short, Donovan’s personal values are not immune to the general standard of the community.

From the perspective of the community, the pursuit of personal value comes from the community’s foundations and reflects a universal value system. From the perspective of the individual, this process begins from the “I-self” releasing itself, evaluating and recognizing itself in the image of others, and returns to itself in the form of the “Me-self.”

Conclusion

While most researchers treat individual duties and rights as fully definable concepts to be epitomized, understood, and assessed from a generally \textit{a posteriori} standpoint, they should be
not understood as finalized and invariable notions. Specific contexts and variable relationships can frame contradictory understandings of these philosophical concepts. In a socio-historical system where value systems are diverse and constantly changing, the identification of personal dignity is not only important for forming an individual’s creative activity; it is also beneficial for the development of legal systems in which the harmony between personal and community interests plays a key role in the sustainable development of society. This must come first and foremost from the awareness of the role of individuals in the community and the available workspace of individuals in that community. There is no general formula for the movement of social history; therefore, any assessment of an individual or national strategy policy must be based on a pragmatic and flexible framework.
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“I am Guarding it from Mess and Measure”:
Poetics of Order/Disorder in Frank O’Hara’s “Urban Pastoral”

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Abstract

Postwar America gave rise to multiple literary traditions, often referred to as the era’s counterpoetics in the sense that they veered from the Eliotic dictum of impersonality, in particular, and from the rigid academic verse of New Criticism, in general. Prominent among these groups are the Confessionals, the Beats and poets of the New York School. Their visions of poetry might seem irreconcilable at times; yet, these poets do share their discontent with the era’s containment culture. An eminent figure of the New York School, Frank O’Hara devoted his creative energy to a vibrant and vivid rendering of a disordered yet compelling city such as NYC. Its frantic atmosphere speaks to his imagination, fuels his aesthetic verve and, in a synergetic manner, feeds on it, gleaning order/meaning from the poet’s words. In this respect, O’Hara’s poetry can be construed as a containment of an established literary order, embodied in the rigorous dictates of New Criticism, but most important, as an outburst of meaningful disorder that finds strong resonance in life within NYC. Meaningful it is, for such disorder liberates the poet from feelings of vacuity and loss amplified especially by postwar anxiety, substantiating the poet’s thought that, after all, “people do not totally regret their life,” as O’Hara puts it (O’Hara, 1995, p. 97).

In probing into the synergy between O’Hara’s poetry and his city, this paper aims at examining the way in which the city, in O’Hara’s words again, “flatters meanings of my life I cannot find,” and in so doing, it not only invests the poet’s life with meaning but also galvanizes his quest for meaning itself (O’Hara, 1995, p. 230).

Keywords: postwar America, city, order, disorder, New York school, the “Urban Pastoral”
Counterpoetics in Postwar America

Before probing into O’Hara’s city as presented in his poetry – how the poet inhabits the city and how the city engulfs him poetically – a brief account of the anti-tradition poetics of post-war America is apropos as it will pave the way for the discussion about the emergence of the New York School, and the peculiarity of Frank O’Hara’s poetry, in particular, upon which I shall dwell with more details in a later section.

Postwar America witnessed many changes on different levels – social, economic as well political. Notably, literature was equally affected by those changes, which accounts for the emergence of an anti-tradition poetics cutting with the long established traditions of writing and what was then perceived as “pure” art. The aesthetic detour that the era had witnessed, as it were, felt so drastic at times that experimentation, originality and innovative verse, in poetry, were considered as the new tradition of the era.

If we take a look at the different poetic circles that characterized postwar America, we can distinguish between different modes of writing that many poets espoused at that time period. Postwar American poetry, in this respect, clustered a wide range of sometimes distinct, sometimes overlapping modes of artistic expressions. We find, for instance, traditional poets such as Richard Wilbur and John Crowe Ransom, who followed the principles of New Criticism. We also find so-called idiosyncratic poets, such as Robert Lowell, John Berryman, Sylvia Plath, Anne Sexton, Adrienne Rich, to name a few, who began writing traditionally. Feeling that their early verse was penned in the rigid confines of formalism, these poets made a sharp departure from such formal dictates so much so that their poetry was considered as a counter-discourse to the era’s political rhetoric of containment. Experimental poets, on the other hand, were poets who, as their appellation denotes, experimented with fresher forms and content. Inspired by Jazz and Abstract Expressionism and often regarded as bohemian, they were referred to as counter-culture poets whose poems were sometimes decried as shocking at the time. Prominent among this group are the Beats. Allen Ginsberg’s “Howl” epitomizes this poetics of revolt and shock, or what Robert Lowell (1960) called, in his National Award Speech, “raw” poetry: “Raw, huge blood-dripping gobbets of unseasoned experience [that] are dished up for midnight listeners” (Lowell, 1960). To a large extent, the New York School Poetry aligns itself with the Beats, although with less intensity when it comes to its preoccupation with the era’s political issues and moral flaws.

In his “Urban Pastoral: Natural Currents in the New York School”, Timothy Gray provides an expressive account of how the New Year School Poetry came to be born, as he pithily delineates the things that these poets have in common. Gray (2010) writes:

In the early 1950s, a group of young poets converged on New York City. Blessed with sophistication and wit, they forged close relationships with each other and with the avant-garde artists whom painter Robert Motherwell half-seriously dubbed the “School of New York.” Over time, thanks to their first publisher, gallery director John Bernard Myers, five of these poets (Frank O’Hara, John Ashbery, Barbara Guest, James Schuyler, and Kenneth Koch) came to share the appellation with these artists, even though they resisted being pigeonholed in this way… Regardless of the label used to describe them, members of the New York School found in the city a charged atmosphere conducive to their ambitions, a realm where the discussion, exhibition, and
Frank O’Hara’s poetry is considered as one of the leading figures of the New York School, one whose poetry directly derives from the vibrant, hectic lifestyle characterizing New York City. This literary choice made O’Hara announce his departure from the modern idea of “impersonality” that T. S. Eliot (1982) put forth in his eminent essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” In a sharp move from this Eliotic dictum, O’Hara wrote a short essay entitled “Personism: A Manifesto” in which he defines “personism” as such:

Personism, a movement which I recently founded and which nobody knows about, interests me a great deal, being so totally opposed to this kind of abstract removal that it is verging on a true abstraction for the first time, really, in the history of poetry… Personism has nothing to do with philosophy; it’s all art. It does not have to do with personality or intimacy, far from it! … It puts the poem squarely between the poet and the person … and the poem is correspondingly gratified. (O’Hara, 1995, p. 498)

In a comic yet derisive tone, O’Hara argues for poetry that is spontaneous and colloquial, one that does not heavily rely on stylistic devices. Interestingly, a good deal of O’Hara’s poetry is, indeed, inspired from phone conversations, lunch chats, party gatherings, and so on. As he puts it in his manifesto, “The poem is at last between two persons instead of two pages” (Emphasis added, O’Hara, 1995, p. 498).

Frank O’Hara (1926–1966): A Postmodern “City Poet”

We cannot study Frank O’Hara’s city poems without alluding, albeit briefly, to his modern precursor Walt Whitman (1819–1892), who had also found life in New York City both invigorating and enticing. Reveling in metropolitan life, Whitman had lived in New York for around twenty years, during which time he had written profusely about the pleasantly rowdy nature of the city. In his poetry, he celebrated the city’s tumult and liveliness, finding in the throbbing mass of people inhabiting New York a place for all Americans. Whitman himself insisted that Leaves of Grass “arose out of [his] life in Brooklyn and New York from 1838 to 1853, absorbing a million people, for fifteen years with an intimacy, an eagerness, an abandon, probably never equaled” (as cited in Pannapacker, 2007, p. 199).

Although they lived in two different time periods, it is thanks to those who designed and built the steel railing overlooking the Hudson River, in New York City, that O’Hara and Whitman presently engage in a daily conversation that transcends time and space. Two quotations from these two poets are actually etched on the banks of the Hudson. They run thus: “City of tall facades, of marble and iron-proud and passionate city – mettlesome, mad, extravagant city!” (Whitman, 1995, p. 270), and “One need never leave the confines of New York to get all the greenery one wishes” (O’Hara, 1995, 197).

Reading O’Hara’s poetry, it is therefore tempting to look for Whitmanesque influence, which O’Hara himself acknowledges, for he refers to Whitman as his “great predecessor” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 305). In “Dolce Colloquio,” O’Hara states his debt to Whitman even more bluntly:

1 In his essay, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” T. S. Eliot (1982) writes: “Poetry is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality … an expression of significant emotion, emotion which has its life in the poem and not in the history of the poet” (p. 42).
O Sentiments sitting beside my bed
what are you thinking of?
of an ebony vase?
of a pail of garbage?
of memorizing Whitman? (O’Hara, 1995, p. 150)

Frank O’Hara sets on poeticizing the quotidian in his poetry, making New York City – its flowing energy and idiosyncrasies – the blood that pumps life into his poems. For this reason he has been called “City Poet,” alongside Walt Whitman, despite the two poets’ different styles. Harris Feinsod (2017) refers to O’Hara as an “urban choreographer … whose poems are organized around the chatty observations of a metropolitan flâneur” (p. 249). So much attached to New York City, O’Hara wrote in “A Party Full of Friends”:

Someone’s going
to stay until the cows
come home. Or my name isn’t
Frank O’Hara (O’Hara, 2013, p. 25)

If anything, these lines denote O’Hara’s infatuation with New York City, Manhattan in particular. O’Hara’s city poems delight in the mobility that is reflected in the city. In “Rhapsody,” a poem in which he provides a detailed account of a busy day in NYC, the speaker wonders, in the opening lines: “515 Madison Avenue/ door to heaven?” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 326). To O’Hara, it could be so, for the city is often presented as a placebo to his restless soul.

Since we are talking about O’Hara’s strong attachment to the city, the poet’s poetic heart, as it were, is always a good place to start with in order to gain a good grasp of the poetics of order and disorder, distinctly revealed in his so-called “urban pastoral.” The last lines of his poem “My Heart” encapsulate the gist of O’Hara’s poetics, as he says:

I want my feet to be bare,
I want my face to be shaven, and my heart –
You can’t plan on the heart, but
The better part of it, my poetry, is open. (O’Hara, 1995, p. 231)

O’Hara’s poetry, therefore, refuses to be restrained by rhyme, meter, or by the rigid principles of formalism. His verse is rather open to the possibilities lying ahead, as well as to new – if not unpredictable – circumstances. The coincidence that he often depicts in his poems reflects the kind of disorder in which he takes delight, as well as the untidiness that he fully embraces. It should be noted, however, that it is a meaningful disorder, not the mess against which he is carefully “guarding” his poetry.²

Frank O’Hara composed a considerable number of his poems during lunch hours, as he walked out from the museum where he worked as a curator, jotting down what he saw, what he heard, what he felt, and so on. In his introduction to his collection Lunch Poems, he wrote:

² In a compelling line from his poem “Biotherm,” subtly alluding to poetry, O’Hara’s speaker says: “I am guarding it from mess and measure” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 444).
Often this poet, strolling through the noisy splintered glare of a Manhattan noon, has paused at a sample Olivetti to type up thirty or forty lines of ruminations, or pondering more deeply has withdrawn to a darkened ware- or firehouse to limn his computed misunderstandings of the eternal questions of life, co-existence and depth, while never forgetting to eat Lunch his favorite meal. (as cited in Gilbert, 1991, p. 176)

In *Walks in the World*, Roger Gilbert (1991) talks about some sort of correspondence that takes place between O’Hara’s poem, on the one hand, and New York City, on the other. He argues that:

> Walking in a crowded city seems to have provided him with exactly the balance of solitude, motion, simulation, change and leisure that he needed for his poetry; the texture and rhythm of an urban walk corresponded closely to the texture and rhythm he sought for his poems. (p.176)

Indeed, so spontaneously does O’Hara’s poetry flow that the reader would need no directions to journey through the poet’s words. The reader’s journey would be as spontaneous as the poet’s words; that is why, as the speaker in “Life on Earth” puts it, the reader explores those poems “with no revolver pointing the roadmarks” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 156). The reader, thus, accompanies the poet in his literary journey without the forceful desire of getting precise directions to reach even more precise destinations. Teeming with coincidences and surprises along the way, O’Hara’s poetry does not provide instructions and signs on how to get to a certain meaning. The heart of his poems beats against the thudding heart of so boisterous a city such as NYC. Its hustle and bustle seems even more vigorous in the poet’s words – words that do pulse with action.

O’Hara makes his poems pulsate with action through the use of copious dynamic verbs, thereby endowing his poetry with much verve. His use of unconventional syntactic structures such as ellipsis, suspension, incremental repetition and choppy sentences at times also reflects the unconventional and hectic lifestyle in New York City. But perhaps the most remarkable feature of O’Hara’s city poems is the swift shift between stanzas, sentences, and even phrases, a technique that captures the dizziness one would feel during a busy day in Manhattan. Along these lines, Gilbert (1991) provides an apposite remark about O’Hara’s poem and the occasion of writing. He states the following:

> Not only their habitual use of the present tense, but also their fluid, often ungrammatical language seems to cancel all distance between represented experience and representational text, as though the poem had come into being simultaneously with the walk itself. (p. 176)

O’Hara’s poetry, therefore, reads as a reflection of mundane, everyday life. It captures the immediate moment, which probably explains the titles of his poetry collections such as *Lunch Poems* and *I Do this I Do that Poems*. As Mark Tursi explains in “Interrogating Culture”:

> O’Hara views and interprets experience, where the events of his life become the ‘action’ and the subject of the poems, as well as the ‘art’ of the poetry. … O’Hara’s poetry has a sense of urgency and immediacy, spontaneity and anti-formalism, which speaks in a directness of everyday experience and ordinary colloquial language. (Tursi, n.d.)
Indeed, for all the immediacy inherent in them, O’Hara’s poems are carefully guarded against “mess and measure,” as he writes in “Biotherm” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 444). That is, their disarray is not merely an untidy, futile mess: It is “mess” that refuses to be confined within any type of “measure,” that is, any type of order. Far from being inspired by rigid formalism or the credos of New Criticism, O’Hara declares, starkly in his poem “Memorial Day 1950,” that “Picasso made [him] tough and quick.” Eloquenty, he adds:

At that time all of us began to think
with our bare hands and even with blood all over
them, we knew vertical from horizontal, we never
smared anything except to find out how it lived. (O’Hara, 1995, p. 17)

Indeed, in his city poems, O’Hara managed to get to the heart of the city, the people and himself, revealing poetically “how [they] lived.”

O’Hara’s poems, in this regard, are teeming with abundant details, often presented in the poet’s compulsive use of enjambment and caesuras, which generates a tense, yet therapeutic mood for the speaker and a somewhat breakneck rhythm that mimics the city’s rejuvenating disorder. Ruptured syntactic structures and the ensuing fragmented thoughts are a direct substantiation of the speaker’s present thoughts, collected on the spur of the moment and not “at tranquility,”3 in a Wordsworthian sense.

Obviously, O’Hara did not compose his walk poems as he walked, but it was reported that he composed them not long after his walks, especially at the museum where he worked as a curator. The immediacy of the poems, though, is strongly conveyed through his use of the present tense, which gives us a deeper insight into O’Hara’s vision of poetry. His poems, he believed, should be as close as possible to the hectic pace of the city, embodying all the details of daily life in a way that mimics the immediacy of film watching (“I’d have the immediacy of a bad movie,” he writes in “My Heart” [O’Hara, 1995, p. 231].) Regarding this connection, James E. B. Breslin writes:

With their realistic precision and their swift, free, uncommitted movement, the lunch hour poems create the poetic self as a rapid, filmlike series of transparencies, open to experience, neutrally and indiscriminately taking it in. (as cited in Gilbert, 1991, p. 177)

Therefore, writing poetry becomes an activity inseparable in its nature from the other activities that the poem describes. Along these lines, Richard Gray (2011) rightly argues that “[t]he poet shifts rapidly from one place to another without the usual semantic props, such as ‘when,’ ‘after,’ or ‘before.’ Everything, as a result, is absorbed into an undifferentiated stream of activity, the flow of the now” (p. 289).

As we probe into his poems, we find the poet fully and wholeheartedly embracing the city’s disorder, meaningful and revitalizing chaos, and projecting this disorder unto his poems. His choice is ideological as it reflects, again, the era’s counterpoetics. In this sense, Tursi claims:

3 In his preface to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth (1967) describes poetry as the “spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings … recollected in tranquility” (p. 13).
O’Hara’s attempt to dismantle dominant ideologies about life and dominant assumptions about art, is, in a sense, a deconstructive mode. In other words, by working within the realm of the ordinary, with the language that we all think, act, construct and communicate with, but somehow outside of convention (by virtue of its slang and colloquialism and therefore critical of it), O’Hara finds and reveals the extraordinary. He is eccentric, yet entirely common; he is outside of ‘approved’ language, yet completely immersed in the language of everyday life … O’Hara’s poems are controlled distraction or conscious digression. (Tursi, n.d.)

Frank O’Hara’s “Urban Pastoral”

“One need never leave the confines of New York to get all the greenery one wishes”

(OD’Hara, 1995, p. 197)

Pastoral poetry is part of the long-established pastoral tradition that is based, among other things, on the idealization of rural landscapes and rustic lifestyles. It is not surprising, in this regard, that aesthetic energy and artistic revelations have been, for centuries, connected with the realms of sylvan charm, as it were. The oxymoronic phrase “Urban Pastoral” appeared when artists started to find in the urban experience a source of inspiration no less compelling than what the rural pastoral experience had to offer.4

As observed earlier, Frank O’Hara’s poetry is an epitome of the urban pastoral tradition. In many of his poems, he provides a detailed account of the borough of Manhattan in its rowdy, hectic pace. The speaker in his poems finds order in the very disorderly atmosphere endemic to the city. Interestingly, in “Rhapsody,” the speaker says: “Everywhere love is breathing draftily/ like a doorway linking 53rd with 54th’’ bringing together the “stringless labyrinth” of the city (O’Hara, 1995, p. 326). What is more, it is the “rancid nourishment” of the city and the energy it generates that fuels the poet’s poetic imagination (O’Hara, 1995, p. 326).

Nothing so better reveals the synergy, harmony, almost telepathy-like relationship between the city and the poet than these opening lines from “A Warm Day for December:”

57th Street
street of joy
I am a microcosm in your macrocosm
And then a macrocosm in your microcosm (OD’Hara, 1995, p. 376)

“To the Mountains in New York” is yet another poem that depicts O’Hara’s fond embrace of New York City, despite its defects:

Yes! Yes! Yes! I’ve decided,
I’m letting my flock run around
I’m dropping my pastoral pretentions!
and leaves don’t fall into a little halo
on my tanned and worried head.

4 Pastoral Poetry and Pastoral Drama, by Walter W. Greg (2004), is an informative book on the enduring tradition of pastoral poetry and pastoral Drama, their origins and development.
I love this hairy city
It’s wrinkled like a detective story
and noisy and getting fat and smudged
lids hood the sharp hard black eyes. (O’Hara, 1995, p. 198)

Here, the speaker rejects the idea of ensconsing oneself in a pastoral enviorment that is associated with the rural experience, and instead he fully indulges in an urban life that he finds more exciting. He compares the city to a woman, being “hairy,” “wrinkled,” and “fat,” and decides that he is head and heels in love with her, despite the danger that lurks beneath “the smudged Lids [that] hood the sharp hard black eyes.”

Through both form and content, O’Hara’s poem “Walking” depicts the city’s disorder that the speaker longs for – disorder that he fails to find in the countryside, which probably explains the blankness that pervades the poem. The speaker says very overtly: “the country is no good for us” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 477). It is the city and not the countryside that provides the speaker with solace to his restless mind. Disenchanted with the country, he says:

the country is no good for us
there’s nothing
to bump into
or fall apart glassily. (O’Hara, 1995, p. 476)

What is more, the lines that the poet jots on paper, in disarray, mimic the kind of motion the speaker is after. The uneven lines also reflect the nonconformist, bohemian lifestyle of NYC. His feelings of dissatisfaction are conveyed through the use of negation in “not enough” and “nothing.” The speaker seems to long for the air of the city, for its fast and furious rhythm, to fill in this haunting blankness and to reinvigorate the setting. In “O’Hara’s Aesthetics of Shock,” Oliver Brossard (2009) brings about an even more pertinent observation of the structure of the poem, as he contends:

The presence of the city is to be felt almost organically as if the poem dealt with its elements in the same way an urban center manages its ongoing traffic of vehicles and people, its flux of information. The architecture of the poem answers, if not mirrors, the syntax of the city: in O’Hara’s urban grammar, clauses are hit-and-run accidents. (p. 223)

O’Hara’s prose poem “Meditations in an Emergency” equally confers this sense of haste that imitates the hasty lifestyle within New York City, which is revealed from the outset of the poem, that is, through the oxymoronic title, clustering “meditations” and “emergency.” “Even trees understand me! Good heavens, I lie under them, too, don’t I? I’m just like a pile of leaves,” the speaker exclaims (O’Hara, 1995, p. 197). Certainly, greenery is not a characteristic feature of New York; that is why the speaker soon qualifies his statement by stating that he is not yearning for pastoral life: “One need never leave the confines of New York to get all the greenery one wishes – I can’t even enjoy a blade of grass unless I know there’s a subway handy, or a record store or some other sign that people do not totally regret life” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 197).
Conclusion

So long as men can breathe, or eyes can see,
So long lives this, and this gives life to thee.
(Shakespeare, “Sonnet 18”)

In the above lines from Shakespeare’s Sonnet 18, the poet eloquently expresses everlasting love, a feeling that can be preserved in abiding lines of poetry. In other words, metonymic of art, the poet’s lines will never die, nor will his love. By association, being one of the leading figures of the New York School Poetry, Frank O’Hara managed to preserve an era of American history in his poetry. This has greatly contributed to his enduring popularity. He also contributed, albeit indirectly, to a modern-postmodern dialogue revolving around the city – cultural dialogue that transcends time and space and attests, once again, to the American desire to transcend frontiers. After all, as Whitman wondered, rhetorically, in “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry”:

What is it then between us?
What is the count of the scores or hundreds of years between us? (Whitman, 1995, p. 149)

Through his poetry, Frank O’Hara blurred spacial and temporal distance between the poet’s modern and postmodern preoccupation with the city.
References:


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A Mechanism Linking Discrimination, Conflict, and Switching Behaviour in Bicultural Individuals

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Abstract

This study focuses on the switching behaviour exhibited by Zainichi Koreans (ethnic Koreans living in Japan who have effectively managed to maintain their Korean nationality and have been granted the status of tokubetsu eijusha [“special” permanent residents] by the Japanese government). In the present article, the term “switching” refers to the alteration of behaviour according to different cultural contexts. This study aimed to identify the mechanism underlying links between perceived discrimination, internal conflict, and switching. A questionnaire survey was conducted with 184 Zainichi Koreans. Path analyses showed that discrimination had a significant effect on conflict ($\beta = .31$, $p < .001$), and that conflict enhanced switching significantly ($\beta = .25$, $p < .001$). In addition, discrimination directly exerted a significant, positive effect on switching ($\beta = .25$, $p < .001$). These findings suggest that switching may ultimately be caused by discrimination on the part of the host’s majority society or individuals. This study’s findings contribute to the theory that switching is a way for immigrants to protect themselves if they perceive discrimination from – or feel conflicted toward – the society in which they live.

Keywords: bicultural individuals, conflict, discrimination, Japan, switching, Zainichi Koreans
Introduction

Increasingly, individuals are moving between countries due to the modern conveniences of the international travel system and the contemporary socioeconomic climate of globalization, both of which have contributed significantly to the growing numbers of immigrants worldwide. These individuals are regarded as bicultural or multicultural people, who “switch” their behaviour as they move between different cultures (van Oudenhoven & Benet-Martínez, 2015).

In Japan, there is an ethnic group of so-called Zainichi Koreans, most of whose ancestors came to the country during the Japanese colonial period between 1910 and 1945 (Fukuoka, 1993). The vast majority of Zainichi Koreans migrated from the Korean peninsula to Japan before 1945 (Harajiri, 1989). Lee (2011) mentions that, up until the present, there have been five generations of Zainichi Koreans. The term “Zainichi Korean” implies that these people are maintaining their Korean nationality (they possess only a Korean passport) and that they live in Japan as tokubetsu eijusha (“special” permanent residents) – a category that is differentiated from ipan eijusha (“general” permanent residents). The legal status of tokubetsu eijusha applies to a social category of immigrant communities, such as the Zainichi Koreans, which originated as settlements of ethnic non-Japanese citizens of the former Japanese empire, whereas the ipan eijusha did not arrive during the Japanese colonial period. Some Zainichi Koreans have acquired Japanese citizenship; this process entails giving up their Korean nationality and thus becoming legitimate Japanese citizens. Within this category, Tani (2002) included those who – even though they became Japanese citizens through naturalization – still maintained some emotional ties, to some degree, with the Korean peninsula. Although Zainichi Koreans are usually sorted into two groups in accordance with their ethnicity and their affiliation with either North or South Korea, we limit the present study’s population to those holding a South Korean passport and citizenship. Therefore, in the current study, we define those who maintain their Korean nationality and have tokubetsu eijusha status in Japan (including those who became Japanese citizens through naturalization) as Zainichi Koreans. In addition, we treat Zainichi Koreans as a group of immigrants, following the previous perspectives outlined by Tani (2002).

Zainichi Koreans could be considered multicultural individuals, in that they have more than one internalized culture (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005). Previous research has demonstrated the existence of switching behaviour among multicultural individuals toward both the root-ethnic and the host culture: Schindler, Reinhard, Knab, and Stahlberg (2016) argue that such multicultural individuals spontaneously switch their behaviour between these cultural contexts. It has been reported that such switching behaviour exists among the Zainichi Koreans in particular. For instance, Fukuoka (1993) reported narratives from interviews with young adult Zainichi Koreans, such as a participant who declared that “I feel there are two aspects to myself. I am a Japanese person when I interact with Japanese people (with a sense of myself as never differentiated from the Japanese), and I am a real Korean when I interact with my fellow Koreans. I think I separate the Japanese self from the Korean self.” Fukuoka (1993) uses such narratives to argue for the development among Zainichi Koreans of a “switching mechanism”. Although previous sociological literature suggests that switching behaviour may exist among Zainichi Korean young adults, the background context for why they tend to shift behaviour patterns according to their conversation partner’s ethnicity or the conversation context has not been empirically established.
In the current article, *switching* refers to the alteration of a person’s behaviours according to different situational or cultural contexts. This study proceeds with a focus on the switching behaviour of Zainichi Koreans. It seeks to identify their switching mechanisms based on an explication of specific factors that are linked to switching. Finally, perspectives derived from this study’s findings could help to deepen Zainichi Koreans’ self-understanding regarding their way of existence, and it could provide them with some sense of ease regarding their complicated situation, one in which they constantly shift between different cultural contexts.

Schindler et al. (2016) state that bicultural individuals simultaneously possess conflicting meaning systems, and therefore switch behavioural patterns according to different situational or cultural contexts. On the other hand, in discussing the adverse effects of switching – as compared to the abovementioned perspectives – van Oudenhoven & Benet-Martínez (2015) point out that switching could spur such internal conflicts because alternating their behaviour between the root culture and the host culture is stressful for bicultural individuals. In short, whether conflict precedes switching or switching leads to conflict is not clear. Therefore, the present study posits two directions for the hypothesized models – one moves from conflict to switching, and the other moves from switching to conflict – and elucidates which of these hypothesized models presents a good fit for the sample data.

Im (2001) argues that Zainichi Koreans switch between their Korean and Japanese names to avoid discrimination from the host majority population, which produces the hypothesis that discrimination promotes switching. In relation to discrimination, we hypothesized that the increase in the Zainichi Koreans’ age range would correlate with additional reports of perceived discrimination. This could be because, after World War II, Japanese society was exclusive and discriminatory toward aliens due to their “different pedigree” (Lee, 2011). As mentioned above, most of the Zainichi Koreans emigrated from the former Japanese colonies prior to 1945; thus, the older Zainichi Koreans experienced Japanese society’s discriminatory attitude toward foreigners. Furthermore, we anticipated that the experience of discrimination would enhance participants’ feelings of internal conflict because many Zainichi Koreans feel torn between two nations. This happens even after acquiring Japanese citizenship through naturalization (which entails giving up their Korean nationality) due to the Japanese society’s history of discrimination against the Zainichi Koreans (Mori, 2002).

In addition, it was expected that the older a Zainichi Korean, the more likely they would be to switch between different cultural contexts. That is, an older Zainichi Korean interacting with fellow Koreans will act “Korean” in terms of behaviour and, while engaging with Japanese people, the same Zainichi Korean will modify behaviour to fit a more “Japanese” behavioural style. This behaviour may be the result of Japanese society’s strong emphasis on homogeneity and the suppression of Zainichi Koreans’ cultural heritage under the Japanese empire – during which period many of the presently older Zainichi individuals lived (Tsujimoto et al., 1994). In this type of migratory context, Zainichi Koreans should be expected to employ switching behaviour to “survive”, cordonning off their ethnic heritage from the host majority culture in response to different cultural contexts.

**Goals and Hypotheses**

The aim of this study is to elucidate the mechanism of switching in relation to the specific conflicts and discrimination experienced by Zainichi Koreans, who constitute an ethnic minority in the host Japanese society. The findings and the insights drawn from the case of Zainichi Koreans in Japan could help to build a better relationship between the ethnic
Zainichi Koreans and the host Japanese population. By identifying the factors that underlie Zainichi Koreans’ adoption of switching behaviour, an understanding concerning the background context of the Zainichi Koreans’ switching could be facilitated between the two groups. Furthermore, this foundation of mutual understanding could be related to a feeling of shared kindness or tolerance.

The study hypotheses are as follows:

H1: Zainichi Koreans who are older report higher levels of discrimination.
H2: Zainichi Koreans who are older are more likely to switch.
H3: Discrimination increases feelings of conflict.
H4: Discrimination exerts a positive effect on switching.

We present two hypothetical models below. Model 1 links discrimination to conflict and then to switching (Figure 1), whereas Model 2 links discrimination to switching and thereby to conflict (Figure 2). Age is included in both these proposed models. We elucidate below which is a better fit for the data.

![Figure 1: Model 1, with a link from discrimination to conflict, and thereby to switching](image1)

![Figure 2: Model 2, with a link from discrimination to switching, and thereby to conflict](image2)

**Methods**

**Sample and Data Collection**
Respondents were 184 Zainichi Koreans (93 men and 91 women). We used two sources to generate our sample. First, participants were recruited with the assistance of the Okayama Mindan (South Korean Residents’ Union in Japan), which holds an event on the 15th of August each year to memorialize and celebrate Japan’s release of the Korean Peninsula (colonized 1910–1945). The first author visited this event and distributed 200 questionnaires; of these, 107 responses (54%) were obtained. Mindan staff repeatedly made announcements requesting event attendees’ cooperation with the survey. Second, data were gathered with the
assistance of the Mindan in Osaka, which is geographically close to Okayama. Questionnaires and prepaid return envelopes were distributed via mail. Of the 200 questionnaires sent to the Osaka Mindan, 77 (39%) were returned.

Regarding ethical considerations, the purpose of this study was explained in a document accompanying the questionnaire, and participants were assured of the confidentiality of their personal information and responses. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants, and participation was anonymous and voluntary. The questionnaire was administered in Japanese.

**Measures**

All items were measured using Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

**Switching.** This measure consisted of 9 items (Appendix 1) concerning shifting or changing interpersonal behaviours depending on the respondent’s current situation or companions. Items were selected based on the Switching Scale developed by Lee and Tanaka (2017a). An example item is “I conform more to the behaviour of others when I am with Japanese people than when with fellow Koreans.” In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha was .86.

**Conflict.** Conflict was measured using 4 items (Appendix 2) on the Conflict Scale developed by Lee and Tanaka (2017b), which evaluates the experience of feeling psychologically torn between two cultures or groups. An example item is “I do not feel that I can completely identify with either Korean or Japanese ethnicity”. In the present study, Cronbach’s alpha was .64.

**Discrimination.** Based on Berry and Sabatier’s (2010) study, we generated one question to examine perceived discrimination from the host majority population: “Japanese people discriminate against me because I am Zainichi Korean”.

**Demographic variables.** Questions about the participants’ background information, such as gender, age, nationality, and the number of generations (as Zainichi Koreans) their family had been in the country, were included in the questionnaire. Furthermore, to explore Zainichi Koreans’ actual lives between the two cultures, two questions were asked, with four response options (Japanese, Korean, both, or neither), following Ward (2006): “Which lifestyle are you familiar with?” and “Are you fluent in the Korean or Japanese language?”

**Data Analysis**

SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software version 20.0 was used for descriptive analysis, exploratory factor analysis, and correlation analysis, to confirm underlying assumptions for path analysis. Path analysis was performed using AMOS (Analysis of Moment Structure) 20.0 to test relationships among variables included in the proposed model.

**Results**

**Sample Characteristics**

Almost all participants (92.4%) were second-, third-, or fourth-generation immigrants, and most (93.5%) had retained their ethnic Korean nationality. Proportions of men (50.5%) and women (49.5%) were similar, and they were aged between 20 and 83, with a mean age of
47.6 years (SD = 16.9 years). To the question “Which lifestyle are you familiar with?” slightly less than two-thirds (63.9%) selected Japanese, rather few (5.0%) selected Korean, about one-third (29.5%) reported familiarity with both Korean and Japanese lifestyles, and very few (1.6%) selected neither. In response to the item “Are you fluent in the Korean or Japanese language?” almost all the participants reported fluency in Japanese (95.1%), very few (1.6%) were fluent in Korean, and a few (3.3%) were fluent in both Korean and Japanese.

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Variables

Means, standard deviations, and correlations between the variables are shown in Table 1. Pearson’s correlation analysis showed that switching was significantly and positively correlated with older age ($r = .29$, $p < .01$), higher levels of perceived discrimination ($r = .37$, $p < .01$), and greater feelings of conflict ($r = .33$, $p < .01$). Discrimination had a significant and positive association with older age and greater levels of conflict ($r = .21$, $p < .01$; $r = .32$, $p < .01$), respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable</th>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$SD$</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Age</td>
<td>47.55</td>
<td>16.89</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Discrimination</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Switching</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Conflict</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and correlation analysis results

Path Analysis Results for Discrimination, Conflict, and Switching

To illustrate which of the hypothesized models (Model 1: discrimination exerts an effect on switching and thereby leads to conflict; Model 2: there is a link from discrimination to conflict, which in turn is linked to switching) provided a good fit to the sample data, path analysis was conducted. A comparison between the two proposed models showed the hypothesized Model 2, with a link from discrimination to conflict and then to switching, had a lower AIC fit index, indicating that it fit better than Model 1. Comparison of the goodness-of-fit statistics for the two models is shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$p$</th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>GFI</th>
<th>AGFI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>19.91</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>22.98</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. AIC = Akaike information criterion; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; AGFI = adjusted goodness-of-fit index; RMSEA = root–mean–square error of approximation.

Table 2: Goodness-of-fit indices for the two proposed models

Figure 3 shows the final empirical model adopted in our analysis, which exhibited good fit to the sample data: $\chi^2 = 1.91$, df = 1, $p = .17$. Additional fit indices, the GFI (goodness-of-fit index) and AGFI (adjusted goodness-of-fit index), were greater than 0.90. Furthermore, the
RMSEA (root–mean–square error of approximation) was less than 0.50. Explained variances ($R^2$s) for this model were .04, .10, and .25 for discrimination, conflict, and switching, respectively.

As shown in Figure 3, older age, greater feelings of conflict, and higher levels of discrimination were directly associated with higher switching scores ($\beta = .25, p < .001$; $\beta = .25, p < .001$; $\beta = .25, p < .001$, respectively). Discrimination had a significant effect on conflict ($\beta = .31, p < .001$), and conflict enhanced switching significantly ($\beta = .25, p < .001$). These findings indicate that greater perceived discrimination caused internal conflict, which, in turn, led participants to feel uncomfortable with their position “in between” their ethnic Korean and the host Japanese cultures or groups; this, in turn, led to changes in their behavioural patterns according to the situation.

Figure 3: Empirical model of the relationships between discrimination, conflict, and switching. All paths are significant and standardized. **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$

Discussion

This study aimed to clarify the mechanisms linking discrimination, conflict, and switching among Zainichi Koreans. As a result of the path analysis, the model positing a link from discrimination to conflict and in turn to switching (Model 2) was a better fit to the sample data than the model positing a link from discrimination to switching and thereby to conflict (Model 1). In addition, discrimination exerted a significantly positive effect on switching. Thus, Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 were supported.

From these results, we conclude that there are two paths that underlie switching. First, those who perceive greater discrimination experience more conflict between two cultures or groups and, therefore, switch behavioural patterns to resolve this conflict. Past sociological studies suggest that there could be a switching behaviour phenomenon existent among Zainichi Koreans. However, thus far, there has been no empirical establishment of how switching behaviour is promoted, that is, the processes involved in switching including the variables related to switching behaviour.

The current study’s results help clarify the nature of the mechanism linking discrimination to conflict and thereby to switching, which is an observed phenomenon among Zainichi Koreans in their current life-context. This is empirically established in our questionnaire survey. Second, based on our results, which showed that discrimination directly exerted a positive effect on switching, we speculate that Zainichi Koreans may employ switching behaviour strategies to deal with discrimination from their host society or population. In a similar vein, Hong, Zhan, Morris, and Benet-Martínez (2016) argue that multicultural
individuals employ a switching strategy to counter discrimination by a host majority society or individuals.

In sum, our findings suggest that, for the participants in the present study, the ultimate cause of switching may be higher levels or perceived levels of discrimination from the host majority society or individuals. In other words, the study findings could not attribute switching to a sense of “belonging” for either the ethnic or the host categories. Rather, Zainichi Koreans’ probability of adopting switching behaviour was dependent on perceived discrimination they experienced from the host society or population. For instance, although some Zainichi Koreans become Japanese citizens through naturalization (giving up Korean nationality), they could still easily engage in switching if they perceived discrimination from their host society or its members. Again, we would like to underscore that switching is a behaviour strategy the present participants experienced in their daily life, not an abstract or intangible concept that exists only in theory.

In extending these results to other societies, if immigrants perceive discrimination from the host society, we cautiously propose that they might employ switching behaviour as a tool to manage two different cultural contexts (Yampolsky, Amiot, & de la Sablonnière, 2016). However, only bicultural people with high levels of integration with both ethnic and host cultures can switch behavioural patterns according to different contexts (Schindler et al., 2016). From a perspective based on the immigrants’ perceived discrimination at the hands of the host society – and given that present-day Japan is oriented toward multiculturalism (Lee, 2011) – if Japanese societies were to implement a multicultural policy of non-discrimination for foreigners in Japan (for instance, in the domains of renting a house or obtaining employment), this would enable foreigners in Japanese societies to live life with a greater sense of security, which would, in turn, produce genuinely bicultural individuals who perceive the ethnic and host culture as compatible. Furthermore, this state of affairs would promote wellbeing and achievement (van Oudenhoven & Benet-Martínez, 2015).

Regarding findings relating to age, Hypothesis 1 (older Zainichi Koreans would experience greater discrimination) was supported. This confirmed previous findings (Fukuoka, 1993). Hypothesis 2, which posited that older Zainichi Koreans are more likely to switch between different cultural contexts, was also supported. The Japanese society in which the older study respondents had lived had championed exclusive homogeneity (Kimura, 2009); this is in contrast to present-day Japan’s relatively positive orientation toward multicultural coexistence (Kim, 2011). In such an assimilationist context, alternating behaviours according to context could be a strategy utilized by older Zainichi Koreans to survive Japanese society’s oppression of the atypical Zainichi Koreans.

We note three limitations to this study. First, regarding the measurement of perceived discrimination, only one item was used. Future research should employ a scale to measure this variable and then confirm the model illustrated in the present study. Second, since the measurement of conflict had a small alpha coefficient, future research should increase the number of items used in this scale and thereby formulate a more robust instrument.

Third, the generalizability of the model drawn from this study to include other foreign permanent residents in Japan remains to be verified. The Japanese government is establishing two kinds of legal status for foreign permanent residents in Japan: general and special permanent residents. As a community of immigrants within Japanese society, Zainichi Koreans belong to the latter category.
Conclusion

In the present study, we articulated the mechanisms underlying switching behaviour, whereby Zainichi Koreans change their behaviour patterns in accordance with shifting situational or cultural contexts and in relation to conflict and discrimination. The model linking perceived discrimination to conflict and thereby to switching fit the sample data better than did the model linking perceived discrimination to switching and then to conflict. This result implies that conflict precedes switching behaviour rather than switching behaviour leading to conflict; furthermore, both conflict and (the resultant) switching may ultimately be caused by discrimination on the part of the host majority society or individuals. We hope that the study’s particular finding – that the fundamental sources of switching behaviour are conflict and perceived discrimination – may provide the members of the Japanese host society with a deeper understanding of Zainichi Koreans. We trust that it will also raise awareness and deepen the self-understanding of Zainichi Koreans by aiding them in comprehending what causes behaviour patterns that oscillate between cultural contexts.

Additionally, we hope that it will foster a feeling of shared empathy between ethnic Zainichi Koreans and the host Japanese population. In this way, the two groups could reject the hierarchical relationship of ethnic resident and host and interact with each other on equal terms – a relationship between individuals that extends beyond national boundaries. By fostering such a sociocultural relationship, the incidence of intergroup conflict caused by imbalanced relationships between the ethnic minority and the host majority could see a marked decrease.

Acknowledgements

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Switching Scale

1. I conform more to the behaviour of others when I am with Japanese people than when with fellow Koreans.
2. I express my emotions more straightforwardly with fellow Koreans than with Japanese people.
3. I restrain my behaviour to a greater extent with Japanese people than with fellow Koreans.
4. I tend to be more modest and/or humble with Japanese people than with fellow Koreans.
5. I interact in the Japanese style with Japanese people, and in the Korean style with fellow Koreans.
6. My way of interacting with people spontaneously changes depending on whether they are Japanese people or fellow Koreans.
7. I use obscure expressions more often in conversation with Japanese people than with fellow Koreans.
8. I pay attention to manners more with fellow Koreans than with Japanese people.
9. I respect Confucian ways of thinking more when I am with fellow Koreans.
Source: Switching Scale (Lee & Tanaka, 2017a)

Appendix 2: Conflict Scale

1. I do not feel that I can completely identify with either Korean or Japanese ethnicity.
2. I hesitate to do things when the Japanese and Korean ways of doing them differ.
3. I feel that I cannot settle down in Japan or in Korea.
4. I cannot decide whether to live a fully Japanese, Korean, or Zainichi Korean life.
Source: Conflict Scale (Lee & Tanaka, 2017b)

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Physical Reality, Language, and the Cinderella Problem

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Abstract

This article identifies, and explores the nature of, a number of “explanatory gaps” between our conception of physical reality and our cultural understanding, in particular our understanding of language and experience of reality. Some suggestions are made to address those gaps. On the one hand, certain positions in physical science are widely accepted; physical monism, the commonality of behaviour, reality at a quantum level, biological entities as temporary clusters of atoms held together by energy fields, and “facts” as constructs. On the other hand, reality as we experience it is “of many sorts” (Popper, 1972); neither physical nor perceptual, but verbally constructed, “unreal” in any physical or historical sense. Language is rooted in sociality and qualitatively different from other forms of communication. The article identifies and considers some major disparities and some tentative ways of reconciling them. In particular, it addresses the disparity between physical reality and fiction or purely imaginary reality (the “Cinderella Problem”) through the notions “what if...?” and “as if”.

Keywords: physical monism, interactions, model-dependent realism, imaginary reality, verbally constructed reality, sociality, problem-solving, communication models
Explanatory Gaps

It seems to me that a number of ideas in science (physical and biological) and humanities (language/communication studies in particular) have become widely accepted, and that they seem to be in some cases wide apart. There is an “explanatory gap” that needs to be addressed from both sides. In particular, views on the nature of “ultimate” physical reality do not extend easily or in any detail to the everyday world of socio-cultural reality and experience. On the other hand, some humanities-based ideas need adjustment in the light of the physical understanding of the world and the physical monism that goes with it. Any approach that contains, or implies, a mind-body dualism will be inconsistent with much in physical science and our understanding of the brain (Eagleman, 2015). Our understanding of verbal communication involves cultural and social parameters that are distant from physical and biological fact. There are different “realities”, and much of our reality, that is, reality as we experience it, is verbally constructed and “unreal” in a physical sense. Thus, questions arise about whether an integrated and consistent view of physical and social reality is possible, and indeed about what we take “reality” to be. The role and nature of verbal communication is central to this discussion. We need to identify what questions need to be answered. Some of the ideas in question are on the one hand:

• “Reality is not what it seems” (to use the title of Carlo Rovelli’s recent book (2016) in which “reality” is the strange and not directly knowable, but scientifically describable, ultimate quantum reality). According to the “Copenhagen interpretation”, we can have no knowledge of that ultimate reality; we have only phenomena which are our ways of perceiving and measuring ultimate reality (Baggott, 2013)
• Physical reality, including every living thing, is a single interconnected totality
• There is no radical Cartesian mind-body dichotomy
• Reality is our model or construction of it, and it is formed by the ways our brains work (Eagleman, 2015)
• Our awareness of reality is a product of interactions (Rovelli, 2015)
• The human perceptual range is very limited, and that is a limitation on what (everyday) reality is for us
• All of our understanding is “model-dependent”; there is no independent, external viewpoint that can determine “truth” (Hawking and Mlodinow); we only have the coherence of models and observations or other models.
• Each individual is integrated with a social group or community and shares many of its characteristics.

And on the other hand:

• Reality as we experience it is “many-sorted” (as Popper (1972, pp. 37–38) put it), and includes physical, perceptual, social, ideological, and personal constructions. As Popper (1972) says,
  “… there are many sorts of reality… such as our subjective decoding of our experiences of foodstuffs, stones and trees, and human bodies...Examples of other sorts in this many-sorted universe are: a toothache, a word, a language, a highway code, a novel, a governmental decision; a valid or invalid proof, perhaps, forces, fields of forces, propensities, structures; and regularities.” (pp. 37–38)
• Much of our reality is verbally constructed (and this may limit our constructions of reality). Note that many of Popper’s examples are wholly or partly matters of verbal construction.
• Much of our reality comes from and is integrated with other people; that is, it is socially constructed, but each individual is thought of as a “knowing subject” with an individual experience and understanding of the external world.
• Language has its origins in sociality and has developed multiple functions exponentially through positive feedback, one of which is reasoning in a verbal “surrogate” world.
• Our everyday awareness of language and sense of reality in consciousness are “macro-level” phenomena arising from complex “micro-level” processing of which we are unaware and which depend on how our brains work.
• Language is qualitatively different from other naturally occurring and artificial communication systems.

It should be obvious that there are wide disparities between our understanding of physical (including biological) reality and what we know about the functions of language and our verbally constructed realities. As Ewing (1951, p. 145) pointed out, the Einsteinian conception of space-time is quite different from our everyday experience of time and experience of the passage of time. In a similar way, we know there is a wide gap between our understanding of the brain at a cellular level and our conscious awareness. As the biologist Steve Jones (2009, p. 77 ff) has pointed out, there are wide gaps between our understanding of the biology of the brain on the one hand and sociological and behavioural phenomena on the other. As he says, biologists naturally hesitate to act as sociologists (and, of course, vice versa). Furthermore, the outstanding genomics expert, Svante Pääbo, also points out (2014, p. 208) that “[T]he dirty little secret of genomics is that we still know next to nothing about how a genome translates into the particularities of a living and breathing individual”. Conversely, students of the humanities cannot provide the physical underpinnings of social, aesthetic, cultural, or linguistic constructions. Many Cartesian philosophical approaches focus on the separate “mind” of the individual knowing subject, whereas most neuroscientists would point out that our experience of mind is the representation of the brain interacting with information from outside the individual in an integrated process. As Jones also says in the same context, we must admit to areas of ignorance. However, it may be useful to highlight some of the problems and propose some solutions. The discussion takes us into a wide range of connected issues.

““The Cinderella Problem”

Some of the above disparities between our physical understanding and our understanding of language might be summed up as the “Cinderella Problem”. It is a problem of understanding reality as we experience it, and specifying the mechanisms by which our sense of reality arises. To put it another way, Cinderella is simultaneously both unreal and real. In the frequently held philosophical sense of reality as the state of things as they actually exist, or more widely everything that is or has been, or everything that is, has been, or will be regardless of whether it is observable or comprehensible, Cinderella (the character and story) is unreal. There never was a “real” Cinderella. There is no evidence for her existence and the story involves supernatural processes beyond physical reality. Cinderella is not the real-world value of a variable. And yet... Cinderella lives in the imagination of millions and exists in books and films. The story of Cinderella may not be highly realistic, but it has an element of realism. There is a recognisable (physical) human setting and social context, and the story
raises obvious social and ethical issues. Cinderella can be a vehicle for the discussion or awareness of those issues, especially, but not solely, for children. The Cinderella story appeals to our emotions and sense of justice, and it helps to construct ideas about human relationships, including myths about romantic love.

Moreover, the story has a certain universality. As Arthur Waley (1947) has pointed out, there is a Chinese story that has clear similarities with the western story, and the Chinese story was possibly transported to China from India – the Cinderella scenario transcends cultures. The suffering, virtuous heroine ultimately rescued is a recurring literary trope in, for example, medieval romance, Pushkin’s Captain’s Daughter and Wilkie Collins’ Woman in White as well as in cheaper fiction and in old Perils of Pauline films. Cinderella and the Cinderella story make up a discussion world. In those ways, Cinderella is real – part of our “many-sorted universe”. In that sense, anything we can think of has a certain existence in our brains, and is hence “real” – golden mountains, triangular unicorns, and so on but the latter are just additional examples of how we can create a kind of reality through verbal combinations that have no real-world reference. If Cinderella is a reality, it is a very different one from the reality of quantum physics or neurotransmitters between synapses; and yet the two extremes must be connected to form reality as we experience it. It is a verbal construct, not an “imitation” in the Aristotelian sense, because there is nothing that is imitated; it is rather a world created by verbal means. Why should humans engage in such constructs?

The Cinderella problem is connected to, but of wider scope than, the issue of whether constructed examples such as Russell’s much-discussed The present King of France is bald (1905) or the similar Sherlock Holmes is bald discussed by Kripke (1971, p. 65 ff) have a truth value or not. (Whereas the present King of France is a possible verbal construction [naming by description] with a meaning but no reference in the real world, Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character in an imaginary world, like Cinderella [with direct naming], with various characteristics in that imaginary world.) Philosophers are divided on whether a sentence without a real-world reference can have a truth-value. Kripke takes the view that there are multiple possible worlds, and in each one a truth-value can be assigned. The view taken here is that language allows the construction of multiple realities (“possible worlds”), including fictional worlds, and that this is a normal human means for exploring existence – not a regrettable logical lacuna. Thus, Sherlock Holmes is bald can be true or false within the fictional world, but of greater importance is the exploration of issues (in fiction) and the verbal mechanisms by which “unreal realities” are explored. The idea that truth is limited to reference to real-world refers is very narrow.

The philosophical definition (above) related to actual existence in time and space may also be narrow, but it would become useless if anything imaginary or verbally constructed were counted as “real”. We would not be able to express the clear sense of (ontological) difference in the types of reality, or between golden rings and golden unicorns. We regularly distinguish reality from fantasy; for some people suffering from severe psychological conditions the inability to make the distinction is a central part of the condition. On the other hand, some “unreal” things (in addition to those mentioned by Popper) – qualities such as justice, virtue, malevolence, greed, and so on – are important social “realities”. How can we resolve that paradox of the reality of the unreal? Can we connect physical processes through to a cultural construct? Is there any sense in which the many “sorts of reality” are all reality? We know that reality for a bat or a clownfish is different from our human reality, so we must have a particular kind of human reality, although even human reality clearly exists in a spectrum of experience; people with synaesthetic connections (e.g. between sound and colour) live in a
different form of reality from that of most people; some people have very visual representations and memories, others have less visualisation and more verbal constructs. The question can be re-phrased as what is non-physical human reality, how can we explain it, and how can cultural realities – stories, ideologies, laws, social and economic systems, economic transactions, linguistic expressions, and many more – be connected to physical reality? The answer lies in language.

We can be misled by our perceptions (as many psychological experiments have shown), although we generally trust the evidence of our eyes and ears in everyday life. Verbally created constructs of all sorts may be questionable, but they are generally relied on; a price label of £10 for the purchase of a packet of birdseed or an ice cream might be deemed expensive, but is unlikely to be questioned as a statement of fact. However, verbal constructs can clearly be misleading, at least in certain respects. The sun does not “rise” and “set”; the breeze does not “get up”. We cannot take every news story at face value. We cannot take the Cinderella story as an account of fact, events, or as an accurate representation of a social reality. We suspend our disbelief to engage with the story, and do not question it as a story\(^1\) – the textual object is what it is, even if we think it is silly. The story may lead us into a belief that justice and virtue will always be rewarded, the wicked will be punished, that love triumphs over adversity, that wrongs will ultimately be put right, or even that there are magical forces at work in the universe – or we may judge such ideas as bunk, – but we will form a judgement on it using the story as it is. Like any myth it is a component of a particular conception of society and its belief systems. This is one way in which language may be misleading. Notions or conceptions of reality can be false. Prince Charming could turn out to be a brutal wife-beater, or Cinderella may turn out to be a terrible nag.

Misleading Aspects of Language and the Objectification of Language

Philosophers have long distrusted language, and pointed out the discrepancies between linguistic expression and the reality of what is “really” meant. It is easy to see that the sun does not really “rise” and “set” and that it is not really pulled across the sky by a three-legged golden crow. The view of Ewing is typical. He says (1951, p. 37 ff) that variation in meaning is a problem in arriving at truth and that,

Language may also lead to philosophical mistakes, because its verbal form gives misleading suggestions as to the structure of reality or because two sentences which really do not assert the same kind of thing at all are taken to do so because they have the same grammatical structure.

For example, the sentences: The man came out and The sun came out express quite different realities with the same grammatical form.

Rovelli (2016) takes a similar view from a scientist’s perspective when he tells us that physical reality is not what it seems. He draws attention to the clear disparity between ultimate physical (quantum) reality and our everyday reality, much of which depends on verbal conventions. We are misled partly because our perceptual and cognitive abilities are too slow or too limited to capture ultimate physical reality or other dimensions of reality.

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\(^1\) Generally...the late radio humourist, Dennis Norden, once imagined a child asking to the perplexity of a parent, if everything returned to normal after midnight, why didn’t the glass slipper disappear? One might wonder also whether Prince Charming needed to visit the optician if the only way to recognise Cinderella was by her shoe size even after dancing with her all night.
(such as UV light or ultra-sound). Rovelli (2016) adds “We slice up the reality around us into
discrete objects. But reality is not made of discrete objects. It is a variable flux”. (p. 224)

His view is not new. The contrast between the atomic world and our world of appearances
was made by Stuart Chase in his *Tyranny of Words* (1938). Buddhists have long held
the doctrine of the “inherent non-substantiality” of things (Dalai Lama, 1999, p. 109) and that
objects regarded as discrete are not so, but are recognised because of the fact that by
convention we give names to parts of the world. Antal (1976) pointed out that we think of the
Danube as a single “thing” but that in reality “it” is constantly changing in various ways; it is
the name that gives a sense of constancy and sameness to the river. That is another of the
problems in the relation of reference – where does an “object”, such as a river, or plane
journey begin and end? Where does the Pacific become the China Sea?

However, Rovelli’s view is important because it expresses a fact about the physical universe.
Our language behaviour and our mental resources too rest on an ultimate quantum reality.
But we should remember that language (the totality of speech acts or the stored verbal
resources in our brains and in our speech communities) is also a reality of a different sort (as
Popper [above] says) – at least it is part of the human experience of reality. Verbally
constructed reality is, nonetheless, a reality that appears to have a degree of constancy like
other social institutions. It may be a “flux” (and verbal communication clearly changes over
time), but it also has organisation and some stability. Furthermore, we “reify” or “objectify”
our utterances and texts (Strawson, 1971, p. 3; Mulder, 2005, p. 71 ff) in order that they can
be combined, manipulated, and discussed; that is, given a kind of stability. An objectified
statement may, among other things, be assessed for truth. In order to do that we require an
awareness that a verbal construct may not correspond to reality as experienced; that is, the
dual view of verbal constructs as simultaneously “real” and “unreal” is a necessary part of
having language as a surrogate world. We may say, *John answered the door*, or *All John’s
plans went up in smoke*, but we know that the door did not ask a question and John did not
answer; the expression is a conventional way (in English) of describing his action in
responding to a knock at the door. Furthermore, there was no burning of plans or real-world
smoke, but the failure of plans is real enough. Cinderella’s visit to the ball and Sherlock
Holmes’ baldness are both unreal and real.

Real-world utterances are physical events in time and space with social functions and effects;
they are not “things” in the way that tables, trees, or doors are “things”. Our objectified
utterances are constructs from sound input processed by our brains in several ways; we then
treat them as “things”, reify them as speech sounds, meanings, requests, assertions,
aesthetically pleasing or displeasing, typical of a class or ethnicity, sensible or outrageous,
and so on. Electronic or written storage of speech acts as text enhances objectification and
analysis. A recorded utterance is not an utterance, but an object for analysis. All of those
ways of looking at an utterance contribute to our construction of social reality and orientation
in it. The objectification of utterances and written texts is a necessary part in the construction
of a virtual reality. Cinderella too is an objectified text creating a virtual world.

The Flux of Physical Reality and the Relative Stability of Language

The reality of objectified utterances comes about through our cognitive processes. Objectified
texts exist in a discussion world that can persist over thousands of years, like the sayings of
Confucius or Plato. Language is the means of cultural transmission (and it is the means of its
own transmission in language acquisition). Objectified texts or utterances are all unreal
realities, like Cinderella. Popper (1972, p. 31 ff) calls this creation of a discussion world the “argumentative function of language” (although there is no need to restrict verbal worlds to the rational discussion of ideas). Thus, Rovelli’s (2016, p. 9) view of reality flux or “endless dance of atoms” in the quantum world is inconsistent with our sense of the stability of social products and structures and our attribution of reality to non-physical things, such as classes, abstractions, imaginary characters or circumstances, ideologies, or social systems. We have here an explanatory gap between (temporarily) organised stability and flux, and also between a physical view of reality and ways in which language is our default *modus operandi* for social and real-world orientation. As the anthropological linguist Foley (1998, p. 74) argues, language has “colonized our brains”, and become our way of looking at reality, orienting ourselves in society, and creating verbal explanations, explorations, and representations. For Rovelli,

We, just like the rest of the natural world, are one of the many products of this natural dance – the product, that is, of an accidental combination. Nature continues to experiment with forms and structures; and we, like the animals, are the product of a selection that is random and accidental, over the course of eons of time. (p. 21)

An “endless dance of atoms” cannot explain the relative constancy and stability either of ourselves or cultural products such as language. The inconsistency is partly resolved by seeing objects as temporary clusters of organised material and energy, and language as existing in human clusters like a “dissipative structure” in chemistry. Delselme (2000, pp. 146–147), following Prigogine, defines this as “an open system that is constantly crossed by a flux of matter and energy which permits entropy to diminish and the system to become organized”. For the individual, language and language products can be maintained through the use of a great deal of energy to support the enormous number of synaptic associations which underlie our experience of language. But, because of human mortality and the need to integrate all individuals into social structures, we also require cultural transmission for the continued existence of language and language products (Jones, 2009, p. 40 ff).

That cultural transmission is a feature of human sociality, and is aided by the spread of “memes” (Dawkins, 2004). It should be obvious, however, that the explanatory gap is only partly filled, since the relation between brain activity at the cellular level and consciousness of language (and language created consciousness) as well as social and interpersonal constructions remains. Furthermore, the role of “memes” with positive feedback mechanisms, while a plausible model, lacks a clear mechanism². Thus, there are many features of language and historical change in language which one can reasonably describe as “memetic”. Clichés (*not rocket science, heart of the home*, and so on), fixed expressions (*red rag to a bull, a stitch in time,...*), regular collocations (*e.g. in case of, in consideration of, on behalf of, over and above, in a minute, ...*) are examples, as are the “wave-like” spread of phonological and grammatical changes through speech communities with new forms appearing (such as “do-support” and inversion in early Middle English, or recently a subject-predicate structure after *how about* – *e.g. how about we go?*) and others becoming less used (*how about us going?*) or more or less disused (such as *lest* or the passive in *-ing*; *e.g. the tea was serving = the tea was being served* in 18th century English). New expressions appear all the time for new needs (*brexit, brexiteer*) or new ways of saying things (*funky, pants, newbie, peng*) for

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² It is possible that “mirror neurons” in the pre-motor cortex involved in imitative behaviour are a mechanism (Provine, 2012, pp.18–19).
innovation or social differentiation. The factors in the spread of memes and the gradual disappearance of other linguistic forms involve cultural and dispositional parameters; exposure to expressions in the media, peer-group pressure, leaders with perceived prestige, generational differentiation, adaptation to new circumstances, and so on. Those are all factors in what Houdebine (2015) calls “l’imaginaire linguistique”—the ways people conceive of and relate to their language. Fitting them together with our physical understanding of the world is the problem of the construction of human reality through language and its characteristics. The sociological notion of a “meme” needs to be fitted into a wider understanding of cultural transmission, including the pre-requisites of cultural transmission. One such prerequisite is the integratedness of the individual into the speech community. As noted above, we must not underestimate the extent to which our brains are concerned with other people and coordinated with them. Communication is obviously the mechanism for that integration.

Language as a Social or Species Phenomenon

“Integratedness” means that language, objectified utterances, and other cultural structures do not exist for the individual alone. Language can be seen as a property of the species homo sapiens and specific languages as properties of groups of individuals in communities (and across communities). It binds individuals and groups together (and divides them). Objectified utterances, such as those of Popper or Rovelli, exist in the discussion world (Popper’s World 3 is one way of looking at this, but one should not be restricted to the world of rational ideas and discussion; Popper’s World 3 of rational discussion, ideas, and scientific knowledge is also a verbal construct dependent on cultural transmission rather than an independently existing entity). These explanatory constructs (language, a language, objectified utterance, World 3) are further instances of the Cinderella problem. They are both real and unreal. They exist in our brains and databases as extensions to our brains, not in the external reality of physical processes, and arise from a combination of the properties of verbal communication and the grouping of individuals into cooperative, organised societies. A concept such as “language” as a species property (the intension of the set of all languages or the factors that make any language an instance of language) involves the attribution of a kind of reality to an abstraction (as also in structure, justice, or beauty). That hypostatisation is typical of verbal communication, and occurs in the attribution of existence to types, as opposed to tokens (the archetype gorilla as opposed to this or that gorilla), and to classes as well as to members (the class of ruminants as opposed to individual cows or zebras).

We are touching here on the ancient debate between realists and nominalists over whether concepts are realities or just names or verbal conventions. Any linguist will emphasise the conventionality of verbal expressions, but the point here is that regardless of one’s position in the philosophical debate we treat class concepts as if they were real – they become a kind of reality by our thinking of them. The philosopher Quine (1956, p. 12 ff) has pointed out that treating classes as if they existed is a matter of verbal construction and is useful for explanatory purposes (we want to state what is true of any member of the class of gorillas); thus, there are limits to extreme nominalism in which only individuals exist. Classes are convenient, if arbitrary, fictions, and part of normal language behaviour—unreal realities again. Moreover, the cohesion of any group requires some form of common communication system with acceptance of the constructs it creates. In French (but not English), there is a verbal convention to distinguish la fierté (justifiable pride) from l’orgueil (unjustifiable pride); in French (but not English), one distinguishes libre (“free – without restriction”) from gratuit (“free – without charge”) and, in Russian, going by a means of transport (jexat’) from going on foot (id’ti’). The problem is wider, however, because a single human is both an
individual communicator and a member of a class of speakers, whose verbal behaviour contributes to, and is largely determined by, the norms of the group. We need to look at “communication”.

**Communication Models and Explanatory Gaps**

Communication is often described as a process in “transfer” models or “exchange” models for two-way communication or networks. The best-known transfer model is that of Shannon and Weaver (1949), although Saussure’s “speech circuit” (1916/1972, pp. 27–28) is very similar. The Shannon and Weaver model (1949, p. 7) is:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Transmitter</th>
<th>Receiver</th>
<th>Destination</th>
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<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Message</td>
<td>Signal</td>
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![Shannon and Weaver model](image)

It is obvious that the directionality of the arrows in this model can be reversed for two-way communication, in cases where the information source and destination can swap places (as in speaking, but not traffic signs and signals). It can also be the basis for network models involving multiple participants (e.g. in one-to-many communication). The Shannon and Weaver model has been widely used in many disciplines from linguistics to marketing. It is useful as a starting point for the consideration of the communication process, but it has been extensively criticised (Chandler, 2007; Rastall, 2015). The main criticisms are that the model is too broad and fails to discriminate between different types of semiosis; that it lacks a social, discoursal, and situational context for communication; that it lacks a feedback

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3 The work of the Sebeoks and their followers and co-workers is particularly important. Sebeok (1986) is a useful starting point.
component (either from the receiver or from the signal); that the role and place of the communication system is unclear; and that, hence, the many complex disposing factors in utterance formation and interpretation are absent. In short, meaning-making is left unexplained along with language as a social phenomenon. (Shannon and Weaver quite explicitly said they were not concerned with qualitative (“semantic”) information, so one must beware of applying their model too readily.)

It is irrational to be over-critical of Shannon and Weaver. Their model was probably only ever intended as a convenient visualisation, although they make excessive claims for its general applicability to virtually any form of semeiosis (1949, p. 7) – language, animal communication, mechanical or cybernetic control, artistic performances, interpretation of natural phenomena – regardless of the medium, the direction, the nature of the participants or agents, or the type of semiotic entities involved (natural indices, artificial symbols, unmotivated signs, and so on).

Shannon and Weaver (1975) explain:

The information source selects a desired message out of a set of possible messages…The selected message may consist of written or spoken words, or of pictures, music, and so on

The transmitter changes this message into the signal which is actually sent over the communication channel from the transmitter to the receiver…In oral speech, the information source is the brain, the transmitter is the voice mechanism producing the varying sound pressure (the signal) which is transmitted through the air (the channel).

The receiver is a sort of inverse transmitter, changing the transmitted signal back into a message and handing this message on to the destination. When I talk to you, my brain is the information source, yours is the destination; my vocal system is the transmitter, and your ear and the associated eighth nerve is the receiver. (pp. 7–8)

I should like to mention two other problems that are relevant to our discussion. First, the model is too compartmentalised. This is inconsistent with the integrated oneness or totality of reality – one of the explanatory gaps alluded to above – including integration into a language community. Second, the Shannon and Weaver model (and a great deal of linguistics) can too easily suggest the idea of someone “using” a language through the notion of “selection” and, hence, to imply a mind-body dualism that is inconsistent with most modern thinking, that is, a controlling mind which “selects” pieces of language for communication (although Shannon and Weaver speak of the actions of “brains”; their position is thus also consistent with scientific monism). Lakoff and Johnson (2003) describe (and later criticise) the transfer view of communication in language as follows:

The speaker puts ideas (objects) into words (containers) and sends then (along a conduit) to a hearer who takes the ideas/objects out of the word containers. (p. 140)

The notion of “selection” by the human brain (let alone for innate animal behaviours or for programmed machines) is clearly problematical, if interpreted too literally. Any “selection”
in language is not the same as conscious forms of coding (e.g. in map symbols or Morse) or
instinctual animal responses from a fixed repertoire of behaviours. In language, there are too
many disposing factors, so that “selection” needs to be seen as an (unconscious) adaptation of
verbal resources to complex circumstances. One does not “select” a tense or number from a
set of choices, but one applies the appropriate tense or number in the circumstances, and
mutatis mutandis for other verbal features, such as “going” in Russian. The problem is really
the uncritical acceptance and application of the model. The compartments in the model can,
perhaps, best be seen as ways of looking at phases in a very complex and continuous process
of energy transfer without sharp boundaries, and as foci for different perspectives on
communication (such as the physical mechanism or process of interpretation or the set of
resources in the communication “system”). The messages, sent and received, need to be seen
as end points (for participants) in a communication process which exists in the wider
situational and social context, and in particular in the context of a mass of parallel and
simultaneous associations (phonological, grammatical, semantic, connotational, logical,
associative, value-based [“aesthetic”], and so on). Thus, we can say Fred is rich / well off/ not
short of a bob or two/ rolling in it, and so on with multiple associations and disposing factors
in the “selection”. As noted above, we know little of the micro-level connections involved
and of how they build up into verbally created representations and social orientations, let
alone the many discourse worlds or “virtual reality” of verbally constructed reality. We have
little choice but to work a posteriori, that is, we can attempt to use the comparison of
different texts and utterances in their situation, attitudinal factors, and social context to work
out the disposing factors in their production and interpretation (e.g. in the “selection” of well-
off rather than rolling in it), and hope that we might find the physical mechanisms of
organisation in the gap between cells and conscious awareness.

Given the fact, however, that utterance formation precedes our awareness of our own
speaking, and that our verbal resources are not conscious, the notion of a controlling mind
separate from the process is untenable4, as is the idea of an autonomous brain acting as an
instigator of communication outside any context or situation. The individual speaker is a
member of a wider group from whom language is acquired and in whose speech community
the individual communicates. Any actual signal sent by the speaker takes place in a situation
or context which influences that communication. The isolation of the individual sender and
receiver is a convenient fiction for the purposes of analysis (see below); all verbal
productions and interpretations require the norms of a given community which are
determining factors in that production and interpretation. We are too enamoured of our own
autonomy, and too inclined to focus on language as a property of the individual alone. The
neuroscientist David Eagleman (2015) makes a similar point when he says, “Brains have
traditionally been studied in isolation, but that approach overlooks the fact that an enormous
amount of brain activity has to do with other brains. We are social creatures.” (p. 133)

Furthermore, the behavioural psychologist, Robert Provine (2012) has provided convincing
studies of involuntary group behaviour, such as yawning, laughing, coughing, and so on
which show that our behaviour is closely attuned to that of the group and much less
controlled and individual than we like to think.

A similar point has been made by philosophers such as Hegel and Bradley. Francis H.
Bradley (1962 [1876]) says, for example:

4 There are, of course, many reasons for thinking this, for example, the facts that physical brain states affect
mental states or health and that different experiences of reality can be physically induced by action on the brain
through drugs or perceptual input.
The child learns...to speak and here he appropriates the common heritage of his race... the tongue that he makes his own is his country’s language. It is the same that others speak, and it carries into his mind the ideas and sentiments of his race...and stamps them indelibly... (pp. 171–172)

Ignoring Bradley’s 19th century mode of expression, Peter Singer (1983) comments:

Bradley’s point, and Hegel’s, is that because our needs and desires are shaped by society, an organic community fosters those desires that most benefit the community; moreover, it so imbues its members the sense that their identity consists in being part of that community... (p. 41)

Our language and our verbal responses are not our individual choices, but are acquired from the community wherein we acquired our language. This is obvious, if we think of the phonology, grammar, and lexis we have as well as of our verbal responses in social situations, where we have little or no individual choice. The phonological form of the word “cat”, the grammatical requirement to select for number in English count nouns, the semantic distinction between bull and cow, and all the other phonological, grammatical, and semantic forms and distinctions are acquired for membership in a linguistic community and are not a matter of individual selection or decision. Any individual variation in expression is relatively minor by comparison with the mass of verbal conventions. Perhaps, we act more like ants in a social collective linked by communication than we care to think. (For a further discussion of these points, see Rastall, 2018). We think of verbal performance and our understanding of the world as belonging to our private and individual experience, but ignore how much is shared and common to all members of the community. This social integration in a communicating totality, along with empathy, is one of the prerequisites of cultural transmission.

Language as a Selective Advantage; Qualitative Features of Languages

One other way forward might be to see language in terms of Tinbergen’s (1963) four questions and in particular to ask what its selective advantage as a behavioural adaptation is. This has been a matter of some debate between ethologists. Communication is clearly one of the current functions of language and the sub-classification of communicative functions has been extensively discussed, but it is also clear that the present complexity of language with its multiple functions, including the verbal creation of discussion worlds, the provision of social orientation, and the role of language as our means of construing reality, has arisen from simpler origins. As Bateson and Laland (2013, pp. 712 ff) have pointed out, current utility in behavioural adaptations is not necessarily the same as the origin of a behaviour. The production of tears as a symptom of emotional state, for example, has its origins in keeping the eyes free of infections and irritants (a Darwinian “associated serviceable habit”). For language, those simpler origins were probably connected to the adaptations of humans to living in larger groups and having a more cooperative lifestyle, which in turn led to increases in brain size (Dunbar’s “social brain hypothesis”, 1998) through genetic modifications. Positive feedback could have played a role in the great increase in the functions of communication (Rastall, 2000, pp. 99 ff) until the present position is reached with a complex of social, representational, and argument functions to such an extent that in many ways

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5 Speakers use, for example, different greetings – hello, hi, g'day and so on, but the “choices” here are determined by social and personal variables. The same is true for other variations in expression.
6 The work on ants in Würzburg by Franck et al. (e.g. 2017).
language is our reality. (For the role of positive feedback in biological systems, see Dawkins, 2004).

Qualitative Developments in Language

However that may be, it should be remembered that there have been a number of steps along the way to language as we currently experience it. Notably, as Bühler (1981) and later Popper (1972) pointed out, there is a clear qualitative difference between communication as an expressive symptom (e.g. a cry of pain) or an address signal (e.g. a warning or sexual attraction behaviour) and the use of representational symbols to refer to discrete portions of the world or processes in it, that is, the development of unmotivated conventions for symbolic (and abstract) communication. In particular, language symbolisation allows reference to the external world in the absence of any direct stimulus or referent.

Language is not just quantitatively different from other naturally occurring communication systems, that is, with more signs in the system. It is qualitatively different in several respects. First, language is not only a form of signalling emotional states (e.g. aggression, submission, fear, sexual intention or response) or expressing feelings such as pain. Language involves taking the world of experience and re-working it in a world of symbols as a way of manipulating experience and ideas into a kind of virtual reality of language, or model of reality. That is a major qualitative development and the origin of the Cinderella problem because the virtual world created by language is inherently unreal, but also a way of exploring the real world. One should note also that, in language, expression and address functions are fulfilled not by inarticulate or iconic cries but by articulate utterances; those functions are shared with other animals, but they are quite differently formed in humans and have far more complexity. When hurt, the anthropomorphic Yogi Bear is made to respond not just with ouch, but also That smarts, that really smarts, that is, with both an inarticulate and an articulate expression. A real bear would just howl with pain. Furthermore, there is the obvious complexity of sign constructions.

Second, groups of connected signs provide multiple perspectives and greater precision. Thus, we have, for example, the big tree over there, to specify the tree in question and to classify it. In “sentences” different components of experience are linked into a whole – for example, to make a judgement (the tree is big) or predication (the tree has fruit on it).

Third, all languages show the feature of “double articulation”; that is, we have complexity both in combinations of signs (grammatical complexity) and in phonological/differential units (/p/ – /bat/, /pit/, /pin/, /apt/, /tap/ showing the separate relevance to communication of the differential (meaningless) units {/p, a, t/} and their sequence) – phonological complexity.

Fourth, signs (and also phonological units) are not simply discrete “choices” from sets of units; they have social/aesthetic values (“connotation” as when we attribute different values to, for instance, combine, join together, muck in or cat, moggy, pussycat, and use them in different contexts; phonological units also have expressive and connotational characteristics – for example, “hissing sounds” such as [s] and [z] have often been used for aesthetic effects in poetry and in English /n/ is associated with signs of negation – not, never, no (and combinations such as nowhere), null, non-, un-, in- ). There is complexity arising from multiple associations of verbal units and the factors determining their selection in an utterance. Information implies (unconscious) “choice”, but information value is not purely quantificational, nor a matter of a controlling “mind”.

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Furthermore, at some point in the development of language as we know it, there was the qualitative step of combining signs to present analytical representations of complex processes, which in turn led to the possibility of questioning and explanation. Those developments were not positive feedback in the same way that the male lyre bird has acquired an enormously long tail, or bats have acquired large ears, that is, uni-directional, quantitative development. The qualitative changes require additional explanation as multi-dimensional developments. Perhaps, increased cooperation required increased reasoning as part of cultural evolution (Steels, 2011). Popper’s view is that language developed as a “problem-solving” device (1972, pp. 145 ff). We can interpret “problem-solving” in a very wide sense to cover any semiotic means to address a communicational need (social or practical), but symbolic conventions and the conventional linguistic analysis of experience are clearly important for reasoning in practical problem-solving. As we have seen, however, they can be useful but misleading in the construction of verbally created worlds; that is, in our verbal construction of reality.

The analysis of our experience by verbal conventions (Martinet, 1962, 1989) is one of the key strategies. Thus, the experience of heat from the sun can be expressed as *I am warm* by conventionally separating the experiencer (*I*) from the experience (*warm*) and linking them by reference to a present state (*am*) in a conventional sequence. That this is conventional is shown by the German *Mir ist warm* (lit. “to me is warm”) or French *J’ai chaud* (lit. “I have warm(th)”). Of course, one could just say *Phew!* to express what is after all a direct totality of experience. The idea of being warm leads us to a view of reality in which being warm is a state and in which there is a reality called *warmth*, as opposed to a set of individual experiences.

Another aspect of the qualitative step in the conventional analysis of experience is the identification and naming of the components of an experience; this involves a step of abstraction. Thus, in *Mary is dancing* the person, Mary, is distinguished from her actions. From another point of view, Mary and the dance are a single totality. The poet, Auden, asks (in *The Tower*) “who can tell the dancer from the dance?”. Linguistic abstraction and the conventional analysis of experience allow us to identify Mary (who can do many things) from her actions (which could be performed by someone else): *Mary is working, Fred is dancing*.

There is a further level of generalisation of signs. Thus, in *Fred made a fire, Fred made a boat, Fred made dinner* Fred performed very different actions, but *made* is used in each case, rather than a separate verb or distinct predicate for each set of circumstances (at least in English); it indicates that the fire, boat, and dinner were the result of Fred’s actions. The verb, *made*, can then be extended to other cases such as *Fred made a mistake* (where the mistake is not a physical result of “making”, but the action itself, and *mistake* is also a judgement on the action). We end up with a very vague notion of what it is to make something, but the uncertainty is reduced by the direct object. In these cases, we have the sort of divergence of verbal convention from “objective reality” that philosophers have drawn attention to. This is the “downside” of verbal conventions and indeterminacy of reference; verbal reality can be imprecise (lack one-to-one isomorphism with experience) and it can create misleading conceptions of the world (e.g. through hypostatisation or myth-making). However, verbal conventions are useful and efficient and, of course, they are the way language has developed.

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7 The answer to Auden is that in physical reality one cannot distinguish the dancer from the dance, but thanks to language conventions we can all make the distinction – but the distinction is a verbal construction for talking about the world – dancer and dance are verbal ways of looking at, and classifying, events.
for human purposes; that is, not for the exact representation of the world, but as a practical means for talking about it and orienting ourselves in it.

**Interaction and Mental Models**

Language requires both a physical mechanism for signalling – social and communicational interaction – and a means of interpreting signals, both verbal organisation in the form of conventions and patterns of verbal association and some relatively stable associations with memories and experiences. The reality of quantum phenomena (or any other reality), Rovelli (2015, p. 18) tells us, consists in their interaction. We can say that we too are constantly adjusting our sense of reality through interactions. They may be perceptual input or some form of semeiosis, verbal or otherwise; usually multiple forms of semeiosis are involved—communication is multi-modal and integrated. Real verbal exchanges must be seen as dynamic events, not as static things (Rastall, 2006). Because of its conventionality and many social dimensions, however, language signalling is not just a matter of physical interaction. There must also be interaction with something, that is, some mental model (Johnson-Laird, 2006) that is updated. That mental model must be relatively stable, that is, maintained by a constant flow of energy, as suggested above, and it must also involve the objectified speech event. The failure to maintain any part of the model (e.g. through non-use) can lead to its weakening or loss – that is, we forget.

A freshening breeze, a barking dog, a road sign, an utterance may all cause a change to our picture of some part of reality— the weather, the arrival of the postman, cows crossing the road, a letter from the bank... The notion of some relatively constant mental model with which interactions occur is implicit in the philosopher David Hume’s account of our sense of the relative constancy of the world around us (1748/1968, pp. 192 ff), in which new information must be compared and contrasted with a previously constructed reality. Any change would have to be explicable. We would be surprised and upset to find that the car was not in the garage where we left it. Not finding the car would conflict with our expectation or model of that bit of our reality, and we would want a reason for it. A change in the appearance of a road could be explained by road works or a new building. The idea of a mental model is close to the physicist’s notion of model-dependent realism, explained by Hawking and Mlodinow (2010) as follows:

According to the idea of “model-dependent realism...our brains interpret input from our sensory organs by making a model of the outside world. We form mental concepts of our home, trees, other people, the electricity that flows from wall sockets, atoms, molecules, and other universes. These mental concepts are the only reality we can know. There is no model-independent test of reality. It follows that a well-constructed model creates a reality of its own. (p. 172)

Hawking and Mlodinow are not concerned with social interaction, but we can see that similar principles can apply to social communication. The physical model of reality is maintained so long as observations are consistent with its predictions, but may be overturned by a body of contrary evidence; similarly, our model of, say, the appearance of a street remains constant until we notice a change. There may be a new building, or it may appear darker than before. In the first case, we must change our model. In the second, we look for an explanation such as the cloud cover or time of day. Hawking and Mlodinow’s view is an updated version of George Berkeley’s principle (1710/1910, p. 31) that *esse est percipi* to *esse est intelligeri*. In both, the only route to knowledge of the world is through the senses and the operation of
intelligent modelling. It should be clear that the information which reaches us through the senses is not only perceptual, but also communicational, and especially verbal. A lot of that information, however, is concerned with our social orientation and exploration of ideas rather than with factual information. We must allow for model-dependent reality through verbally constructed worlds and social orientation.

Here we come back to the Cinderella problem. The reality of our verbal interactions undoubtedly has a physical mechanism, but our models and the messages we send and receive are non-physical realities. Indeed, verbal constructions may have no real-world reference at all. Language then creates a world of imaginary experience. We live in our own constructions of the world, as Schopenhauer would say our “representation of it”, but we must remember that our representation is shared with that of others and to a large extent dependent on what we acquire from others. Our representation is not purely individual, as Foley, Eagleman, and Provine (above) suggest. But our representation depends also on human cognitive capacities and our socialisation, including the myths and abstract constructs that come from language and from a long history of rationalisation (and, so to speak, “irrationalisation” – mythologising) of the world around us.

In Conclusion: Physical and Verbal Reality

It makes no sense to say that somehow there is language on the one hand and factual reality on the other. That view is a commonplace of much language philosophy and the “criticism of language”, which led to (failed) attempts to set up logically perfect languages such as we find in the Principia Mathematica (Whitehead & Russell, 1910) and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1922) as well as in much of truth-functional semantics. Language is a reality (not outside, or opposed to, reality) and, as we have seen, language creates a significant part of our reality. Our verbal interactions as we are aware of them are parts of a social reality connecting each individual to others and to the external world. Our language depends on our cognitive processes; each apparent “speech sound” is a construct of our brains along with all of the other linguistic units and their associations. Language is also part of the interconnected oneness of all things too, but – as a surrogate for, or conventional way of modelling, physical reality – it is both a function of physical processes and a way of construing, or looking at, the external world and internal experiences. We live much of our lives in a language world- it is our reality even if it is just a (misleading) construct. “Possible worlds” are constantly created by verbal means. Any possible world is treated as if it were a reality, but any possible world is subject to judgements about its realism, factuality, morality, among many others- we fantasise, but are not fantasists.

Where language creates experience, we project (objectified) verbal constructions onto the real world of experience and look for resemblances. Thus, in proverbs such as a stitch in time saves nine or one swallow doesn’t make a summer, we look for cases in which a timely action prevents damaging consequences or in which one good thing does not mean that all is going well. The real-world possibilities are, of course, endless. A swift movement may prevent the breaking of a valuable vase or foresight in driving may prevent an accident; one report of good company profits may be set against a generally gloomy economic outlook, or one win by a generally losing football team is a rarity rather than an indication of major improvement. The proverb can thus function as a warning or caution. But also we look for a lack of resemblance; in such a case we might say the proverb does not apply. Similarly, with any verbal expression. In John loved Mary, we will assess whether John’s attitude and behaviour is really that of loving and whether the loving is really something in the past. In the
Cinderella story, we can project the key features of the story into a potential real world to determine \( \text{inter alia} \) the poetic truth of the construction – do the ideas resemble known situations, attitudes, and so on? can we learn from the moral of the tale?

However, we must also allow that, if language is a reality, then language too is not what it seems, and that is clearly the case when we consider the unconscious processes and verbal resources that are applied to circumstances and communicational needs. Our awareness of language, like our awareness of the perceptual world, exists at the “macro-level” of everyday experience.

A further implication is that the speaker participant producing or receiving verbal signals is internal to a complex social process. We are not observers independent of the totality around us, however much we feel ourselves to be separate individuals operating independently. That feeling is an illusion and the philosophical distinction between the empirical and transcendental subjects used to account for the “paradox of subjectivity” (very clearly discussed by Carr, 1999) must give way to a process in which the brain creates a representation of the world (including a representation of language) to itself as part of a single totality and in conjunction with other brains. As noted, speech sounds are not discrete entities, but constructs formed by the brain from continuous sound energy, and English speakers can respond to circumstances with plural or non-plural nouns and a range of tenses—but “select” they must and the range of “choices” (not conscious ones), that is, the set of conventions we have acquired and which integrate us into the Anglophone community, is determined by the norms of our language community, which we have acquired and apply (unconsciously) to circumstances. The same can also be said of the language analyst observing verbal phenomena. The analyst too is part of the totality and not a purely external observer. The analyst may not be part of the verbal exchange, but does need to be internal to the conventions of the language under analysis and to have the cognitive processes for recognition of verbal phenomena. The vaunted “scientific objectivity” of linguistics is an illusion. The best we can do is to adopt an artificial “objective stance” towards verbal phenomena applying a limited and selective range of criteria and abstracting phenomena of interest (otherwise no analysis would be possible (Ewing, 1951, p. 210); there would be too many aspects of a single problem), although in reality everything is interconnected and can be seen from indefinitely many points of view. The point was made by Bradley (1897).

Language is then a key behavioural adaptation, and a major part of a strategy of cooperation for survival. Humans invest an enormous amount of energy in maintaining language and in its cultural transmission. It is likely that language has its origins in sociality (Dunbar, 1998; Jones, 2009) along with the development of empathy and the recognition of emotions in others, but language as we have it today has both a social purpose and a purpose in our understanding of the world- the representation of events and states as well as their interconnections and rational analysis, the maintenance of memories, and guesses or imagination about possibilities in the future. It helps us to think of what might have been and what might be occurring elsewhere or in the experience of others. The social side of language can be seen in greetings, farewells, polite enquiries about health or wellbeing (where there are reciprocal “adjacency pairs”, a kind of mirror behaviour) as well as in requests, suggestions, advice, warnings, and even demands and orders.

Above, we have identified some of the complexities in the explanatory gap between physical and social constructs, especially the qualitative factors. In order to account for the cultural development of language as a way of thinking with many qualitative steps, we need to look
for the seeds of language development in such abilities as individuation of experiences, recognition of similar individuals as representative of types, the symbolisation of components of experience, the identification of cause and correlation and their representation, and the development of hypothesis formation about the world of experience (guessing, trial and error learning). Those qualities are matters of the organisation and integration of physical mechanisms. Of course, our nearest living primate relatives have only very rudimentary abilities of those sorts and in particular have relatively little symbolisation and empathic abilities, and we can only speculate about the abilities of other hominins\(^8\). We can, however, identify the qualitative properties of communication. On the other hand, humans’ heavy investment in cooperation and the reduction of confrontation in larger social groups has led to characteristics such as high levels of empathy and awareness both of personal identity and of others as persons as well as the sense of group membership. The high level of teaching in, for example, the parent-child relationship has led to the possibility of significant cultural transmission – language development and socialisation go hand in hand for the individual and for the species. The rational and social aspects of human development suggest possibilities for a resolution of the Cinderella problem through the ideas of projection and resemblance.

In the case of language as a means of problem-solving, as we have seen in the case of proposals such as those of Rovelli or Hawking and Mlodinow, there is the statement of a position (e.g. that all reality is interaction, or model-dependent) – an objectified verbal construct. Such a position can be seen in a wider context of debate and can be discussed from a variety of perspectives; as we have seen social interaction implies some point of comparison in the form of a mental model. The debate can be seen in the wider context of proposals for understanding the nature of reality\(^9\). Positions such as “model-dependent reality” can be regarded as starting with ideas of the form “what if...?” and thinking through or projecting those ideas (onto real-world experiences) and comparing with observations. In the case of practical thinking on problems, such as how to skin a rabbit, how to store water, and so on, we can imagine solutions in the form “what if...?” based on observations (such as sharp things cut, what if we use a sharp stone?, or rainwater is retained in tree hollows, what if we made our own hollow as a container?). Language allows the exploration of possibilities as well as possible alternatives (e.g. for a container) and problems (of materials or tools) before practical action and at a distance from or in the absence of the real-world objects or issues- we imagine with language; it is a kind of substitution of language for physical reality and actions. The hypothetico-deductive approach is inherent in language. In a more advanced case: what if reality is just our verbal model of it? Is that a starting point for explanation?

However not all “problems” are of the practical sort. Interpersonal relations and social organisation are also “problems” to be solved in complex communities. Story-telling is also a vehicle for arriving at understanding through imaginary, but realistic circumstances on the basis of possibilities – a form of “what if ... ?” (and for storing and transmitting memories in the form – look what happened when ... , look what happens if ... for instance in morality or admonitory tales). Language allows the construction of imaginary worlds for the exploration of social and interpersonal issues without the need for actions, as in the various forms of the Cinderella story or parables. What if a girl loses her wealth and social status to greedy relatives? What if some chance or intervention could benefit a virtuous but powerless person? Acting out stories and rituals are intermediate between real-world actions and purely imaginary constructions. Isn’t that what we find also in games or children’s play – or drama?

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\(^8\) Although the sociality, artistic products, and inhumation practices of Neanderthals suggest that they too had developed a strong sense of empathy.

\(^9\) For further discussion of this point, see Rastall (2017).
Thus, in both practical and imaginary problems, language allows the representation and discussion of possibilities, which can be treated as “real”. That is, the suspension of disbelief in a story like Cinderella is the treatment of it as if it were real – a “possible world”. The agents in the story and their actions allow us to ponder issues of justice and moral behaviour as well as the role of chance in human affairs. The qualitative step here is this substitution of symbol for physical reality; we can thus see a link between the real and the unreal, or between physical monism and verbally constructed reality.

Reducing the explanatory gap between our physical understanding and perspectives on reality-as-experienced involves, on the one hand, the recognition that individual experience is to a large extent a part of, and determined by, the wider community and one’s place in a physical and social totality and, on the other hand, that language as we now have it is the product of complex qualitative developments. But we must also accept that everyday reality as we experience it is limited by our perceptual and cognitive capacities and that language is the default mechanism for orientation in everyday reality. Part of that linguistic construction of our reality and human concerns involves using the unreal as if real to explore “what if” possibilities. The investigation of physical reality through modelling reality beyond our human perceptual capacities similarly involves setting up hypotheses of the form “what if?” and models of physical reality “as if” they directly represented ultimate reality. The remaining gap is the distance between physical and biological understanding of the brain and qualitative developments in language.
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Ernest Hemingway and His Unconventional Role in World War II

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Abstract

While Ernest Hemingway is often viewed as one of the United States’ greatest writers, the heterogeneous features of his life experience can surprise readers who are simply familiar with his literary production. Although he officially served as a correspondent in World War II, Hemingway wrote only five articles during his time in Europe in 1944 and 1945. Much of his time away from writing was spent participating in irregular warfare. While Hemingway officially denied the charges made against him by other correspondents, Hemingway’s private correspondence reveals that he did, in fact, actively engage in the war effort. Indeed, as a reward for his heroics, Hemingway was decorated with the Bronze Star Medal, the highest military award available to a civilian. The official citation credited Hemingway with courage while bringing the reality of war to his readers. His battlefield heroics could not be mentioned in the citation because it was against the Geneva Convention for correspondents to engage in military actions. There is no doubt, however, that such actions did take place. While Hemingway’s actions were illegal, they undoubtedly helped the US forces advance in France. Sundry skills, from his knowledge of French to his ability to read maps and understand terrain, proved highly useful to US military commanders in the area.

Keywords: Hemingway, World War II, irregular warfare
It is customary to regard Ernest Hemingway as one of the greatest writers of the twentieth century, part of the group of men whom Gertrude Stein called the “lost generation.” Hemingway did not necessarily agree with that characterization, however. In a letter to his biographer Carlos Baker, Hemingway wrote, “I believed there was no such thing as a lost generation. I thought beatup, maybe ... in many ways. But damned if we were lost except for the deads ... and the certified crazies ... We were a very solid generation though without education (some of us). But you could always get it.” Hemingway made his reputation the years following his service with the Red Cross in World War I and later had experience in the Spanish Civil War. He would again see action in World War II, proving, indeed, that he was not part of a lost group of men, but rather of a contingent of men who were very alive and very active in promoting their ideals and beliefs. Indeed, Hemingway’s actions in World War II, though often criticized, did show a calmness under fire and a willingness to risk his life in support of the Allied cause. Far from the scared young man who first experienced war on the Italian Front in World War I, Hemingway had become a creature of war and had grown accustomed to it. As he wrote to David Garnett in 1938, war, in his experience, was not always horrible: “When people know what they are fighting for, or at least are sure of themselves, it is not a gloomy business. It is gloomy to be sent out to die on the Somme or at Passchendaele in ... un-understandable idiocy.”

In the Second World War, Hemingway chased German submarines off the coast of Cuba until he went to Europe to serve as a war correspondent and an unconventional soldier. Yet, as could be expected with Hemingway, his service was not ordinary nor was his behavior. He was already a famous writer returning to his journalistic roots and enjoying a celebrity status that suited his massive ego. During his time covering the war in Europe, he broke the rules for actions by a correspondent in wartime as his private correspondence indicates, although he denied any wrongdoing when he was brought up on charges. As was often the case with Hemingway, he dealt with the war on his own terms, ultimately winning a Bronze Star, the highest military award for which civilians are eligible.

By the time World War II began for the United States in 1941, Hemingway was living in Cuba with his third wife, Martha Gelhorn. More prescient than most, Hemingway had long warned about the dangers of fascism, starting with his support for the Spanish Republic in the Spanish Civil War. He believed that if the Germans and Italians were not stopped in Spain, they would eventually cause greater problems in the years to come. An alliance between these two countries and the Japanese had created the Axis powers, an alliance that had been successful in seizing land across Europe and in Asia.

Although Hemingway spent less than a year in Europe, he saw a considerable amount of fighting and conveyed his experiences to readers back home who were anxious to learn about the war’s progress. His talent as a writer of fiction made his reports from the front lines more exciting than those of a typical news correspondent, as he added colorful commentary along with the recounting of the events of the war.

Yet Hemingway, now in his forties, did not immediately jump into the fray, as he had done in years past. As he wrote to his brother Leicester in August 1942, “I am delighted to hear that your older brother is being heavily criticized by all the desk polishers in Washington for

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1 Ernest Hemingway to Carlos Baker, Easter Sunday 1951, Box 10, Folder 4, Ernest Hemingway Collection, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.

2 Ernest Hemingway to David Garnett, postmarked 1 November 1938, Box 3 Folder 5, Hemingway Collection, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.
taking no part in the war. Please encourage all such rumors as much as possible. I only enter wars according to my horoscope and the signs are not right at the moment.”³ At this point in the war, Hemingway was living comfortably at his home, Finca Vigía, outside of Havana, Cuba. Initially, he was interested in setting up a group that would go after Nazi spies working in Havana. There had been a similar type of organization that he had worked with in Madrid during the Spanish Civil War. He also wanted to use his boat, the Pilar, as a submarine hunter. He would wait until the German submarine surfaced and they attempted to board his vessel, at which time his men would open up with machine guns and try to sink the ship with the bazooka they had on board. As Hemingway wrote to Alfred Rice, “in 1942–3 I never left Cuba at anytime except to go to sea on the most difficult type of mission you could be assigned in counter espionage and anti-submarine work … in 1944 I was at sea until the subs left, going to sea each time one was signaled in our area.”⁴ His wife Martha wrote from London urging him to give up his submarine hunting and come to Europe to witness what everyone knew would be coming – the invasion of the continent.

Martha Gelhorn left Cuba in the fall of 1943, after taking as much abuse as she could stand from Hemingway. She had vowed not to return to the island – a promise that she made good on, starting an affair with General John Gavin and effectively ending her marriage to Hemingway. Life in Cuba had revolved around him, and Martha, much like the woman who’d become his next wife, Mary, felt that she never fully fit into the life at the finca. To add insult to injury, Hemingway had decided to work for Martha’s employer, Collier’s, who chose him as their official war correspondent and not her. Shortly after arriving in Britain, Hemingway was in a car accident, and while he was laid up in the hospital Martha came to see him to essentially say that their marriage was over. He had reserved a room for her next to his at the Dorchester Hotel in London, but she rejected his offer and instead took a room on a higher floor. Hemingway took advantage of his new-found freedom by starting romance with a reporter named Mary Welsh, whom he met through the writer Irwin Shaw (Lynn, 1987, 508–509).

Still suffering the effects of his car accident – a head wound and sore knees – Hemingway boarded the transport to France the night before D-Day. His article in Collier’s gave the impression that he had gone ashore with the troops, when fact he had gone back to the transport ship after the men had landed. Ultimately, he wrote his article from the safety of the Dorchester Hotel in London. Hemingway still needed another six weeks of convalescence before he would be able to join the troops fighting in France. After joining the men, he again suffered a head injury that had lingering effects, such as headaches and ringing in the ears (Lynn, 1987, 512–513). In the article, entitled “Voyage to Victory,” published in Collier’s on 22 July 1944, Hemingway recounted his activities on D-Day and the landing at Fox Green Beach. This was Hemingway’s third war after World War I and the Spanish Civil War; as a result, he was one of the most experienced men in the field, although he held no commission in the US armed forces. As he described it “we came roaring in on the beach, I sat high on the stern to see what we were up against. I had the glasses dry now and I took a good look at the shore. The shore was coming toward us awfully fast, and in the glasses it was coming even faster.” As it turned out, the beach was mined, so they needed to abort the landing, picking up wounded men on the way back to the destroyer, and dropping Hemingway off there as well.

³ Ernest Hemingway to Leicester Hemingway, 12 August 1942, Box 3 Folder 9, Ernest Hemingway Collection, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.
Since there was much uncertainty about the landings, most correspondents were prevented from going ashore on June sixth.\(^5\)

Hemingway ultimately arrived in France and later recounted his experiences during the liberation of Paris for his readers. As usual, his skills as a storyteller helped him to convey what happened, making his accounts a far more interesting read than one might find in a local newspaper: “Never can I describe the emotions I felt on the arrival of the armored column of General Leclerc southeast of Paris. Having just returned from a patrol which scared the pants off of me … I was informed that the general himself was just down the road and anxious to see us.”\(^6\) In reality, Leclerc was not interested in seeing Hemingway, since as the writer later told his readers, the general told him to buzz off. As the day of liberation approached, Hemingway wrote, “We knew there would be fighting the next day by the screen that the German army had left. But I did not anticipate any heavy fighting, since we knew the German dispositions and could attack or by-pass them accordingly, and I assured our guerrillas that if they only would be patient, we would have the privilege of entering Paris with soldiers ahead of us instead of behind us.”\(^7\)

He continued to describe the scene to his readers: “The French armor operated beautifully. On the road to Toussus le Noble, where we knew there were Germans with machine guns in the wheat shocks, the tanks deployed and screened both of our flanks and we saw them rolling ahead through the cropped wheat field as though they were on maneuvers. No one saw the Germans until they came out with their hands up after the tanks had passed.”\(^8\) Yet for Hemingway, the most important thing was getting to Paris safely. As he commented, “my own war aim … was to get into Paris without being shot. Our necks had been out for a long time. Paris was going to be taken.”\(^9\)

Hemingway wrote to Mary Welsh on 31 July and 1 August 1944 from Villebandon and Hambye in France detailing his experiences with the infantry, which he said he preferred to the armored forces on account of the dust. He missed her but was unable to convey his true feelings, given that he knew that many people would be able to read the letter before it eventually reached her. He wrote her “Am very happy when I see you. I make as good a war as I can and I understand infantry but am hearing much [emphasis original] new stuff. Am very happy at Front but that is not loving.”\(^10\) Later he shared his thoughts on the battle with her: “I went over to the big lot I was supposed to be with and asked permission to stay with the Division as long as we are fighting and then catch up with the other people. We are fighting the most important part now and I do not want to leave because timeliness means nothing and like to finish what you start.”\(^11\)

With the liberation of Paris, Hemingway took up residence at the Ritz Hotel and drank copiously of the alcohol stored in its cellars. Many visitors, including a young J. D. Salinger, came to visit the world-famous writer. Hemingway went to visit many of his old haunts from his time in Paris in the 1920s, although, as he wrote to Mary in August 1944, “but it is all so

\(^6\) Ernest Hemingway, “We Came to Paris,” 7 October 1944 in Collier’s, reprinted in Hemingway on War, 327.
\(^7\) Ernest Hemingway, “We Came to Paris,” 7 October 1944 in Collier’s, reprinted in Hemingway on War, 328.
\(^8\) Ernest Hemingway, “We Came to Paris,” 7 October 1944 in Collier’s, reprinted in Hemingway on War, 329.
\(^9\) Ernest Hemingway, “We Came to Paris,” 7 October 1944 in Collier’s, reprinted in Hemingway on War, 332.
\(^10\) Ernest Hemingway to Mary Welsh, 31 July and 1 August 1944 in Baker, 559.
\(^11\) Ernest Hemingway to Mary Welsh, 31 July and 1 August 1944 in Baker, 560.
improbable that you feel like you have died and it is all a dream.” He tried to convince Mary to come to Paris so they could be together; he admitted that they had not known each other very long, but even in that short time period he had gained a lot of affection for her.12

In 1956 Hemingway wrote a fictional short story, “A Room on the Garden Side,” about events at the Ritz Hotel in Paris during World War II. The 2,100-word manuscript described a writer named Robert who was referred to by his admirers as “Papa,” Hemingway’s popular nickname. First published in 2018, this story had previously been viewed only by scholars (Haag, 2018, A1). It was one of five stories that Hemingway penned about the war dealing with subjects such as the irregular warfare in which he had participated en route to Paris. As he wrote to his editor Charles Scribner, Jr. in August 1956, “I suppose that they are a little shocking since they deal with irregular troops and combat and with people who actually kill other people … they are probably very dull stories but some are very funny I think. Anyway you can always publish them after I am dead. I have five more that I am going to write now.”13

In October 1944, Hemingway was summoned to a hearing of the Inspector General, Third Army, regarding his conduct while in the field during the fighting to take Paris. The charges were that he had removed the correspondent’s insignia from his uniform, had assumed command of some of the Free French partisans, had conducted patrols in the area, and that there were weapons stored in his room. Many of the charges had been made by fellow journalists who were perhaps jealous of Hemingway’s fame and saw him as their major competitor. All of these issues could result in a violation of the Geneva Convention’s regulations governing the conduct of journalists in a war zone. Hemingway was able to talk his way out of the charges by saying that he had merely provided advice when asked by the free French forces, he had removed his tunic when it was hot, and the weapons had been stored in his room because there was no other place to store them (Lynn, 1987, 518).

In his recounting of the events of the hearing, Hemingway praised the Inspector General. The incident, which had become the subject of allegations by fellow correspondents, had also invited protests by neutral power signatories of the Geneva Convention. “Allegations were that [I] commanded troops, removed insignia, defended town, ran patrols, had full Col as chief of staff, and other crap. I.G. very sound and understanding,” Hemingway wrote.14 He clearly lied to save himself embarrassment as well as to protect those in command who had allowed him to perform these actions. While many have criticized such actions as going beyond acceptable behavior by a correspondent, Hemingway’s activities were quite useful and, without question, they aided in the success of the military operations in which he was involved (Dearborn, 2018, 469). Commanders made use of Hemingway’s military knowledge and experience, as well as his language skills and knowledge of the terrain. Colonel David Bruce, who was with Hemingway in his exploits during the move into Paris, concluded that Hemingway was a “born leader of men, and, in spite of his strong independence of character [was] a highly disciplined individual.” (Reynolds, 2017, 164, 171; Reynolds, 1999, 386)

There were many stories surrounding Hemingway’s actions. While his actual role in combat is hard to verify, and there is no evidence that he killed any Germans, his behind-the-lines activities are indisputable (Mort, 2016, 202). In many ways, such actions suited Hemingway’s view of himself as a warrior, but he was careful not admit to doing anything

12 Ernest Hemingway to Mary Welsh, 27 August 1944, in Baker, 564–565.
13 Ernest Hemingway to Charles Scribner, Jr., 14 August 1956, in Baker, 868.
14 Ernest Hemingway to Colonel Charles T. Lanham, 8 October 1944 in Baker, 572–73.
that would have been illegal for him to do. Yet in his private correspondence, Hemingway admitted that he did do more than simply offer advice and referred to the French partisans (the Maquis) as “his” men. Hemingway recounted his experiences during this period to Soviet author Konstantin Simonov in a letter written in June 1946 from Finca Vigía: “I tried to be useful through knowing French and the country and being able to work ahead with the Maquis. This was a good life and you would have enjoyed it … Andre Malraux came to see me and asked how many men I commanded. I told him never more than 200 at the most and usually between 14 and 60.”

Further evidence of Hemingway’s actions come from a letter he wrote to Mary Welsh: “[O]n nineteenth [of August 1944] made contact with group of Maquis who placed themselves under my command. Because so old and ugly looking I guess. Clothed them with cavalry recon outfit which had been killed at entrance to Rambouillet.” Clearly, he was doing more here than simply offering advice, which gives credibility to the charges made against him. He also mentioned his actions with the Maquis to his son Patrick in a letter written in September 1944: “have been with an Infantry Division . . . except for the time that commanded a French Maquis outfit (while temporarily detached from being a correspondent) that was the best time of all but can’t write you about it will have to tell you.”

Confirmation of Hemingway’s command of the Maquis unit also came from a letter he wrote to General R. O. Barton, whom he addressed as “Tubby.” He wrote “I am eternally grateful to you for turning me loose that time so I could go on and into Paris so I had a chance to have a command, no matter how irregular, and do something useful and fight into the town I love the best in the world.” He continued, “I could not have done any of things I was happy about in the war without you backing me. And you backed me afterwards when we found out that things were illegal, technically, that should not be in war.” Indeed, his employer Collier’s heard about his improper actions during the fighting for Paris and did not pay his expenses: “they found out from squealers that I had fought. I was using [sic] my own money that I had in England and France . . . so the war cost me 12 G. in 1944–45.”

For his actions, Hemingway was awarded the Bronze Star after the war. As he wrote to Alfred Rice in December 1948, “I was decorated with the Bronze Star which was the highest piece of junk they could give a civilian and an irregular and was proposed for various worthwhile things which could not be given due to my irregular status and the fact they would contravene the Geneva Convention.” The official account of the award, which he received at the American Embassy in Havana in June 1947, gave no mention of Hemingway’s leading of an irregular force, his work as an interrogator, or the setting up of an operations center, but rather referenced his work under fire in the front lines in order to bring the story of the fighting to his readers (Reynolds, 2017, 167). The Bronze Star is the highest award available to civilians serving with armed forces in combat areas, but Hemingway would have liked to have received a Distinguished Service Cross. This more illustrious award, however, was available only to military personnel (Reynolds, 2017, 202).

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15 Ernest Hemingway to Konstantin Simonov, 20 June 1946, in Baker, 607.
16 Ernest Hemingway to Mary Welsh, 27 August 1944, in Baker, 564.
17 Ernest Hemingway to Patrick Hemingway, 15 September 1944 in Baker, 570.
18 Ernest Hemingway to General R.O. Barton, 9 June 1948 in Baker, 639.
19 Ernest Hemingway to General R.O. Barton, 9 June 1948 in Baker, 640.
20 Ernest Hemingway to Alfred Rice 15 December 1948 in Baker, 656.
In a November 1944 article published in Collier’s, Hemingway described his experiences as the unit that he was with advanced toward Germany, preparing for the Battle of the Huertgen Forest. For security reasons, he did not specify which unit or exactly where it was located. Entitled “War in the Siegfried Line,” the article recounts an exciting trek into German territory. As he wrote, “the rat race went on again through rolling, forested country. Sometimes we would be half an hour behind the retreating enemy’s mechanized force. Sometimes we would get up to within five minutes of them.”

Hemingway set the scene well for his readers, using his literary talents to provide them with a detailed look at the conditions the men endured. “The weather had broken. It was cold and raining and blowing half a gale, and ahead of us was the dark forest wall of the Schnee Eifel range where the dragon lived, and behind us on the first hill behind was a German reviewing stand that had been built for high officers to occupy … we were hitting it on the point that the Germans had chosen to prove, in sham battles, that it was impregnable.”

Hemingway used his story to inform the readers about what often happened in combat. Like many of his articles, this one demonstrated the confusion that often occurred when troops were engaged in the field – contrasting that with the commonly perceived belief that wars were well organized affairs with clear objectives.

In a letter to his son Patrick, nicknamed Mouse and various varieties of that word, Hemingway was frank: “We are in the middle of a terrific damned battle Mousie – that I hope will finish off the Kraut Army and end the war – and I cannot leave until our phase of it is over. That is why I didn’t get back and I couldn’t tell you before hand. Then I got in some trouble accused of commanding irregular troops … Anyway it came out all right. We’ve had a tough time Mousler. Very tough. Now tougher than ever … Mouse big fight today in the Forest. Forest is about same as back of Clark’s Fork – trees as thick as thickest.” He also filled his son in on events in Paris following the liberation: “Paris beautiful but still had bad chow situation. Bicycle racing going on. Very fine new riders … Papa still living at the Ritz (joint we took) when back in town. Town so lovely but with the exchange 50 to 1 dollar … horribly expensive.” He also discussed the new paintings by Picasso and other artists that had been finished during the war, commenting that as a result of the German occupation they had nothing else to do except stay home and paint.

While Hemingway indicated that he prayed during the First World War, especially after he was injured, that was not the case for World War II. As he wrote, “[t]his war got through without praying once. Times a little bad sometimes too. But felt that having [sic] forfeited any right to ask for these intersessions would be absolutely crooked to ask for same no matter how scared.” Hemingway claimed he had stopped praying for himself in Madrid in 1937.

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21 Ernest Hemingway, “War in the Siegfried Line,” 18 November 1944 in Collier’s reprinted in Hemingway on War, 335.
22 Ernest Hemingway, “War in the Siegfried Line,” 18 November 1944 in Collier’s reprinted in Hemingway on War, 335.
23 Ernest Hemingway, “War in the Siegfried Line,” 18 November 1944 in Collier’s reprinted in Hemingway on War, 336.
25 Ernest Hemingway to Patrick Hemingway, 19 November 1944, in Baker, 577.
26 Ernest Hemingway to Thomas Welsh, 19 June 1945 in Baker, 592.
during the Spanish Civil War, “when other people were having such a time being destroyed by shell fire that it seemed egotistical and wicked to pray for one’s self.”  Indeed, as he later wrote to Robert Morgan Brown, “I remember asking the chaplain one time if he believed this shit we were fed that there were no atheists in fox holes and him saying, ‘No sir, Mr. Hemingway. No[t] since I came to know you and the Colonel sir.’”

In his third war, Hemingway was not fearful – he was actually enjoying himself. During the First World War Hemingway found shelling to be something that would “make me quite sick to my stomach.” But with his experience in the Spanish Civil War and now World War II he learned to relax and accept the dangers of battle. He related a story to Robert Morgan Brown about events when he was involved in the Battle of the Bulge in Luxembourg. “We had a CP [command post] in a priest’s house… and every night I would drink a bottle of the priest’s wine (it was not sacramental wine) and then urinate in the bottle to fill it up. The priest was reported to be collaborator as everyone always was and I marked the bottles Schloss Hemingstein 1944.” He went on to recount his conversations with the Methodist chaplain who was attached to the unit Hemingway was reporting about: “In the evenings I used to tell the Chaplain… about the Marechale de Saxe who was one of 367 illegitimate children by the same father and commanded his regiment at the age of fourteen and devoted himself to a life of gluttony, sexual indulgence and corruption and I explained that while the Colonel and I had no time for this type of this while the war was on … who knew what we might dedicate ourselves to after this war was over.” Hemingway developed a relationship with this unnamed chaplain and read out loud to him from de Saxe’s book *Reveries on the Art of War*. Hemingway read this, he indicated, “to improve morale; mostly my own. [The chaplain] acquired a strange confidence in us, really believing, and when I was really ruined one night I told him that the Colonel and I were not able to decide if we should conquer the world or take some limited objective like the Belgian Congo.”

Hemingway left France on March 6, 1945 to return to Cuba via the United States. He wrote a brief note to Mary as he departed. “I love you always and always will. Now go to get our life started. Don’t let anything bother you. I’m sorry to be so sticky getting off. Will be wonderful when I see you and will be truly faithful to you every minute I am away. In my heart, in my head and in my body.” After he returned to Cuba, Hemingway wrote to Colonel Lanham claiming that he missed being with the men in Europe. “It is a hell of a thing going away from the 22nd tho. It probably sounds wet but I was, and am, absolutely homesick for the regiment and I miss you very badly Buck. I don’t give a damn about writing. Will have to get over that. I guess I will. Have gotten over everything else.” He felt that the time he spent away from the fighting when he was in Paris was a time to let loose and enjoy himself, for even though he was not an active participant in the fighting, he could still have been killed or wounded when up in the front lines. “I always liked it in Paris because I knew I was always going back and so tried to have as much fun as possible and never had any guilty feelings

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27 Ernest Hemingway to Robert Morgan Brown, 14 July 1954, Box 3 Folder 8, Ernest Hemingway Collection, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.
28 Ernest Hemingway to Robert Morgan Brown, 8 August 1956, Box 3 Folder 8 Ernest Hemingway Collection, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.
29 Ernest Hemingway to David Garnett, postmarked 1 November 1938, Box 3 Folder 5, Hemingway Collection, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.
30 Ernest Hemingway to Robert Morgan Brown, 8 August 1956.
31 Ernest Hemingway to Robert Morgan Brown, 8 August 1956.
32 Ernest Hemingway to Robert Morgan Brown, 8 August 1956.
33 Ernest Hemingway to Mary Welsh, c.6 March 1945, in Baker, 578.
34 Ernest Hemingway to Colonel Charles T. Lanham, 2 April 1945, in Baker, 578.
because knew where we came from and what we did.”

Hemingway went on to write that he regretted that he could not still be with Lanham. He wrote, “I feel like a swine here while you fight… Am quite bitter about some things. But that is another piece of baggage we can not afford. Have some luck and if anything ever happens to us we will all have a fine time with the better element in hell.”

He also wrote to Lanham that he struggled with depression, and he was doing his best to cut down on his drinking as a present to Mary. Like him, Mary was married at the time they met. She traveled back to the states a month later and returned to Chicago to announce to her parents that she was planning to divorce her husband, Noel Monks. As he wrote to Lanham in April 1945, “Mary finally got to the states. Had a hell of a trip. She couldn’t tell me why over the phone. So have thirteen days more of Limbo while she finishes N.Y. and sees her family… Cut out all drinking at night, you know… So all morning drinking… haven’t had the real headaches now for quite a while.”

He wrote Mary a week later, to let her know about the events going on at Finca Vigía and in the village that was going to be her new home, until the land appropriation of the Cuban Revolution forced the couple to relocate to the United States. As he mentioned to her, “[h]ave gotten you a lot of lovely books and there is a humming bird that lives quite near and comes everyday to the bougainvillea. Little house is fixed up so you can have it if you want it. It is very nice. No childrens [children] come until the end of June.” He indicated that writing to her was, as he put it, a “selfish pleasure.” Hemingway felt that he was working to get into writing shape and that letters were one way to accomplish this. They would be followed by a simple story and later a complicated one.

As Hemingway wrote to Colonel Lanham later that month, “I would have given anything to have stayed as you know and did a very poor job of getting away as it was. But there really wasn’t any choice.” This was largely because Hemingway was still suffering the effects of his head injuries, which should have received greater attention at the time, and indeed may have gotten that proper treatment at a time when there was not a major war in progress. He also indicated that he had been absolutely faithful to Mary. As he mentioned, it was “easy when you really love somebody.” He felt that when Mary came to join him life would be able to start – although he was quite lonely otherwise. As he wrote, “As it is am just killing days and wishing I was a soldier instead of a chickenshit writer. Old worthless wish.” He also encountered braggarts at the local bar telling their war stories to all who would listen, only to be shot down by Hemingway, who declined to talk about his time in the thick of the fighting.

In many ways, Hemingway’s work in combat turned out to be more successful than his job as a journalist. He took the correspondent job as a step to getting some useful job in Europe, but he ultimately wrote only five articles for Collier’s over the course of ten months and they paid less than half of his expenses. While there is no question that Hemingway played an important role in the war, he played only in a minor role as a journalist. His work in combat with the Maquis, his knowledge of French and of the countryside around Paris, which he had explored while he lived there in the 1920s, were all very helpful to the Allied cause. But when the specter of war again rose in Korea in 1950 Hemingway stayed out of it. His age and physical condition probably precluded his participation. As he wrote to his young love interest Adriana Ivancich in July of 1950,
“About going to the war: I will only if it is my true duty. I will not go to be valiente, nor to advance myself, nor to maintain any reputation. I will go only if it is truly necessary that I go fight. Then I know where I go and with whom. But I refuse to worry one minute about it until it is time to go.”

Hemingway’s role in World War II demonstrated both his willingness to aid his country in a time of need as well as his unconventional approach to wartime service. His submarine patrols did relatively little to help the war effort, but the time spent in Europe was an important aid to the Allied victory in World War II. In many ways, his position as a journalist was merely a way for him to get involved in the fighting. From his days in the Spanish Civil War, Hemingway had been a premature anti-fascist and his fighting against the Germans in World War II was a natural extension of his ideological and political beliefs. The war marked a transition in Hemingway’s career. He no longer sought glory with the same intensity as he did as a younger man. He never again went into the fray of battle, preferring the comforts of home in Cuba and Idaho. He emerged as a mature writer, winning the Nobel Prize and the Pulitzer Prize in the mid-1950s. Yet his depression and heavy drinking took a serious toll on his health. Mary would join Hemingway in Cuba at Finca Vigía, although their relationship would prove to be a complicated one, with Mary attempting to leave Hemingway only to be stopped at the airport in Havana and taken back to the finca. She remained married to Hemingway until his death in 1961 from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. She, like the other women who loved him, saw a special quality in Hemingway that made him, as some would argue, the greatest writer of his generation. Such genius rarely comes without a price, and that was certainly the case with Hemingway.

41 Ernest Hemingway to Adriana Ivancich, 23 July 1950, Box 3 Folder 6 Hemingway Collection, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas.
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Memories and Mindscapes: 
An Intertextual Study of Haruki Murakami’s *Norwegian Wood*

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Abstract

This study focuses on obligatory and optional intertextualities that are discernible in Haruki Murakami’s novel *Norwegian Wood*, intertextualities that take the form of direct references and allusions to classical and modern literary works, contemporary films and music. The present analysis aims to substantiate a number of important analogies between the novel’s theme, plot, setting and characters and those of *The Catcher in the Rye*, *The Great Gatsby* and *The Magic Mountain*. It also illustrates how intertextuality is achieved through adaptation, translation and dialogue, all the while exposing undertones of literary theories such as postmodernism, existentialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism that foster creative interaction between reader and narrative.

*Keywords*: Haruki Murakami, intertextuality, Norwegian Wood
Introduction

Intertextuality, the idea that the meaning of a text is shaped by other texts, is one of the dominant ideas in modern literary criticism. It is a complex concept that is probably best understood through an analogy. Iampolski (1998) compares it to an intriguing episode in The Odyssey where Odysseus journeys to the Underworld to consult the blind prophet Teiresias. The old seer immediately recognizes Odysseus when they meet and foretells the long years of wandering ahead of him. Odysseus’s mother was also there but, unlike Teiresias, she does not recognize her own son.

The blind man, it turns out, can see better, for his blindness has retained the past and its images in the dark. To recognize is to place what you see alongside what you know, alongside what has already been. Odysseus’s mother, bereft of her memory, cannot "see" her son. Sight without memory is blind. (p. 2)

The blind prophet recognizes Odysseus because the gods have allowed him to retain his memory beyond his death. Odysseus’s mother, having no such ability, can only gaze blankly on the face of the son she once loved. This encounter throws light on the complex nature of intertextuality: Just as Odysseus is recognized only by someone who preserves a memory of him, texts can only be understood by the reader when connected to memory.

Intertextuality, therefore, is the way the meaning of a text is shaped by memory. By the term “memory” we mean the experiences of the author who wrote it down and the experiences of the reader who decodes it. In other words, the meaning of the text is the result of the writer’s experience as much as it is the product of the reader’s personal encounter with it. Thus, for Hirschman (2000) these “memories” that create intertextuality are “the interconnectedness of cultural narratives, such that current texts refer always backward to structures and ideas contained in earlier texts; each generation’s patterns of discourse are built upon those of preceding generations” (p. 57).

The beginnings of intertextuality can be traced back to Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of “dialogism”, which suggests that all utterances occur inside a social context to the extent that every utterance is made in response to what has already been said and what subsequently may be said in reply (Latham, 2008).

Kristeva (1986) advanced the idea in her seminal essay Word, Dialogue, Novel. Therein she states that “any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another. The notion of intertextuality replaces that of intersubjectivity, and poetic language is read as at least double” (p. 37).

Worton and Still (1990) likewise broadened the notion by saying that the writer is a reader of texts before he is a creator of one and therefore the texts he creates are inevitably filled with various references, quotations, and influences. The reader, on the other hand, brings to mind at the moment of reading all the texts he has previously encountered.

Reading thus becomes a process of moving between texts. Meaning becomes something which exists between a text and all the other texts to which it refers and relates, moving out from the independent text into a network of textual relations. The text becomes the intertext. (Allen, 2000, p. 1)
Conceptual Framework

This study is framed by Fitzsimmons’ (2013) classification of intertextualities, of which two, obligatory and optional, are present in Murakami’s novel. Obligatory intertextuality occurs when the writer intentionally compares or associates two (or more) texts. To be able to comprehend the writer’s intention, the reader must not only understand the text he is reading (hypertext), but also the text to which the writer is alluding (the hypotext). Without this link being made, the reader’s comprehension will be, at best, inadequate.

The second type is optional intertextuality and refers to connections that are helpful but not essential to an understanding of the text. Optional intertextualities are like hidden freebies in a literary work. They are not prerequisites for enjoyment, but finding them constitutes a bonus in the form of deeper insights into the literary piece.

These two types of intertextualities appear in Norwegian Wood in the form of direct references and allusions to classical and modern literary works, films and music. Other intertextual methods such as adaptation, translation and dialogue likewise abound, enriching the novel’s narrative elements while revealing undertones of contemporary literary concepts. This facilitates a creative interaction between the reader and the text, enabling a more nuanced appreciation of the work.

Summary of the Novel

Norwegian Wood (Noruwei no Mori) was published 1987 and was translated into English by Jay Rubin. It is a coming-of-age story set in the late 1960s at the time of tumultuous student demonstrations in Tokyo. It remains Murakami’s most popular work, even as he ventures into darker themes in succeeding novels such as Kafka on the Shore.

The novel begins with the main protagonist, Toru Watanabe, arriving at Hamburg Airport while the Beatles’ song “Norwegian Wood” is playing on the plane’s speakers. He recalls a scene 18 years ago when he was walking in a meadow with Naoko, the girl he loved. Toru and Naoko grew up in Kobe along with Kizuki, Naoko’s boyfriend. They were a small, tight group until Kizuki inexplicably committed suicide. This tore Toru and Naoko apart and both decided to go to Tokyo to study at separate universities. Toru lives in a dormitory with a stuttering but compulsively neat roommate he calls Storm Trooper. He also befriends Nagasawa, an intelligent but egoistic senior who takes him out on double dates. One day, he and Naoko happen to meet again and rekindle their old friendship.

On Naoko’s 20th birthday they meet at Toru’s apartment, where Naoko breaks down in tears. Toru comforts her and they end up making love. The next day Toru tries to reach Naoko but she has moved to another place. While he is pining for Naoko, he befriends Midori Kobayashi, a lively though quirky classmate in his drama class. Midori invites him to her family house where they have dinner and share a tender kiss.

A letter from Naoko arrives informing Toru that she is staying in a sanatorium to deal with her psychological problems. Toru visits her and meets her confidant, Reiko Ishida, a woman in her late thirties who is also convalescing there. That evening, Naoko kneels at Toru’s bedside. In the moonlight she shows her naked body to him and then leaves without a word.
Reiko tells Toru that she was studying to be a concert pianist when a nervous breakdown derailed her ambitions. Despite her delicate condition, she met a man who genuinely loved her. Her life was progressing in a positive direction until a young lesbian student, whose advances she had refused, accused her of sexual harassment. This caused another nervous breakdown that destroyed her marriage and drove her to the sanatorium. Moreover, at this same time Naoko confides to Toru that when she was a child she witnessed her sister’s suicide.

Toru reconnects with Midori after returning to Tokyo, and takes him for drinks at her favorite bar. She then introduces him to her father, who is confined in a hospital. Toru quickly bonds with her father, who weakly gestures to him to take care of Midori. Nagasawa informs Toru he passed the foreign ministry exam and invites Toru to join him and his girlfriend, Hatsumi, for a celebration. The dinner ends on an ugly note when the couple argues heatedly in front of Toru.

Toru visits Naoko again at the sanatorium, where they share more tender moments. He then goes back to Tokyo and gets busy moving from the dorm to a rented house with a small garden. He invites Naoko to live with him when she feels she is ready. By this time, he has forgotten about Midori and when he remembers to call her, she refuses to speak to him. He feels guilty about neglecting Midori and feels even worse upon learning that Naoko’s condition has deteriorated. Toru and Midori eventually reconcile even as Toru realizes he is actually in love with two women. Midori supportively agrees to wait while Toru sorts out his feelings.

Two months later, Toru receives news that Naoko has committed suicide. Devastated, he wanders homeless for a month until he finds himself alone and hungry on a beach talking with a kind fisherman. After their conversation, he resolves to pick himself up and resume his life. Reiko, having decided to leave the sanatorium, visits him in his house in Tokyo. They hold a memorial service for Naoko by singing her favorite songs on the guitar. They sleep together that night, but Reiko leaves the next day for Hokkaido to begin a new life. Later, Toru excitedly calls Midori telling her he “wants to begin everything from the beginning”.

**Intertextual Analysis of the Novel**

Intertextuality is not a modern concept. Bauman (2004) notes that “the relationship of texts to other texts [emphasis added] has been an abiding concern…since Aristotle speculated on the potential shape of tragedies based on the Iliad and the Odyssey as against other relations of the fall of Troy and its aftermath” (p. 2). It is this interdependence of authors as demonstrated in Murakami’s *Norwegian Wood* that this study will analyse. All direct quotations from the novel are taken from the Vintage International Edition, copyrighted by the author in 2000.

**Obligatory Intertextuality**

The title of the novel is an obligatory intertextuality because a proper appreciation would be inadequate without the idea that it is based on the Beatles’ “Norwegian Wood (This Bird Has Flown)”. The song was written by John Lennon and Paul McCartney and released in December 1965 as part of the band’s *Rubber Soul* album.

The song’s opening line (“I once had a girl, or should I say she once had me.”) succinctly captures the ambiguity in the relationship of Toru and Naoko. They are the closest of friends, confiding in and making love to each other. However, the psychological commitment is one-
sided, since Naoko never gets to sort out her feelings for Toru because she still loves her boyfriend Kizuki, or at least feels some kind of responsibility for his suicide.

Optional Intertextualities

This type of intertextuality is not necessary for an adequate appreciation of a story. Nonetheless, an awareness of the allusions and adaptations in the text enriches in no small measure the reader’s understanding of the narrative by revealing pathways towards a multi-layered interpretation of its elements.

*The Great Gatsby* by F. Scott Fitzgerald

Murakami makes lengthy references to Fitzgerald’s 1925 novel about the fictional town of West Egg on New York’s Long Island in the summer of 1922. The story focuses on the young and mysterious millionaire Jay Gatsby and his quixotic pursuit to win back the affection of his former sweetheart Daisy Buchanan. The book explores themes of decadence, idealism and social upheaval during the 1920s, an era also known as “The Jazz Age”.

In *Norwegian Wood*, Toru and Nagasawa become fast friends due to a mutual admiration for the novel. Nagawasa considers it a badge of distinction to have read *The Great Gatsby*. For him, that separates him and Toru from the “hicks and slobs” that live in their dormitory. Furthermore, the references to Fitzgerald’s novel are an aid to characterising Nagasawa. He is not your ordinary serial womanizer. He is a well-read and intelligent person who is a keen student of human behaviour. One can also see a parallelism between his character and that of Jay Gatsby. Both are cynical human beings who see life as inherently unfair but who are nonetheless driven to succeed.

Another optional intertextuality the two novels share is the colour green, which is central to Fitzgerald’s opus. In a memorable scene in the book, Jay Gatsby stands on his lawn on a moonlit night reaching out to the green dock light, a symbol for Daisy Buchanan, whose affection he seeks to reclaim. In a similar scene in *Norwegian Wood*, Toru gazes at Naoko’s house as he walks within the sanatorium grounds in the moonlight.

Likewise, the name of Naoko means “forest” (related to *green*) in Japanese. It can be assumed that just as green symbolizes Gatsby’s quixotic pursuit of Daisy, it also stands for Toru’s heroic love for Naoko. Interestingly, Midori, which is the name of Toru’s other love interest, means “green” in Japanese. In the same way that the guiding beacon on the dock is green and symbolizes Daisy, the colour green in *Norwegian Wood* represents Midori, a light providing direction to Toru whose mind is confused by his complicated relationship with Naoko.

*The Catcher in the Rye* by J. D. Salinger

Murakami admits to being a fan of Salinger; this shows in the many instances in *Norwegian Wood* where *The Catcher in the Rye* (1965) is referenced. To begin with, both novels are in the mould of a *bildungsroman* – a coming-of-age story in which a young protagonist undergoes a transformative experience towards deeper maturity. Several intertextualities in this regard are worth noting.

First, Tokyo and New York serve as mindscapes for the respective protagonists of the two novels. It is in the city where they express and act out their ideas and meet people who support or challenge their perceptions of life. On one side are the subways, bars, parks,
museums, and hotels of Holden Caulfield’s New York City. On the other are the bullet trains, bookstores, restaurants, and love motels of Toru Watanabe’s Tokyo.

The cities are places of existential wanderings for both protagonists. Holden roams New York for days searching for authenticity both in old friends and new acquaintances. Toru spends months living and loving in Tokyo trying to come to grips with his love for two women of complicated characters.

A second intertextuality has to do with dormitory friends. In *The Catcher in the Rye*, Holden has a dorm-mate named Robert Ackley, an insecure guy who is always barging into his room and bothering him. Toru, on the other hand, rooms with a very neat guy he calls Storm Trooper because he always wears sternly formal clothes. Ackley and Storm Trooper do not share the same traits, but they accomplish the same purpose by serving as foils to the protagonists, highlighting their respective characteristics by striking a contrast. Ackley’s obtrusiveness clashes with Holden’s tendency to keep to himself. In the same manner, Storm Trooper’s obsessive compulsiveness contrasts with Toru’s laid-back demeanour.

It is the character of Stradlater in *The Catcher in the Rye* and that of Nagasawa that bear similarities. Stradlater is Holden’s sexually hyperactive dorm-mate, while in *Norwegian Wood*, the randy one is Nagasawa, Toru’s dorm-mate, who boasts of having bedded 75 girls. But unlike Stradlater who is an academic slacker (he asks Holden to write an English essay for him), Nagasawa is a resolutely studious person.

In another parallel, Naoko and Jane Gallagher are both girls whom the protagonists love but who do not reciprocate the protagonists’ affections. In *The Catcher in the Rye*, the object of Holden’s affection is Jane Gallagher, a girl with whom he spent one summer in Maine. They have never been sweethearts, but Holden is fascinated by every little thing about her, especially the way she keeps her kings in the back row when playing checkers. He is attracted to Jane but never gets to reveal his feelings for her. In *Norwegian Wood*, Naoko is the object of Toru’s unrequited affection. He loved her even when she was still going out with his best friend. His affection never wavers even when she leaves for the sanatorium to deal with her neurosis. He waits for her to recover while planning for the time when she finishes convalescing and they can finally live together. His is a heroic kind of love – selfless, fiercely committed and given purely without thought of reciprocation.

Both Holden and Toru have secondary objects of affection, Sally Hayes and Midori. In the case of Holden, it is Sally Hayes. He is not attracted to her as much as he is attracted to Jane Gallagher, but it is Sally whom he seeks out when he needs somebody to talk to. At one point, her outgoing personality lifts Holden’s spirits so much that he impulsively asks Sally to elope with him. Toru’s secondary love is Midori Kobayashi. Like Sally she is attractive and friendly. Toru meets her at the time Naoko is confined in a sanatorium. She runs their small family-owned bookstore while her father is confined in a hospital. She and Toru date several times and develop feelings for each other although Midori still has a boyfriend and Toru is still very much in love with Naoko.

In some instances, the parallelisms between the two girls are striking. For example, Sally’s coquettish efforts to attract people’s attention in the ice-skating scene in Radio City is replicated in a scene in *Norwegian Wood* where Midori meets up with Toru dressed in an eye-catching miniskirt.
Phoniness can be regarded as another point of contact between the two novels. *The Catcher in the Rye* is filled with Holden’s rants about the inauthenticity of people around him. He describes his teachers, fellow students, and most of the people he meets in New York City as “phonies”. Only Jane Gallagher and his sister Phoebe are spared from his cynicism. In *Norwegian Wood*, it is a secondary character, Midori Kobayashi, who expresses disgust at the superficiality of people around her, describing the members of a college organization she once joined as “phonies.”

It is interesting to note that the Harvill Press paperback edition of *Norwegian Wood*, published in 2001, uses the word “fraud” and “fakes” instead of “phonies” in their version of the quoted passages above. It might have been a belated attempt by Murakami to hide the more obvious intertextualities of his novel with Salinger’s work.

Birds and Ducks form another point of contact. In *The Catcher in the Rye*, Holden is so curious about what happens to the ducks in the Central Park lagoon during winter that he cannot resist asking Horowitz, the taxi driver, about it. Likewise, Toru Watanabe shows concern for equally vulnerable creatures in *Norwegian Wood*. While walking with Reiko in the grounds of the sanatorium, he inquires how the birds in the aviary fare when the cold sets in.

The plight of the ducks and the birds intrigues and frightens both Holden and Toru. Like those creatures, Holden and Toru are about to experience a difficult season in their lives – a psychological winter if you will. In asking how those animals will survive the coming cold, they are in effect wondering how they, too, will manage. Unfortunately, the symbolism is lost on Horowitz and Reiko, who respond to their queries with exasperation and playful mockery.

**The Magic Mountain by Thomas Mann**

While *Norwegian Wood* is sometimes called the Japanese *The Catcher in the Rye*, it also has much in common with *The Magic Mountain*, the 1924 novel by Thomas Mann considered one of the most influential works of 20th century German literature. There are several significant intertextualities between the two novels.

The first of these revolves around the importance of sanatoriums. When Toru brings a copy of *The Magic Mountain* to the sanatorium, Reiko reacts with mild incredulity: “How could you bring a book like that to a place like this” (p. 141)? Toru knows Reiko is upset because she lives in a sanatorium that is very similar to the one described in *The Magic Mountain*. The protagonist of the novel, Hans Castorp, visits a relative at the Bergdorf, a sanatorium in the alpine slopes of Davos, Switzerland, where he himself ends up staying for seven years.

In *Norwegian Wood*, the sanatorium is Ami Hostel, hidden among the mountains outside Kyoto. Toru Watanabe goes there to visit Naoko, but it is Reiko, not Toru, who has stayed there for seven years. The two places are similarly located far from the city; self-sustaining, commune-like institutions in which the residents endeavour to live in harmony.

Female Characters are another point of correspondence. In *The Magic Mountain*, Castorp falls in love with Clavdia, a beautiful but sickly Russian woman. In *Norwegian Wood*, Toru visits his love – the beautiful but mentally ill Naoko.

Hereditary Ailments also are prominent in both books, with major characters suffering from physical or mental illnesses that run in the family. In Mann’s novel, Castorp has tuberculosis...
just like his cousin Joachim, who eventually succumbs to the disease. In Murakami’s work, Naoko battles depression and commits suicide just as her sister did when she was young. In addition, Midori’s parents both die of brain cancer.

Politics figure prominently in both novels. The events in both occur at a time of political upheaval. Those in The Magic Mountain occur in Germany during the years leading to the First World War. In Norwegian Wood, they happen in Japan at the time of 1960s student uprisings.

Forrest Gump
Forrest Gump is a 1986 novel by Winston Groom, made into a successful film in 1994 starring Tom Hanks. One of the most memorable quotes from both the novel and the movie is “Life is a box of chocolates. You never know what you’re going to get”. Forrest Gump says it to a nurse sitting beside him on a park bench. It is also spoken by his mother on her deathbed. In Norwegian Wood, Midori makes almost exactly the same comment in a conversation with Toru: “I always think about that when something painful comes up. ‘Now I just have to polish these off, and everything’ll be OK.’ Life is a box of cookies” (p. 332).

Murakami was presumably influenced by Groom’s novel, which appeared a year before Murakami published his novel. It is interesting to note that the 2001 Harvill Press edition of Norwegian Wood actually uses the word chocolates instead of cookies.

The Gambler by Fyodor Dostoevsky
Dostoevsky, the author of Crime and Punishment and The Brothers Karamazov, is one of the most highly regarded Russian writers. However, his personal life was characterized by a constant struggle with a gambling addiction. His novella The Gambler was actually written under a strict deadline to pay off his gambling debts. Murakami references that particular work in the conversation between Toru and Nagasawa, where the latter tries to rationalize his chronic womanizing by comparing it to a gambling addiction: “Hard to say. Hey, you know that thing Dostoevsky wrote on gambling? It’s like that. When you’re surrounded by endless possibilities, one of the hardest things you can do is pass them up” (p. 46).

Electra by Euripides
This tragedy written by Euripides is based on the story of Electra, who took revenge on her mother and stepfather for the murder of her father, Agamemnon. Murakami references this work in the first meeting between Toru and Midori, and in the part where Toru’s drama professor speaks about the concept of *deux ex machina*. Toru also refers to the literary term in his monologue at the bedside of Midori’s father in the hospital: “But think about it – what if there were a *deux ex machina* in real life? Everything would be so easy! If you felt stuck or trapped, some god would swing down from up there and solve all your problems” (p. 253).

It is interesting to note that Murakami himself employs a *deux ex machina* to facilitate a resolution near the end of Norwegian Wood: Toru’s dilemma whether to choose Midori or wait for Naoko is resolved when he receives word from Reiko that Naoko has committed suicide. Nonetheless, Naoko’s death at the latter part of the novel does not come unexpectedly as a *deux ex machina* usually does, but is foreshadowed throughout much of the novel. And while the predicament has been resolved, the novel still ends with an air of uncertainty that often characterizes Murakami’s stories.
Beneath the Wheel by Herman Hesse
This 1906 novel by the German writer and Nobel laureate is referenced in the part where Toru reads a copy of the novel while Midori is asleep. It tells the story of Han Giebenrath, whose education focuses on intellectual improvement at the cost of personal development. He studies at a seminary but leaves after a creeping mental illness causes a decline in his academic performance. Back in his village he takes up the life of a blacksmith as alternative to a life of scholarly pursuit. However, he never fully adjusts to this situation and later drowns himself in a river.

As with other literary works mentioned in Norwegian Wood, one finds some parallelisms in the plot and characters of Beneath the Wheel. Han and Naoko are similar in that they are both intelligent characters suffering from mental illness and an inability to have productive social interactions. They both retreat to a life of simplicity to deal with their sickness – Han to a village as a blacksmith and Naoko to a sanatorium. In the end, both are unsuccessful and take their own lives.

John Updike, Boris Vian, Dante Alighieri
Norwegian Wood contains a number of passing references to other famous authors. John Updike, for example, was directly mentioned as one of Toru’s favourite writers. Another noted writer, Boris Vian, is referenced in Toru’s description of his humdrum life without Naoko.

It is interesting to note that these writers dealt with deeply psychological themes and populated their works with characters wrestling with existential issues. One might also add that Naoko and Midori, the objects of Toru’s love in Norwegian Wood, echo Dante’s Virgil and Beatrice in Divine Comedy. Symbolically speaking, Naoko takes him down to the depths of hell and purgatory because of her psychosis, while Midori leads him up to paradise through her stable and positive view of life.

Painting
Norwegian Wood also alludes to the visual arts, specifically the works of Edvar Munch (1863–1944), a Norwegian expressionist painter known for his intense portrayal of psychological themes. His best-known work is The Scream, which shows a figure with an agonized expression against a swirling landscape and red-orange sky. Murakami references the painter’s style in Toru’s description of the sanatorium grounds layout:

It occurred to me that this was what you might get if Walt Disney did an animated version of a Munch painting. All the houses were exactly the same shape and colour, nearly cubical, in perfect left-to-right symmetry, with big front doors and lots of windows. The road twisted its way among them like the artificial practice course of a driving school. (p. 136)

Indeed, some of Munch’s paintings such as “Evening on Karl Johan Street” and “The Red Vine” feature cube-shaped houses painted in solid colours with multiple symmetrical windows (Messer, 1985). This intertextuality serves to emphasize the psychological states of the patients in the sanatorium: they are trying to live as normal a life as possible in a place where they are both free and confined.
Films

Casablanca
Films are likewise referenced in the novel. In the iconic movie Casablanca (Wallis & Curtiz, 1947), Rick (Humphrey Bogart) gives strict instructions to the house pianist never to play the song “As Time Goes By” in his café because it reminds him of Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman), the woman who broke his heart. This is referenced in Haruki Murakami’s novel, specifically in the episode where Naoko requests Reiko to play “Norwegian Wood” on the guitar:

“That song can make me feel so sad”, said Naoko. “I don't know, I guess I imagine myself wandering in a deep wood. I’m all alone and it’s cold and dark, and nobody comes to save me. That’s why Reiko never plays it unless I request it”. “Sounds like Casablanca!” Reiko says with a laugh. (p. 146)

The Graduate and “Scarborough Fair”
The Graduate (Thurman & Nichols, 1967) is an American film based on the homonymous novel by Charles Webb. The film is referenced indirectly in the scene where Toru, Naoko and Reiko are in a coffee shop listening to the radio playing Simon and Garfunkel’s version of “Scarborough Fair”, which is part of the film’s soundtrack.

The reference is significant for two reasons. The first one is because the movie, like Norwegian Wood, is a coming-of-age story. In the film, 21-year-old Benjamin Braddock (played by Dustin Hoffman) is seduced by an older woman, thus marking his transition to adulthood. This intertextuality foreshadows Toru’s sexual encounter with Reiko, a woman in her late thirties, which occurs near the end of the novel. Interestingly, that event also precedes a progression in Toru’s character. Sometime after that night with Reiko, he excitedly calls Midori telling her: “I have a million things to talk to you about … All I want in this world is you. I want to see you and talk. I want the two of us to begin everything from the beginning”. (p. 386)

Secondly, the song “Scarborough Fair,” which is actually an old English ballad, serves to describe in poignant terms the unrequited love that Toru has for Naoko:

Are you going to Scarborough Fair?
Parsley, sage, rosemary and thyme;
Remember me to one who lives there,
She once was a true love of mine.

Music

“Here Comes the Sun”
Besides the song “Norwegian Wood,” a Beatles composition that is mentioned at length in the novel is “Here Comes the Sun.” The song was written by George Harrison and first released on the Beatles’ 1969 album Abbey Road. It was referenced in the part where Reiko, at the coffeehouse in the mountains, is playing songs requested by Toru and Naoko:

Her milk was on the house if she would play the Beatles’ “Here Comes the Sun”, said the girl. Reiko gave her a thumbs up and launched into the song. Hers was not a full voice, and too much smoking had given it a husky edge, but it was lovely, with real presence. I almost felt as if the sun really was coming
up again as I sat there listening and drinking beer and looking at the mountains. It was a soft, warm feeling. (p.187)

Murakami could have chosen this song because it fits the scene’s hopeful atmosphere. After a long dark spell, Naoko looks happy and seems on the way to a recovery. Toru senses a faint promise that Naoko might finally learn to reciprocate his feelings for her:

Little darling, I feel the ice is slowly melting
Little darling, it feels like years since it’s been clear
Here comes the sun, here comes the sun,
And I say It’s all right. (Harrison, 1969)

Conclusion

_Norwegian Wood_ is replete with intertextualities that enrich the reader’s encounter with the text. The melody and lyrics of the song “Norwegian Wood” capture the sexual and dramatic energies of Toru’s coming of age. It provides the only significant instance of obligatory intertextuality in the novel. An appreciation of Murakami’s work would be largely incomplete without an idea of the Beatles and that particular composition.

The rest of the references are optional intertextualities consisting of thematic and plot borrowings from _The Great Gatsby_, _The Catcher in the Rye_, and _The Magic Mountain_ showcasing Murakami’s postmodern style and references to contemporary films and music. The most apparent philosophical influence on the novel is existentialism, as is evident in the angst, anxiety and fear of Naoko, Reiko, and Toru as they struggle valiantly, and with varying results, to overcome their neuroses.

Toru is finally able to sort out his feelings for the two women in his life – Naoko and Midori – and experiences an exhilarating epiphany at the end. Reiko is eventually able to summon the courage to leave the sanatorium and start a new life in another city. Naoko, though, is not as fortunate. There are just too many ghosts in her past. Her sister’s suicide and that of her boyfriend are simply too much for her fragile psyche; even a love as heroic as Toru’s fails to lift her out of a fatal despondency.

Psychoanalytic theory is touched upon here not so much as a window into Murakami’s mind but as a means to make sense of the tortured psyches of his main characters. We see Toru struggling to deal with unresolved emotions, Reiko wrestling with psychological conflicts, and Naoko fending off guilt. A hint of feminism is evident in the independence and assertiveness of the character of Midori.

Finally, the references serve to form a postmodern pastiche of plots, themes and subtle adaptations that celebrate the genius of the original authors, making the old narratives as relevant today as they have ever been. In this “post-truth” era when people are sadly retreating into their own versions of reality, this openly integrative aspect of intertextuality may just be what is needed to bring more civility and empathy to the reading and discussion of current issues.
References


Scarborough fair. Traditional English ballad.


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Abstract

Philippine folk epics are the highest stage of development in Philippine folk literature. However, due to the ravages of colonization and the evolution of contemporary cultural preferences, folk literature has been waning in popularity. With the advent of modern culture and its attendant technology has come the new medium of video games, which is truly popular among the younger generations and can be used as an alternative method of learning. Through this medium offered by the new technologies, this research aims to reclaim Philippine folk epics by developing a video game based on an Ifugao epic called Hudhud hi Aliguyon. The work will follow the process called the modified waterfall model. To create a structured narrative, the epic has been analyzed and tabulated according to Vogler’s adaptation of the monomyth in order to see how Aliguyon, the main character, develops. The values, unique cultural traits and distinct ideals that characterize Ifugao culture have been carefully studied so that the culture may be represented authentically in the game’s narrative, character traits and artwork. The narrative will start in the village of Hannanga with the protagonist Aliguyon, who recklessly seeks retribution against his father’s enemy; as the game progresses, he will grow into a more honorable and ideal hero.

Keywords: Ifugao Epic, game development, Monomyth
Introduction

Subject and Medium
This game development will focus on the story of Hudhud hi Aliguyon, because it is with epics like this one that Philippine folk literature reaches its highest development (Eugenio, 2001). It was also chosen because it is one of the few epics that has been fully recorded, transcribed, and translated (Manuel, 1963). It also displays Filipino values and beliefs that the researchers wish to exhibit. Essentially, folk epics or “ethnoepics” are stories about heroes and their deeds told in verse, but according to E. Arsenio Manuel (1963), it should also have the following characteristics: its narrative must be of sustained length and be based on oral tradition; it must hinge on a series of supernatural events or heroic deeds; it must be in the form of verse, which is either chanted or sung, and it must have an evident seriousness of purpose, embodying or validating communal beliefs, customs, ideals and moral values. Based on these criteria, researchers have been able to identify and collect more than 20 epics from different groups of people throughout the Philippines (Eugenio, 2001); Arsenio Manuel’s criteria are evident in the aforementioned epic Hudhud hi Aliguyon. To be able to translate this epic into a narrative for the game to follow, the epic will be analyzed adhering to the definitions of Campbell’s monomyth.

Game design is our chosen creative medium because it is a shared interest, it is in harmony with our skills sets, and it has afforded us rather unique and positive experiences. These skills include writing, drawing, designing, and music composition. Using them, it is decided that the theme of Hudhud hi Aliguyon is relevant to the game’s design, and the project requires a storyline or narrative, a storyboard, concept art and sound design. Although it is not required for this research, the researchers plan on creating a complete game — or at least a demo — that follows the written narrative. Narratives will be written collaboratively among the researchers as they share ideas with one another. The art required for designs and storyboards will be executed using drawing applications such as Photoshop, ibisPaint, Paint Tool Sai, etc. Sound design will be completed on GarageBand using custom and premade samples.

Inspiration
Inspiration for the design and development of this game stems from the researchers’ history with video games. As a part of the younger generation, the researchers were interested in exploring the aspects and inner workings of game development and the effort put into it by game developers. The researchers occasionally gather together to play a role-playing game known as Dungeons & Dragons; this game provided a vast fantasy world where the players would solve puzzles and quests, which is an inspiration for developing this particular game. There were several other games that provided this same experience, but with creative twists of their own. Other games that had an impact on this project were Final Fantasy, Pokémon, and the Legend of Zelda, to name a few. Adding to the inspiration was the lack of Filipino representation in modern media; there are precious few instances, if any, where a video game includes a Filipino character or even mentions any aspect of Filipino culture. Being Filipinos, we are naturally attentive to the cultural practices of our homeland and have made it our aim to showcase them. Being oral literature, these epics’ scope has been limited to the country’s rural areas, so the number of urbanites who are willing to sit and listen has been steadily dwindling. Several authors have attempted to revive epic literature, but their efforts have been thwarted by the taste for more modern, global literature (Macasantos & Macasantos, 2015). With the development of the game, and with video games’ popularity among mainstream media consumers, the researchers hope to take advantage of the opportunity videogame
technology provides to stimulate and revitalize Philippine folk literature.

**Purpose**

The purpose of our work is to reintroduce Philippine epics to the general public through the development of a game based on one chosen epic. The chosen epic will be analyzed to identify important cultural elements and values inherent to the indigenous group in which the epic originates and that ought to be represented in the game. The researchers also hope to motivate future studies about Philippine literature that aim to generate innovative ways to preserve it.

A critical research objective is to determine how the character of Aliguyon develops throughout the epic according to the monomyth. Thus, the research traces the Ifugaos’ values, distinct ideals, and unique culture that can be inferred from Aliguyon’s journey.

**Conception and Significance of the Study**

The researchers aim for the results to serve as a benchmark for reintroducing Philippine folk literature into the cultural life of the nation, so an expected practical result is to bridge the popularity gap between Philippine folk literature and gaming. It should also contribute to the study of *Hudhud hi Aliguyon* and help expose the epic to a wider audience.

**Scope and Delimitations**

Game concept and design will be brought to fruition using the RPG Maker MV and will feature a story based on the Ifugao epic *Hudhud hi Aliguyon*. The story will take place before the year 1565. The language used will be mainly English, since it will reach a wider audience; according to Bangel and Lockwood (n.d.), English is a universal language because of how it can be learned without much difficulty, and it will allow those who do not know much about Philippine culture to learn about it in a language they understand. It should be noted that some original terminology such as bangibang and Daya will still be used. Then, the game is aimed towards people between the ages fifteen and twenty-five; it will be playable on a desktop PC and Mac, and there will also be a port for iOS and Android smartphone devices.

**Definition of Terms**

- **Adobe Photoshop**: It is a software used for graphic design, digital art, image editing and the like.
- **Concept Art**: This is for initial stage design and is used to plan out the visuals for the game.
- **Hudhud**: An ifugao term for lengthy chants. (Manuel, 1963).
- **ibisPaint**: A digital art application only available for mobile iOS devices.
- **Narrative**: A story, or plot that is told to others through different forms of media.
- **NPC**: Non-playable character. This is a character in the game with which the player can interact, but cannot control.
- **Paint Tool Sai**: A computer software used for graphic design and digital art.
- **RPG**: Role-playing game, a game in which each participant assumes the role of a character (or characters) that they control (Rouse, 2011); this is the genre-type that characterizes our end product.
- **Sound Design**: The process of recording, manipulating, and creating audio elements for different forms of media.
- **Storyboard**: A sequence of drawings that serve as a rough draft for the shots to be used in a
movie, animation, video game, etc.

Review of Related Literature

In this part, the literature related to the medium will be discussed to further clarify what the game development design will involve. It will also discuss literature related to the state of Philippine literature and its epics to further expand on the theme. The culture of the Ifugao people will be explored provide cultural for Hudhud hi Aliguyon, after which the epic itself will be discussed.

Philippine Literature: Concerns and Priorities

Philippine literature, as stated by Godinez-Ortega (n.d.), comes in many shapes and forms and has lately become richer and more diverse. Philippine literature can be traced back to the pre-Hispanic period, but written works have generally been erased following the arrival of the Spanish, leaving only the oral tradition. Works in this tradition come in many forms such as riddles, tanaga, folk songs, folk narratives, and epics, all recorded by Chinese, Spanish and Arabic chroniclers. The efforts of the colonizers to erase oral traditions cause concern among present-day Filipino artists, whose aim is to keep Filipino culture and tradition alive through mass media. There were also movements in the 1960s and 1970s that became concerned with “Filipino identity” in a sudden burst of nationalism.

Another area of concern is oral literature. Oral literature such as traditional epics have flourished notwithstanding printed literature, although the numbers of people who listen has been progressively dwindling. There has been an attempt to revive the art of epics in the 1960s, with Ricaredo Dementillo’s Barter in Panay, which was a bridge between the traditional folk epic and modern literature. Other authors followed suit; however, few failed to establish the connection with folk tradition. The traditional epic soon faded into the background and was eventually replaced by more modern and global literature in the 1980s (Macasantos, F., Macasantos, P., 2015).

Hudhud hi Aliguyon

The researchers will be focusing on the epics of the pre-Hispanic period, particularly the Hudhud hi Aliguyon. It was recorded by Amador T. Daguo in his work titled Hudhud hi Aliguyon, a translation of an Ifugao harvest song with introduction and notes (Manuel, 1962). This version was sung by Hinayup Bantayan of Burnay, and it was transcribed by Pio B. Abdul in Ifugao. Amador then produced a text and line by line translation in verse.

The story of Aliguyon is set in the village of Hannanga, and the epic begins with Aliguyon playing with a top he received from his father. Once he finishes playing, he asks his rooster for a sign of his victory, and when he receives it, he arms himself and takes his comrades into a camp. While waiting, he seeks assurance from the idao bird, and his father throws a spear at him to test his skill. After proving that he is ready, they continue on to Daligdigan, where he meets an unprepared Pumbakhayon. Because of the unexpected visit, Pumbakhayon asks for time to eat, but instead of eating, he seeks out signs of his victory through sacrificing a rooster. After receiving the good omen, he takes his father’s spear and engages in a fight with Aliguyon; however, neither of them prevails because they are both invincible and equals in skill. Their war continues for years, until they stop the fighting by drafting a peace pact in Daligdigan. Subsequently, Aliguyon courts Bugan, a sister of Pumbakhayon, and takes her as
his wife, while Pumbakhayon courts Aliguyon’s sister in return.

This epic represents several Filipino and Ifugao beliefs and values. According to Demetrio (1986), the Filipino value of respect for elders is evident in the epic. This is seen where the mothers of Pumbakhayon and Aliguyon call for their fight to end. Seeing the mother of their opponent, they each remember their own mothers and respect their wish for the fight to stop. Another value is epitomized in the individual’s ability to respect and admire good qualities in others, including enemies. As the story progresses, Aliguyon and Pumbakhayon gain mutual respect for each other, seeing how strong and honorable the other is. In the end, they end their war because of this respect they have for each other. Lastly, the respect for divine or sacred beings is evident in their prayers to the Rooster and the Idao bird. The two main characters depended on these sacred beings for positive signs or good omens with regard to the war in which they would become embroiled. Besides these, there are also other beliefs and moral values shown throughout the epic that will be hinted at in the game.

Ifugao Culture and Beliefs

The Ifugao used to call themselves Ipugo, which means “from the hills” (Dulawan, 2001). There are several theories as to where they originated. Some say that newer immigrants drove them to the mountains, while others suggest that they willingly lived in the mountains as a preference. The Ifugao believe that they are direct descendants of Wigan, one of the gods of the skyworld.

In their society, the people follow a kinship system that includes deceased ancestors to the fourth generation and is known to extend even further back, while their smallest possible social group is constituted by husband-and-wife and their offspring (Dulawan, 2001). Several rituals involving man and rice – an important staple – invoke ancestors, and they also have a ritual called Bogwa which is an exhumation rite for the second burial of an ancestor who is thought to need help from his/her living relatives. Blood ties are very important in Ifugao society because they affect the individual’s role within it.

In an Ifugao family, the father has final say regarding activities such as work, care of the children and religious events (Dumia, 1979). In the absence or death of the father, the mother takes his place, but generally, the mother simply assists him and her options are rather limited as compared to the father. For children, they are given care and attention in their early years, and they are expected to be obedient and respectful towards their parents. Once they reach their later years, they are expected to help their parents cultivate and work the land. Besides that, the responsibilities of the children differ depending on their sex. Boys are expected to learn how to hunt, fight, work the fields, and learn the family lineage, while girls have to learn how to manage a household, work in the fields, and recite ballads such as the Hudhud and Liwliwa.

Another relevant structure in their society is social class. There are three: the kadangyan, the tagu, and the nawotwot. According to Dulawan (2001), the kadangyan is made up of the wealthy who do prestigious and honorable deeds; their relatives who have not accomplished any of these deeds make up the tagu. They can be the kadangyan’s children, parents, or other relatives. For them to be a part of the kadangyan, they must first perform the uyauy (wedding feast) or the hagabi (ultimate prestige feast). Meanwhile, the nawotwot is made up of the common folk or the poor. They have little material wealth and have not done any distinguished feats. The distinctions between these classes are made obvious through their material
possessions, clothing, and role in society. For clothing, rich men usually wear balituk (stringed, horn-shaped gold pieces), binuhlan (men’s g-string design), pang-o (agate necklace), and ginutu (belt made of shells and animal bones). Some of them would also wear leg bands made of brass-copper wires called padang. For rich women, they have gamit or bayyaung, which is a special weave of tapis that is predominantly red and black. They also wear the pang-o, balituk, inipul (precious headbeads), and mayad (a belt to hold their tapis in place). Then, both the women and men have bags where they put things such as betel nut and tobacco; these bags are called pinuhha (for men) and ambayung (for women). On the other hand, the common men wear a g-string with no design, and they either wear cheap body ornaments or none at all. For the common women, they have the inggalgaletget or itnilu, which is an ordinary weave of tapis that is usually black and white.

In their society, the kadangyan are highly respected by the common folk. They are usually the ones who provide for the poor. They let the poor work the fields for palay (rice at a stage prior to husking) and feed them in times of famine. They are also the leaders and protectors of their tribe, and this is shown in the physical position of their homes. Kadangyan houses can be found in the center of their village, while nawotwot dwellings are found on the margins. Then, when it comes to tribal wars, the kadangyan will call upon their comrades and tribesmen to join them in battle. After the battle, if someone comes back with the heads of slain enemies, their social prestige as a warrior will increase. Tribal wars are problematic, as tribal Ifugao law calls for relatives of persons killed to avenge them, which can lead to an endless cycle of vengeance and vendetta. It should be noted, however, that although the kadangyan are seen as leaders, there is no methodized political system in their community (Dumia, 1979). There is no judge or jury, and the families themselves must settle problems between or within families, and they do that by looking back to their customs and applying what they know to their particular situation. Although there is no specific punishment for serious offenses, they do have three ways in which to settle minor conflicts: the ug-gub (dart throwing), the bultong (wrestling), and the “boiling water” trial. The first two are reserved for boundary disputes, while the last one is for theft. For the more serious cases, the families follow the “eye for an eye” method. It dishonors the individual and the family when one does not try to “get even”.

Having information about the culture and life of the Ifugaos is essential in visualizing the Hudhud hi Aliguyon as a videogame. Discrete cultural physiognomies may not be outwardly itemized in the epic, but they determine the nature of the protagonists’ exploits and the message. This means that in order to understand the game’s plot and storyline, one must be able to identify the characteristics of Ifugao culture. This understanding will also determine how this world is reconstructed within the game, a world in which the player will be fully immersed.

The Monomyth

After analyzing a series of myths and legends across multiple cultures, Joseph Campbell found a common underlying structure that he called “the monomyth”. This monomyth details the various hurdles to be overcome by the hero. In his book, Campbell (2004) summarizes the adventure as a cyclic diagram. It starts with the Call to Adventure, where the hero is lured, asked, or coerced into starting a journey for something greater than himself. After that, he may or may not encounter a helper who will support him, especially when he is about to go into the Threshold Crossing where he will meet a guardian who guards the gateway. He either defeats or convinces the gatekeeper to let him through, which at times leads to the Brother-Battle or Dragon-battle. If the hero dies, he enters the Dismemberment or Crucifixion stage.
Either way, he enters a new and unfamiliar world where he will encounter strange forces that will either test him or give him magical aid as helpers. Once he overcomes his obstacles, he will gain a reward that can be Sacred Marriage, Father Atonement, Apotheosis, or Elixir Theft if he still encounters additional hostile forces. After that, the hero takes flight to return to his world. If he was blessed, he will be able to return safely without problems. If he was not, he will be pursued as he escapes. In the event of his return, the hero might undergo the Return, Resurrection, Rescue, or Threshold Struggle. Once he leaves the unfamiliar world, whatever powers accompanied him must be left behind, and upon his return, he brings a blessing or boon that saves the world. Campbell also notes that some tales have differences when compared to the diagram. Some might put more emphasis on certain stages or combine different cycles in one book.

Meanwhile, Christopher Vogler suggests a new take on Campbell’s Monomyth in his book The Writer’s Journey (2007). Instead of Campbell’s blueprint for a Hero’s Journey (Departure, Descent, Return), he proposes three parts: Act One, Act Two, and Act Three, with each detailing different stages the hero will experience (Vogler, 2007). Act one starts in the Ordinary World so as to provide a vivid contrast with a subsequent stage when the hero stumbles into the Special World. Then the hero is challenged with a problem or an adventure (Call to Adventure) and, out of fear, the hero might be reluctant or may even refuse the call (Refusal of the Call). To encourage and prepare the hero for the adventure, he will undergo the Meeting with a Mentor who might give him advice, magic powers or guidance. The relationship between the hero and the mentor is similar to that of parent and child or teacher and student. Once the hero accepts that the adventure must be undertaken, he will enter the Special World in Crossing the First Threshold, and this marks the change from Act One to Act Two. In this Special World, the hero will encounter Tests and meet both Allies and Enemies while he learns how the Special World works. Then, in the Approach, the hero reaches the most dangerous area of the Special World, one called the Inmost Cave. This is where he will cross the second major threshold. Afterwards, the hero undergoes the critical stage of Ordeal where he will encounter his greatest fear or a strong enemy in battle. This keeps the readers in suspense because they do not know if the hero will prevail or not. Once he defeats the enemy and survives death, the hero can now receive his Reward, which can be a special weapon, a token, or a blessing. The reward could also be the appearance of a loved one or the acquisition of a new love. This marks the end of Act two and the start of Act Three. The first stage here is the Road Back, where the hero will journey back to the Ordinary World while encountering tests and dangers. The hero then goes through Resurrection, where dark forces attempt one last battle before getting obliterated. After all that, the hero returns to the Ordinary World in the Return with the Elixir. The hero might bring an important lesson, elixir, or treasure from the Special World. If the hero does not bring anything from the Ordeal, he will be doomed to repeat the adventure.

All in all, Campbell’s monomyth and Vogler’s adaptation can be used in incorporating the epic into a narrative script. It will help in selecting parts and trials to emphasize and in developing the characters throughout the story. All those will help in creating a narrative that will captivate the audience while staying faithful to the epic.

**Video Games and their Features**

What usually attracts an audience to video games is its narrative, since according to an interview by Bustillos (2013), video games are simply a different way of telling a story, in the manner of novels or movies. Video games are entertaining and unique in their own way
because they let gamers have input and interact with the narrative, giving them choices and a range of diverse activities, making the experience truly immersive.

To help achieve this immersion, Feldman (2001), states in “Designing Arcade Computer Game Graphics” that color plays a significant role in setting the overall mood of the scenes and in emphasizing a particular emotion to make the audience become invested in the scene. The font of the text also contributes to the overall mood of certain scenes, showcasing personality and theme. Music also plays a meaningful role in setting the mood of a scene and to give its visuals a larger impact, though it mostly runs in the background (Whalen, 2004). In a research by Fu and Zhang (2015), those who have not yet been accustomed to playing video games are more likely to take notice of the details than those who are, but each group still acknowledges the music which, in the end, contributes significantly to the gamer’s immersion in the game. Schell (2008) also says that character and world design are integral to ensuring that the game that is presented is believable and is another way for people to attach characters to their own personal narratives, making the game even more compelling to the audience, especially when it sympathizes with a character (McWilliams, 1998). These elements, along with others such as animation and in-game art all contribute to the gamer’s immersion, and if these are appealing and work in harmony, they make the whole experience more enjoyable.

**Game and Literacy**

The player always learns something from the game. According to Gee (2003), to learn a new video game is to learn a new literacy; he infers that video games use multimodal text (texts that mix words and images) as tools of literacy. Moreover, Gee (2003) also indicates that video games are a semiotic domain, meaning that symbols are its main form of communication alongside words; however, there are different genres of games that deal with different types of symbols, languages, and the like. Video games usually display certain symbols or scenarios that the players interpret in their own way depending on the context of the game, validating it as learning a new literacy. Literacy being the ability to identify, understand, interpret, create, communicate and compute using printed and written materials associated with varying contexts (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 2004).

Another study done by Sanford and Madill (2007) found that many students of both sexes find success with alternative literacies beyond video games. These are chat rooms, comic books, blogs, trading cards, zines, film creation, and more. These new forms of literature make them “literate,” albeit not in a traditional sense. Some even try to improve their literacy through practice, using these non-traditional forms of literature. Knowing this, it is safe to assume that video games combine numerous complex literacy skills in certain activities, and that video games are an ideal way to convey a message or a lesson to a younger demographic. Along with learning literacies, the medium of video games helps in cognitive and creative thinking when solving certain puzzles or pursuing certain quests implemented within its architecture. The pedagogical potential of video games is one that we aim to promote here. Bringing games into the classroom enhances the students’ disposition to engage in a learning environment. In a study conducted by Groff, Howells and Cranmer (2010), teachers were asked to bring console games into their classes; the results were positive and well accepted by the students, who were motivated to learn the topic at hand with the help of video games. The study found that inserting video games into an educational environment is helpful, as long as teachers carefully choose games that are relevant to their pedagogical objectives; such a game should
have a clear end-goal and encourage students to think creatively, use only the related or appropriate parts as called for by the context of the particular lesson, and allow students sufficient time to become familiar with the game (Groff, et al., 2010). Therefore, not only will video games motivate a student to learn, but it will also let them exercise skills and cognitive functions that they might otherwise not practically use. However, players usually need to make sense of the core narrative of a game in order to understand it and become interested.

**Studies on Philippine Literature and Culture**

Before the present research, there have been similar studies that relate Philippine literature and culture to game development. One example is *Philippine Epics and Gaming: Creating a Narrative Structure*, a study conducted by Wenceslao B. Agnir IV. In this study, Agnir had hoped to use a new medium (video games) to expose younger generations to Philippine epics. His final product was a narrative and script, written in accordance to Vogler’s adaptation of Campbell’s monomyth, that was based on his chosen epic *Raja Indaraptra*. He also detailed the various archetypes mentioned by Vogler that he used in his narrative, and to make sure he stayed truthful to the epic’s values and messages, he studied its cultural background to gain context. At the end of it, he recommended that future research similar to his should go online, because it would mean that, online, the game would be accessible to more people and gain exposure (Agnir, 2009).

Sean Raphael G. Santos completed a similar study titled *Salakay: A Video Game Script with Philippine Mythology Characters and Figures*. His final output was a hyper-narrative which featured Philippine mythology. It centered on three playable characters, one from each group of islands, who is on a mission to save the land from destruction and war. And although he did not choose a specific epic, he used the common themes from various Philippine folk epics as an inspiration for his script. He noted that most heroes have supernatural powers, good looks, leadership skills, and determination (Santos, 2009). Using the themes he had identified, he was able to formulate three (3) characters with each having twelve (12) combat missions, leaving 36 re-playable characters. His recommendations for future researchers was to include visuals, because it is essential in imagining the action in the script. Santos also advised developers to carefully consider the type of music, use of language, the combat systems, etc.

These studies provide insight and recommendations as to how the study of video game development itself should proceed. They will help in overcoming obstacles that the previous researchers have identified, as well as providing ways to create a more efficient game. With all the similarities, the studies have different emphases. Agnir’s study, focuses solely on *Raja Indaraptra*, while Santos focuses more on general and common themes in order to create his own story. Here, the study we are conducting focuses on *Hudhud hi Aliguyon*, which is a different epic from a different group.

**Methodology**

**Source of Research Data**

The book the researchers will use as reference for the translation of *Hudhud hi Aliguyon* is *Philippine Folk Literature: The Epics* (2001) by Damiana L. Eugenio. This book contains a compilation of recorded epics from different areas in the Philippines, and is translated into both English and Tagalog, containing as well a summary of and background for the epics themselves. The reason why the researchers chose this book for the epic is because it is the most accessible, raw translation of *Hudhud hi Aliguyon*. The copy within the book was taken
from Amador T. Daguio’s study titled *Hudhud hi Aliguyon, a Translation of an Ifugao Harvest Song with Introduction and Notes*, which is the first transcription of the epic (Manuel, 1963).

*Hudhud hi Aliguyon* was also chosen because, as Manuel (1963) stated in his study titled *A Survey of Philippine Folk Epics*, it is one of the few epics that have been recorded, transcribed, and translated. In his study, it states that four songs have been published in translation with the original text, and there have also been three songs rendered in English prose. Other songs have been recorded on tape, but have not been transcribed. The researchers also chose this epic because of the values it presented, which are endemic to Ifugao culture. These values include bravery, respect for their gods, elders and for their enemies.

**Content Analysis**

This research will use content analysis as the technique in analyzing data. It will involve breaking down the text into manageable categories of words, phrases, or sentences, subsequently identifying the relevant concepts and themes present in it. After that, the data gathered will be examined using Vogler’s adaptation of the monomyth as found in his book *The Writer’s Journey* (2007). It is composed of three parts with each having its own set of stages that a hero will go through. This framework will be used to transform *Hudhud hi Aliguyon* from an epic and into a narrative script that will be used as the game’s storyline. It will be used to identify parts of Aliguyon’s journey as presented in the epic that must be emphasized.

Model 1. The Monomyth

**Game Development**

For the production of a game development output following the narrative of *Hudhud hi Aliguyon*, the researchers will create the game using RPG Maker MV. In this program, we are able to build our own maps and create items and characters relevant to the story with which
The player can interact. It will be made in a 16-bit pixel art style with a third-person perspective, following the main player character, Aliguyon. The genre of video games that the researchers will follow in the making of this game is called a “Role-Playing Game.” There will be cutscenes and quests within the game that follow the narrative the game is based off to move the plot forward, following Campbell’s monomyth as it progresses. The software development methodology used in planning the game development output will be a modified version of the Waterfall Model (n.d.). It is a model with a linear framework and is divided into sequential phases, with some overlap and splashback acceptable between phases (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMMS], 2008). The modification allows for a less restrictive framework, where the developers are able to go back to the previous step and edit as needed. It is ideal for supporting less experienced project teams and project managers, or project teams whose composition fluctuates (CMMS, 2008).

![Model 2. Modified Waterfall Model](image)

The first step for the Waterfall Model is “Idea” or “Requirements,” wherein the developers must conceptualize the specifications of the input and output and the final product is studied and marked (Sharma, 2016). At this stage, the researchers will focus on creating the narrative, concept art, and other elements that will be integrated into the final product.

Second, the developers must conduct an “Analysis” or “System Design,” where they study their ideas and how to implement them through specifying hardware and system requirements; this step is also for defining the overall system architecture and the coding needed for the game (Sharma, 2016). This part will involve conceptualizing how different concepts for the game will be coded or built up with the use of models.

The input from the system design is developed into smaller units in the “Design” or “Implementation” step, developing and testing each small unit as game development progresses.
The next steps are the “Development” and “Test” phases or the “Integration and Testing” phase, where each unit developed earlier is integrated into a system, and then tested repeatedly as a software to check for any errors in the programming. The researchers will create the actual coding for the game at this stage. Once done, it will be tested to identify any issues within the system that must be resolved before the game will be presented.

Lastly, the “Final Product” or the “Deployment of System”, where after development and testing, the game or product is released into the market and published; researchers present the game to panelists.

Presentation of Research Data

Aliguyon Character Development

In Act 1, Aliguyon is introduced as the son of Amtalao, who acts like a leader among his comrades. He is portrayed to be religious and respectful of divine beings, as seen in lines 19-20: And cried out: “My comrades, do what is to be done. / We shall pray the rooster prayer, for we are going to battle”. He also values honor, because he is willing to fight for the honor of his family and start a war with his father’s enemies; however, his desire for honor makes him disrespectful and disobedient towards his mother. This is presented in lines 35–37: He cried out, “May it be that our broken bowl / Be not the bad luck of Aliguyon son of Amtalao, / But that of her mother Dumulao”. He prays that any ill luck that might go to him would transfer to his mother when she scolded him for doing a ritual that she believed him too young to know about. He also opposed certain Ifugao beliefs in the early part of Act 2. One example of this is when he mocks Pumbakhayon’s deformed toes, which is taboo because Ifugao culture dictates that one must not insult or ridicule another person’s deformities. But as his story progresses, Aliguyon gradually learns respect.

In the middle of Act 2 he acquiesces to Dangunay’s request to stop fighting because she resembled his mother, Dumulao. He remembers that he must respect and obey his mother, which is a change from how he had treated her while she was scolding him in Act 1. He also learns to respect and admire Pumbakhayon as their fight continues in Act 2, as he acknowledges that Pumbakhayon is his equal in strength. He goes as far as to defend Pumbakhayon when his comrades cheer for him to be beheaded, as seen in lines 461-463: “Ay! You, my comrades, and fair / Gentle ladies, quiet your shouting, / For Pumbakhayon is an equal and worthy opponent.

In Act 3, Aliguyon has grown to treat Pumbakhayon as a brother instead of an enemy. Pumbakhayon does not even oppose the idea of Aliguyon becoming his brother-in-law, as shown in lines 793-794: “What is the objection to Aliguyon’s suit? / That he be my brother-in-law, I approve. He has also become patient, as he does not rush to the service of Pumbakhayon and his family when he decides to marry Bugan, and at the wedding ritual, where he attains the honor he had been searching for. In the end, Aliguyon has become a more ideal depiction of a hero because he has learned forbearance and become honorable.

Values

Recurring values are honor and respect. According to Dulawan (2005) and Dumia (1979), these ethical principles are precious to Ifugao society. One of the aims in the life of an Ifugao is to attain social prestige, which is often equated to attaining honor (Dulawan, 2001). Once an individual has achieved great honor and earned a higher rank, they expect those at lower
ranks to give the amount of respect their new standing demands (Dumia, 1979). The theme of respect can be divided into three categories: respect for elders, respect for divine beings, and respect for their enemies.

**Honor**
The theme of honor appears in this epic seven times. Honor, as seen in the epic, can be derived from fighting or performing rituals. Throughout the first and second act, Aliguyon believes that he must gain honor by fighting a war against Daligdigan and its leader, Pumbakhayon. He does this in order to regain his family’s honor by continuing the feud his father and Pumbakhayon’s father had years ago. Though the concept appears several times throughout the epic, there are two noteworthy scenes. The first is when Aliguyon passes Iken’s test:

> For no doubt you will measure skill with Iken  
> “Who is Pangaiwan, the only old man  
> Still living from among the enemies of my youth.” (line 129–131)

The second scene is when Aliguyon finally arrives in Daligdigan:

> Aliguyon introduced himself “My name  
> Is Aliguyon, son of Amtalao of Hannanga.  
> I came to renew the hostility between your father and mine.” (lines 201–203)

Honor can also be gained through rituals such as the uyauy or their wedding ritual. In Act 3, Aliguyon achieves this form of honor through marrying Pumbakhayon’s sister, Bugan. In their culture, this is deemed as the highest form of honor one can achieve, an honor for which Aliguyon was vying at the beginning of the epic.

**Respect**
“Respect” is also a frequently recurring theme, categorized into respect for elders, respect for enemies, and respect for divine beings. Respect for elders can be seen in the instance where Aliguyon is reminded of his mother during the war against Pumbakhayon. Because of this, it caused Aliguyon to obey her in order to show respect for Pumbakhayon’s mother.

> Aliguyon thought: “Is not my own mother Dumulao like her?”  
> Dangunay appealed to him saying, “Aliguyon, go to your camp,  
> For Pumbakhayon must go to eat.” (lines 348–351)

After Pumbakhayon’s mother Dangunay tells Aliguyon and Pumbakhayon to momentarily stop the war, both parties obey and go back to their respective camps in order to eat and rest. Later in the epic, the same situation occurs with Pumbakhayon:

> Pumbakhayon, respecting her, leaped to the granary yard.  
> Aliguyon followed, and put down his shield,  
> And went up the house in order to eat; (line 489–492)

In this instance, Pumbakahayon is the one to notice how Dumulao is similar to his own mother. Both instances show how the young men, seeing each other’s mothers in their own mothers, respected the women and retreated upon hearing their orders.

Respect for divine beings can be seen during the rituals, such as the performing of the rooster
prayer several times throughout the epic. In their culture, this prayer is used to honor divine being. It is mainly used when going to war and is a sort of prayer for victory. In the epic, both Aliguyon and Pumbakhayon show this respect for divine beings.

Finally, respect for enemies is evidenced when Pumbakhayon and Aliguyon begin to see each other as equals. There are instances when Pumbakhayon praises Aliguyon’s skill as can in lines 306-308, where Pumbakhayon says “How wonderfully Aliguyon shows his skill, / Son of Amtalao!”

In addition to this, Pumbakhayon also defends Aliguyon’s honor by explaining to the women in his village that Aliguyon is just as skilled in battle as he, the same women that were encouraging him to take Aliguyon’s head. As mentioned before, having one’s head taken is dishonorable, so this is where Pumbakhayon’s regard for Aliguyon as an equal comes through:

“For worthy as an opponent is Aliguyon, He is as good as I am.” (lines 320–322)

The respect given by Pumbakhayon is later reciprocated by Aliguyon, when his comrades encourage Aliguyon to claim Pumbakhayon’s head in lines 460-463. Much like Pumbakhayon, he tells his comrades to calm down, for he claims that Pumbakhayon is his equal.

Other Cultural Traits
Throughout the epic, many of the unique aspects of the culture of the Ifugaos are referenced. The first and most prominent aspect is the importance of ancestry and bloodlines as a mark of identity, evident in phrases such as “Son of _____” and “_____’s son”. This is evident in line 1 where Aliguyon is introduced as the son of Amtalao. It is implied that he carries with him the identity of his father, that he cannot be “Aliguyon” if he is not the son of Amtalao. Furthermore, he is considered of high rank among his people because his father was part of the upper class in their village. His status among his people was made clear in the way his comrades follow his commands and requests without questioning them, all throughout the epic. The constant repetition of his particular lineage further cements the notion that being the son of Amtalao is one of the dominant traits of his identity.

Another important culture is how the Ifugaos view the Rooster as a divine being. The phrases related to this are “Rooster Prayer” and “Rooster”. As shown in line 48–67, they believe that the rooster is one of the beings that were created first, giving it significance within their culture. The roosters were created by darkness, and they serve as a guide for them to decide when they are given a choice that may or may not kill them. They obtain the rooster’s guidance through their rooster prayers and sacrifices as seen in line 20: We shall pray the rooster prayer, for we are going to battle.” Before moving forward with renewing the fight between him and his enemy, Aliguyon had to pray the rooster prayer to ensure that it was the right decision and to ensure that none of them will die.

The next prominent culture trait that is portrayed in the epic is the “eye for an eye” tribal law. Tribal law encourages equal exchanges, so whatever wrong is done to a person, it must be paid back in equal measure. It must be noted, however, that this only applies to extreme cases such as murder. In the epic, an example of tribal law can be found in line 203: “I came to renew the hostility between your father and mine”. In this line, Aliguyon tells Pumbakhayon that he wants to fight him because he wants to continue their fathers’ conflict.
of tribal law is felt when both Aliguyon and Pumbakhayon seek to continue the struggle even after the opponent retreats. They continue their war because tribal law demands that one must fight for indemnification for crimes committed against one’s family.

**Ideal Behavior**

The ideal behavior represented in the epic revolves around respect, obedience, dedication to duty and to role played by the character. Each of these is closely tied to one other.

**Respect**

Respect is a critical value to the Ifugaos. Based on one’s position in society, the individual is given a certain degree of respect and others must always remember to give that individual the appropriate deference. Respect can be earned through one’s heritage or by having attained a degree of prestige. Interactions between lower-class and higher-class characters is characterized by mutual respect.

This theme was most evident with Aliguyon’s interactions with his comrades. In their society, he is part of the upper class, the kadangyan, and because of this his comrades, who have a lower social status, must obey him. This can be seen in line 21: *His comrades noisily assembled*; and line 417: *His comrades obeyed: some went to spread mats*.

Besides the interaction between social classes, the theme of respect can also be found between parent and children. It is essential for the children to respect their parents, because they are an important part of their lives. It is from their parents that the children derive their identity. Children receive their status from their parents and their deeds, and parents also provide for and educate them. In lines 349–352, Aliguyon acquiesced to the request of Dangunay, Pumbakhayon’s mother, because she had reminded him of his own mother. Because of her likeness, he respected her wishes for them to stop the battle for that night.

**Obedience**

Obedience is closely tied with respect, because respecting someone also demands obedience to that person. If a person disobeys an order, it implies that that person does not respect the person that gives the order. In the epic, it was derived from the interactions between classes. Aliguyon is respected by his comrades because they always heed his command, even in extreme situations, as happens in line 268. Here, they ran when they heard the enemies’ shouts, but when Aliguyon called for them to return, they composed themselves and went back to him.

Another aspect in the theme of obedience is respect for elders: Aliguyon and Pumbakhayon would obey their respective mothers’ requests because they greatly respect their mothers, and because of that, they always obey them. In Aliguyon’s case, however, he did not obey his mother all the time. In the earlier part of the epic, he disobeyed her wishes to desist from starting a war and even disrespected her, wishing her ill luck. Eventually, he remembered to respect and obey his mother as he should have from the start.

**Dedication to Duty or Role**

In Ifugao society, everyone has their respective duties and roles, and these are either based on the person’s role in society or on their personal identity. They must meet the expectations and standards tied to the role, because doing otherwise would be considered dishonorable.

Examples of this are echoed in Aliguyon and Pumbakhayon’s actions. Both of them have the
role of protector and leader because of their status as a *kadangyan*. Because of that, they must always account for their village and comrades. In lines 278-281, Pumbakhayon asked Aliguyon to fight him in another place to save their rice fields from being destroyed. He has to think of the field and protect it, because it is a source of food and livelihood for his people, and it is part of his duty as a *kadangyan* to safeguard their interests.

Besides their role as protectors, they are also warriors. When faced with a challenge, they are expected to accept it honorably. In fact, in two separate occasions Aliguyon and Pumbakhayon were encouraged by onlookers to take each other’s heads as a trophy. Doing so would bring them great honor, and it would also serve to end the war.

Other characters in the epic play their own predictable roles. The mothers, Dangunay and Dumulao, have a duty to care for their children and work in the fields, and they are often found managing the fields and caring for Bugan and Aginaya. Pumbakhayon and Aliguyon’s comrades have a duty to follow them even in war. These characters always strive to fulfill their duties, exhibiting their dedication to their social roles.

**Conclusion**

Data analysis yields an understanding of the critical themes and essential features that will influence the video game adaptation of the epic. At the start of the game, Aliguyon should be someone who is desperately looking for honor. He has good intentions, but his actions have consequences that he did not fully consider. From that beginning, he will grow into the ideal hero of the Ifugaos. The values of respect and honor will be emphasized through the character’s actions. Honor is found to be the overarching theme, as pursuing is Aliguyon’s foremost motivation. Furthermore, the social ideals and unique cultural traits outlined above will guide the interactions between the game’s characters. His comrades and friends will treat Aliguyon with respect and obedience, but his elders will not shy away from pointing out those faults that he should overcome. As the game’s environment is crafted, the unique culture of the Ifugaos will dictate objects, backgrounds and sounds.
References


Appendix

Conceptualization and Creative Output

The creative output of this research will be a video game. It will be a third person 16-bit RPG which will be made with RPG Maker MV. It will be based on the epic *Hudhud hi Aliguyon*, which is one of the Philippine Folk Epics that is recorded, transcribed, and translated.

Main Character
The player will play as the brave protagonist Aliguyon, son of Amtalao and Dumulao. He is a leader among his people and his comrades, and he knows how to motivate them even through dark times. He embodies many of his people’s ideals and aspirations, yet he has many human flaws. He can be impatient, petty and disrespectful, as is seen in his initial treatment of Dumulao and Pumbakhayon in the epic.

Narrative
The game’s narrative will be based on the story of *Hudhud hi Aliguyon*, which will be written following Vogler’s adaptation of the monomyth. It will also incorporate the values, unique culture, and ideals identified in the epic to make the narrative more interesting and authentic. It will start with the first stage of Act 1, *Ordinary World*, which opens the story in Hannanga, the village where Aliguyon lives, and it will end in the last stage, *Return with the Elixir*, where Aliguyon finally marries Bugan. As the story develops, characters will be introduced such as Dumulao, Pumbakhayon, and some of his comrades to give the story more life and dialogue. These characters will all be created based on the culture, values and ideals found in the epic, making the video game microcosm more cohesive and comprehensive to the player.

Creative Output

Descendants of the Sky: Song of Aliguyon is a game demo that follows the story of the character Aliguyon. Following Vogler’s monomyth, the narratives for Act 1 and Act 2 were created, but not Act 3, as it was advised that the researchers simply make a demo to introduce him. This will create intrigue, without exerting too much superfluous effort into the project. The title screen has three buttons: New Game, Continue, Options. The first will create a ‘new game’ for the player, which will start in the introduction. The ‘Continue’ will load any “game
save files”, so the player may come back to the game at another point besides the introduction. The “Options” will list the settings. The player may set the music, dash, and other options according to their needs.

The game will start in the middle of Hannanga with the main character, Aliguyon. He is the kadangyan of the village of Hannanga, and is described as brash and reckless. His main motivation is to attain the honor he has lost after a certain event that happened before the start of game, and in order to do that, he must fight Pumbakhayon, the kadangyan of the neighboring tribe, Daligdigan. Pumbakhayon serves as the direct foil to Aliguyon, and is seen to be more calm, calculating, and logical in his approach to leadership and war. In essence, he is the ideal leader Aliguyon strives to be.

The player can explore the village of Hannanga and interact with objects in the world while
the story unfolds. They also have to interact with people around them, especially important side characters such as Maolot, Aginaya, and Dumulao for the story to progress.

The two characters in the graphics are Igon and Maolot. They are Aliguyon’s friends. The player had to search for them in the game and meet with them in front of his house. It is essential for the player to find them, because they are necessary for progress to the next stage of the game.

The player will have to hunt down a boar with Igon and Maolot. Once they encounter a boar, the game will shift into the battle interface. The battle mechanics of the game rely on the concept of Fervor and Focus. These are treated as limited points that, at certain quantities, are used to unlock certain skills that Aliguyon can use. Fervor and Focus revolve around two different themes that are meant to represent the inner struggle Aliguyon has as kadangyan; whether he should do things his way in a brash and reckless manner (Fervor), or listen to Old Iken’s advice and strategize wisely and accordingly (Focus). The researchers had planned that depending on which one the player uses most often, there would be overworld consequences to dialogue and interaction outside of battle; however, this was not implemented into the demo, as it was not possible with the software currently used to make it.
This is the “Victory Screen” that appears once the player defeats the boar. After this, it exits the battle interface, and the player can proceed with the rest of the narrative. The game demo will end after the battle with Old Iken, who is Aliguyon’s mentor. This battle marks the start of Aliguyon’s war, because he would have received the permission he needed to move forward with his plans. It ends here to strengthen interest regarding what happens next, as the protagonist can expect support if the game continues to the next stage.

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Colonial Administrative Integration of African Territories: Identity and Resistance in Nigeria’s Southern Cameroons, 1922–1961

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Abstract

British administrative policy in Africa, and particularly in Cameroon, was generally misguided. *Encyclopedia Britannica* supports this largely undisputed perspective, declaring that “British rule was a period of neglect, and this, coupled with the influx of numerous Nigerians, caused great resentment. […] At independence, French Cameroun had a much higher gross national product per capita, higher education levels, better health care, and better infrastructure than British Cameroons” (“Cameroon”, 2019, para. 2–3). This state of affairs is likely the result of the decision to administer the British portion of Cameroon as a constituent part of Britain’s Nigerian colony. This arrangement dictated the course of events in the Southern Cameroons territory from 1922 to 1961. From this basic premise, this paper argues that the administration of British Southern Cameroons as part of the British Nigerian Colony brought about an identity crisis in which Southern Cameroonians, albeit integrated into Nigeria, predominantly chose to maintain their identity as a distinct, separate group of people. As such, the allocation of their territory to Nigeria exposed them to alien political domination, as most of the administrators in the Southern Cameroons were Nigerian. Consequently, Southern Cameroonians formed political pressure groups, created political parties and wrote petitions to the British Government as well as to the United Nations in an effort to resist the authority of what they considered to be an intrusive foreign entity. A corollary to this state of affairs was the vote in the 1961 plebiscite. With the great majority of voters choosing to sever their ties with Nigeria, Southern Cameroonians reasserted their distinct identity and called for an end to the political domination that resulted from their unsolicited association with Nigeria.

*Keywords*: Southern Cameroons, Southern Cameroonians, identity, Nigeria, politics, political domination, resistance, integration, British Nigerian Colony
Introduction

Even in cursory retrospect, it is evident that local national identity groups have historically mobilised to counteract a centralised state’s efforts to create internal homogeneity, contesting, for example, the imposition of a common language, of a shared education system, of administrative hierarchies that are considered unsuitable to those groups, and of collective mythologies, histories and the like. In most cases, attempts to dominate people or interfere with their identity have triggered violent opposition. Such was the case with the German annexation of Cameroon, when in 1884 several indigenous groups engaged in active resistance to the German annexation of their territory. Among these were the Nso, Bangwa, Bakweri, Duala and the Ewondo, groups that, driven by an undeniable siege mentality, fought to protect their cherished identity and their traditional institutions and hierarchies. Given their reaction, it is evident that colonialism was imposed on them against their will, given the violence with which several coastal indigenous groups greeted the Germans (Fanso, 2017, 155–157). Even groups like Bali, Bamum, and Ewondo, who later collaborated with the Germans, either initially resisted or were coerced in one way or another to submit to German authority, which lasted from July 1884 to February 1916. After the fall of German Kamerun, the territory came under the direct tutelage of the League of Nations, which in turn surrendered its control to Britain and France as Mandatory Powers. These powers experimented with a shared-dominion arrangement called the Condominium; with its ultimate failure Britain and France decided to partition the territory. In the course of the partition, Britain and France acquired 1/5 (20%) and 4/5 (80%) of the territory respectively (Ndi, 2013, 74–76). The territory taken by Britain was not only small in terms of surface area but was also narrow (elongated), non-contiguous (separated) and marred by transportation and communication difficulties that made its effective administration from Nigeria nightmarish (Ngoh, 2001, 3). In spite of this, the British knowingly decided to administer Southern Cameroons as a part of Southern and later Eastern Regions of Nigeria.

This paper maintains that the administration of Southern Cameroons as an integral part of Nigeria saw the latter engage in a continual endeavour to politically dominate the former. But in the Nigerian political arena, Southern Cameroonians resisted all forms of political domination throughout the period of their attachment. Attempts by Nigerians to politically dominate the Southern Cameroons took many forms, both in Nigeria and in the Southern Cameroons territory. The features of some Nigerian constitutions such as the Clifford Constitution of 1922, the Richards Constitution of 1946, the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 and the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 contained signs of either political domination or absorption of the Southern Cameroons territory firmly into Nigeria (Ngoh, 2001, 11–58). Moreover, Southern Cameroonians were largely underrepresented in the Legislative and Executive Councils of Nigeria, causing Southern Cameroonian politicians, through political pressure groups, political parties and parliamentary discourses, to mount a coherent and constant resistance to Nigerian ascendancy. Ultimately, in 1961, their massive vote against integration with the Nigerian Federation (Nohlen, 1999, 167) was partly informed by the desire

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1 The different communities that existed in what was to become Cameroon were classified into several ethnic groups, each of which constituted a cultural unit. These ethnic organizations varied in their political and socio-economic composition. The highest authority in these communities was their “natural ruler” – the King. The power of the King was supreme and most communities viewed it as such. It was thus difficult for indigenous people to understand that the Kaiser of Germany or the Queen of England was greater than their ruler. This partly why people resisted European annexation of their territory.

2 After the defeat of the Germans at the end of the First World War in Cameroon, the territory fell under the League of Nations’ Mandate “B” Status and was to be administered by Britain and France on behalf of the League of Nations following the Terms of Mandate.
to steer clear from Nigerian politics – a sure way of escaping political domination and reasserting their identity.

The period between 1922 and 1961 has animated a great deal of scholarly discourse in Cameroon and beyond. Several scholars have skilfully treated the different aspects of the Southern Cameroons-Nigerian political intercourse. Atem (1984) offers a lucid discussion regarding the symbiotic connection that existed between Cameroon and Nigeria from 1884 to 1961. His study touches on the political, economic and social dimensions of the interaction between the two states. In his memoirs about his administrative exploits in British Africa, Milne (1999) unveiled with astonishing depth the constitutional and personality problems that were associated with the emergence of Southern Cameroons as a self-governing entity and its ultimate unification with the Republic of Cameroon. On his part, Ndi (2013) discusses the distinct political culture of Southern Cameroonian politicians during the period of political tensions over the choice of independence options (p. 103). Faced with the conflicting opinions of those who wanted the territory to remain part of Nigeria, those who wanted reunification with French Cameroon and those who wanted outright independence, Southern Cameroonian politicians demonstrated the maturity and political acumen needed to reach consensus. Southern Cameroons Constitutional History, especially between the years 1922 and 1961, has been handled by Ngoh (2001) with particular attention to the specific impact had by Nigerian Constitutions on the Southern Cameroons, while Chem-Langhee (2004) has painstakingly studied how and why Southern Cameroonians opted for the preservation of their distinct identity. Similarly, Nfi (2015) demonstrated how the Southern Cameroons’ interaction with Nigeria led to attempts by the Nigerians to Nigerianise the Southern Cameroons’ economy, civil service, judiciary and education. In another argument, Nfi (2014b, xii) has maintained that the reunification debate in the Southern Cameroons allowed immigrants from French Cameroon to interfere in Southern Cameroons politics and to ultimately influence the plebiscite results in favour of French Cameroon. Lastly Aka (2002), adding another dimension to the study of this period in Cameroonian history, has traced the underdevelopment of Southern Cameroons to the British administration in the territory which was, unmistakably, the outcome of the administration of Southern Cameroons as part of Nigeria. Thus, much ink has flowed in academe on the Southern Cameroons question. Though different aspects of the territory’s interaction with Nigeria have been handled, the present study is different in that it gives insights on attempts to dominate and obliterate the Southern Cameroons as a political entity and the strategies its people employed to resist all forms of political domination.

**British Southern Cameroons: Bases of Association with Nigeria**

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 saw Britain and France shelving their longstanding colonial rivalries to put up a united front against Germany in her African colonies (Elango, 1987, 7). Accordingly, they formed the West African Expeditionary Force (WA EF), a military unit that toppled the German government in Douala and led to the implantation of the condominium as a provisional measure, allowing for a period of time to reflect on how the territory would ultimately be administered once Germany was defeated. (Ndi, 74–76). However, due to unforeseen circumstances, the condominium model proved abortive, the concept being supplanted by both parties’ desire to partition the territory. These unpredicted snags included, among others, disagreements over critical financial and territorial authority issues. Thus, while there was a dispute over the specific outlines of the condominium, there was a fairly strong consensus over the need to partition the territory between the two European powers. It thus followed that the Picot Line gave 432,000 km² (4/5) to France and 88,000 km² (1/5) to Britain, an unequal partition that was never disputed by Britain (Eyongetah, Robert, &
Palmer, 1974, 79). Meanwhile, Britain had controlled Nigeria following a colonisation that began as far back as 1861 after the acquisition of the Lagos Colony (Onwubiko, 1972, 254). France on her part had occupied territories at the eastern border of German Kamerun, in what became known as French Equatorial Africa.

Perceptions of geographical space are meaningful to imperial states as they develop, pursue and circumscribe their interests. Perceptions of the space necessary for the imperial community to progress and subsist are important, as empires develop a geographical “personality” that in some ways determines their political direction and spatial expansion. Thus, the interests of Britain and France in Cameroon, in view of the vacuum left by the German collapse, can be understood to hinge upon the desire to preserve and enhance the coherence of their colonial strategy in Africa, as well as of their strategies in war-torn Europe. In light of such strategies, in 1916 the British War Office was amenable to giving France the whole of German Kamerun, wanting to raise French morale during a dreadful moment in that nation’s history. The French diplomat Picot, apparently unaware of British intentions, drew a demarcation line that left 20% of Cameroon in British hands (Nfì, 2014b, 13). That partition gave the two powers territories adjacent to their colonies, and it was consensual. As a result, both parties agreed to and welcomed the partition as it was, but given that imperial perceptions of space are not generally shared by people that actually live in that space, the overall feeling among Cameroonians was one of dissatisfaction in view of a partition they perceived as arbitrary. Sultan Njoya of the Bamum Kingdom, for instance, was one of those who resisted the partition, especially due to the fact that his Kingdom fell under French tutelage (Ngoh, 1988, 82–84). The partition of Cameroon was therefore a thorny issue that brought difficulties and misery to the people of the territory (Mukete, 2013, 33–36). Thus, the resistance to political domination within Nigerian politics by Southern Cameroonians was an extension of the same spirit of resistance to the partition of their territory.

Thus Britain gained territories lying adjacent to her Nigerian colony while France acquired a large territory adjoining her colonies in French Equatorial Africa. As a measure that at the time seemed coherent with the strategic logic of their territorial holdings, the British chose to administer the British Northern Cameroons and British Southern Cameroons as separate parts of the Northern Nigerian Provinces of Benue, Bornu and Adamawa and the Southern (and later, Eastern) Province of Nigeria respectively. This decision was not taken with the consent of either Nigerians or Cameroonians. Thus, some Nigerians—notably the members of the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) – as well as significant groups of Cameroonians disapproved of the decision (Ngoh, 2001). A number of considerations informed the British decision to administratively link her Cameroon holdings to Nigeria. In the first place, Britain (after much reluctance) ended up acquiring these portions of Cameroon mainly for strategic reasons. Administering her portion of the Cameroons as an integral part of Nigeria was a strategic move taken by the British administration to tidy her Eastern Nigerian Boundary with the Cameroons (Rubin, 1971, 71). In a memorandum dated May 29, 1919, Alfred Milner, the British Secretary of State for Colonies, argued that “The territory we have gained, though not large in extent, has a certain value in giving us better boundaries and bringing completely within our borders native tribes which have hitherto been partly within British territory and partly outside it” (Gardinier, 1967, 523, cited in Ngoh, 2001, 4). One example of territories that Britain needed in order to have its boundaries tidied was Yola. Having acquired the territory whose primary purpose was to tidy the eastern border, administering it as part of Nigeria became the logical thing to do.

Britain’s compulsion to connect her newly acquired Cameroonian territory to her Nigerian colony is better understood when one remembers the British disinterest in acquiring any part
of Cameroon after the First World War (Rothwell, 1971, 73 cited in Ngoh, 2001, 3). Ostensibly, the British lukewarm attitude towards the annexation of Cameroon – already manifested at the beginning of the “scramble” – had not completely disappeared. After having fought with France and defeating Germany in Cameroon during the First World War, she only needed a part of Cameroon to use as a bargaining chip in the ensuing negotiations that were expected to follow the end of the war (Osuntokun, 1978, 257, cited in Ngoh, 2001, 3). Akinjide submits that British Secretary of State for Colonies, Lord Lewis Harcourt, had suggested to Lord Lugard that Britain should give the whole of Cameroon to France in exchange for all of Togo and Dahomey (Akinjide, 1979, 231). The British reluctance to take over control of any part of Cameroon made associating the territory eventually acquired to Nigeria an understandable action.

The foregoing arguments should demonstrate that it was a rational decision by the British to administer Southern Cameroons as part of Nigeria. Britain thus took advantage of the leverage given by Article Nine (9) of the Mandate Provision to administer Southern Cameroons as part of Nigeria. The association of British Cameroons in general and British Southern Cameroons in particular to the British Nigerian colony, which lasted for close to forty years, left indelible imprints on the Southern Cameroons territory and greatly shaped the political evolution of that political unit called Southern Cameroons. During this period of appurtenance with Nigeria, Southern Cameroonians generally demonstrated their unwillingness to be fully integrated politically within Nigeria, in spite of their compulsory administrative connection.

Southern Cameroons-Nigeria Appurtenance: The Administrative Arrangement

The administrative system that was instituted in British Cameroons in 1922 was based on the policy of Indirect Rule. In fact, before 1922 it was not certain which administrative policy should be used in British Cameroons (Fanso, 2017, 236). After the partition, the Governor-General of Nigeria, Lord Frederick Lugard ordered that “the British Cameroons be administered according to the Laws of Kamerun so far as these were known, or according to the laws of the part of Nigeria in which the administering officer had previously held his appointment” (Fanso, 2017, 236). Eventually, what were implemented in British Cameroons were the laws of Northern or Southern Nigeria. This situation remained so until July 20, 1922 when the British administration in the territory officially began (Fanso, 2017, 236). Meanwhile, by April of 1922 the Secretary of State for Colonies had approved the use of Indirect Rule in the British Cameroons territory as the administrative policy. This policy was preferred because it was financially cost-effective to the British, who were not willing to shoulder an extra financial burden in the administration of overseas territories, desiring the colonies to pay for the cost of their own administration (Kilson, 1970, p. 74).

According to Coleman (1958), Indirect Rule refers to “a system of local administration in which the essential features were the preservation of traditional political institutions and their adaptation under the tutelage and direction of the British administration to the requirements of modern units of local government”. On his part, Onwubiko (1972) has defined Indirect Rule as “a system of administration under which traditional rulers were allowed to rule their people under the supervision of British officials” (p. 259). In this way, the British recognised indigenous administrations and organised chiefdoms as Native Authorities or Native Administrations (NAs). Through the NAs, the British administered the local people by passing

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3 This Article permitted Britain to have full powers of administration and legislation in the area subject to the mandate and could be administered as part of their adjacent territories.
down orders through them and receiving feedback from the natives through traditional rulers. Thus, traditional rulers acted as administrative intermediaries in this particular system of administration.

The British portion of Cameroon was divided into two parts. These included British Northern Cameroons and British Southern Cameroons. The Northern Half adjoining Northern Nigeria was administered as an integral part of the three Northern Nigerian provinces. The Tigon-Ndoro-Kentu area became part of the Benue Province with its capital in Maiduguri; the Northern and Southern Adamawa Districts formed part of Adamawa Province with its capital at Yola, while the Dikwa Division became part of Bornu Province with its capital at Makurdi (Eyongetah et. al., 1974, 81). This particular connection resulted from the fact that British authorities, to a certain degree, regarded the British Northern Cameroons territory as an extension of Northern Nigeria and as part of that Fulani-dominated area (Ngoh, 1988, 4). Southern Cameroons was not split in the same manner, as it was initially administered as an additional province within the Southern Provinces of Nigeria; it subsequently became part of Eastern Nigeria, albeit as an unattached province (Eyongetal et al, 81). The administration of the Southern Cameroons as a single entity likely accounted for popular identity cohesion, which in turn enabled the preservation the area’s traditional culture. Thus, political circumstances have determined the evolution of the present-day North West and South West Regions of the Republic of Cameroon. Southern Cameroons was divided into four Divisions: Victoria, Mamfe, Kumba and Bamenda. A subsequent addition was the Bamenda Division, which was further split into three: Bamenda, Wum and Nkambe (Ngoh, 1988, 4).

The ultimate authority in the administration of the Nigerian Colony and the mandated territory of Cameroon was the governor-general who resided in Lagos (Fanso, 2017, 236). Under the governor-general were two lieutenant governors who were in charge of the Northern and Southern Cameroons, while the “resident” was the principal executive officer of the Cameroons Province and was based in Buea (Fanso, 2017, 237–238). The district officers (DOs) headed the divisions and were assisted by the assistant district officers. Under them were the traditional rulers who served as district heads. The system of administration was thus hierarchical and highly organized, especially with the putting in place of the Indirect Rule system of administration. By this arrangement, Southern Cameroons was linked to Nigeria constitutionally, administratively, and legislatively. It thus followed that constitutional, administrative, judicial and legislative changes in Nigeria invariably affected the Southern Cameroons territory. For the most part however, such changes were either consciously or unconsciously designed to enable Nigeria to dominate Southern Cameroons politically.

Evidence of the Political Subjugation of Southern Cameroons within Nigeria

The manner in which the administrative system was structured linked Southern Cameroons to Nigeria constitutionally, administratively, and legislatively. Since constitutional, administrative and legislative changes in Nigeria invariably affected Southern Cameroons, it followed that some of those changes were regarded by many Southern Cameroonians as unfair and designed to dominate them politically and obliterate their identity. Evidence of the political subjugation of British Southern Cameroons began to be perceived as far back as 1922 with the passage of the Clifford Constitution by Sir Hugh Clifford. This constitution abolished the old Nigerian Council and replaced it with a Legislative Council of 46 members. It also created an Executive Council that was essentially an advisory body to the Governor (Ngoh, 2001, 10). The passage of the Clifford Constitution coincided with the official commencement of the British Mandate in Southern Cameroons. But the Constitution apparently ignored the need for
Southern Cameroons to be represented in the Legislative and the Executive Councils. As such, Southern Cameroons was never represented therein despite the creation of the Legislative and Executive Councils. This situation was regarded by many Southern Cameroonians as an attempt to politically dominate and/or marginalise them, since between 1922 and 1951 they had no representation in the Legislative and Executive Councils in Lagos.

The 1946 Richards Constitution that replaced the Clifford Constitution illustrates the continuing legislative marginalisation of Southern Cameroons by Nigerians. Sir Arthur Richard believed in the full integration of the Southern Cameroons into the Nigerian Colony. This Constitution divided Nigeria into the Northern, Eastern and Western Regions. Southern Cameroons formed part of the Eastern Region, with its Capital at Enugu. While the central Legislative Council remained in Lagos, Regional Assemblies were created in the three regions. Southern Cameroons was given two Native Authority seats in the Eastern Regional Assembly, and they were occupied by Chief Manga Williams of Victoria and Fon Galega II of Bali. Thus, besides introducing unwelcome constitutions, the British and the Nigerians made efforts to Nigerianise the Southern Cameroons administration by allowing only two seats in the Assembly.

The Southern Cameroons territory also witnessed an influx of Nigerian administrators. As early as 1923, different Southern Cameroons government departments, including post and telegraphs, police, prisons, agriculture, medical, education, customs, marine, and public works were dominated by Nigerians (Nfi, 2015, 33). By the 1940s, the first African Assistant District Officer for the Manyu Division (in Southern Cameroons) was a Nigerian (Nfi, 2015, 33). The British justified the non-appointment of Southern Cameroonians to top administrative positions between the 1920s and the 1940s by stating “Nigerians were already more acculturated with the British imperial system and the English language than their counterparts in Southern Cameroons” (Fanso, 1982, 475 cited in Nfi, 2014, 33). Interestingly, most of these Nigerians, on which the British depended for the administration of Southern Cameroons, were far less qualified and could not “deliver the goods” (Ibid.). This left many in Southern Cameroons with a distinct feeling of political subjection to Nigeria, a situation that led to the emergence of widespread resistance against and criticism of the British system. Resistance manifested itself in the form of political pressure groups, political parties and through petitions and elections.

**Resistance to Political Domination: Political Pressure Groups**

The feeling of political domination by the Southern Cameroonian politicians brought the seeds of political pressure groups in the territory. One of the swiftest responses to the apparent attempts at political domination within Nigerian politics was the formation of the Cameroon Welfare Union (CWU), created in 1939 by G. J. Mbene in Victoria. Among its objectives, Chem-Langhee (2004) has submitted, was that of “… catering for the interests of Cameroonians which, at this point, included the assertion of a Cameroons identity” (p. 24). The question of the Southern Cameroons identity remained strong in the minds of the people throughout the period of their association with Nigeria. This invariably was the motivation for the determination by the Southern Cameroonians to resist all forms of political domination within Nigeria. Consequently, in early 1940, the CWU petitioned the British administration against the non-representation of Southern Cameroons in the Legislative Council in Lagos (Chem-Langhee, 2004, 24). This move, though delayed for two more years, eventually led to

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4 This division corresponded to the location of the three main ethnic groups in Nigeria. The Northern Region was Hausa-dominated, the Western Region was Yoruba, and the Eastern Region was Igbo.
the appointment of Chief Manga Williams in 1942 as the Southern Cameroons representative in the Legislative Council in Lagos.

The demise of the CWU necessitated the founding of a like-minded political pressure group, the Cameroon Youth League (CYL). It was founded on March 27, 1940 in Lagos and was led by Southern Cameroonian students in Nigerian Schools and Colleges. These included Paul M. Kale, Emmanuel M. L. Endeley and John N. Foncha. While the League had variegated objectives, its ultimate purpose was to seek a recognized political status for Southern Cameroons, and this had to be achieved through the creation of a separate legislature for Southern Cameroons (Chem-Langhee, 2004, 25). The creation of the CYL was thus another landmark move by Southern Cameroonians to maintain their identity and shield themselves against all types of domination from their Nigerian neighbours. In fact, it was the increased pressure of the CYL that eventually led to the appointment of Chief Manga Williams as the Southern Cameroons representative to the Legislative Council in Lagos. But it also led to the enfranchisement of the Southern Cameroons within Nigeria.

As a reaction to the terms of the Richards Constitution, another political pressure group, the Cameroon Federal Union (CFU) emerged in the Southern Cameroons in 1947 under the leadership of E. M. L. Endeley. This pressure group canvassed for the re-enfranchisement of the Southern Cameroons and the creation of a separate Southern Cameroons Region (Rubin, 1971, 84, cited in Chem-Langhee, 2004, 27). The Richards Constitution had paved the way for the Southern Cameroons to lose its seat in the Legislative Council in Lagos while being granted only two Native Authority seats in the Eastern Regional Assembly.

In May 1949 yet another political pressure group was created in Southern Cameroons, the Cameroon National Federation (CNF) also led by E. M. L. Endeley. This group demanded, among other things, the establishment of an administratively separate Cameroons Region with its own House of Assembly under a commissioner responsible to the Trusteeship Council. Beyond this, it also advocated for unification/reunification of the Cameroons (Chem-Langhee, 2004, 29). By 1951, a resurgent Southern Cameroonian identity buttressed the desire for the country to be restored exactly as it was under the German administration. Evidence of this is the emergence of the Kamerun United National Congress (KUNC) as a political pressure group, adopting the German spelling “Kamerun”. Clearly, though Southern Cameroons formed part of Nigeria, its people were demanding a separation.

Another way Southern Cameroonians contested political domination was the formation of political parties.

The Political Parties

Political activism actually began in association with Nigeria. Southern Cameroonian such as Kale and Endeley were instrumental in the formation of political parties like the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), founded in 1940 under the leadership of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe. Through this party, the Southern Cameroons’ political standpoint rejecting the Richards Constitution was given a voice. This political party organized public demonstrations against that constitution (Chem-Langhee, 2004, 26), and while the NCNC was not led by bona fide Southern Cameroonians, members of this community militated in the party and used it as a shield against political domination within the Nigerian system. This was feasible because the party shared a number of the grievances held by Southern Cameroonians.
In 1946 the NCNC toured throughout Nigeria and the Southern Cameroons with the aim of galvanising popular moral and financial support so as to undertake a trip to London to lobby against the Richards Constitution. As a result, in June 1947 a seven-man delegation, including PM Kale of Southern Cameroons, traveled to London to present their case against the Richards Constitution (Chem-Langhee, 2004, 27). This gave Kale the opportunity to present the Southern Cameroons case against the Constitution while requesting the restoration of the Southern Cameroons seat in the Legislative Council in Lagos and the creation of a separate legislature for the territory. Thus, due to their militancy in the NCNC, Southern Cameroonians came to terms with the necessity of using a party led by Nigerians to campaign against political domination by Nigerians. Moreover, besides being used to drum up sympathy against political domination, the party offered political apprenticeship, a necessary requirement in the running of indigenous political parties that began operating in the territory in 1953.

Opposition to the Richards Constitution led to the introduction of a new constitution in 1951 by Sir John Macpherson, who had replaced Sir Arthur Richards as Governor-General. The Macpherson Constitution granted the Southern Cameroons territory thirteen seats in the Eastern Regional Assembly and four seats in the Legislative Council in Lagos. Besides, the territory was also represented in the Executive Council of the Eastern Region and the Central Executive Council in Lagos by S. T. Muna (Minister of Works) and E. M. L. Endeley (Minister of Labour) (Ngoh, 2001, 59–62). Yet, while the Macpherson Constitution addressed some of the issues created by the Richards Constitution, it was still regarded by Southern Cameroonians with contempt because it failed to grant a separate legislature. On the contrary, the Constitution reinforced the Southern Cameroons-Nigerian connection at a time when Southern Cameroonians were shifting towards increasing demands for a separate legislature for the territory. As Southern Cameroonians contemplated the possible steps that could be taken to ensure that the territory gained a separate legislature, a “disguised opportunity” appeared, the Eastern Regional Crisis of April 1953.

Constitutional and personality conflicts between top brass of the NCNC in the Eastern Regional Assembly came to a head when its chairman, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Vice Chairman Professor Eyo Ita proclaimed that the Southern Cameroons Delegation was being deceived and exploited. In the course of the conflict, the lone Southern Cameroonian Minister to the Eastern Regional Council of Ministers, S. T. Muna (Minister of Works) was dismissed. In reaction, nine of the thirteen Southern Cameroonian representatives to the Eastern Regional Assembly formed the Benevolent Neutrality Bloc (BNB), which called on Southern Cameroonians to steer clear of Nigerian politics (Ngoh, 2001, 67–74). According to Ngoh, their reasons for expressing the wish to sever links with Nigeria were that there was “a deliberate disregard of the wishes and aspirations of the Southern Cameroons” and that within Nigeria, "they were unable to make the wishes of the Cameroons people respected" (Ngoh, 2001, 67–74). After holding the Mamfe Constitutional Conference of May 22–24, 1953, Members of the BNB, after numerous discussions, formed the first indigenous political party in the British Southern Cameroons, the Kamerun National Congress (KNC). The Congress was led by E. M. L. Endeley and R. J. K. Dibongue (Fanso, 2017, 99–300). The aim of the party was to seek a recognised status for Southern Cameroons as separate entity and to pursue an eventual reunification with French Cameroon. By 1954, under the Lyttleton Constitution, Southern Cameroons was granted a Quasi Regional Status with a reasonable degree of autonomy. Dr E. M. L. Endeley became the Leader of Government Business. However, the territory had not fully extricated itself from the Nigerian connection and the possibility of continuing political domination. Thus, the struggle for separation continued until 1957, and by 1961 Southern Cameroons was granted autonomy within the Republic of Cameroon. To achieve this end, a
means that was thoroughly exploited by Southern Cameroonian dissidents was the use of petitions.

**The Petitions**

Southern Cameroonian also used petitions to call the attention of the British and the International Community to the attempts at political domination of their territory by Nigeria. These petitions were addressed to political pressure groups, political parties and powerful individuals. In early 1940, for instance, while tension mounted on the non-representation of the Southern Cameroons in the Legislative Council in Lagos, the Victoria Branch of the CWU addressed a petition to the British administration requesting such representation (Kale, 1967, 51–55 cited in Chem-Langhee, 2004, 24). As a result of this petition, the British administration granted the request in principle in 1940; in 1942 it was formally granted with the appointment of Chief Manga Williams as the Southern Cameroons representative. This act was an unambiguous message to the British/Nigerian authorities that the Southern Cameroonians were politically conscious enough to challenge, competently and persuasively, their political subjection and their social marginalisation.

Similarly, in August 1947 and within the political framework of the NCNC, Kale petitioned the Secretary of State for Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, to rescind the Richards Constitution. In this petition and among several other requests, Kale stressed the need to restore the Southern Cameroons representation in the Legislative Council in Lagos and the creation of a separate legislature for Southern Cameroons. When this request was not given adequate response, a protest march was organised in London during which calls were made for the independence of Nigeria and the granting of disengagement for Southern Cameroons. By June 1948, a provincial conference that brought together representatives of youth organizations and tribal unions took place in Mamfe. Therein, the resolutions calling for the Southern Cameroons to be declared a separate entity were approved almost unanimously. This event built up to another petition that was sent to the Governor in March 1949 calling for the establishment of a separate, wholly unconnected administration for the region.

In March 1949, a combined body of various associations and unions of the Southern Cameroons in Lagos, comprising the Mamfe Improvement Union, the Bakweri Improvement Union, the Bamenda Improvement Association, the CYL and the CNF, petitioned new governor Sir John Macpherson and the House of Assembly under a Commissioner responsible to the Trusteeship Council for the establishment of a separate region (Chem-Langhee, 28). It is worth mentioning at this juncture that though Governor Macpherson passed a new constitution that was apparently intended to improve the political representation of the Southern Cameroons within the Nigerian system, a majority of Southern Cameroonians at this point was already favouring the option of separation from Nigeria. Thus, they were unable to fully appreciate the innovations introduced by the Macpherson Constitution that increased the number of their representation from two to thirteen in the Eastern Regional Assembly in Enugu. While the Macpherson Constitution aimed at resolving the issues created by the Richards Constitution, a majority of Southern Cameroonians saw it as an attempt to fully integrate them within Nigeria, a situation that they were already considering with contempt and disdain.

Another petition addressed to the British administration came after the Mamfe Constitutional Conference of May 22–24, 1953, one that reiterated the desire of the Southern Cameroons for separation. This was done as a prelude to the London Constitutional Conference, held in July and August 1953. There, Endeley, J. C. Kangsen and S. A. George assumed the position of
“Benevolent Neutrals”. At the end of the Conference, the need for the revision of the Macpherson Constitution became sorely evident. Sir Oliver Lyttleton later replaced Macpherson as Governor of Nigeria and the Lyttleton Constitution granted the Southern Cameroons Quasi Regional Status on October 26, 1954, with Endeley as Leader of Government Business. The Quasi Regional Status only granted Southern Cameroons limited autonomy, so the struggle for full regional disengagement had to continue. This was achieved in 1957, and the Plebiscite of 1961 put an end to nearly 40 years of attachment to Nigeria.

The 1961 Plebiscite

The 1961 plebiscite put an end to the political connection between the Southern Cameroons and Nigeria that had begun in 1922. In the end, the Southern Cameroons’ association to Nigeria had particularly unpleasant consequences. Besides the Igbo issue (a people that straddle the Cameroon-Nigeria border), the British did much to create division among politicians in order to manipulate them to their own advantage. This partly explains why in the 1950s Southern Cameroonian opinions were fractured among different shades of attitudes concerning the description of independence. Three of these shades are easily identifiable. Some believed that limited autonomy should be attained while staying within the Nigerian Federation. Dr E. M. L. Endeley championed this opinion. Led by JN Foncha, another group of politicians construed independence as unification with French Cameroon. Meanwhile, P. M. Kale held that Southern Cameroons should secede from Nigeria without reunifying with French Cameroon. In other words, this group of Southern Cameroonian stood for the independence of Southern Cameroons as a sovereign state. It is worth mentioning that the politicians did not disagree on the question of independence, but only on the nature of independence.

In the midst of these differences, a majority of Southern Cameroonians remained keenly aware of the 40-year history of Nigerian intrusion into their political life. To put these differences to rest, the United Nations decided on the organisation of a plebiscite in the territory on February 11, 1961. The questions were problematic and hinged on the following two options:

1. Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the Independent Federation of Nigeria? OR
2. Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the Independent Republic of Cameroon?

The conspicuous drawback to this plebiscite was that its questions reflected only two of the three core political options that should have been made available to Southern Cameroonian voters. The third and likely the most popular option, that of “Independence without joining” (secession) was obviated. By the day of the vote, J. N. Foncha of the KNDP, who championed the drive for Reunification with the Republic of Cameroon, had succeeded in charming Southern Cameroonian into believing that a vote for reunification would be the “lesser evil”. Thus, by a total of 233,571 votes against 97,741, Southern Cameroonian chose to achieve independence from Britain by “being annexed” to La République du Cameroun. On the other hand, the British Northern Cameroonians chose, by 146,296 votes against 97,659, to be integrated within the Nigerian Federation (Fanso, 2017, 324–326). The overwhelming victory of the Reunification option in the Southern Cameroonians was indicative of the desire by the people of this territory to sever all links with Nigeria, this while steering clear from the constant attempts by their western neighbours to dominate the region’s political life. This final act by the Southern Cameroonians lay to final rest the almost 40 years of political attachment to
Nigeria, an era characterised by Nigeria’s comprehensive political ascendancy in the Southern Cameroons.

**Conclusion**

The administration of the British Southern Cameroons as part of Nigeria was a practical move. Thus, after the First World War came to a close in Cameroon, the Southern Cameroons region was administered as part of the British Nigerian Colony. This introduced the Southern Cameroons territory to the stark realities of political domination within a Nigerian system that many experienced as an alien intrusion. Foreign domination manifested itself in the forms of constitutions that seemed predisposed against Southern Cameroonians; these were instituted by successive British Governors the likes of Hugh Clifford (1922), Arthur Richards (1946), John Macpherson (1951) and Oliver Lyttleton (1954). Besides being fundamentally hostile to Southern Cameroonian self-determination, as may be observed in these constitutions’ articles, the British also allowed for an environment that administratively discriminated against the people of the region, as most of the territory’s administrators were Nigerians. Faced with this reality, Southern Cameroonians, through political pressure groups, political parties, petitions and the 1961 plebiscite, demonstrated their capacity to resist the diverse and numerous forms of political domination. Thus, in voting for Reunification in 1961, Southern Cameroonians were unambiguously castigating Nigerians for the nearly 40 years that they dominated the politics of the region. However, the union of the Southern Cameroons with the Republic of Cameroon still left much to be desired, as complaints of marginalisation, which ultimately resulted in the 2016 Cameroonian Anglophone Crisis, have come to show. This raises the question of whether Southern Cameroonians escaped political domination in Nigeria only to be marginalised and dominated within the Republic of Cameroon.
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Editor’s Essay: The Return of the Nation

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Some years back, I used to teach a course on the history of Spain using Mark Williams’s book *The Story of Spain*. The course’s title included the word *Spain*, a word that, prima facie, should suggest the idea that I was instructing students on the subjective and emotional particulars that underpin the construction of a *nation*. Had it been my goal to focus solely on naked historical facts, I would have named the course *History of the Iberian Peninsula*. Consequently, I selected the *story* rather than the *history* of Spain because I’ve always assumed that, more so than a geographical space or a set of affective bonds, a nation *is* a story. It is a fable crafted to produce an emotional environment within which individuals, particularly those susceptible or sensitive to imaginary constructs, perceive themselves in a relationship of mutual dependence with a hypothesised community. An effective story will make people process the notional data made available to them and assign it an idiosyncratic meaning, one that implicates such data in a manner that is advantageous to communal cohesion and marshalled collective action. In this way, the social, political and economic environment will engage with the individual’s consciousness after passing through the filter provided by the story’s conceptual content. Given that the story has a subjective hierarchy of value, the particular elements of that external cosmos will be assessed and positioned in accordance with their value as catalysts in the process of imagining the nation.

So the nation is a construct sustained by a story that is designed to generate affinity-based association patterns; it is the type of fixed paradigm that allows individuals to sift and classify objective data and assign it a transcendent value that will harmonise with the story’s plot. It is important to note that this paradigm is comparatively new.

Among some scholars and policymakers there still thrives the somewhat naïve assumption that those socio-political arrangements that we call “nations” have a long and illustrious history, that they have historic boundaries within which citizens have developed an endemic, distinctive culture, and that they represent a natural alignment of social forces. Yet the nation as a political entity is rather new. As Ernest Renan (1992/1882) described it at a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11, 1882,

[N]ations are something rather new in history. Antiquity did not know them: Egypt, China and ancient Chaldea were in no sense nations. They were herds led by a child of the Sun or of the Sky. There were no Egyptian citizens, no more than there were Chinese ones. Classical antiquity had its republics and its municipal kingdoms, its confederations of local republics, its empires; it hardly had a nation in the sense that we understand it. Athens, Sparta, Sidon, and Tyr were small centres of admirable patriotism but they were cities with relatively restrained territory. Prior to their absorption into the Roman Empire, Gaul, Spain, and Italy were assemblages of peoples, often comprising leagues between themselves but without central institutions or dynasties. The Assyrian, Persian, and Alexandrine Empires also did not constitute fatherlands. There were never any Assyrian patriots; the Persian Empire was one great fief. Not a single nation finds its origins in Alexander’s colossal adventure, otherwise so rich in consequences for the general history of civilization. (n.p.)
While the feeling of belonging to a community of individuals that share affinities might be ancient, it is also true that the contemporary concepts of nation and nationality that are common throughout the world crystallised during and following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a multi-ethnic state within which fifteen different languages were spoken. In October 31, 1918, the empire dissolved into separate, essentially ethnic precincts, an event triggered by the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria at the hands of Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip. In its wake, millions of Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Croats, Bosnians, Serbians, Italians, Czechs, Ruthenes, Slovenes, Slovaks and Romanians decided that peace and wellbeing would be more readily available to them if they resided within districts populated by people with whom they shared language, culture, mythologies and/or other significant and distinctive collective values and perceived physical traits. The XX century fall of Spanish, Portuguese, French, British, German and Belgian colonial empires also brought about a surge in nationalist feeling in formerly colonised, now independent regions. But commitment and loyalty to circumscribed and exclusionary collective ethea proved to be quite perilous: that century saw nationalism become a monstrosity, with World War I, Turkification, the Spanish Civil War and World War II causing widespread destruction and the designed extermination of millions of people who did not fit the nationalists’ standardized description of their nations’ citizens.

After World War II, with the proponents of globalization establishing universal moral and civic values likely to be disseminated around the world, it seemed like nationalism would fade away like the memory of a bad dream. In his 1989 essay “The end of history?” Francis Fukuyama went as far as to suggest that liberalism had triumphed over nationalism, and that the nation as we’ve known it was, or would soon be, a thing of the past. He has had to pull back from his previous position, trying to explain the bewildering and unanticipated rise of nationalists like Putin, Modi, Erdogan and Trump and the garish sabre-rattling that accompanies their hazardous rhetoric.

It is understandable that the Irish, for example, would take the nationalist road when confronting a foreign power that had been so harmful, for so long, to people on the island. At that historical moment, nationalism may have been the only way to marshal the energies of a group large enough to have a chance to break colonial fetters. The same may be said of Latin American and African nationalisms. But the troubling aspect of nationalists, as I see it, is that in their efforts to describe the confines of the nation they must, by necessity, also define the characteristics of people, often guiltless and inoffensive, who must be excluded from the state they envision. Nationalism, be it Catalan or Trumpist, is a rigorous drawing of lines meant to separate those who will be embraced by a described collective from those who will not. This is a fact, despite claims to the contrary by proponents of “liberal” or “civic” nationalism: In their view, a nation can be defined by shared moral and ethical values of freedom, tolerance, equality, and individual rights. Such poppycock asks us to abandon our powers of rational discernment and believe that a community such as a nation can be formed on the basis of shared attitudes toward social values. Along these lines, every sincere and honourable Central American that can demonstrate a devotion to those values must be recognised as a US national and should be allowed to clamber up the border wall without further restraint. Additionally, the millions of US citizens that do not share those values must be catapulted over the wall to the “other” side.

In this regard, it would probably be safe to say that Scotland and England both ground their political narrative and legal systems upon nearly identical moral and ethical principles, as outlined in civic nationalist theories. Yet Scottish nationalists want to break from the UK
while characterising their brand of nationalism as “civic” rather than “ethnic”, such that a Scot is merely someone living in Scotland, regardless of ethnic background or of any categorising trait. This begs the question: Why then bother to erect an international border between Scotland and England? Would a hard boundary along the Cheviot Hills make Scotland free? Free of what?

By its very nature, nationalism excludes; the silo mentality that distinguishes it from progressive principles places individuals within imaginary “affinity assemblages” whose commonalities have nothing to do with social values. Nationalism aims to insure that no external forces demolish the invented, fantasy barricades it establishes to circumscribe its imagined community; accordingly, it needs to design a positive image for the favoured group, while proposing a negative one for those that are excluded. To this end, often times a sort of demonology is developed to depict people outside nationalism’s imaginary assemblages. This explains statements made by Catalan independence leaders like Quim Torra, who references DNA to explain who is a real Catalan, who lists Spaniards as “beasts” and has openly declared that Catalan identity is dissolving under the weight of the “immigrant avalanche”. Auspiciously, his statements have been labelled “dangerous and irresponsible” by the anti-racist organisation SOS Racism. And his attitude, needless to say, does little to advance the image of Catalan nationalism as “civic nationalist” (Rodríguez, 2018). Moreover, the ugly brawl to secede from Spain, a free, open democracy and one of the most liberal welfare states in Europe, requires an explanation that takes into account Torra’s manifest ethos.

The nation is a story. Like fables and tall stories, nationalist narratives are dependent on a particular disposition of the individual to accept fiction as a means to an end. To a reader of Jules Verne or Philip K. Dick the end is entertainment, while to a consumer of a nationalist fable the end is political. Few would question, for example, that in almost every respect (economic, political, social, military, technological) the United States is a great nation, and yet the mantra “Make America Great Again” has attracted the attention of a significant percentage of American voters, who put aside daily substantiation of the nation’s prominence in order to vote for the man who would accomplish such a superfluous feat. And retrieving that greatness begins by requesting billions of dollars from Congress to build a border wall, the most eloquent monument to the true nature of nationalism.

Resurgent nationalism is heedless of a forthcoming world in which cultural and geographic migration will be the norm. Yael Tamir (2019) still believes that nationalism can be rehabilitated and be made to assume more caring, liberal and tolerant features. Yet he seems unconvinced by his own analysis and appears reluctant fully to endorse the return of the nation. Thus, he issues an ominous forewarning:

As we enter the age of a new and caring nationalism, a warning should be aired. National partnerships that are profitable to some are dangerous to others. There is no solidarity without in-group favouritism, stereotyping, and other negative side effects of group membership. Nationalism can be tamed, but it cannot be constructed in ways that run counter to human nature and social psychology. The hope to have patriotism without flags, hymns and symbols and a sense of identity that by its very nature is inclusive contradicts everything we know about the way groups are formed. (p. 178)

In view of the proliferation of nationalist groups clamouring for redemption, the danger is that another conflagration, inspired by nationalist fables, will be fatal to the concord and
goodwill that was presaged by social scientists and historians in the 1990s. To this day many politicians warn of the growing danger: In a speech in January 2019, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier (2019) of Germany characterised nationalism as “an ideological poison”:

To put it in a nutshell, nationalism is ideological poison that is no less poisonous in a new guise. We in Europe in particular should never forget this, but rather we will keep this memory alive and show that we have learned from our bloody history, especially that of the 20th century.

Nationalism, bête noire of progressives who’ve longed for a new era of pluralism, equity and tolerance, is coming back with a vengeance, promoting eccentric politicians and creating division and marginalisation.

A tiger cannot change its stripes.
**References**


