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Introduction

A warm welcome to the IAFOR Journal of Cultural Studies, Issue 2.2!

As the journal enters its third year of existence, it might be a good idea to stop for a moment and reflect upon the distance the journal has already covered in its short time of existence. It was and continues to be the aim of the journal to inform about and engage with the latest developments in cultural studies globally. With the first four issues published, it can be said that it has certainly fulfilled this aim. Insightful and engaged articles charted and continue to chart the waters of cultural studies globally, spanning discussions of spirituality, ethnic rituals, linguistic interventions, media futures and much more. There is a wide breath of topics in evidence and the quality of contributions is at times humbling.

So it is time to thank all the individuals and institutions involved in making this journal a big success. First and foremost, thanks go to all the authors who have worked hard on their cutting-edge research in order to present it here to a global audience. I would also like to thank IAFOR and its editorial staff for making this publication possible in the first place. Thanks also go to the multitude of reviewers who have given us their time and expertise in order to analyse possible contributions, make valuable suggestions and engage with topics in a professional, supportive manner. Last but not least, a thank you to the changing local editorial staff who have enriched the contributions with their insightful and expert knowledge. The journal will strive to continue along this successful trajectory made possible by all the afore mentioned in the future and thus give back to the worldwide community of cultural studies researchers and practitioners.

For issue 2.2, I would like to welcome a new addition to the staff. Joshua Synenko will take over as the Journal's Book Review Editor. Book reviews will feature prominently in the following issues and will present a valuable overview of new publications in the burgeoning field of cultural studies.

The issue at hand opens with Pawel Zygadlo's “Patriotic Rhetoric in Chinese Public Spaces”. In his text, Zygadlo examines public spaces in China. After giving a history of such spaces in China, he analyses government messages publicised and communicated in such spaces in a variety of manners. His research culminates in the conclusion that these messages have shifted comprehensively over the last decades in style and content and the discussion of why this is the case.

The next article also remains in China. Jing Yang's “American Cinematic Discourses of Women’s Oppression in Old China: From The Good Earth to Pavilion of Women” compares and contrasts the two films from her title and analyses how Western mediated images of China have changed in the time period between the making of these two films. Interestingly enough, she comes to the conclusion that many of the stereotypes of orientalism have not changed all that much over the decades and takes the film industry to task to portrait a more up-to-date and realistic image of China in its products.

“Immigration, Identity and Mobility in Europe: Inclusive Cultural Policies and Exclusion Effects” by Maxime Jaffré, Emmanuel Pedler and Elena Raevskikh analyses EU cultural interventions in Marseilles by researching the publics' reaction two theatres in this city. They come to the conclusion that while the EU's funding policies are indeed well-intentioned,
much of this funding is doing little to change cultural power distribution in urban areas, which ought to have been addressed in the first place.

Jamal Shah and Bican Şahin’s “A Liberal Assessment of Intercultural Relations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan” investigates intercultural relations in a particular remote area in Pakistan. He draws a dire image of present intercultural relations there and advises a strong change in policies.

In “Me, My Selfie, and I: Personal Photo-Sharing as a Form of Self-disclosure on Social Media”, Patricia Williamson, Trey Stohlman and Heather Polinsky write about the most popular image making media practice today, the selfie. Their assessment of the phenomenon makes it clear that selfie taking is much more than just a passing fad; rather, it has strong repercussions for social communicative practices, one's self-image and the way we perceive the world in general.

“The Analysis of Personal Supernaturalism Using World View Theory” by Shelley Ashdown uses World View Theory in order to compare reactions to supernaturalism in a number of communities. Her research testifies to the fact that supernaturalism is not an isolated, but rather a shared trait across cultures, with a surprising number of similar practices existing across communities.

Finally, Bill Phillips' “Crime Fiction and the City” gives a fascinating account of traditional crime fiction and its relationship to the city. He demonstrates that it is actually not only the individual city which gives crime fiction its distinct character, but, on a grander scale, the development of urban sceneries as backdrop to the stories in general which make this genre so popular.

Happy reading!

Holger Briel
Editor
Patriotic Rhetoric in Chinese Public Space

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Abstract

This paper begins with the analysis of the socio-cultural phenomenon known as “public space.” This analysis is followed by the reflection on distinctive features of public space in contemporary China. Subsequently, I focus on the use of public space by Chinese authorities for spreading official political and ideological discourse. For this purpose, I analyse the form and content of messages displayed in places of public utility. I conclude by showing what, how and why these are being displayed and widely promoted by the authorities. I argue that public space in China, on the one hand, is “public” in the sense that it is accessible and used by citizens; on the other, it is “arrested by authorities” and used for their socio-political and ideological purposes. Such an arrangement is a statement of the unvocalised agreement between the authorities and citizens that allows the former to avoid major conflicts with the latter and legitimise political power. In return, the latter enjoy a wide range of socio-cultural freedom and are being provided with psychological comfort resulting from identification with a greater endeavour of restoring the glory of the Chinese nation.

Keywords: Chinese rhetoric, Chinese nationalism, ideology, Chinese values, socio-political slogans
Introduction

In 20th-century Chinese propaganda and rhetoric, the power of slogans used by the authorities have played a major role in establishing and legitimising political and ideological leadership. Besides newspapers, radio, television and recently the internet, public space has also been employed as a means of communication between the authorities and society. The analysis of the form and the content of the messages displayed in the public space is then no less important than studying newspapers, TV news or official speeches. It not only reveals the content and motivation behind socio-political discourses promoted by the authorities but also shows how the public accommodates the space employed by the authorities for their political and ideological purposes. Concluding from data obtained in several geographically distant locations in China, we can then state that the public space in China, is “public” in the sense that it is accessible and used by citizens to conduct non-political socio-cultural activities. However, the design and control of socio-political and ideological messages displayed is entirely controlled by the authorities. Such an arrangement, rarely, if at all, challenged by the public, is a display of the unvocalised agreement between the authorities and citizens. It allows the former to avoid major conflicts and keep political power. In return, the latter enjoy a wide range of socio-cultural freedom and psychological comfort of identification with the greater good of the “nation’s rejuvenation”.

What is “Public Space”?

"Public space" is a term that appears across a wide range of academic disciplines. The idea as such does involve quite a few aspects of the physical and social life, and a single approach could hardly exhaust the meaning of the concept. The adjective “public” turns our attention to the socially shared nature of the space, and the noun “space,” indicates the necessity of the spatial factor for social interactions to happen. “Public” then includes roads, squares, parks, beaches, government and privately owned buildings, places of religious cults and all access-free zones and buildings with all instalments that are accessible to members of society. Even if some of them are not available to everyone, the message presented in their visible and accessible parts has its impact on the socio-political discourse. It brings us to another feature crucial for space to be considered “public” which is its relation with “public sphere,” understood as “forums of public discussion” (Habermas, 1998). It has even become a task for practitioners and academics alike, to “conceive spaces that are at once accessible to everyone and which also foster a sense of shared concern, the emergence of a local public sphere” (Tonellat, 2010). Any form of fully, or partially, opened space that “fosters a sense of shared concern” can then be considered public. The accessibility of a public space can be moderated or negotiated. Especially in the era of the appreciation of the private property on the one hand, and the growing regulatory efforts of governments on the other, what makes space “public” is more a shared image than a physical “here and now.” Another interesting observation of researchers in recent years is the fact that the “focal” point of interpretation moved from open space in general towards accessible “zones” with clearly marked boundaries and limited capacity of accommodating participants. Schools, hospitals and even public buses are good examples here. Despite all these limitations, public space must be in some way accessible to an at least certain number of citizens who are not the owners of that particular place. French philosopher Henry Lefebvre went even further arguing that public space is what he called the “right to the city,” the right of the inhabitants to have better control over the production of the space of their daily life. In Levebre's thinking, public space is an object of creative transformation remaining in a dialectical relation with the notions of power and control. It is not just a physical vacuum that can be utilised by society for certain purposes but is the sine
qua none condition for the emergence and existence of a particular type of society (Levebre, 1991).

Public space is then an arena of social interactions for which the presence of actual space is necessary or at least very desirable. However, for public space to be considered truly “public,” it must be more of a part of the shared mental landscape of the participants than just a physical place that human beings pass through.

**Public Space in China**

Without a doubt, the concept of the public space is a product of Western civilisation derived from the notion of *agora*, the place of citizen interaction in ancient Greece. Habermas argued that it was the *agora*, the spatiotemporal and mental construct with all the socio-political interactions taking place that led to the emergence of the public sphere and phenomena like civil society and democracy (Habermas, 1989). Public space as a phenomenon also occurred in other places around the globe as well, but at different times and not in quite the same form. In China, for instance, despite the long history of its civilisation, public space as a publicly used and imagined place is quite a recent invention. A family-oriented lifestyle, ruled by the strict socio-ethical code, to a large degree limited citizens’ activity to strictly drawn boundaries beyond which the world often virtually did not exist (Sun, 2004). This is not to say that people in Imperial China were not aware of the concept of a greater space, going beyond the boundaries of their family business world. Quite to the contrary, the notion of *tianxia*, “under the heaven,” had been a concept recognisable to most of even the least educated Chinese. However, the concept itself was referring to such a geographically and mentally broad scope that it remained somehow “aloof” (Sun, 2004). As the famous proverb says, “The Heaven is high (above us), the Emperor is far away (from us).” The proverb then “recognises” the significance of these two factors for the perseverance of the very existence of the cosmos. However, as it exemplifies, their significance for the everyday matters seems to be of little importance. Such perception of *tianxia* contributed to a further expansion of the realm of a family on the cost of the space shared by the members of different households. The model of Changan, the ancient capital, displayed at the City Musem in Xi’an, provides us with a visual representation of the way the urban space was arranged and perceived in Imperial China. Massive city walls surround the city. Inside the city walls, we see the space divided by smaller walls creating separate segments with the Imperial Palace overlooking the entire city from behind another wall. The everyday experience of a common citizen was then confined to the boundaries of a walled part of the city s/he lived in. He, and even to a greater degree, she was rarely leaving their compound, making the encounter with individuals from beyond these inner walls sporadic. Streets, markets, temples and schools that were certainly used by the public could hardly compare with the Athenian *Agora*. For instance, the markets that emerged during the Tang dynasty (618–907 AD) were controlled by guilds and “native-place associations” (*xiangtong hui*) (Gaubatz, 2008). Temples were either family-owned, or they belonged to a particular religious denomination. Moreover, starting from the time of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), they were put under strict control, further limiting the free exchange of ideas and the possibility of creating an independent public sphere. The actual civic public space emerged in China only as a result of modernisation movements in the early 20th century. The event that could be classified as a first example of an active participation of citizens from different classes that utilised larger space for public purposes was the May 4th Movement. On the 4th of May 1919 students of universities in Beijing, followed by merchants and ordinary citizens, took their political agenda to the streets. Soon, the people of Shanghai and other large cities followed them. The May 4th Movement paved the way
towards wide usage of the open space for socio-political movements and propaganda. This situation, rather unknown in Imperial China, soon became a norm leading to the great worries for the ruling class. As a result, the open space for socio-political activity was soon “arrested” by government forces (Zarrow, 2005). Similar situations repeated a number of times in the later history of China with three instances of particular importance. The first one was the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) when bands of young Red Guards took to the streets, thus making them a scene for the display of their political agenda. At first, not very well controlled by the central government, young “guards” soon ignited a quasi-civil war. The authorities had not much choice but to take over control of public space once again and send most of the “active” participants out of towns and cities. The second was the so-called "Wall of Democracy" time between November 1978 and March 1979. Citizens were encouraged to put forward petitions and critique of the ruling regime. The uptake of this chance was slow at the beginning but soon grew and become so forceful that the critical tone of the petitions and street banners made authorities quickly re-establish their control (Vogel, 2011, pp. 250–257). The most recent issue regarding public space in China happened in the 1980’s when, communist intellectuals, partly supported by the authorities, were searching for a “new identity” (Schoppa, 2006). As Philip C.C. Huang has pointed out, it was “a space intermediate between state and society in which both participated”, “a third realm” (Huang, 1993: 224). According to Edward Gu, it was “an intellectual space comprising (1) state generated public space, (2) society-originated, officially-backed public space, (3) societal public space and (4) dissident public space” (Gu, 1999, p. 391). The resulting Tiananmen tragedy was, on the one hand, a culminating point of display and utilisation of public space understood in such a way. At the same time, it was a final breakaway from it. As a consequence, it led to the elimination of “dissident public space,” or at least in restricting its scope to secret, underground zones.

The doubts regarding the applicability of Habermas' theory of the public sphere to China put forward by Huang can easily be applied to public space as well. Public space in China, at least to a degree, is designed, overlooked and simply controlled by the authorities. It is almost impossible to find a place of public use, especially in urban China, that has been designed without a state permit. The state strictly controls any, public or private, display of pictures, art, written messages and slogans. No art or musical performance, not to mention any religious activities, can happen without an involvement of the local government. With the occasional exception, this rule is generally adhered to by citizens. Such an observation would correspond with the theory that Asian cultures have a collectivist element playing an important role and are inclined towards authoritarianism (Pye, 1988). However, it would be an oversimplification to conclude with such a statement. A short look at the variety of activities in the public places and the way they are being performed brings us to a slightly different conclusion.

Writing about the use of public space in China, Stephen McDonell, a BBC reporter, quite correctly noticed a core feature of the Chinese public, namely renao (lit.: “hot-noisy”). As he put it: “To be 热闹 (renao) is to be bustling with noise and excitement” (McDonell, BBC News, 11 March 2017). The space in China to be called “public” must be loud and ideally full of people. A visit to Starbucks or McDonald's, must-go places for the Chinese middle-class, provides a sufficient proof of such a claim. Public squares and most streets are similarly populated. It is quite difficult to see an empty street in any even mid-size city or town, and there are always people dancing, singing, playing musical instruments, doing Taiji or simply chatting or conducting commercial activity in public parks. Shopping malls, markets and even hospitals are the places of public encounters where all sorts of social
interactions can be seen and heard. In short, in China, there are always people visible where there is a place or zone available to them. Moreover, those people are very audible and not shy to interact with others. Even if the interactions are usually limited to the group of family acquaintances (Sun, 2004), the public space in China is very much “alive”, renao. Participants are often organised in groups spending their time and money on a specific activity, and the obvious opportunities for interactions and deliberation could then suggest that the public space in China is very close to the Habermas’s ideal type. Some researchers then would like to see the public space in China as a place of the display of the individuality of the citizen, and even the birthplace of any future “democratisation”. However, the design and control of this space flooded with citizens who use it to display their lifestyle, aspirations and individuality, is in the hands of authorities. Moreover, the authorities, following the steps of the past regimes, do not hesitate to use it for their particular purposes. These “design and usage” of public space is to be analysed in the following.

Patriotism in Chinese Public Space
Methodology

In China, access to public space is open to every citizen. However, we would call this access “passive” or at least “conformed”, since the right to design it and determine the message that can be spread through it is in the hands of the authorities. The focus of the present research is then on the official slogans promoting patriotism and appreciation of Chinese culture and current politics. These slogans are widely distributed and can be seen in parks, public squares, on buses, on the streets and in public buildings. The banners, posters, planks and similar displays of official propaganda used for analysis have been photographed and translated by the author. The obtained results have been verified for accuracy by native Chinese speakers with a high command of English. Another source of the material for the current study were the overheard conversations, talks, discussions and short verbal exchanges of ideas between Chinese citizens in the parks, public squares and other places of public use. All the material analysed in this study were collected during the author’s trips between Feb 2015 and March 2017 to different locations in China, such as Fuzhou, Xi’an, Chengdu, Shanghai, Xishuangbanna and Suzhou.

Findings

What is the message that the authorities try to disseminate among the citizens with slogans displayed in public space? How is the message justified? What is the motivation of such actions? What do the banners, posters, planks and similar displays of official propaganda tell us about the authorities that put so much effort into popularising particular values? Probably the most appealing slogan that is constantly reproduced through the entire spectrum of public space is Zhonghua Minzu de Weida Fuxing (中华民族的伟大复兴), which can be translated as The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In recent years it is usually paired with a main ideological slogan of the current administration Zhongguo meng (中国梦), The China Dream. It was originally mooted by Jiang Zemin after he came into power, replacing Invigorating China (振兴中华) that was used by Sun Yat-sen back in 1894, and later by the CCP (Ho, 2014: 176). Sun Yat-sen's original slogan was a call for an “awakening” of a sense of Chinese national identity among the subjects of the Qing Empire (Harrison, 2001). Nation-building rhetoric was never actually abandoned by Chinese Communists (Wu, 2014, p. 63). However, for Jiang Zemin, who took over the power from Deng Xiaoping in the 1990’s, the appeal to the “rebirth of nation” became necessary for at least two reasons. First, it legitimised him and put him in line with the other “great leaders of the new China”. Second,
it justified his departure from the communist principles and furthered the development of a market economy. The particular item making him “great,” was his work towards “rejuvenation” of the most precious Chinese nation. This “great” task could have been accomplished only through proper socio-economic policies. Even though Jiang Zemin is probably the least favourite leader in the recent history of China, his call for national revival seems to find a resonance among citizens (Link et al., 2013, p. 3), and the current administration also made it into a crucial element of its ideological agenda.

Another essential term commonly used in regards to making China into a “strong country” (强国, qiangguo) is tuanjie (团结), “unity” or “solidarity”, an almost indispensable element of public space in China, especially in regions populated by ethnic minorities. One of the common banners then reads Jiaqiang minzutuanjie, cujinminzujinbu(加强民族团结, 促进民族进步, Strengthen national unity, expedite national progress). The term minzu in the first part of the sentence refers to all ethnic groups living in China. In the second part, it means the Chinese nation in general. The People’s Republic of China, as its constitution states, is the “unitary multi-national state built up jointly by the people of all its nationalities” (Preamble). China currently recognises 55 ethnic minorities, besides the dominant Han (Macceras, 2011, p. 111). The authorities that often face socio-cultural and political conflicts in some areas inhabited by minorities try then to spread the message that only through “unity and solidarity” among different ethnic groups can economic and political “progress”, be achieved. Knowing the level of tension in areas such as Xinjiang, and Tibet (Xizang), the message and the purpose of such a slogan is clear. Not only will the “solidarity” between ethnic groups bring prosperity to the entire nation, including those minorities, but, since “progress” is the most desired historical necessity, such a “unity and solidarity” are also unavoidable historical necessities.

*Zhongguo jingshen, zhongguoxingxiang, zhongguowenha, zhongguobiaoda* (中国精神, 中国形象, 中国文化, 中国表达), *Chinese spirit, China’s image, China’s culture, Chinese expression* is another example of the appeal to Chineseness as the value of utmost importance. This appeal to Chinese values, national character and Chineseness in general, has become an integral part of the socio-political agenda of the regime after Jiang’s call for national rejuvenation. Chinese values, lifestyle, and a way of communication and culture, in general, have thus been officially recognised as being at least equal to, if not even superior, to their western counterparts. Through slogans like the one above, the authorities try to provide socio-psychological comfort to the citizens who on the one hand are “proud descendants of the Yellow Emperor”, but on the other face the hardships of everyday life. However, there is also a political consideration hidden behind this appreciation of Chinese values, culture and lifestyle. It demonstrates that Chinese ambitions to become a world superpower, are believed to be achievable through the use of soft power. Language and culture are primary tools that can be utilised to this effect. It is then of the utmost importance to preserve and cherish this language and culture among the Chinese themselves. Another noteworthy fact in this respect is the appreciation of hierarchy and social inequality in traditional Chinese culture (Pye, 1985). Despite claiming equal status for every citizen, starting from the time of Deng Xiaoping Chinese authorities accepted not only market economy, but also social inequality. As Deng himself put it once, “Some must get rich first”.¹ The following administration went even further and put much more emphasis on “harmony” than “equality.” An appeal to the Chinese character of such an arrangement seems to be a very handy justification for such a shift.

¹ http://bbs.tianya.cn/m/post-news-192008-1.shtml
Renminyouxinyang, minzuyouxiwang, guojia youliliang (人民有信仰，民族有希望，国家有力量)，is another slogan that can be seen in many places around China. It translates to (If) People have faith, there is hope for the nation, and the country is powerful. As we can see, the future of the nation, its prosperity and very existence depend on the “faith of people”. The “strength of the country” can only be assured by the faith of the “people”. However, to which faith is this slogan referring? For those living in China, this “faith” refers to the policies pushed forward by the current regime. The not always popular reforms marking the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy “reinstalled” class divisions (Goodman, 2013), and left many citizens economically and socially behind. Faith in the "right" direction of the socio-economic changes is presented as necessary for the happiness and success of the entire nation and the country. Even the ones left behind, struggling with day-to-day survival, should recognise the utmost importance of such an endeavour.

Another slogan which has been around for decades and still is visible in many parts of the country, is Mei yougongchangdang, meiyouxinzhongguo (没有共产党, 没有新中国), Without Communist Party, there would not be/is no new China. It is interesting for at least two reasons. First, it emphasises the value of this “New China,” that the Mainland is equal with the PRC, the state established by Mao Zedong. “New China,” a term widely used since then, means the state of equal rights and opportunities when the exploitation of one class by another has been/will be eradicated. The PRC is then this “New China,” the promised land of progress and happiness of the strong nation. The second interesting feature comes from the enigmatic character of Chinese grammar in which the tenses are not always very distinct. The second part of the slogan can be then translated as “there would not be a new China” or as “there is no new China”. As the first translation praises the CCP’s contribution to establishing this “promised land of Chinese people”, the second bears a strong political message. Although indirectly, it states that without the CCP the New China, so much desired by everyone, is impossible. In other words, the leadership of the CCP is irreplaceable, and any move towards such a replacement would endanger the entire project.

Due to the limited scope of this paper, the transcripts from the discussion regarding the importance of the Chinese nation, identity, patriotism and China in general recorded cannot be fully presented here. It is worth noting, though, that if the “officials” are often subjects of criticism from common citizens, the historical role of a great Chinese nation is almost never questioned or denied. Quite to the contrary, Chinese across classes, genders and different age groups are almost unanimously proud of their Chineseness, cherish Chinese values and believe that China and the Chinese nation should play a greater role in the future history of the world. This does not mean that common Chinese people are fully aware of the nature of Chinese values or know China's history. It also does not mean that the often ostentatious demonstration of class differences and the disrespect for compatriots of lower status is inexistent. Neither is it the case that Chinese are not keen on obtaining foreign passports. It is quite to the contrary. Many Chinese know very little about “Confucian values”. Many Chinese also love to display their social status and are not shy to let everyone around them feel their superior position. Finally, quite a number of Chinese are more than keen to become citizens of a foreign country. However, all this does not prevent them from “being proud of being Chinese”. All this leads us to the conclusion that this appraisal of the Chinese is a result of an unwritten agreement with authorities and peers and does not simply follow from official discourse. Rather, it is an amalgamation of all of these ingredients.
Discussion

As demonstrated above, one can learn quite a few things about the aims and objectives of authorities from the messages displayed in places for public use. First of all, it becomes apparent that the appeal to “traditional” culture is a vital element of the current regime’s socio-political agenda. The positive appraisal of Confucian values such as family and social harmony stays very much apart from the basic principles of communism. Except for the remains of older murals, often remembering the times of Cultural Revolution and barely readable, we could not find any examples of a call for class-struggle, overthrowing bourgeois elites or a call for social and economic equality. Instead, the emphasis on harmonious (hierarchical) family and a harmonious (economically unequal) society is overwhelming. Moreover, love of country and nation, the concern for its future and international recognition are also leading themes to be pushed forward by the authorities. At the same time, the leading role of the CCP is emphasised. The CCP is presented as guardian of the interests of the masses, the only guarantor of socio-political stability. Additionally, the CCP and the government are praised as the only powers working towards the honour and international recognition of the “Great Chinese nation” (Gries, 1996). Any sign of counter-arguments cannot be found. This is mainly due to the fact that authorities design and control the physical aspect of public space. Authorities actually do grant citizens a certain level of freedom in the way of using public space. It makes places renao, a desirable feature of “the place to go” in China. Since the identification, or at least compliance with, the authorities' policy is a sine qua none condition for being allowed in public space, the larger the audience is, the greater the pressure on the individual to respect the equilibrium. Citizens largely remain self-restrained and respect the boundaries in exchange for the freedom to perform the activities that make a place renao and thus satisfies the need for sociability. Intentionally or not, citizens by their physical presence in the places of public utility do consume, digest and reproduce the authorities' messages, even if they do not always find them plausible and convincing; they seem to be quite cosy with most of the ideas presented to them. As a result, both parties attain their goals; the authorities spread their messages through which they legitimise their right to rule and control the public space by drawing the boundaries for citizens’ activities. Citizens on their behalf, through at least verbal and superficial acceptance of such arrangements, are granted a considerable level of freedom to use the public space the way it suits their needs (entertainment, socialising, commercial activity). Moreover, the content of the messages is not anymore an appeal to the class-struggle, but directs citizens’ attention to the “greatness of the Chinese Nation” and provides a sense of belonging and psychological comfort (Ho, 2014). Of course, the whole process is an ongoing “negotiation” and a result of an un-vocalised compromise between two parties. Looking at the content of internet discussions, still largely dominated by the official discourse reproduced by authorities and citizens alike, different voices can be heard. However, they might be difficult to identify, especially for one unfamiliar with the modes of Chinese communication that are very much fond of indirect speech, the use of euphemisms, quotations from the literature and the application of numerous nicknames (Kirkpatrick & Xu, 2012). On the one hand, authorities claim the right to define acceptable criticism and on the other pre-empt any anti-establishment discourse by informing the public on a daily basis about yet another high-ranking state or party official being investigated for “corruption and other crimes”. Authorities then apply the well-tested strategy of controlling the discourse and criticism directed towards themselves and this especially so since the current leader assumed his post and the anti-corruption campaign became a vivid element of his political agenda, and anti-corruption discourse has been incorporated into state-sponsored propaganda. Similarly, the authorities leave some room for the unhappy voices but designing and controlling the shape
and the size of it. Intentionally or not, citizens reproduce the official discourse produced by
the authorities and make it an integral part of their political and socio-cultural perception.

Conclusion

Contemporary western inquiry into the nature of public space in China focuses much more on
the specific exemplification of the public space than on the utilisation of commonly
accessible places for specific political and cultural purposes. The structure of shopping malls,
public parks, and the social dynamics of these places have become the object of numerous
studies and articles (Jewell, 2016; J.P. Sniadecki, 2012; 2015). With some notable exceptions
(Pan, 2011), most of them pay more attention to the activities performed by the attendees and
and the discursive interrelations between the physical setup and these activities, than to the way
the public space is being used for political purposes. What we tried to achieve in this article,
was to pay close attention to the message transmitted through social arrangements of the
public space and with the specific installations that are being deployed. We then investigated
the content and sources of the message, the rationale behind particular examples and their
intended aims/purposes. The importance of such an analysis stems from the fact that,
throughout the ages, politicians, educators and religious leaders have used all possible
channels of communication to propagate their doctrines and ideologies. Through the analysis
of the relationship between the message and the mode of its presentation, not only can the
addressees of the message be identified, but also the motivation behind the publication of
certain slogans. Political elites in contemporary China, allowing renao places of public utility,
nevertheless try to spread the official cultural and national discourse through semantically
simple messages. They also try to provide socio-psychological comfort to prevent masses
from focusing on the ideological and practical contradictions of the system. Citizens prefer
not to openly resist the official discourse, finding it often quite appealing and in a way being
in line with their need for raising their self-esteem. In other words, the psychological comfort
of “gaining face” prevails over the possibility and freedom of (anti-government) speech.
Authorities do not hesitate to utilise this socio-psychological need for their own agenda.
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American Cinematic Discourses of Women’s Oppression in Old China: From *The Good Earth* to *Pavilion of Women*

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Abstract

Discourses of women’s oppression in old China have helped to establish the dichotomization between the “progressive” West and the “passive” China. The description of O Lan’s submission to the Confucian patriarchy in Pearl S. Buck’s bestseller *The Good Earth* (1931) and its Hollywood version in 1937 has appealed to Western imagination across decades. More than half a century later the submissive O Lan was transformed into a rebellious Madame Wu in a US-Sino co-production *The Pavilion of Women* (2001) which was loosely adapted from Buck’s 1946 bestseller with the same title. The film describes Madame Wu’s pursuit of subjectivity with American assistance and ends with a promising communist future. The interwoven narrative strands of women’s individual pursuit, American cultural superiority and China’s revolutionary transformation render the film a key site to examine contemporary American perceptions of China. By comparing the production and reception of *The Good Earth* and *The Pavilion of Women* against their cultural and historical contexts, the essay argues that the filmic narrative of women’s empowerment re-writes the role of the West in China’s project of modernization.

**Keywords:** American cinematic discourses, women’s oppression, Chinese modernization
Introduction

Discourses of women’s oppression in old China have constituted a seminal part of Western knowledge of the Eastern other. No longer the oriental paradise of refined women as described by Marco Polo in the thirteenth century (1968: 322), a deteriorating China reigned by the Manchu Dynasty was projected as a stagnant place in the Western imagination. From Arthur Smith’s disparagement of gender inequality in Chinese Characteristics (1894), to fictional and cinematic constructions of O Lan’s victimization in The Good Earth (1931, 1937), to tales of women’s plight in Amy Tan’s The Joy Luck Club (1989) and its cinematic presentation in 1993, to women’s tragic rebellion in Chinese art-house hits like Yellow Earth (1984) and Raise the Red Lantern (1991), women’s degradation was established in the Western consciousness as an integral part of the repressive China. The conventional feudal discourse was nonetheless reconfigured in a US-Sino coproduction: Pavilion of Women (2001).

Loosely adapted from Pearl S. Buck’s 1946 bestseller with the same title, Pavilion of Women featured women’s oppression and rebellion in a turbulent China caught between the declining Confucian patriarchy and the impact of western influences. Compared to O Lan’s tragic fate in an earth-bound China afflicted by locust plagues and political upheavals, Pavilion of Women described women’s compliance and defiance in a multifarious society of local gentry, foreign influences and revolutionary forces. Released about eight months before China’s entry into World Trade Organization (WTO), the film featured how Madame Wu’s individualistic growth was assisted by an American missionary doctor during the Japanese invasion and the rise of Communist forces in the 1930s. The narrative described the aristocrat woman’s change from the victim/perpetrator of the feudal family to the rebel against the patriarchal authoritarianism. Upon its simultaneous release in China and the U.S. in April 2001, the film failed to impress audiences on either side, probably because of its clichéd message of missionary heroism and/or political maneuvering in its daring alteration of the original novel. Compared with the commercial and critical success of the novel-turned-film The Good Earth, the lackluster reception of Pavilion of Women which addresses to similar motifs requires closer examination. By situating Pavilion of Women against Western discourses of women’s oppression in old China, this article examines the intertwining discourses of women’s individual pursuit, American enlightenment, China’s social transformation and their implications in the film.

Discourses of Women’s Oppression in Old China

Women’s oppression in feudal China drew prominent Western attention at the cross-cultural encounter in the mid-nineteenth century. Since the notion of women’s rights had become a

1 The entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the WTO was seen as “a matter of prestige for an increasingly powerful nation” for the Chinese public (Zhang Yongjin, 1998: p. 238). Since Taiwan has taken the seat in GATT after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the PRC became an observer member in 1984 and have re-applied for an official membership since 1986. At China’s entry into WTO, the BBC predicted that “China is both a huge unfolding marketplace for the world’s exporters and a powerhouse of manufacturing that could swamp the developed western nations” (13 June 2002). For further discussion, see Yongjin Zhang (1998).
signifier of social development along with the advancement of western modernity, the notorious cruelty of foot-binding and female infanticide in the Chinese society was abhorred by the collective western mind. While the West came to terms with the rising gender consciousness, as demonstrated by publications like Mary Wollstonecraft’s *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), John Stuart Mill’s *The Subjection of Women* (1869) and Ibsen’s controversial drama *A Doll’s House* (1879), an American missionary account *The Chinese Slave-girl: A Story of A Woman’s Life in China* (1880) disturbed the Western public.

The misogynist tradition was taken as a metaphor of retrogressive China in the West. The “insecurity of the life and happiness of woman” was seen as the “weakest parts of the Chinese social fabric” by the American missionary Arthur Smith (1919, p. 286). In his *Chinese Characteristics* (1894), the critique of the absence of sympathy towards women’s degradation appealed to Chinese intellectuals. Lu Xun, disillusioned by the newly established Republic of China (1912–1949) for its unfulfilled promise of freedom and equality, urged his students to read Smith’s books to understand the Chinese situation (Liu, 1995, pp. 45–87). Despite some freedom accorded to a small number of elites, the majority of women remained shackled by Confucian doctrines. For more than two thousand years, Chinese women were fastened to the bottom of the hierarchical family structure via a set of conventions and customs. The Confucian classic *The Book of Rites* dictated a “strict sexual and generational division of labor” to confine women to the domestic sphere, based on the assumption of their psychological, physical and mental inferiority (Andors, 1983 p. 12). “Few societies in history,” stated Kay Ann Johnson, “have prescribed for women a more lowly status or treated them in a more routinely brutal way than traditional Confucian China” (1983, p. 1). Though mothers could manage family property, intervene in marital lives of younger generations or even preside over the household, women were generally deprived of existence outside the family. Throughout history the cultural devaluation of women became legitimized and institutionalized with women’s active or passive complicity. Their reproduction of the patriarchal hegemony verified Antonio Gramsci’s argument that hegemony consisted of the “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the population” (1971, p. 12). The subjugation of women was nonetheless subject to change at the dawn of the twentieth century when Confucianism was denigrated as a hindrance to China’s modern development.

The call for improving women’s status in China was propelled by Western influences and the rise of Chinese nationalism. The expansion of Western ideas was based on the assumption of China’s inability to transform itself from within. Dismissed by Hegel as “a natural vegetative existence” isolated from the civilized world in 1837 (1956, p. 142–3), China’s “rotting semi-civilization” inculcated “hereditary stupidity” in its population according to Karl Marx (Marx & Engels, 1968, pp.13–16; 111–118). His prediction that the march of Western capitalism would eventually replace Oriental despotism and the Asiatic Mode of Production embodied popular Western sentiments about China (O’Leary, 1989, p. 69). The lack of progressive impetus in Chinese cultural tradition, in contrast to the “Protestant ethic” which stimulated the development of capitalism in the U.S., was argued to account for China’s

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2 Despite the capitalist exploitation of women in the workforce underlined by various forms of patriarchal domination, women gained some economic independence outside the patriarchal family and participated in the public sphere. For further discussion, please refer to Rita Felski (1995), Ellen Jordan (1999) and Bonnie S. Anderson (2001).
decline in modern world (Weber 1968, 1985). Assured of the country’s inability of self-government, the West penetrated into China through the acquisition of foreign concessions and treaty ports after the Opium Wars. Since American missionaries saw China as a protégé of the U.S. and took “America Assists the East” as their mandate (Tuchman, 1972, p. 39), they played a leading role in setting up hospitals, orphanages and schools. They also strove to reform the misogynist tradition by advocating the abolishing of female infanticide, child marriage and foot-binding. Consequently, girl’s schools established by some progressive Chinese elites began to rise in the urban areas after 1900 (Yu, 1988, p. 181–182). Kang Youwei, a political-engaged intellectual who launched the Hundred Days’ Reform at the end of the Manchu dynasty, organized the first “Unbound-Feet Society” in 1882 on the grounds that “crippled women . . . would produce weak children and be unsatisfactory mothers” (Jayawardena, 1986, p. 178).

Women’s emancipation in China was intertwined with the nation-building discourse in the modern era. Since the founding of the Republic in 1912 failed to transform Chinese society which was plagued by residues of feudalism and imperial powers, the Chinese intelligentsia sought to create a new national culture by adopting western models of science, democracy and individual freedom in an upsurge of occidentalist fantasy (Chen, p. 2007). In the foreign-inspired New Culture Movement (1915–1923) which generated the birth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and culminated in the May Fourth Movement during China’s degradation at the 1919 Versailles Treaty, women’s liberation was often utilized for the nationalist agenda. From the massive idolization of Nora’s romantic individualism (He, 2008), to Lu Xun’s description of a widow’s victimization in “The New Year Sacrifice” (1924), to the leftist discourse of women’s awakening as national salvation in films like Xin nü xing (New Women, 1934) and Ma lu tian shi (Street Angel, 1937), to the CCP’s mobilization of women in the revolutionary transformation of the 1930s and 1940s, the Chinese narratives of women’s liberation were contextualized in the matrix of confronting Confucian authoritarianism and Western imperialism and constructing modern nationhood (Larson, 1988).

Despite these multifarious narratives about “Westernized” or “liberated” women in China, Pearl S. Buck’s portrayal of the peasant woman O Lan captured the American public. Buck lived in China intermittently from 1892 to 1934 and witnessed the tumult that accompanied the Manchu dynasty’s slide into anarchy and revolution. Exposed to the patriarchal domination of her missionary father and the misogynist culture of Chinese society (Yoshihara, 2003, p. 150), Buck featured O Lan’s tragic fate in her most acclaimed work, The Good Earth (1931). Being critical of the superficial importation of western culture as a means of freedom, Buck saw the “voiceless” peasants as China’s “strength and glory” (1933), and created iconic

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3 For a critique of the patriarchal discourse in Chinese women’s liberation, see Elisabeth J. Croll (1978) and Shu-qin Cui (2003).

4 Nira Yuval-Davis observed that Chinese male intellectuals perceived their feelings of disempowerment resulting from the processes of imperial subjugation “as processes of emasculation and/or feminization. The (re)construction of men’s – and often even more importantly women’s – roles in the processes of resistance and liberation has been central in most such struggles” (1997: p. 67). As early as 1919, Mao Zedong, the future paramount leader of the CCP, advocated for women’s emancipation by raising a women’s revolutionary army. For further discussion, please refer to Stuart R. Schram (1969) and Nira Yuval-Davis (1997).

Compared with the emphasis on Wang Lung’s family saga in the novel, the highlighted role of O Lan on screen had a profound influence upon the collective American psyche. Winning its player Luise Rainer an Academy Award, the image of O Lan was placed alongside Marco Polo as constitutive of the public knowledge of China (MacKinnon & Friesen, 1987, p. 120). Scenes of O Lan toiling in the vast rural landscape, giving birth in the wheat-field and breeding the family create an impression of the Earth mother figure with epic grandeur. The sentimental ending of Wang Lung mourning his diseased wife deviates from the novel in which O Lan’s lonely death does not stop the husband from taking a concubine. Starting with O Lan’s marriage and ending with her death, the film romanticizes the peasant woman’s sacrifice and virtue to sustain the patriarchal family regardless of the socioeconomic transformations. The presumably universal analogy between the primitive O Lan and the ancient land renders China an ethereal space removed from modern history.

To contemporaneous American audiences witnessing women’s accomplishments from aviation pioneer Amelia Mary Earhart to tennis champion Marian Anderson, O Lan’s slavish faith and silent perseverance on screen evoked mixed feelings of pity, sympathy and condescension. These sentiments permeated many of Buck’s writings about China and Chinese women. Both empowered and limited by her outsider status of a “civilized” American woman observing the pre-modern Chinese society, Buck sought to “universalize” the narrative and “racialize” her Chinese subject by situating the Chinese woman within the quotidian domestic life (Yoshihara, 2003, p. 158). When Buck’s feminist edge became more manifest in her novel Dragon Seed (Buck, 1942) in which a farmer’s wife left her newborn baby for the anti-Japanese battle, the revolutionary woman did not achieve the impact of O Lan. The fact that Katharine Hepburn’s role as the farmer’s wife in the Hollywood adaptation of Dragon Seed (1944) failed to win an Oscar nomination indicated that American audiences were more accustomed to see Chinese women as submissive victims. Women’s tragic lot in China, a recurrent tale in Hollywood films like The Toll of the Sea (1922), The Bitter Tea of General Yen (1932) and Shanghai Express (1932), led to the critical observation that “death of Asia” constituted a predominant motif in American cinema (Moy, 1993, pp. 82–100). In this spirit, the proposal to turn Buck’s second biggest bestseller Pavilion of Women (1946) into a film was denied by Hollywood censors on the ground of Madame Wu’s impatience with her marriage (Buck 1955).

More than half a century later, Pavilion of Women was adapted into a US-Sino joint production with a shift of focus in the narrative structure. The Chinese official discourse of woman’s liberation and socialist transformation could be detected in this film along side with the standard message of American cultural superiority. Compared to O Lan’s blind loyalty to patriarchal feudalism in The Good Earth, Pavilion of Women proposes to assimilate women’s
liberation and Western assistance into China’s revolutionary transformation on screen. The film modifies the denunciation of the retrogressive China and describes women’s struggle to grasp their own destiny, indicating the internally generated change in China. The following will explore how the reconfiguration of the feudal narrative both reproduces and disturbs conventional Western imagination.

**Women’s Liberation as Social Transformation**

The production of *Pavilion of Women* mirrored the interwoven discourses of US-Sino geopolitical relationship and global capitalism. As the first Buck novel filmed with mainly a Chinese cast, the making of the film suggested the re-assessment of Buck in China during the relaxed political climate. Declared *persona non grata* by the Chinese government for her bitter critique of the Communists in the 1940s, Buck and her works fell into oblivion in China even after the US-Sino rapprochement (Conn, 1996, p. 372). It was not until 1994 that the official ban on her books was rescinded in the surge of thought liberation accelerated by Deng Xiaoping’s inspection tour of Southern China in 1992 (Patterson 1992; Melvin 1999). At the same time when China strived to assert its place and voice on the world stage, such as its multiple applications for entry into WTO and acclaimed role to stabilize the international market during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, Hollywood craved for the huge Chinese market and lobbied for the granting of Permanent Normal Trading Relations with China on October 10, 2000. To “get a foothold” in China, Universal Studios agreed to fund *Pavilion of Women* in cooperation with the state-owned Beijing film studio, especially with a paltry budget (Lin 1999).

The cinematic narrative of women’s liberation via American assistance in *Pavilion of Women* nonetheless failed to attract Chinese and American audiences. Promoted as the first “Chinese-made Hollywood film” in *People’s Daily* on April 2, 2001, the film was seen as a leap forward for the Chinese to intervene in American discourses about China. The advertising materials, such as the claim of the first-ever “positive” cinematic depiction of CCP in America, or producer Luo Yan’s joking that she was seen as the Chinese woman commanding a group of American men, revealed the penchant of flirting with a nationalist sentiment (Deng 2001). Across the ocean in the U. S., the marketing discourse exaggerated the film’s exotic appeal instead. The sensational wordings like “American pries . . . forbidden liaison with a beautiful aristocrat” in a “world of danger, temptation, and obsession” overwhelmed the feminist edge of the film. In the context of commercial entertainment, *Pavilion of Women* directs the tale of an American missionary saving Chinese women towards a rather unusual ending of women’s regeneration in the Communist revolution. Such reductive treatment of the literary classic and real-life history into sentimental theatricality elicited multiple criticisms. From the Chinese dismissal of its claim of American superiority, to the American criticism of its political bias (Thomas 2001), *Pavilion of Women* evoked an anachronistic experience in view of China’s rise on the global stage.

The cinematic alterations to the original novel demonstrate the convergence of women’s liberation and Chinese national awakening under the mechanism of cooptation. The novel
begins with Madame Wu’s momentous decision on her fortieth birthday to buy her husband a concubine to relieve herself of the connubial obligations. As the de facto head supervising the household, Madame Wu ventures into intellectual exploration by listening in on the tutorial sessions of Brother Andre, an Italian priest hired to teach her son English. Impressed by Andre’s gentle persuasiveness about spiritual freedom and commitment to the Chinese orphans, she starts to examine her life in a new light and discovers her love towards the foreigner after his murder by local robbers. The novel ends with Madame Wu’s matriarchal supervision of the family and orphanage while communing with Andre in spirit. While paying homage to the novel’s sentimental romanticism and Christian humanism, the film offers a melodrama of scandalous affairs, oriental sex, political turmoil and women’s struggle for individuality. Compared with the relatively marginal role of the Italian priest in the book, Andre is portrayed as a powerful American missionary-doctor facilitating the dissolution of the feudal family in the film. Under his influences, Madame Wu is transformed, the concubine Qiuming is redeemed, and Madame Wu’s son Fengmo is enlightened. Despite Buck’s reservation about the “seething mess” brought out by revolutionary forces in China (Buck, 1928, p. 1929), the film treats the Chinese revolution in a positive light. In contrast to the book account of Fengmo’s joining the Kuomintang government army (KMT), the young man’s involvement in the underground Communist activities in the film is cast in an idealistic light probably out of political predilections. To enhance the film’s exotic appeal, the filmmakers manufacture the transgressive Madame Wu-Andre and Fengmo-Qiuming romance as a secondary plotline which is rather burdensome. At Andre’s noble sacrifice to save women and children from a Japanese air raid in 1938, the low-angle camera capturing his fall in slow motion celebrates the spirit of religious martyrdom. Andre’s death not only provides a textual solution to his illegitimate feelings towards Madame Wu, but also erects the Japanese imperialists as the ultimate villain destroying the constructive interaction between the American and the Chinese community. The most significant alteration is the narrative of Madame Wu’s radical transformation from a feudal matriarch to an Ibsenesque Nora-like figure that breaks free from patriarchal constraints. Despite its strenuous effort to interweave these narrative strands, the film is criticized for “battling with itself” (Koehler 2001).

Madame Wu is depicted as a complicated character caught between the yearning for freedom and the submission to the patriarchal family. After decades of service to the family, Madame Wu murmurs to her mirrored image “it is time to do something. Otherwise I’ll feel sorry for myself” in a mock monologue. In this classic moment of reflection to the character/audience, the mirror shot emphasizes Madame Wu’s preoccupation with self-identity in a momentum of mid-life crisis. Feeling suffocated by the quotidian domesticity like a “frog living in a well,” Madame Wu is determined to change her drab life. Under the disguise of wifely virtues particularly applauded by the Chinese gentry, Madame Wu purchases a young concubine Qiuming to extricate herself from sexual obligations to the Lord. Prioritizing intellectual pursuits over connubial obligations, Madame Wu exemplifies a distinctive yearning for individual subjectivity. The moral ambiguity of exploiting the poor orphan girl in exchange for her own limited freedom seems not to bother Madame Wu who prides herself upon saving Qiuming from starvation. As the beneficiary and perpetrator of the feudal convention,
Madame Wu is accustomed to making necessary compromises. In another occasion, Madame Wu employs Andre to teach her son English so that he is better qualified for the arranged marriage between the two aristocratic families. In the contemporary Chinese fad of getting some western education as a signifier of open-mindedness, Madame Wu honors the feudal practices against Fengmo’s will. Although embittered by the patriarchal repression, Madame Wu is still constrained by the feudal conventions. The spiritually bewildered Chinese woman is eventually led to the pursuit of individual freedom under the supervision of Andre.

The narrative constructs Andre as a charismatic figure of significant influence in the Chinese community. At his first screen appearance, Andre breaks into a delivery room to save Madame Kang with a surgical operation to the abhorrence of Madame Wu and other Chinese folk. Assuming the status of a modern intruder into the largely conservative Chinese community, Andre often commands the situation while the Chinese characters stand aside and look at him in reverence. He tends to the poor and cures the sick, and more importantly, stimulates the intellectually hungry Madame Wu. In his tutorial sessions covering a wide range of subjects like music, geography, astronomy and western dress, Madame Wu is invigorated and turns out to be a most articulate student. When Andre spins a wheel to generate electricity, a curious Madame Wu shades her eyes from the illumination of the bulb, touches the gadget in wonder and widens her eyes in surprise. The symbolic scene of enlightenment is followed by a succession of off-screen conversation in which Madame Wu and Andre exchange ideas about individual happiness and familial obligation, freedom of soul and arranged marriage, westerners’ Christian belief and Chinese pragmatism. The catechism-like questions applaud the spiritual loftiness of American individual convention over the constraining Chinese society. The juxtaposition of the voice-over dialogue and the montage sequence of Madame Wu’s management of the household suggests her newly acquired vision in the wake of Andre’s instruction. Previously secluded from the outside world, Madame Wu is able to expand her intellectual horizons at Andre’s gentle encouragement. The American messenger thus launches the dual task of awakening Madame Wu to Western modernity and assisting her ventures beyond the feudal constraints.

Andre’s power of enlightenment is further demonstrated by the transformation of Madame Wu’s son Fengmo. As a liberal-minded youth, Fengmo is distressed by the feudal family, unhappy with the arranged marriage and disillusioned by the KMT government’s ineffectual resistance against the Japanese. At Andre’s tutorial sessions the young man craves for the vision of freedom and equality in American society. At Fengmo’s arrest for his involvement in underground Communist activities, Andre comes to his rescue and wins the admiration of Fengmo, who later reveals his forbidden love towards Qiuming. Ashamed of his degenerate birth father, Fengmo somehow sees Andre as a surrogate father figure and even accepts the extramarital affairs between Andre and his mother after the initial shock. At the encouragement of Andre, Fengmo leaves the feudal family and eventually joins the Communist army alongside with Qiuming. Having facilitated Fengmo’s change from an angry young man to a Communist soldier, Andre plays a paternal role in nurturing modern individuals. The disintegration of the feudal family is more powerfully demonstrated by Madame Wu’s sexual awakening as an essential segment of her transformation.
The resurgence of the habitually repressed female sexuality adds a new layer to the classic feudal narrative. Compared to the rough categorization of reproductive or seductive femininity in *The Good Earth*, *Pavilion of Women* features Madame Wu’s sexual awakening as a token of her realization of individuality. In Madame Wu’s long marital life based upon obligation, the tyrannical husband wears her out with constant sexual demands. In several chamber scenes, Madame Wu cannot communicate with the husband who indulges in physical pleasures of wine, opium and oral sex. Beneath the façade of patriarchal authority, the Lord has neither strong will nor intellectual curiosity in contrast to the heroic Andre or the spiritually minded Madame Wu. Struggling with the feudal regulation of women’s sexual mores and yearning for freedom, Madame Wu withdraws her previous accusation of Qiuming’s “shameless seduction” of her son and learns to understand the plight of the low-class concubine. Arguably out of a transcending bond of “sisterhood”, she agrees to send Qiuming away to a missionary school at Andre’s recommendation. *En route* home after seeing Qiuming off, Madame Wu and Andre are forced to take shelter by a convenient thundershower in a deserted temple and consummate their forbidden love with a prolonged kiss. Madame Wu, previously submissive to women’s fate as man’s sex tools, is suddenly awakened to her own sexuality. As a bombastic crescendo of violins intensifies this moment of physical intimacy in the soundtrack, Madame Wu trembles at Andre’s caress and responds with equal passion. Overwhelmed by such alien sensations which are denied to her in the feudal marriage, Madame Wu seems regenerated in the exhilarating surge of love. The encounter with her own individuality functions as a liberating momentum to prompt Madame Wu’s break from patriarchal constraints.

The latter half of the narrative constructs Madame Wu as a Chinese version of Nora in pursuit of independence. Reminiscent of Nora’s determined walking out of the bourgeois family in *A Doll’s House*, Madame Wu refuses to be her husband’s private property and decides to leave the feudal family during an air raid. At the moment of national and familial crisis caused by Japanese invasion, Madame Wu finally gets a taste of freedom that has been denied her in the Confucian patriarchy. In response to the husband’s threatening “without Wu family you are nobody” and subsequent imploring for her accompany, the tearful woman speaks in an almost condescending tone: “You don’t understand . . . not this time.” Refusing the assigned role as the faithful wife, Madame Wu literally breaks away from the husband’s clasp and walks out of the courtyard in a symbolic split with the feudal imprisonment. The winding path of the women’s individual pursuit and China’s modern transformation converge in the film epilogue. Set in 1941, three years later after Andre’s death, a tracking shot moves away from the deserted Wu compound towards the expanse of open space where a much more relaxed Madame Wu plays with Andre’s orphans in a green meadow. In this manufactured paradise sheltered from the warfare, the children announce their names such as “Faith”, “Mercy” and “Charity” with smiles. When her son and Qiuming in Communist military uniforms wave from a hilltop afar, Madame Wu has a fantasized vision of re-uniting with Andre as the camera circles around the couple in a classical Hollywood scenario of romance. With the camera pulling away from the happy reunion, the film ends in an aerial view of the land veiled by misty clouds. This moment might be a “spectacular rendition of Pearl Buck’s missionary fantas” as it places the Chinese people and land under the celestial vision of
Conclusion

The conscientious juxtaposition of America’s civilizing influences and women’s liberation in Pavilion of Women exemplifies a nuanced China narrative. The pro-leftist discourse of assimilating western influences and women’s liberation into the Communist revolution in the ending echoes the occidentalist fantasy of the New Culture Movement by linking women’s empowerment with China’s national awakening. The emergence of “new” women seeking after true love or autonomous subjectivity was deemed as part of China’s modernization project amidst the encroachment of foreign powers and constraining Confucian traditions (Schwarcz, 1986; Chow, 1991). When leftist gender ideology took the lead in the 1930s, women were encouraged to walk out of patriarchal family to participate in social reform as men’s equal. The fate of Qiuming bespeaks a manifestation of the outstanding feminist-nationalist alliance in China’s modern history. Compared to the book account of her unrequited love towards Madame Wu’s son and reunification with her lost maternal family, the film describes Qiuming’s transformation from a feudal concubine to a communist soldier, a well-reiterated tale in revolutionary classics such as Bai mao nü (The White-haired Girl, 1950) and Hong se niang zi jun (The Red Detachment of Women, 1961). Pavilion of Women thus combines China’s official gender ideology with the conventional Western imagery of old China and anticipates a revolutionary China consisting of open-minded intellectuals and transformed women. The assimilation of women’s liberation into the revolutionary enterprise, on the other hand, evokes cynicism from the West as one American viewer commented that the epilogue “could have been scripted by Chairman Mao.”5 The lukewarm reception of the film in the U.S. might be attributed to its implicit challenge of American-centeredness.

The rewritten feudal narrative of women’s oppression in Pavilion of Women re-accesses the role of the West in China’s modernization project. The film reverses Hollywood’s conventional trajectory of consigning Asian characters to death by featuring the sacrifice of the American missionary. Andre’s death is a textual necessity without impinging on the domain of Western imperialism, since the transformed Madame Wu, Fengmo and Qiuming will absorb his spirits constructively into the building of a “new” China. Out of the ruins of the feudal family emerges a new type of inter-personal relationships based on equality, liberation and devotion to the communal good. The rendering of American cultural influences as a kind of “heritage” illustrates a shade of China-centered narrative which is echoed in another US-Sino co-production Shadow Magic (2000) about China’s first encounter with cinema at the beginning of the twentieth century. The tale of a British fortune-seeker displaying the Lumière brothers’ shorts in Beijing ends with his expulsion and his young Chinese apprentice taking over as “an early specimen of ‘enlightened Chinese’” to shoot films about local people and local scenes (Xu, 2007, p. 60). The narrative of assimilating Western influences into China’s social reform in these co-productions suggests a rising tendency of Chinese intervention in constructing American images about China. The self-empowering discourse of women’s emancipation and the vision of a progressive China

5<http://www.filmjournal.com/filmjournal/reviews/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000696791>
with the surge of revolutionary passion in Pavilion of Women disturb the Western cultural complacency to a certain extent. If the submissive O Lan in The Good Earth reproduces and shapes the conventional American impression of an ossified China unable to transform itself from within, women’s acquisition of power and agency in Pavilion of Women modifies the previous dichotomization between the “progressive” West and the “passive” China based on the Hegelian schema and re-evaluates Western influences in China’s project of modernization. With China’s emergence as a global power of economic and cultural significances, the cinematic endorsement of women’s empowerment in Pavilion of Women might be linked to the sophisticated American perception of China in contemporary times.
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Immigration, Identity and Mobility in Europe: Inclusive Cultural Policies and Exclusion Effects

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Abstract

European cultural policy programs, such as European Capitals of Culture (ECC), seek to develop new forms of civic cohesion through inclusive and participative cultural events. The cultural assets of a city elected "ECC" are mobilized to attract a wide range of new audiences, including populations poorly integrated into local cultural life and consequently distant from pre-existing cultural offers. In the current context of increasingly heterogeneous individual perceptions of Europe, the ECC program aims to promote cultural forms and institutions intended to accelerate both territorial and cross-border European cohesion. This new cultural consumption pattern is conceived to stimulate integration and mobility, but also to create a legitimate and transnational ideal European citizen type. However, cultural struggles and identity conflicts that are emerging in contemporary Europe, especially in the context of increasing immigration issues, raise new challenges for European cultural policies to address inclusion and integration with populations poorly integrated into local cultural life.

Our comparative research addresses the contrasting cases of "European Capitals of Culture" from southern and northern Europe, cities which have recently been affected by the ECC political mechanism, and cities that had been elected as ECC in the past. This paper aims to explore the impacts of European policies on institutions, as well as to understand current obstacles to their efficient implementation. For this, we analyze the urban cultural geography through innovative statistical and cartographical methods.

Keywords: cultural policies, immigration, cultural institutions, inclusion, Europe, European Capitals of Culture
The Exclusion Paradox of Inclusive Policies

Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the European Community has enhanced its competence in the field of culture. The use of culture as an economic tool has become a central concern in contemporary European political thought, promoting the impact of inclusive cultural policies to strengthen both regional and municipal cohesion in Europe, as well as mobility. This new political culture is primarily based on the creative potential of urban renewal to generate new cultural scenes promoting more “participative” and “multicultural” experiences for EU citizens.

Historically associated with diversity and pluralism of cultures and traditions, European cities appear as training grounds for local policies aiming to foster the successful inclusion and participation of EU citizens. Coping with strongly heterogeneous and multicultural contexts, European regions endorse inclusive cultural policies depending on their own cultural contexts. In July 2010, the European Commission published a working document¹ that describes the implementation of inclusive cultural tools and infrastructures as part of regional socio-economic development. This document refers to various national and regional support measures for national heritage industries, such as theaters and the audio-visual sector, and recommends engaging a mapping approach of the EU cultural and inclusive policies to identify the diverse areas that require further progress.

With the aim of promoting a better understanding of common cultural heritage and bringing together European citizens, several political programs were created and applied to territories as top-down political intervention for raising their international profiles. For example, the “European Capitals of Culture” program (ECC), which was created in 1985 by the European Union Council of Ministers and focused initially on major large cities (e.g. Paris ECC-1989, Madrid ECC-1992, Stockholm ECC-1998), has changed the rules and criteria of attribution of this status in favor of smaller, cross-border or economically fragile agglomerations (e.g. Marseille ECC-2013, Umeå ECC-2014, San-Sebastian ECC-2016).

This new cultural consumption pattern was conceived in order to stimulate integration and mobility, but also to create a legitimate and transnational ideal European citizen type. Inclusion is conceived of as the equal participation of all citizens, both nationals and foreign nationals, without considering foreigners as a separate group, in all sectors and in all aspects of city life. However, cultural struggles and identity conflicts emerging in contemporary Europe, especially in the context of increasing immigration issues, raise new challenges for European cultural policies to cope with inclusion and integration with populations poorly integrated into local cultural life.

Analyzing Cultural Struggles in European Cities with Contrasting Profiles

Focusing on European cities and regions that were elected "European Capitals of Culture" (ECC), our CURRICULA² research project seeks to understand obstacles to the integration of populations into local cultural life. The work program topic of this research focuses on

¹ The European Agenda for Culture – progress towards shared goals. Accompanying document to the Commission Report to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the European agenda for culture, SEC(2010)904, 19 July 2010, 3.
cultural dynamics in different European regions with highly contrasting historical and cultural profiles. By comparing different “European Capitals of Culture”, we aim to explore how immersive cultural institutions, historically rooted and implemented in a territory, are called upon to renew their perimeter while redefining their relationships with audiences.

By examining the reorganization and renewal of cultural institutions in “European Capitals of Culture”, the CURRICULA research project focuses on relationships between European inclusive cultural policies, immersive cultural institutions (theaters, museums, opera houses, etc.) and European mobility issues, all closely related to immigration and cultural identity concerns.

By varying the contexts, sizes, politics, and cultural histories of cities elected ECC, the analysis includes cases of cities recently affected by the “European Capitals of Culture” program, such as Marseille (ECC-2013), Umeå (ECC-2014), Wroclaw (ECC-2016), and their counterparts who were elected ECC in the past Genoa (ECC-2004), Bologna (ECC-2000). From this framework, we aim to explore the implementing and anchoring processes of European dynamics at the local level, and also to understand how the ECC political mechanism is integrated into the collective memory of targeted populations. Finally, our project focuses on heterogeneous immersive cultural institutions (opera houses, theaters, museums) that are analyzed and compared according to their impact on the inclusion of populations poorly integrated into local cultural life.

The table below shows the crossovers between chronological dimensions (former "ECCs" vs. current "ECCs"), geographical positions (northern cities vs. southern cities), and politico-administrative orders (centralized countries vs. de-centralized countries) that differentiate the cases of each selected city (see Figure 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northern Capitals</th>
<th>Recent ECC</th>
<th>Former ECC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Sweden – centralized country)</td>
<td>(Poland – de-centralized country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(France – centralized country)</td>
<td>(Italy – de-centralized country)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Crossovers between four European cities with contrasting profiles.

Research Methodology

The CURRICULA research program was launched in 2013 with the study of Marseille ECC-2013. The experience and methodology conceptualized and developed during the case study of Marseille ECC-2013 was then used in several international case studies. At the current time, the second stage of this project is focused internationally on Poland and Sweden. Studying the long-term impacts of European cultural policies, using the cases of Bologna (ECC-2000) and Genoa (ECC-2004) will occur during the third stage of the project.

In this paper we present the results of our study on Marseille ECC-2013 collected during the first stage of our research. The results of surveys implemented in Sweden, Poland and Italy
are expected in the coming years.

For the specific case of Marseille ECC-2013, our investigation began with the following problems and questions: How do cultural institutions in Marseille renew their scope and redefine relationships with their audiences during the ECC year? How do these institutions react to the restructuring of the competitive field? Are they managing adaptive or hybrid strategies with new conceptions of culture? Or, conversely, do they gradually become obsolete? How do audiences (esp. youth and immigrants) react to new European cultural policies? Are they becoming more participative, or conversely, do they remain resilient to cultural institutions, and new cultural offerings?

We began our survey with two important city theaters that were integrated into the Marseille ECC-2013 program: the National Theater of La Criée and the Theater of Le Merlan-National Scene. This choice was determined by two main factors: (1) the two theaters are durably anchored in Marseille’s cultural landscape, and (2) they present dissimilar institutional profiles, and are located in two economically and socially contrasting neighborhoods (see Figure 2).

![Figure 2: Two contrasting cases of National Theaters in Marseille impacted by European cultural policies: On the left, the Theater of Le Merlan-National Scene, which premises are shared with a supermarket (North Side Marseille); on the right, the National Theater of La Criée located on the tourist docks of the Old-Port (Downtown Marseille).](image)

The National Theater of La Criée was founded in 1981. Since its foundation, La Criée has been based in a prestigious downtown neighborhood near the Old-Port. Despite its central location among the upper-middle class housing, the theater was created to promote a non-elitist approach to classical theater. The historic building of the La Criée Theater was previously occupied by Marseille’s central fish market, a place traditionally associated with multiculturalism and immigration, situated in the city at the crossroad of populations on the tourist docks of the Old-Port.

The Theater of Le Merlan-National Scene was founded in 1980. The main objective of this institution was the promotion of theater and cinema to the poor populations of peripheral neighborhoods. The Theater of Le Merlan is based on the north side of Marseille, in a neighborhood for some time already associated with immigration, drug dealers, and crimes. The premises of the Theater of Le Merlan are shared with a supermarket, a police station and a library for children.
The map in Figure 3 shows the location of the two theaters in Marseille’s urban landscape.

![Map of Marseille theaters](image)

Figure 3: The geographical and institutional cultural heteronomy of two theaters in Marseille

A – The Theater of Le Merlan-National Scene: Peripheral location, the “Hood”

B – The National Theater of La Criée: Central historical location, “Downtown”.

Map data © 2016 Google.

In 2013, the Theater of La Criée was integrated into the “European Capitals of Culture” program. The newly elected artistic director of the theater, Macha Makeïeff, enriched the theatrical program with new artistic genres, such as circus, dance, orchestral music, jazz and cabaret. This new institutional branding was launched with *Ali Baba*, a musical show created by Macha Makeïeff showing the spirit of tolerance and integration of the city of Marseille’s multicultural inhabitants. Collaborations with several foreign theaters have also been created to attract new international audiences to Marseille.

The Theater of Le Merlan has been strongly impacted by European inclusive policies strengthening and supporting a broad vision of a theater open to everyone regardless of income, cultural origin, age, or educational level. The new artistic director of the Theater of Le Merlan, Francesca Polioniato, began the public presentation of the new program with an African dance symbolizing the “young” image of the institution. The annual program of the theater combines rock, rap, slam, juggling and hip-hop shows with several “intellectual” avant-garde representations. By offering free tickets to the youth and family associations of the neighborhood, the Theater of Le Merlan also engages municipal social politics with the immigrant populations who belong to these associations.
The methodology of our research is built upon an articulation of several types of statistical and cartographical data analysis. Since 2013, we have analyzed the Theater of La Criée and the Theater of Le Merlan ticket office databases. These databases contain the addresses and zip codes of every subscribed and non-subscribed ticket buyer, as well as information on shows that these individuals prefer to visit during the year. To deepen our understanding, we also implemented several paper and online questionnaires with a number of detailed questions on personal cultural experiences and practices.

For the questionnaire survey, we chose five different shows from the program of the Theater of La Criée, and five shows from the program of the Theater of Le Merlan. This approach allowed us to analyze socio-demographic differences between the audiences of each show, and to understand how the inclusive programs of the two theaters meet the expectations of different types of spectators. The table below describes the main characteristics of each show that we have included in our comparative scope (see Figure 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Show</th>
<th>Main characteristics of the show</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theater of La Criée</td>
<td>Cyrano de Bergerac (Georges Lavadant)</td>
<td>French Classical theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater of La Criée</td>
<td>Queen of Hearts (Juliette Deschamps)</td>
<td>Retro cabaret style songs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater of La Criée</td>
<td>De Nos Jours (Ivan Mosjoukine Theater Company)</td>
<td>Modern circus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater of La Criée</td>
<td>La Mouette, Oncle Vania, Trois Soeurs (Christian Benedetti)</td>
<td>Modern theater based on classical pieces of Anton Tchechov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater of La Criée</td>
<td>A Midsummer Night's Dream, The Comedy of Errors (Propeller Theater Company)</td>
<td>Modern interpretation of Shakespeare in English with French subtitles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater of Le Merlan</td>
<td>Smashed (Gandini Juggling)</td>
<td>Artistic juggling with apples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater of Le Merlan</td>
<td>Asphalte (Cie Denière Minute)</td>
<td>Modern dance and hip-hop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater of Le Merlan</td>
<td>Dormir 100 ans (Pauline Bureau)</td>
<td>Youth and family show</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater of Le Merlan</td>
<td>Diner with André (Tg Stan &amp; de Koe)</td>
<td>Avant-garde theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater of Le Merlan</td>
<td>Soirée Gravitation</td>
<td>Music concert (poetic rock)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: The main characteristics of theatrical shows included in our analysis.

The qualitative questionnaire surveys give us information about the cultural mobility and the subjective preferences of each respondent, while the ticket office databases provide an overall view of audience make-up. After collecting these data, we built a number of small-scale datasets containing multiple dimensions about living areas, and lifestyle, as well as urban, regional and cross-border cultural mobility patterns of audiences of the two theaters, and then, compared them to broader statistics databases such as those from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), to find correlations with the socio-economic characteristics of Marseille's population.

Two main geographical units structure the INSEE databases: zip and district codes (commune/arrondissement level) and IRIS codes (infra-communal level). The city of Marseille is divided into sixteen districts. Each district has its own zip code (13001, 13002, etc.). These codes allow us to locate the different urban zones inhabited by the theaters' audiences, and also to identify where individuals are not engaged with cultural offerings. The map below shows the distribution of Marseille’s districts (see Figure 5).
The IRIS (Aggregated Units for Statistical Information) geographical division is more detailed than zip and district codes. France is composed of approximately 16,000 IRIS codes that cover infra-communal territories scaled to the target size of 2,000 residents per basic unit. Thus, the combination of big data (National statistics by zip codes and IRIS codes) and small data (ticket office databases and qualitative surveys on theater audiences) allowed us to create new databases for the analysis of the impacts of European cultural policies in Marseille. Using these methods, we were able to test and evaluate the inclusive power of cultural institutions concerned by the ECC program, such as the Theater of La Criée and the Theater of Le Merlan, by finding correlations between the social profiles of theater audiences and the socio-economic characteristics of Marseille's population. This original methodology provides a better understanding of cultural participation and mobility in the city, as well as insight to how social and cultural stratification can be impacted – or not – by European cultural policies.

The Case of Marseille, European Capital of Culture 2013

Since the ancient Greeks established their first settlement around 600 BC, the city of Marseille has had a long historical tradition of cosmopolitanism. As a Mediterranean port city, Marseille has benefited from the different waves of migration that have marked the identity of the city over time. Today Marseille is still one of the most cosmopolitan cities in France, as well as in Europe. In 2013, the city was designated as the European Capital of Culture, and to confirm the status of Marseille as a cultural crossroad, the European Union and the French Ministry of Culture funded the construction of the Museum of European and Mediterranean Civilizations (MuCEM). This brand new and iconic museum was built directly at the entrance of the Old-Port, on the docks where most immigrants and refugees entered after WWII following the end of colonialism. To celebrate the new European Capital of Culture, the New York Times published two articles in 2012 and 2013 about the spirit of tolerance and the integration of immigrants in Marseille. In a first issue addressing the historic French republican concern about “who gets to be French?” (Meyer, 2012, April 11)
the newspaper asked “can and should the Marseillais spirit of civilized tolerance spread northward?” The following year, the newspaper highlighted Marseille as the “Secret Capital of France” (Kimmelman, 2013, October 4). Based on these consensual considerations and in the context of identity conflicts and cultural struggles emerging in contemporary Europe about immigration issues, it is interesting to ask the following questions: What is the real situation of immigrants in Marseille and what relation do they have toward European institutions of culture? Are they open to inclusive European cultural policies? Are they becoming more participative, or conversely, do they remain resilient to cultural institutions and to new cultural offerings?

**The Cultural Identity of the City of Marseille: Is Marseille an Exception?**

Marseille is historically recognized for being a cultural crossroads for populations from the Mediterranean as well as Europe. The city is the second largest city in France and has about 1 727,000 inhabitants in its metro area. While Paris’s metro area is much greater than Marseille in population (12,405,426 inhabitants), Marseille is a much larger city with a surface area of 240.62 km², compared to Paris with only 105,40 km². Because of its pre-eminence as a Mediterranean port, Marseille has always been one of the main gateways into France. This geographic location has attracted many immigrants and made Marseille a cosmopolitan melting pot. According to French national statistics, almost one in two inhabitants have immigrant ancestors. The Muslim population of the city counts over 250,000 inhabitants. Marseille also has the third largest Jewish population in Europe after Paris and London. Many people in Marseille come from elsewhere in France or from abroad. By the end of the 18th century, approximately half the population was not born in the city; these populations came mostly from other parts of southern France, but also from the northern part of the country. In 1999, almost 25% of Marseille’s population was born outside metropolitan France. This cosmopolitan situation has made Marseille and the region of Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur very diverse culturally and geographically. According to research comparing different regions in France, the Region Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur is now clearly identified as land of immigration (Yvan Gastaut, 2009). “Today the PACA region is a very highly urbanized area with a population of 4.5 million urban residents, or 90% of its population, approaching 5 million. The majority lies in the four major cities, Marseille, Nice, Toulon and Avignon, and in the many medium-sized cities with over 20 000 inhabitants. The 300,000 foreigners or 430,000 immigrants recorded within the PACA region, according to the distinction drawn by the INSEE, represent almost 10% of the population and live mainly in urban areas, although their presence in rural areas cannot be overlooked.”

**The Geographical Distribution of the Population in Marseille**

Despite its very singular and cosmopolitan composition, Marseille is also a divided city. When analyzing the city by profession, income, age and ethnicity, we find dramatic results related to the socio-demographic distribution of the population.

When we compare the distribution by profession in Marseille at the infra-communal level, we can see a clear division of the city between the north and the south. For example, the percentage of higher-level professions (CEOs, intellectual professions, and managers) is much more important in the south side of Marseille, while the highest percentage of blue-collar workers is located in the north side of the city (see Map 1).
Map 1: Distribution of the population by profession in Marseille at the infra-communal level (IRIS codes).

When we compare the distribution of the population by age, we also find a city that is quite divided between the north and the south. When we look at the map of the percentage of 60-75 year-olds compared to the share of 15-29 year-olds, once again, it clearly appears that the elderly population is not living in the same neighborhoods as the younger. Despite the fact that many young people live downtown in the historical center of the city – as is the case in most cities in Europe – a large percentage of them are nonetheless living in the northern neighborhoods of Marseille. By contrast, most of the elderly population is living on the south side of the city, in the neighborhoods along Marseille’s waterfront (see Map 2).

Map 2: Distribution of the population by age in Marseille at the infra-communal level (IRIS codes).
If we compare three different maps showing income and poverty rates, we find strong relationships with the two variables that we previously explored, profession and age. On the first map, we see the distribution of income across the city of Marseille. As we observe, the population with the highest income live in the south and east sides of the city. While the south side of Marseille’s waterfront appears to be very wealthy, in contrast, the northern neighborhoods seem to be rather economically disadvantaged (see Map 3).

Map 3: Distribution of the population by income in Marseille at the zip code level

In contrast to this observation, we can compare the previous map on income with the following one based on poverty rate. What we observe is the exact opposite of the previous map. The poorest populations are essentially based in the northern neighborhoods of Marseille (see Map 4). In this present case, and considering our previous analyses, we can see that the poverty rate is strongly correlated with neighborhoods where the population is not only undereducated, but also very young. This is exactly what we observe on the next map showing the poverty rate distribution of the under-30-year-olds (see Map 5). Interestingly, the districts of the city that have the highest poverty rates are also the youngest ones.
Finally, once we move on to the analysis of immigrant and foreign population distribution in Marseille, compared by income, age and profession, we find strong evidence that these populations are likely to be correlated with young, undereducated and low income neighborhoods. The following two maps show the distribution of the immigrant and foreign population across the city of Marseille (see Map 6). As we observe on the two maps, the
districts with the largest percentages of immigrant and foreign residents are essentially located in the north side of Marseille, where, as we have seen before, the population is mostly young, poor, and undereducated. Furthermore – all things being equal – we also find strong correlations between district locations on the two maps for both immigrant and foreign populations. These observations provide strong evidence that the status of immigrants and foreigners may be correlated and share the same social profile.

Based on these results, we now have a better idea about the social profile of populations living in the north and south sides of the city of Marseille. From our observations, we can conclude that while the population of southern neighborhoods of the city is older, more educated and wealthier, the social profile of the population from the northern part however, is younger, undereducated and from both poor and low-income backgrounds.

To test these assumptions, we conducted repeated statistical analyses using SPSS software. The database used for the test came from the National Statistics Office (INSEE) and was scaled to the city level of Marseille. The results we found give strong evidences to our hypotheses. When testing immigrants as the dependent variable, and controlling for numbers of higher professions (i.e. CEOs, intellectual prof., and managers) and numbers of blue-collar workers, the regression analysis gives a significant and positive correlation with blue-collar workers \((t = 16.877, \text{Sig.} = .000; \text{see Table 1})\). Then, when we repeated the test with immigrants as the dependent variable, but controlled for six age categories (from 0-14, 15-29, 30-44, 45-59, 60-74, 75-+), the results gave significant and positive correlations with age categories of 0-14 and 15-29 year-olds \((t = 9.646, \text{Sig.} = .000 \text{ for 0-14 year-olds}; \text{and } t = 7.012, \text{Sig.} = .000 \text{ for 15-29 year-olds})\). Conversely, correlations were significant but negative with the age categories of 45-59 and 75-+ year-olds \((t = -5.257, \text{Sig.} = .000 \text{ for 45-59 year-olds}; \text{and } t = -2.939, \text{Sig.} = .004 \text{ for 75-+ year-olds; see Table 2})\).
So what conclusions can be drawn from these observations? How do these results overlap with cultural practices? To what extent are immigrants integrated into the cultural life of institutions? And what is the influence of European cultural institutions on these populations? To answer these questions, we began with the analysis of two national theaters’ audiences with contrasting profiles. One is located in the historical center of the city (The Theater of La...
The other is integrated into a supermarket in a suburban neighborhood (The Theater of le Merlan).

To test hypotheses about the participation of immigrants with these institutions, we asked audiences two very simple questions: (1) Where do you live in the city? and (2) What is your means of transportation? The first question gives us information about whether a person is living near or far from the theater. The second, what kind of means of transport he or she uses to travel to the theater. The questionnaires asked respondents to choose from five answers: (1) by foot, (2) public transportation, (3) bike, (4) car, (5) other. Before analyzing this data, we first merged the data gathered with our surveys with data from the national population census. We then mapped our results from the two theaters combined with census data about immigrants. The first layer (with blue bubbles) indicates the proportion of theater audiences by district. The second (by color intensity) indicates the proportion of the immigrant population within these districts. On each map, we use a temple symbol to indicate the theater location to show the location of the institution in relation to its audience.

After testing these different variables and comparing maps, we found evidence that neither of the two theaters’ audiences is related to the immigrant population. Furthermore, we found that whatever the location of the theater or cultural institutions (whether they were central or peripheral), there was no significant impact or influence of these institutions on the immigrant population. We found, for instance, no significant impact when the cultural institution was located in a central location of the city such the Theater ofLa Criée. The immigrant population remains poorly integrated into local cultural life and does not travel downtown to engage in cultural practices. On the first map, we can observe that most audiences of the Theater ofLa Criée come from central, southern and eastern neighborhoods of the city. However, very few are from the north side of the city, where we find the highest proportion of immigrants (see Map 7).

![Map 7: Distribution of La Criée Theater’s audiences vs. immigrant population by zip code.](image-url)
In the case of the Theater of Le Merlan, we found no significant impact despite the cultural institution’s location in a poor and peripheral neighborhood. Despite the fact that, since its creation in 1980, the Theater of Le Merlan has specifically dedicated attention to attracting populations poorly integrated into local cultural life, we can see from the following map that, even thirty-five years later, there are still some significant challenges to overcome before the institution is accepted into the northern neighborhoods of Marseille. As we observed, most of the audience of the Theater of Le Merlan comes from central and southern Marseille neighborhoods, although we do find some exceptions such as individuals coming from the 13th district (a north-eastern neighborhood nearby) or the 16th district (a north-western neighborhood nearby). However, in districts where the immigrant population is the largest, the impact of the Theater of Le Merlan remains very low. In other words, immigrant cultural practices stay separate from top-down cultural legitimacy, even when European cultural offerings are brought to these populations (see Map 8).

Map 8: Distribution of Le Merlan Theater’s audiences vs. immigrant population by zip code.

To analyze these observations further, we did some simple frequency tests about who goes to the theater and by what means of transportation, in order to compare factors of distance and proximity between audiences of the two theaters.

As expected, we find that, despite the fact that most of the La Criée’s audience comes by car (47.1%) – mostly from southern districts, see Map 7 – nonetheless a significant part of them come on foot (28.7%). These results confirm the fact that the Theater of La Criée mainly attracts populations from downtown Marseille, given that most of its audience lives in the nearby central neighborhoods, when they are not from the south side of the city (see Table 3).
In contrast, however, the Theater of Le Merlan does not get the same results. We find that 73.3% of the audience comes by car, while only 0.5% come on foot. These results confirm the fact that, despite its location in a northern district of Marseille, the Theater of Le Merlan does not have a great impact on the population of its nearby neighborhood (i.e. immigrants), but rather attracts audiences from central and eastern districts of the city. As seen in the table, the factor of distance is stronger than proximity as the great majority of audience comes by car when not by public transportation or with the theater’s shuttle (see Table 4).

### Table 3: Means of transportation used to come to the Theater of La Criée.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means of Transportation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- On foot</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- By public transport</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- By car</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- By bike</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing System</td>
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<td>27.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4: Means of transportation used to come to the Theater of Le Merlan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means of Transportation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- On foot</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>- By bike</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>,5</td>
<td>,5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- By public transport</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- By car</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- By Le Merlan Theater’s shuttle</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast, however, the Theater of Le Merlan does not get the same results. We find that 73.3% of the audience comes by car, while only 0.5% come on foot. These results confirm the fact that, despite its location in a northern district of Marseille, the Theater of Le Merlan does not have a great impact on the population of its nearby neighborhood (i.e. immigrants), but rather attracts audiences from central and eastern districts of the city. As seen in the table, the factor of distance is stronger than proximity as the great majority of audience comes by car when not by public transportation or with the theater’s shuttle (see Table 4).

### Table 4: Means of transportation used to come to the Theater of Le Merlan.

However, some differences appear when we analyze the theaters’ attendance depending on the different shows offered. When we compare audience preferences of five shows at the Theater of La Criée, and four at the Theater of Le Merlan, we observe some significant variations between the two institutions.

In the case of the Theater of La Criée, despite the diversity of artistic offerings varying from classical French theater to modern circuses, we see little change in the type of audience depending of the different types of shows offered by the theater. The new “inclusive” program of La Criée only weakly attracts populations from the northern districts. Only 5 individuals from the second district (13002) and the third (13003) attended “Cyrano de Bergerac” and “A Queen of Heart”; 4 individuals from the thirteenth district (13013) attended “Trois Tchekhov” (see Table 5).
However, regarding the attendance of audiences living in the southern districts (esp. districts 13006, 13007, 13008, 13009) we can observe that the majority is more attracted by classical types of theater shows (“Cyrano de Bergerac”, “Trois Tchekhov”, “Cie Propeller”). The audiences from the eighth district (13008), are particularly strongly attracted by the “traditional” classical shows such as “Cyrano de Bergerac” (28 persons), and tend to be less interested by “modern” shows. Only four attended “A Queen of Heart” (cabaret show), and 3 “De Nos Jours” (circus show).

Therefore, we can conclude that inclusive European policies devoted to enhancing cultural mobility and attracting new populations to downtown Marseille, mainly concern populations that are (1) already acquainted with the Theater of La Criée, and (2) essentially living in the wealthy southern districts near the institution.

Table 5 shows audience distribution of the Theater of La Criée in different Marseille districts, depending on five heterogeneous shows included in the program during the “European Capital of Culture” year. Southern districts are indicated in orange. Northern districts are in purple, and central and eastern districts are marked in grey. Because of its central location, the Theater of La Criée is gentrified but geographically and socially more diverse than the Theater of Le Merlan. According to the chi-square test of independence – $X^2$ (df = 60, N = 356) = 64.993, p > .05 – there is no correlation between the origins of audiences in the city and specific theatrical offerings (see Table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Name of representation</th>
<th>13001</th>
<th>13002</th>
<th>13003</th>
<th>13004</th>
<th>13005</th>
<th>13006</th>
<th>13007</th>
<th>13008</th>
<th>13009</th>
<th>13101</th>
<th>13102</th>
<th>13103</th>
<th>13104</th>
<th>13105</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If you live in Marseille, can you specify your district?</td>
<td>Cyrano de Bergerac</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Queen of Heart</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trois Tchekhov (La Mouette, Oncle Vania, Trois Soeurs)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De nos Jours (Cie Ivan Mosjoukine)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cie Propeller – Shakespeare (Songe d’une nuit d’été &amp; Comédie des Erreurs)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>356</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Distribution of the La Criée Theater's audiences in different Marseille districts, depending on five heterogeneous shows

$X^2$ (df = 60, N = 356) = 64.993, p > .05 (.307).

However, the general assumption of centralization and gentrification of theater audiences becomes more balanced in the case of the Theater of Le Merlan. The restructuring and “inclusive” rebranding of the Theater of Le Merlan focused on the immersion of the theater in its local environment (i.e. in northern poor district neighborhoods), and on the attraction of local audiences (mostly young immigrants). The comparison of five heterogeneous shows from the theater’s annual program demonstrates some differences in audiences depending on the type of show offered.
While we find a strong presence of inhabitants of Marseille's southern districts (13005, 13006, 13007) during certain types of shows such as “Asphalte” (hip-hop show), “Smashed” (juggling show) and “My Dinner with André” (avant-garde show), we see a significant change in audience when the theater performs shows dedicated to youth and families, such as “Dormir cent ans”. Among the four shows, we see that “Dormir cent ans” attracts the greatest number of local inhabitants from the northern districts (12 individuals from the 13th, 14th and 16th district). However, the specific artistic and avant-gardist staging of “My Dinner with André” is more comparable with the theatrical offerings of the Theater of La Criée, and is clearly more in line with an audience from Marseille's southern districts (19 individuals coming from the 5th, 6th and 7th districts). Therefore, we can make the assumption that downtown residential populations, who attend the Theater of La Criée for its avant-garde shows, tend to come to the Theater of Le Merlan mainly for similar offerings. However, we can assume that the inclusion of more shows dedicated to youth and families in the theater’s program could potentially raise the immigrant population’s interest to come more often to the Theater of Le Merlan.

The table below shows the distribution of Theater of Le Merlan’s audience in different Marseille districts, depending on five heterogeneous shows included in the program during the “European Capital of Culture” year. Southern districts are indicated in orange. Northern districts are in purple, and central and eastern districts are marked in grey. Because of its location on the north side of Marseille in peripheral neighborhoods, the Theater of Le Merlan is less gentrified but also geographically and socially less diverse than the Theater of La Criée. According to the chi-square test of independence – \( \chi^2 (df = 64, N = 154) = 95.953, p < .01 \) – there is a strong correlation between audiences from central and southern districts of the city, and specific theatrical offerings, that is in the present case, with avant-garde shows. However the Theater of Le Merlan remains poorly inclusive with populations from northern districts that count a large proportion of immigrants (see Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Name of representation</th>
<th>ASPHALTE</th>
<th>DORMIR CENT ANS</th>
<th>MY DINNER WITH ANDRE</th>
<th>SMASHED</th>
<th>SOIREE GRAVITATION (CONCERT)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If you live in Marseille, can you specify your district:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13001</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 – Distribution of Le Merlan Theater's audiences in different Marseille districts, depending on four heterogeneous shows

\( \chi^2 (df = 64, N = 154) = 95.953, p < .01 (.006) \).
Conclusion

Three main conclusions can be drawn from the results of these analyses:

First of all, we observe a weak correlation between (1) inclusive European policies applied to cultural institutions and (2) the participation of audiences poorly integrated into local cultural life. In the two cases of the theaters investigated during our survey – the Theater of La Criée (downtown theater) and the Theater of Le Merlan (peripheral theater) – immigrants, young and poor populations were underrepresented in the audiences of both “classical” and “contemporary” shows.

Secondly, regular theater-going audiences can easily reach the peripheral districts to participate in new cultural offerings, while populations poorly integrated into cultural life are not attracted by cultural offerings in downtown Marseille, despite the new “inclusive” programs of the La Criée central theater. This “one-way” urban cultural mobility is part of the “exclusion paradox” of inclusive policies that are effective mostly with populations that are already familiar with local cultural offerings. In contrast, populations poorly integrated into local cultural life are becoming even more excluded, particularly in the context of current European cultural policies, such as the “European Capitals of Culture” program.

Thirdly, in the case of the Theater of Le Merlan, local populations from the northern districts of Marseille mostly participated in the youth and family show “Dormir cent ans”. Therefore, cities and institutions could potentially be more attractive and inclusive for new generations of immigrants under the following conditions: (1) by increasing the geographical proximity of cultural institutions and amenities to low income neighborhoods, (2) by providing inclusive cultural programs more focused on youth and families as well as on immigrants' ordinary concerns and ambitions, (3) by improving urban mobility and public transport across the city between the center and periphery.
References


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A Liberal Assessment of Intercultural Relations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan

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Abstract

Various theories attempt to provide generalized solutions to the challenges arising out of plurality but no unanimous mechanism has been developed so far. Many questions related to cultural diversity can be addressed if theories are complemented by empirical research. This paper is an attempt in that direction. It evaluates the attitudes of cultural groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan, towards culture and the strategies for the management of plurality by conducting a field survey for collecting data through 2977 questionnaires and 80 personal interviews from 9 religio-linguistic groups. The paper makes Douglas Hartmann and Joseph Gerteis’s model of difference (2005) a theoretical classification and investigates which vision is appreciated most by the people of KP. The paper shows that the majority of the people in KP has a negative attitude towards assimilationism, cosmopolitanism and fragmented pluralism but a positive attitude towards interactive pluralism. After this research it was found that KP society is more tolerant and liberal than it was thought to be.

Keywords, multiculturalism, Muslimization, assimilation, cosmopolitanism, fragmented, pluralism, interactive pluralism
Modern states are faced with multiple challenges both from within and without. Externally, they face the challenge of globalization with its cultural, economic and political dimensions and impacts. Internally, states struggle with the rising tide of religious, ethnic and cultural plurality. Those who are not comfortable with heterogeneity may see plurality as a challenge to the integrity and security of modern state and may support homogeneity by assimilating minority groups. On the other hand, minorities may challenge this assimilative thinking and policies of the majority and may want their identity to be recognized and protected with group rights. Thus, states with plural identities face the fundamental challenge to the idea of homogenous nation-state.

The struggle for minority rights has made many inroads in political theory in the last three decades. Will Kymlicka (2001a, pp. 17–19) has mentioned several reasons for this activism. For example, the wave of ethnic nationalisms unleashed by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe; the nativist reaction against immigrants in many Western countries; the increasing level of political awareness and mobilization of indigenous peoples due to the draft declaration of the rights of indigenous peoples at the United Nations; and the growing threat of secession within several Western democracies. Nathan Glazer (1997, p. 147) includes the remarkable expansion of the women’s movement; the change in sexual mores; and the unsuccessful attempts of the United States to assimilate African-Americans as important triggers for minority rights.

Plurality has become a “fact” that moral and political philosophy cannot bypass while proposing fair terms for stability and co-operation in society. As Christopher McKnight (2000) declares, the universalisability of moral judgments is not a cross-cultural feature; diversity must be accepted as a fact and be recognized as existed. Being a fact, the existence of cultural differences in a society may be an issue undermining the stability and integrity of a society. It was believed that liberal education and modern means of communication would link people together across states and the relevance of cultural identity would progressively vanish. Moreover, the application of the universal framework of rights would properly address the demands of minorities and would cause a steady assimilation of citizens resulting in blending of all cultures and the emergence of a single cosmopolitan society (Kymlicka 2001a: 204–205). However, this optimism has been proved flawed and identity consciousness has surprisingly increased. Neither globalization nor democratic transformation has helped avoiding cultural conflicts (Casals, 2006, p. 3).

Most democratic states are facing a crucial challenge: how to accommodate minorities’ interests while preserving the stability of the state and universal human rights. Liberalism has serious difficulties with this question because according to a widespread view, group rights and individual rights are deeply incompatible. Liberalism holds that individual, being an end in itself, has certain basic rights and liberties that need to be the focus of political theories and state actions and that individual should not be deprived of his/her rights on the plea that his/her right violates some perception of good. The problem, and in some way a challenge, for the liberal scholars is how to accommodate and harmonize disagreements which may arise out of ethno-cultural plurality. This observation pinpoints the potential problem of adopting a model of differentiated citizenship based on asymmetrical rights. This problem requires us to rethink the interpretation of the basic principles and values that sustain liberalism. Many liberal scholars have pleaded for accommodating minorities. For example, Charles Taylor (1994, pp. 62–3) argues that as proceduralist neutrality of liberalism cannot accommodate minorities, it must be modified to give way for the politics of difference. Will Kymlicka (1989; 1995) insists that justice requires that the traditional human rights approach
should be complemented by taking into account the group-differentiated rights for minorities. Chandran Kukathas (2003, pp. 93; 237) stresses that a free society is the only answer to the situation of plurality where different groups live together and no group has the right to compel anyone to become or remain its member.

Liberalism is sympathetic to plurality because of its strong belief in the significance of individual’s freedom to have a life of his/her own, even if that way of life is disapproved of by the members of the larger society. Liberalism believes in the idea that minorities’ ways are to be tolerated. However, the widespread idea that group rights can only be justified from a communitarian perspective assigning value to group over individual is rejected as flawed. Liberal theorists normally oppose group rights because besides skepticism over the satisfactory criteria to define “minority” and “community”, the right-holder must have reason and moral agency, which groups lack and consequently, have no basic need for the ascription of rights. Only individuals are capable of reasoning, make decisions and take actions, and the decisions and values of a group are always the product of the individuals’ decisions and actions. Thus, all group interests originate from individual ones; individuals, not groups, have interests and are the potential holders of moral rights. This is the ontological and moral individualist stance of liberalism.

Liberals disagree among themselves on how to treat minorities’ cultures and practices. The first group is strongly against multicultural practices of tolerating minorities’ practices and places emphasis on the protection of individual rights. The pioneer of the second group is Chandran Kukathas who supports “benign neglect” and advocates that groups should neither be hindered nor promoted. The third group is comprised of the liberals who strongly defend a version of multiculturalism where state should give recognition to group rights and offer special protections to minority culture with their activities subsidized.

Thus, a debate about multiculturalism has been started which has produced major fault lines within the liberal tradition. Multiculturalism as a policy is considered as against assimilation (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005). Multiculturalism is thought to be a divisive policy producing major upheavals. However, there are differences which can be accommodated by providing a number of policies without bringing any major discontent. A fuller conception of multiculturalism, as Hartmann and Gerteis (2005) also propose, must begin by breaking down the false opposition between unity/solidarity and difference/diversity.

Minority rights are special rights that individuals have by virtue of their association with particular groups. The existence of minority rights as moral rights can be rejected on their face value as against liberalism; however, their recognition might be justifiable only as long as they are adjusted and understood in terms of individual rights. For example, the representation of a minority in parliament, though legally attributed to group, is founded on the individual right of all citizens to political participation.

However, those group rights which are irreducible and not based on the consent of the members of the group cannot be justified under liberal theory. Again, social group is accepted as an artifact of individuals and has no distinct existence of its own apart from its members. This means that communities are important and have, if they, value because of their

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1 For further discussion see Barry (2001).
2 For more information see Kukathas (2003).
3 For further detail see Kymlicka (1995).
contribution to the well-being of individuals whose lives have the ultimate value. Michael Hartney (1995, p. 206) calls this view as value-individualism as opposed to value-collectivism. It does not mean that groups do not matter but, as Kukathas (1992) says, rather that there is no need to depart from the liberal language of individual rights to do justice to them. Thus, an attractive political theory must accommodate the claims of minorities, on the one hand, and the promotion of democratic citizenship, on the other.

Multiculturalism\(^4\) is considered as one of the policies which has been applied by many Western states to cope with the rising tide of plurality. Multiculturalism may contribute to stability in a pluralist society beset with problems arising out of plurality, though some people may object to it, specifically in Asian and Eastern European states, who may say that the provision of minority rights may pose a threat to the security and stability of the state. They may also argue, specifically in the case of formerly colonized states, that the existing minorities have received many benefits from the former colonizing masters and have collaborated with them, so equality requires that minorities should not be provided with minority rights\(^5\). Consequently, some of the states will not give greater autonomy, power or resources to minority groups perceived as a threat to national integrity and security and are thought as collaborators of foreign enemies, a phenomenon called as the “securitization” of ethnic relations (Waever, 1995). However, if minorities have legitimate grievances and those grievances are practically heard and accommodated, then such a policy may create in them a sense of belonging to the state and if taken prudently, may establish a harmonious and stable pluralist community.

Yet we have a fundamental problem with normative theories of multiculturalism which rely on an essentialist conceptualization of cultures which cannot be sustained and justified. Cultures are not homogeneous and fixed, specifically at national level. They have internal variations and external overlaps (Patten, 2011). However, this does not mean that there are no distinct cultures. The members of groups have a broad consensus on certain generalizations which makes the group distinct from others (Patten, 2011).

Pakistan is faced with the problems of plurality and, like other Eastern states, is a neglected country as far as research regarding plurality is concerned. No attempt has been so far made to study the attitudes of cultural groups towards cultural differences and the status of multiculturalism in Pakistan. The main concern of this paper is to evaluate the attitudes of cultural groups towards culture and the state’s management of plurality from liberal perspective in one of the provinces of Pakistan namely Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It evaluates the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP towards assimilationism, cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism and interactive pluralism. Though this distinction of the ways of managing plurality is based on Hartmann and Gerteis’s (2005) theoretical classification of managing differences, we submit it to an empirical test by evaluating the attitudes of the cultural groups in KP towards these models.

We have chosen KP because the degree of plurality here is higher than the other provinces of Pakistan. KP is home to more than 25 linguistic\(^6\) and five religious groups. The study takes the most prominent groups in KP into account and leaves out the groups which are minor and

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\(^4\) We take multiculturalism as a policy or approach of accepting and treating the fact of multiculturality.

\(^5\) See for example W. Kymlicka (2001b).

\(^6\) See for further detail Rahman (n.d.).
least prominent for future research. Furthermore, we are interested in the evaluation of their attitudes towards culture and the state’s management of plurality in KP. Again, the findings of this study should be taken as specifically related to KP and cannot be generalized to the whole of Pakistan.

Section two deals with the methodology adopted in the present study. Section three evaluates the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards culture and the strategies for managing plurality while section four concludes the papers by positing that the attitude of cultural groups in KP is negative towards assimilation, cosmopolitanism and fragmented pluralism but positive towards interactive pluralism.

Methodology

We took five linguistic and three religious minorities and the dominant Pakhtun group as the domain of our research. Linguistic groups are taken because in the subcontinent the linguistic affinity is the powerful mobilizing factor in the enunciation of demands for regional autonomy (Jalal 1995, pp. 223–4). For selecting linguistic minorities, we adopted three criteria as a test. The first criterion was the population of the linguistic minority groups and here we took 200,000 as a bench mark for selecting a group, leaving further smaller groups for future research. The second test was the geographical representation where we took groups from the South, middle, East, West and North of KP. The third test was the activism in airing their demands through media and group mobilization. These tests were qualified by five linguistic groups namely Seraiki in the South, Hindko in the middle and East, Kohistani and Gujar in the middle and West and Chitrali in the North of KP. For religious minorities three groups namely Christian, Hindu and Sikh were selected.

Two research tools namely questionnaire and interview were used. Questionnaire was first pilot-tested. For the determination of sample size from each group the following formula for simple random sample was applied.

\[ n = \frac{z^2p(1-p)}{e^2} \]

Where \( n \) = Simple random sample size. \( z \) = Confidence interval = 95 per cent whose value in \( z \) table is 1.96. \( p \) = probability of response = 0.50. \( e \) = margin of error = 5.5 per cent. \( q \) = 1 - \( p \)

Now \( n = 1.96^2*0.5(1-0.5)/0.055^2 = 317 \). Thus, the estimated sample size is 317.

For each of the minority group 450 questionnaires were distributed among the population for which the lower limit was kept as 317 while for the dominant Pakhtun group 550 questionnaires were distributed among them for which the lower limit was kept as 400.

For the collection of data we went to the region where the target group is in majority. We went to the universities, colleges and schools located in that area. In the university we selected departments and classes randomly and distributed questionnaires among the students there. We gave three questionnaires to each student- one for him/her and two for his/her parents. Similar was the case with the colleges. In schools we distributed the questionnaires among the staff members only. We gave two questionnaires to each staff member-one for him/her and one for his/her family member. Similarly, we distributed questionnaires to other
members of the group. During our stay in the group we took interviews from the common members and intellectuals of the group.

At the end of the field work which lasted from March 21, 2013 to August 18, 2013 taking 4 months and 29 days, 2977 questionnaires were collected after discarding the ambiguous and partially filled questionnaires out of which 1591 were filled by males and 1386 by females. The total number of interviews conducted with the members of all the targeted groups was 80.

Data Analysis

After the data was collected, we thoroughly checked all the questionnaires and discarded those which were ambiguously or half filled. In this way a total of 78 questionnaires were discarded. The remaining questionnaires, 2977, were entered in the SPSS statistical program and were analyzed by simple descriptive statistics. Interviews were analyzed through content analysis. The recorded and written material of the interviews was carefully analyzed and the important statements of the interviewees were coded. The findings obtained from the analysis of the data of the questionnaires were cross-checked with the finding of the interviews.

Attitudes of Cultural Groups in KP Towards Culture and the State’s Management of Plurality

This portion empirically explores the attitudes of various linguistic and religious groups in KP towards culture and the strategies for managing plurality in terms of assimilation, cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism and interactive pluralism through various related questions asked through questionnaire and interview.

Attitudes of Cultural Groups in KP towards Culture

A number of questions were asked in the questionnaire regarding the attitudes of the members of the groups towards culture. The first question was “Is culture important for a group?” As shown in Table 1, 97.92 per cent of all the respondents agreed that culture has importance for a group.

The second question regarding culture was whether culture should be preserved. As Table 1 shows, a high percentage of 98.35 per cent of the total respondents was of the opinion that culture should be preserved. Religious minorities were highly supportive of the preservation of culture (99.43 per cent).

The third question regarding culture was “Why culture is important for a group?” For Kymlicka (1995, p. 83) culture is important because it provides us with the set of options from which we make meaningful choices. Similarly, for Modood (2013, pp. 39–40) culture has importance for the people because it shows the identity that matters to people marked by difference. The present study judges the position of the people in KP in respect of the theories of Kymlicka and Modood. Kymlicka’s assumption is not supported while Modood’s is in KP.

7 Out of 97.92 per cent, 48.54 per cent strongly agree, 39.07 agree and 10.31 per cent near to agree. In the text of this paper we will use the word “agree” to mean the aggregate of “strongly agree”, “agree” and “near to agree” while the word “disagree” will mean the aggregate of “near to disagree” “disagree” and “strongly disagree”. In the tables the values of all the above terms have been given separately and it should be considered as such in the whole of this paper.
because a majority of 86.53 per cent (P₁ 89.05 per cent, P₂ 9.51 per cent, P₃ 1.32 per cent and
P₄ 0.12 per cent) of the total respondents said that culture is important not because it provides
us with the range of options from which we choose but because it shows the identity of the
members of a group (Table 2). Only 22.67 per cent of the total respondents believed that
culture provides a range of options from which we choose.

The same results also came from the interviews with the members of the targeted groups. For
example, Nusrat Tehsin, a Seraiki, said “Culture is important for a group. It has a role in our
life. It represents our traditions and us. It identifies us. It shows what and who we are”
(personal communication, March 29, 2013). Similarly, Gobind Ram, a Sikh, said “Culture is
important for a group because it shows its identity. For example, we are Sikhs. We wear
turbans and have long beards. These show that we are Sikhs and are treated accordingly”
(personal communication, July 15, 2013).

Attitudes of Cultural Groups in KP towards Assimilation

Assimilationist vision of dealing with plurality has its classical expression in the work of
Robert Park (1939) and Milton Gordon (1964). This vision emphasizes on the existence of
substantive moral bond as the basis of moral cohesion. It gives more emphasis on mutual
responsibilities and cultural homogeneity. The mediating role of the internal groups is
strongly denied. The individual is pressurized to lose the features of his/her former group
identity and adopt the new society’s core values. This vision deals with differences by
removing them (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005). Alexander (2001) is of the opinion that under
assimilationist vision private differences may be tolerated as long as these are not pushed into
the public sphere.

The present study shows that cultural groups in KP had a negative attitude towards any sort
of assimilationist tendencies on the part of the state or dominant group. This was
demonstrated by the attitudes of the members of the targeted groups towards various
questions in the questionnaire which show liberal and non-assimilationist tendencies in KP.

The first statement incorporated in the questionnaire was “Groups in KP should be blended in
dominant Pakhtun culture”. This means whether various groups in KP wish to blend in the
dominant Pakhtun culture or try to maintain their particularities. As shown in Table 3, a
majority of 56.3 per cent of the total respondents said that groups in KP should not blend in
dominant Pakhtun culture. A very strong negative attitude towards the statement came from
the Gujars (71.14 per cent) followed by Sikhs (70.53 per cent). This shows that various
groups in KP wanted to keep their particularities and did not want to be blended into common
Pakhtun culture.

The same attitude was also expressed by the interviewees of the targeted groups. For
example, Mian Zarin, a Gujar, said “Every group should maintain its own culture and
traditions and should not be blended into one culture. This blending of various cultures into
one will destroy our identity-the basis of who we are” (personal communication, May 13,
2013). Imran Khan Jadoon, a Hindko speaker, said “Every culture has a beauty and identity
inherent in it. If you destroy the culture, you destroy the identity of its members” (personal
communication, April 12, 2013). All of the Pakhtuns who were interviewed gave their
opinion that groups in KP should not be blended into Pakhtun culture. For example,

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8 P shows priority. P₁ means first priority, P₂ means second priority, P₃ means third priority and so on.
Muhammad Iqbal, a Pakhtun, said “Unity through diversity is the mechanism which brings comparatively better harmony. Assimilation as a mechanism of treating diversity has brought failure and should be avoided” (personal communication, August 14, 2013).

The second statement incorporated in the questionnaire regarding attitudes towards assimilationism was “Different groups in KP should not mix together”. The purpose of this statement was to show whether groups in KP should mix together by non-forcible ways which will result in slowly losing their own identities and forming a new one not necessarily Pakhtun culture like the mathematical expression of A+B+C+D=Z. The cultural groups in KP showed a negative attitude even towards this soft way of losing one’s culture. A high percentage of respondents (68.27 per cent) said that different groups in KP should not mix together (Table 3). These groups should not be assimilated into one group to lose their particularities through mixing. A marriage effect was also found. 70.45 per cent of the married respondents as against 65.17 per cent of the single respondents did not favor the mixing of various groups in KP.

The above opinion was also demonstrated by the interviewees of the groups. For example, Ganga Vishan, a Sikh, argued “We have interactions with each other and that is beneficial for us. By interacting with each other most of our misconceptions about each other’s ways and cultures are removed. However, we must retain our own particularities and should not mix in a way to lose what we are identified with [our culture]” (personal communication, July 14, 2013). Similarly, Sayed Musarrat Shah, a Hindko speaker, said: “Interaction of the members of various groups with each other is important for the smooth running of a multicultural society. But they should not mix so as to form a new culture while losing their own” (personal communication, April 7, 2013).

The third area where responses of the groups towards assimilationist tendencies were elucidated was the attempt for Pakhtunization on the part of dominant Pakhtun group. The findings given in Table 3 show that 63.69 per cent of the total respondents said that there has been no attempt for Pakhtunization in KP. This attitude was also represented by the interviewees during our interviews with them. For example, Ganga Vishan, a Sikh, said “We have never been compelled to adopt Pashto language, Pakhtun culture or to embrace Islam. We are not aware of any such attempt. Every group lives according to its own religion and culture” (personal communication, July 14, 2013). Alam Din, a Kohistani, said “Certainly, no attempt for Pakhtunization has been done in KP” (personal communication, May 19, 2013). During the field survey we found that a large number of Kohistanis have adopted Pashto language and have voluntarily integrated into Pakhtun culture. However, this adoption of Pakhtun culture is voluntary and not a forced one. For example, while interviewing Muhammad Salam of Kohistani group, he said “We have adopted Pashto for pragmatic reasons. We have marriages with Pakhtuns which compel us to learn Pashto. In this way we forgot our language [Kohistani] and have become Pakhtuns culturally” (personal communication, May 25, 2013). All of the Pakhtuns when interviewed said that no attempt for Pakhtunization has been done in KP. For example, Muhammad Iqbal, a Pakhtun, said “All the provinces of Pakistan are multicultural. The need for imposing one’s culture and language on others arises when the dominant group feels some threats from the minorities. As there is no such situation in KP, we have never seen any attempt in that direction” (personal communication, August 14, 2013).

However, Hindko speakers and Seraikis were less inclined to accept the statement that attempt for Pakhtunization has not been made in KP. Only 45.53 per cent of the Seraikis and
39.57 per cent of the Hindko speakers were of the opinion that there has been no attempt of Pakhtunization in KP. Interviews with some of the members of Hindko and Seraiki group also depicted the same thoughts. For example, Baba Haider Zaman, leader of the Movement for Hazara Province and a Hindko speaker, said “From the very beginning Pakhtuns have made attempts to impose their culture and language on us but we have resisted” (personal communication, April 14, 2013). Similarly, Zafar Durani, leader of the Seraiki National Party and a Seraiki, said “The renaming of this Province from North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to KP was nothing less than a forced attempt to evade our identity. It was an attempt to impose Pakhtun identity on us” (personal communication, March 25, 2013). As far as gender differences are concerned, males disagreed more (66.75 per cent) than females did (60.17 per cent). Similarly, a significant difference was found in the opinions of married and single respondents with more of the married respondents (68.73 per cent) than single respondents (56.25 per cent) disagreed that there have been attempts for Pakhtunization in KP.

The fourth area where the responses towards assimilationist tendencies were investigated was the attempt for Muslimization. In this regard the results of the survey show that compared to Pakhtunization, a fewer number of respondents (53.85 per cent) agreed that Muslimization has not taken place in KP (Table 3). The highest percentage (71.73 per cent) came from the Sikhs who were followed by Hindko speakers (60.12 per cent). The results regarding Pakhtunization and Muslimization also show the actual multicultural practices and policies of KP state and society regarding Pakhtunization and Muslimization.

These results were supported by the interviews conducted with the members of the groups. For example, Ameet Kore, a Sikh, said “There has been no attempt for Muslimization in KP. The Muslims have their own way to preach Islam but that is not a forced Muslimization. Everyone is free to follow his/her religion” (personal communication, July 25, 2013). However, Hindus (61.26 per cent) and Christians (58.62 per cent) were of the opinion that there have been attempts for Muslimization in KP. However, majority of the Hindus and Christians who were of the opinion that there have been attempts for Muslimization fall into “Near to Agree” category (Hindus 47.30 per cent and Christians 43.89 per cent). Again, the members of these groups (Christians and Hindus) when interviewed gave the opposite opinion and said that there has been no attempt for Muslimization in KP. For example, Haroon Sarab Diyal, a Hindu, said “Culture and religion can never be imposed. Muslimization has not been attempted forcibly. I do not see any attempt for Muslimization in KP” (personal communication, June 27, 2013). Similarly, William Ghulam, a Christian, said “There has been never an attempt for forced Muslimization in KP” (personal communication, June 9, 2013). The responses given by the interviewees are contrary to the results of the questionnaires collected from the Christians and Hindus. This may be due to the fact that the question set in the questionnaire simply said “There has been an attempt of Muslimization in KP”. It did not mention forced Muslimization. So, the respondents thought of all the attempts, forced and non-forced, for Muslimization. However, in the interviews it was made clear to the interviewees to reply whether there has been any forced attempt for Muslimization in KP.

The fifth area where the attitudes in respect of assimilationist tendencies were judged was about newcomers. Should newcomers who come to live in their group adopt their values and language? As shown in Table 3, a majority of 60.87 per cent of the total respondents said that newcomers should not be compelled to adopt the values and language of their group. According to them it is up to the newcomers to adopt the values and language of the receiving group or not. Sikh community presented the highest support for this liberal view (84.82 per cent). Even 61.43 per cent of Pakhtuns responded that non-members should not be
compelled to adopt their language and culture. A significant difference of opinion was found between married (64.20 per cent) and single (56.42 per cent) respondents on this issue.

The same response also came from an overwhelming majority of the interviewees. For example, Hazrat Salam, a Kohistani, said “No. Those who want to come and live in our group are perfectly at liberty to adopt or not to adopt our values and language” (personal communication, May 18, 2013).

**Attitudes of Cultural Groups in KP towards Cosmopolitanism**

Cosmopolitanism recognizes diversity, but is skeptical about the restrictions that group membership places on individuals and defends plurality only if it allows individual rights and freedoms but is silent about groups and group rights (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005). This vision does not believe in cultural specificity and mutual obligation, but in tolerance and individual choices. For Hartmann and Gerteis (2005) it is largely individualized and voluntaristic vision while for Alexander (2001) it is “ethnic hyphenation” where group qualities are neutralized rather than negated.

The cultural groups in KP had a negative attitude towards cosmopolitanism. Though the majority of the respondents (81.73 per cent), as shown in Table 5, said that groups should not be given the right of internal restrictions which violate human rights, groups and cultures in KP are valued with a strong attachment to them. This can be construed from the time they allocate to work for their group or to know more about their group, its history and culture. In order to construe response to group attachment, a statement “I spend much time trying to learn more about the culture and history of my group” was incorporated in the questionnaire. As Table 4 shows, 62.14 per cent of the respondents said that they spend much time to learn about the culture and history of their group. This shows that groups are kept dearer by the people in KP. The highest response to the statement came from Chitrals (74.31 per cent) followed by Christians (74.21 per cent) and Pakhtuns (69.04 per cent). Significant difference was found between the opinion of males (66.56 per cent) and female (57.07 per cent) respondents. Similarly, a higher percentage of single (70.33 per cent) than married (56.45 per cent) respondents were found giving much time to study the culture and history of their group.

The above results were also depicted by the interviews’ findings. For example, Jalaludin, a Chitrali, said “Yes. I give time to study my history, language and culture. This is not fixed. Whenever I get time in excess to my other important engagements, I do study my culture to know who we are” (personal communication, April 21, 2013). Margaret, a Christian, said “I devote time to study my religion. I have thoroughly studied Bible. I study Christianity and its literature regularly” (personal communication, June 14, 2013).

A second justification for the cultural groups in KP having a negative attitude towards cosmopolitanism is that, as shown in Table 1, 97.94 per cent of the respondents said that culture has importance for a group. The preservation of culture was also highly emphasized by the respondents (98.35 per cent) (Table1).

A third justification that people in KP have a negative attitude towards cosmopolitanism is that majority of the respondents (86.33 per cent) supported the provision of group rights to the minorities (Table 4). These group rights, what Kymlicka calls as “external protections”, are the rights given to a group to protect it from the adverse policies of the larger society.
This empirical finding is in accord with the theoretical framework of Kymlicka (1995, pp. 37–8) and Taylor (1994, p. 40).

The above results were also supported by the responses given in the interviews. Nearly all of the interviewees supported the view that minority should be protected by the provision of minority rights. For example, Nargis Zaman, a Pakhtun, said “Rights should be given to minorities so that they could freely follow their culture. If you are not giving them some basic rights, that will be injustice because they cannot adopt your culture and religion and you cannot impose your culture and religion on them. However, they should not be given, and never be given, so much internal autonomy to violate fundamental human rights” (personal communication, August 17, 2013).

Attitudes of Cultural Groups in KP towards Fragmented Pluralism

Fragmented Pluralism provides for the existence of a variety of distinctive and self-contained mediating communities and is the closest to being the opposite of assimilation. Here group membership is essential rather than partial and voluntary. Pressure for conformity to group’s values rather than society’s center values is strong. Group decides who are included in or excluded from the group. The state is largely concerned with managing the incompatible rights-claims of groups without imposing any substantive moral claims of its own (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005).

The present study shows that majority of the respondents presented a negative attitude towards fragmented pluralism because the groups are not considered as sacred in KP. The attitudes of the cultural groups, as shown in Table 4, are much positive towards the provision of group rights but as shown in Table 5, they were not supported to have the right of internal restrictions violating human rights.

According to Kymlicka (1989, pp. 240–141; 1995, p. 152; 2001b, pp. 27–28) minorities have two types of demands, i.e. those against their own members which could be used to restrict their liberty (internal restrictions); and those against the larger society to protect itself against the impacts of the decisions of the larger society (external protections). For Kymlicka, the former demands are not while most of the latter are consistent with the liberal principles for the promotion of fairness among the groups. The former restrict the autonomy of the members of minorities while the latter protect it.

As shown in Table 5, a clear majority of 81.73 per cent of the total respondents were against the demand for internal restrictions for a group, if those restrictions intend to violate human rights. This empirical finding is in accord with Kymlicka’s assertion that the right to impose internal restrictions, if violate human rights, should not be accorded to groups (Kymlicka 1995, p. 152). Significant marriage effect was found with a higher percentage of married (84.05 per cent) than single (78.33 per cent) respondents saying that groups should not be given the rights to violate human rights.

This conclusion was also supported by the interviewees. For example, Preet Kore, a Sikh, said “Human rights are sacred. They should not be violated at any cost. The group’s autonomy should not be taken as a plea to violate human rights” (personal communication, July 28, 2013). Similarly, Abdul Hameed, a Kohistani, said “Group should be given minority rights so that it can develop its culture but not at the cost of human rights” (personal communication, May 20, 2013).
A second justification for the fact that the cultural groups in KP did not support fragmented pluralism is their attitude towards new comers. As shown in Table 3, a majority of 60.87 per cent of the total respondents said that the newcomers should not be compelled to adopt the values and language of their group. According to the respondents it is up to the newcomers to adopt the traditions and values of their group or not. This is a liberal and non-assimilationist thinking.

**Attitudes of Cultural Groups in KP towards Interactive Pluralism**

Interactive pluralism recognizes the existence of distinct groups and cultures but tries to cultivate common understanding across these differences through their interactions. The main purpose is the cultivation of cross-cultural dialogue and exchange with an emphasis on mutual recognition and respect of differences. Both fragmented pluralism and interactive pluralism stress the role of groups, but the later stresses groups in interaction with each other and group differences are celebrated and identity claims are regarded as legitimate for entry into public life. The substantive moral order in interactive pluralism is understood to be emergent and is produced in a more or less democratic manner through the interaction of groups (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005).

The present study shows that cultural groups in KP supported interactive pluralism. The empirical results, given in Table 6, show that 93.05 per cent of the total respondents declared that different groups in KP should live together and have various interactions with one another. The highest response to the statement came from the religious minorities. The Sikhs were at the top (99.11 per cent) followed by the Christians (95.28 per cent).

The above results were supported by the interviewees of the targeted groups. For example, Ravi Kumar, a Hindu, said “Interaction is very beneficial. It helps in reducing the tension which might be created out of plurality. We learn from each other and acquire the good habits of each other. For example, here we have good relations with Muslims. We meet them on Eids while they come to us on Devalis” (personal communication, July 13, 2013). Similarly, late Israrullah Gandapur, a Pakhtun and Ex-Law Minister of KP, said “Problems will snowball if the groups live in isolation. Understanding the culture of other groups and interaction among them will help in reducing the tension arising out of plurality” (personal communication, March 28, 2013).

Similarly, a more positive attitude of the members of a group towards the statement “I like meeting and making friendship with members of other groups” shows that they do not consider their group to be exclusionist. They like to maintain their diversity but at the same time like to have interactions with the members of other groups. The present study shows that a great majority of the respondents (93.92 per cent) liked meeting and making friendship with members of other groups (Table 6). The interviews results also show the same trend. For example, Nauman Yousaf, a Christian, said “I feel joy while interacting with the members of other groups. I learn something new from them about their culture. This interaction clears many of my misunderstandings about their religion and culture” (personal communication, June 4, 2013).
Conclusion

This paper evaluated the attitudes of the religio-linguistic groups in KP towards culture and the policies and practices adopted by the KP state and society for managing diversity and tried to add to the existing literature. Currently this is the only known study of this nature conducted in Pakistan. Though this study cannot be generalized to the whole of Pakistan or to other places, at least it gave a picture of the attitudinal status of the cultural groups towards the cultural differences in one part (KP) of Pakistan. Study of the similar nature in other parts of Pakistan will contribute to further expand the frontiers of knowledge in the field and will enable us to give generalized assumptions not only about Pakistan but also about the states having the same nature of plurality as exists in Pakistan.

The study looked into the attitudes of cultural groups in KP towards assimilation, cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism and interactive pluralism. The paper showed that majority of the respondents in KP had a negative attitude towards assimilationism. The views of the respondents supported that the groups in KP should maintain their particularities and should not be blended into Pakhtun culture. Even the soft way of losing one's culture and forming a new identity not necessarily Pakhtun culture but a mixture of all the cultures living in KP, was not supported by the members of various groups. The study also showed that the actual practices of the state and society of KP are not assimilative because majority of the respondents were of the opinion that there has been no attempt for Pakhtunization (63.69 per cent) and Muslimization (53.85 per cent) in KP.

The paper showed that cultural groups had a negative attitude towards cosmopolitanism because groups and cultures in KP are valued, for example, 97.94 per cent of the respondents said that culture has importance for a group. The preservation of culture was also highly emphasized by the respondents (98.35 per cent). Similarly, majority of the respondents (86.33 per cent) supported the provision of group rights to the minorities.

Fragmented pluralism was also not supported by the cultural groups in KP because here the groups are not considered as sacred. The groups did not support the right of internal restrictions for groups which violate human rights. Again, a majority of the respondents said that newcomers should not be compelled to adopt the values and language of their group.

The paper showed that the attitudinal position of KP society is nearer to interactive pluralism. The results showed that in KP 93.05 per cent of the total respondents declared that different groups should live together and have various interactions with one another. Similarly, a great majority of the respondents (93.92 per cent) liked meeting and making friendship with members of other groups.

This study is a launching pad for further research projects. Future research of the same kind may take the smaller than 200,000 linguistic groups in KP to evaluate their attitudes towards intercultural relations. Again, studies of the same nature may be conducted in other provinces of Pakistan to show their attitudinal status in respect of intercultural relations. This will eventually give the overall status of Pakistan which may, with certain limitations, be generalized to a similar case.

Though changes have occurred in the political administration of KP since 2013, it is reasonable to expect that its society still exhibits the same, and because of the advances in education and globalization even increased, trends in accommodation, toleration and liberal
values. KP society is conservative and change, if any, in the attitudes of the people occurs slowly and is usually positive.
References


**Corresponding Author**: Jamal Shah

**Email**: jamalkhattana@gmail.com

### Tables:

**Table 1: Attitudes of Cultural Groups towards Culture and Cultural Preservation**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement/Choices</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<th>Near to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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<td>Groups in KP should blend in dominant Pakhtun culture</td>
<td>174</td>
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<td>431</td>
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<td>288</td>
<td>818</td>
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</tr>
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**Table 2: Why Culture is Important for a Group**

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<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provides range of</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>1</td>
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### Legacy of our forefathers

<table>
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<tr>
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| Don’t know    | 83.33%         | 0%    | 0%            | 0%        | 16.67%           | 0%       | 0.2%              |

### Don’t know

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### Table 3: Attitude of Cultural Groups in KP towards Assimilationism

<table>
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<tbody>
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<td>Groups in KP should blend in dominant Pakhtun culture</td>
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<td>431</td>
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<td>Different groups in KP should not mix together</td>
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<td>11.76%</td>
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<tr>
<td>There has been attempt for Pakhtunization in KP</td>
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<td>10.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The adoption of our culture by those who come to live in our group</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>5.61%</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>13.64%</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>13.91%</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>5.98%</td>
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### Table 4: Attitude of Cultural Groups in KP towards Cosmopolitanism

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<td>I spend much time to learn about the culture and history of my group</td>
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<td>12.23%</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>22.61%</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>27.31%</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>5.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1144</td>
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<td>37.32%</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>10.58%</td>
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### Table 5: Attitude of Cultural Groups in KP towards Fragmented Pluralism

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<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural groups should be left alone in their internal affairs without external interference by the state even if they violate some of the human rights</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>1242</td>
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<td>4.97%</td>
<td>5.14%</td>
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### Table 6: Attitude of Cultural Groups in KP towards Interactive Pluralism

<table>
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<td>1205</td>
<td>375</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<td>12.60%</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
<td>1.18%</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like meeting and making friendship with members of other groups</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>1280</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td>31.34%</td>
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<td>2.22%</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
<td>2.28%</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
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Me, My "Selfie" and I: A Survey of Self-disclosure Motivations on Social Media

Patricia Williamson
Trey Stohlman
Heather Polinsky
Central Michigan University

Abstract

Personal photo-sharing has become a popular activity across social media platforms as a self-disclosure activity. A survey of 366 (N=366) individuals via a web-based questionnaire measured correlations between photo-sharing on social networking sites (SNS) and fulfillment of self-disclosure goals. Data analysis indicated respondents posted selfies to social media to meet the information storage and entertainment self-disclosure goals. Facebook users also posted selfies to aide in relational development, whereas relational development was negatively correlated with the frequency of selfie-posting on Twitter. Neither gender nor age were found to have any impact on the number of selfies posted to social media, overall. However, Snapchat was a more popular SNS for selfie-posting among younger respondents, while Facebook was the most popular medium for posting selfies amongst the older respondents.

Keywords: self-disclosure, selfies, social media
Introduction

Because of the growing popularity of social network sites (SNS) amongst people of a wide-range of ages, it is important to look more closely at the motivations behind posting selfies. Some have suggested those who post a large number of selfies online are narcissistic (Sorokowski et al., 2015; Kapidzic, 2013; McKinney et al., 2012; Muise, Christofides, & Desmarais, 2009), while others warn of the loss of privacy related to self-disclosure (Altman, 1975). This investigation employs a web-based survey to determine the role of self-disclosure on individuals’ decisions to post selfies on social media sites.

Facebook continues as the most popular SNS in the United States, other services are popular worldwide. Twitter reports 320 million active monthly users, with 79 percent of its accounts outside of the United States (O’Reilly, 2015). Instagram, meanwhile, celebrated 400 million users as of September 2015 with more than 75 percent of users living outside of the United States (Isaac, 2016). Similarly, LinkedIn reported 396 million users by the third quarter of 2015. Snapchat is the youngest of the SNS included in this study, with approximately one-million daily active users as of late 2015 (O’Reilly, 2015). Despite having only one-tenth the daily user base as Facebook, the service reported in September 2015 that it has more than four billion daily video views (Carr, 2015). SNS usage has become commonplace in recent years, with recent reports estimating more than 950 million people worldwide use a variety of platforms (Syn, 2014). More than 70% of American teenagers under the age of 17 reported visiting SNS, and that number is expected to rise to nearly 2.3 billion users by 2017 (Klier, Klier & Wigand, 2014). Facebook started as a Harvard-only network created by Mark Zuckerberg in 2004 that quickly achieved a high level of recognition, and today boasts 1.591 billion active users, as of the fourth quarter of 2015 (Cohen, 2016). Internet users in the United States spend an average of 6.8 hours every week using Facebook (Klier, Klier & Wigand, 2014).

While there has been a handful of quantitative studies conducted analyzing the posting of selfies on social media, most of the previous research has focused on finding correlations between personality types and social media usage (Omarzu, 2000; Treem & Leonardi, 2012). The bulk of the rest of the existing research has employed uses and gratifications as the theoretical basis to investigate photo-sharing (Malik & Nieminen, 2015; Alhabash, Chiang, & Huang, 2014). Very little research has centered on the selfie as a form of self-disclosure (Bazarova & Choi, 2014).

This study investigates the phenomenon of posting “selfies” to social media as a form of self-disclosure. Self-disclosure is, simply stated, the act of revealing personal information to others (Jourard, 1971). Selfies are self-portraits taken with a digital camera or cell phone at arm’s length (Qiu et al., 2015; Sorokowski, 2015). The term “selfie” was first used on an Australian internet forum in 2002, but has since become a commonly used term and practice in the past several years (Radulova, 2015). Selfies are generally posted on some form of social networking site (SNS) and seen by friends, followers, and sometimes, the general public. Specifically, this study determines which self-disclosure goals are fulfilled by posting selfies on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn and Snapchat.
Literature Review
“Selfies”

While it is believed the first “selfies” were taken in 1840, both by an American amateur photographer named Robert Cornelius, and in England by British inventor Charles Wheatstone (Wade, 2014), the word itself is a contemporary term. According to the Oxford Dictionary, the word was first used in 2002 on an Australian internet forum (“The Oxford Dictionaries word of the year,” n.d.). Generally speaking, a selfie can be defined as a self-portrait taken by oneself using a digital camera or smartphone (Qiu et al., 2015). Sorokowski et al. (2015) defined selfie similarly, but added that the camera or camera phone must be held at arm’s length or pointed at a mirror, and is usually shared via social media. The development of the “selfie stick” literally extends the parameters of this type of self-photography method (Shipley, 2015). Regardless of how the word is defined, the term has become part of the English vernacular. “Selfie” was Oxford Dictionary’s “Word of the Year” for 2013 (Oxford Dictionaries word of the year 2013), and the word’s usage increased in frequency by 17,000-percent between the years 2012 and 2013 (Sorokowski et al., 2015).

There has been limited research on the posting of selfies on various forms of social media, with the majority of those previous studies focusing on how the Five Factor Model can be used to relate social media activity to personality type (Sorokowski et al., 2015; Ross et al., 2009; Qiu et al., 2015; Gosling et al., 2011; Amichai-Hamburger & Vinitzky, 2010; Lee & Kim, 2014). The Five Factor Model (FFM) refers to the five broad personality dimensions used by social scientists to describe human personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, openness to experience and conscientiousness comprise the FFM (Costa & McCrae, 1992).

Lee and Kim (2014) looked at the relationship between personality traits and self-presentation on Facebook. They found that extraversion was positively related to self-presentation on both the user’s Facebook wall and their news feed. Extroverts more frequently uploaded photos and updated their statuses, and had more friends than introverts (Lee & Kim, 2014). Amichai-Hamburger and Vinitzky (2010) found a strong connection between Facebook users’ personalities and their Facebook behaviors.

Ross et al. (2009) examined the personality and competency factors that influence the use of Facebook as a social medium. They found that the more experience a Facebook user had with the site, the less frequently they visited Facebook and the more Facebook friends they had (Ross et al., 2009). Additionally, the more experienced Facebook users were, the more likely they were to post photos. However, those users also had fewer overall postings on their wall. Extraversion, conscientiousness, emotional stability nor agreeableness were found to be significantly related to the number of Facebook photos posted on their profile (Ross et al., 2009). However, gender was found to be significantly related to Facebook usage and content. Women reported spending more time on Facebook, they had a greater number of friends, and posted more photos and more status updates about themselves than did their male counterparts (Ross et al., 2009).

Sorokowski et al. (2015) investigated selfie posting on social networking sites in Poland. Like Ross et al. (2009), their study found women posted more selfies of all types than did men. However, Sorokowski et al. (2015) also looked at narcissism as a variable. Though women posted more selfies, there was no relationship found between that behavior and narcissism. Men’s narcissism scores, however, positively predicted selfie posting. That
included selfies of themselves alone, with a partner, or a group selfie (Sorokowski et al., 2015). Men’s vanity, leadership, and admiration demand scores, each independently predicted the posting of one or more types of selfies. Self-presentation was found to be a key motivator of social networking in general for both sexes (Sorokowski et al., 2015).

Narcissism was found to be a predictor of social media use in a number of studies (Kapidzic, 2013; McKinney et al., 2012; Muise, Christofides, & Desmarais, 2009). Kapidzic (2013) found narcissism to be a predictor of profile picture selection, while Ong et al. (2011) concluded that narcissists find their own personal profile pictures and selfies to be more attractive when compared to the opinions of their peers. Wang, Jackson, Zhang, & Su (2012) discovered narcissists were more likely to upload the photos they found most attractive to social media, compared to less narcissistic users. Ryan and Xenos (2011) failed to find any connection between narcissism and selfie-posting on Facebook.

Qiu et al. (2015) looked at personality traits of social network site users. They found no significant difference between selfie posters’ personality traits and those of non-selfie posters after controlling for age and gender (Qiu et al., 2015). Selfie-posters’ extraversion was accurately predicted by observers, based on exposure to users’ pictures, but no significant correlation was found between users’ self-reported levels of openness and observers’ ratings. However, Qiu et al. (2015) did uncover a number of interesting findings related to selfie cue validity. Agreeableness was associated with emotional positivity and negatively associated with camera height, suggesting that more agreeable individuals were more likely to take pictures from a lower angle. Conscientiousness was negatively correlated to selfies taken in private locations, as those users were seen as being more cautious and concerned with privacy Neuroticism was related to “duckface” in selfies, while extraversion was negatively related to pressed lips. Those who looked directly into the camera, feigning eye contact in their profile photos were seen to be more agreeable (Qiu et al., 2015).

Diefenbach & Christoforakos (2017) looked at the “selfie paradox,” which relates to individuals’ positive reactions to their own selfies and negative reactions to others’ selfies. Their 2017 survey of individuals in Germany, Austria and Switzerland found that people self-reported self-promotion and self-disclosure as their reasons for taking selfies. Overall, respondents regarded their own selfies in a positive light, yet were more critical of others’ (Diefenbach & Christoforakos, 2017). Furthermore, individuals were more likely to see their own selfies as ironic, while they were less likely to attribute self-irony to others’ selfies. Instead, the study found other’s selfie-taking behaviors as almost exclusively self-presentational (Diefenbach & Christoforakos, 2017).

**Self-Disclosure**

Jourard (1971) defined self-disclosure as the “act of revealing personal information to others” (p. 2). It makes us transparent to others through our communication (Jourard, 1971). Meanwhile, Altman and Taylor (1987) called self-disclosure a form of social penetration. They argued that the act of self-disclosure is a gradual process that allows us to learn about others, and therefore, penetrate deeper layers of personal depth (Altman & Tayor, 1987). Others believe self-disclosure is a dialectical process that occurs in waves, pinging back and forth from a sense of distance to closeness (Brown, Werner & Altman, 1996). This is due to the inner struggle we experience as we want to reveal ourselves to others, yet simultaneously work to conceal that information. Pearce & Sharp (1973) separated self-disclosure from confession and/or revelation. They argued self-disclosure is a voluntary process, while
confession is forced or coerced communication, and revelation is unintentional or inadvertent by nature (Pearce & Sharp, 1973).

Disclosure may fulfill needs for social connectedness and belonging (Tamir & Mitchell, 2012), but may come at a price, requiring the individual sharing their personal information to become vulnerable (Altman, 1975). Selective disclosure may minimize that level of vulnerability, while allowing the discloser to satisfy their desired goals.

Derlega and Grzelak (1979) proposed the functional theory of self-disclosure, positing that disclosure goals activate the self-disclosure decision-making process and help determine the content of the disclosure. Further, Derlega and Grzelak (1979) proposed that self-expression, self-clarification, social validation, relationship development, and social control were the five basic functions of self-disclosure.

Bazarova and Choi (2014) conducted one of the first studies of self-disclosure via SNS, and that investigation is used as a blueprint for the current study. A survey of undergraduate students was conducted, as well as an analysis of students’ Facebook status updates, wall posts and private messages (Bazarova & Choi, 2014). The study employed Derlega and Grzelak’s (1979) five primary goal categories, plus added two new categories, information sharing and information storage and entertainment, based on Lee et al.’s (2008) categorization of disclosure motivations in blogs.

The present study utilized the same seven categories of self-disclosure goals as Bazarova and Choi (2014). Those goals included 1.) identity clarification, 2.) relational development, 3.) social validation, 4.) social control and resource gain, 5.) self-expression and relief of distress, 6.) information sharing to benefit others, and 7.) information storage and entertainment. These seven categories are based upon a functional theory of self-disclosure which hypothesizes that disclosure goals or subjective reasons for self-disclosure activate disclosure decision-making (Derlega & Grzelak, 1979). Individuals self-disclose hoping to attain social rewards.

Identity clarification is considered an intrapersonal goal and occurs when an individual seeks to convey one’s personal identity to others (Bazarova & Choi, 2014). Relational development has long been found to be one of the main motivators for self-disclosure (Altman & Taylor, 1973; Laurence & Barrett, 1998; Lee et al., 2008). This motivator revolves around developing and maintaining friendships, familial or dating relationships. Social validation is an attempt to seek approval and support from others (Bazarova & Choi, 2014). Social control and resource gain occurs when a person tries to somehow obtain a benefit through their self-disclosure, or to control social outcomes within their group of friends and family. Self-expression and relief of distress allows one to release emotions through a form of self-expression. In this case, a selfie would be that form of self-expression Information sharing to benefit others comes from a desire to share information with others that may be of a personal nature, or may emerge from a desire to let others in on something the communicator has discovered. Generally, information sharing is thought to be “benevolent” in nature (Lee et al., 2008). Information storage involves the disclosure of daily life experiences for the purpose of recording personal information so as to be able to access it or reflect on it at a later date (Lee et al, 2008).

Wan, Wu & Lu (2015) argued the selfie is a high form of self-disclosure. In their study of selfies used by product endorsers, they found that social interactivity can moderate the effect
of the endorsers’ attractiveness and credibility on consumers’ attitudes (Wan, Wu & Lu, 2015). Stefanone, Lackaff & Rosen (2011) found females are more likely to share photos of themselves online if they base their self-worth on their appearance. They also linked narcissism and low self-esteem to sharing a high number of pictures of oneself on-line (Stefanone, Lackaff & Rosen, 2011).

**Research Questions**

This study used survey research to investigate how selfie-posting behaviors serve as a form of self-disclosure on various social media platforms. Specifically, respondents were asked about their selfie-posting behaviors on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat and LinkedIn. While Wan et al. (2015) found selfies to be a significant form of self-disclosure, this study looked to determine how self-disclosure goals may vary by SNS when sharing personal photos.

Another variable that deserves attention in terms of selfie-posting behavior is frequency. While narcissism was found to correlate with selfie-sharing in other studies (Kapidzic, 2013; Wang, Jackson, Zhang, & Su, 2012), it would seem logical that those who post a higher number of selfies might fulfill different self-disclosure goals than those who post infrequently.

Finally, age and gender of SNS users posting selfies were analyzed to determine whether those variables impact self-disclosure goals met via the behavior. Our research questions are as follows:

RQ 1: Which self-disclosure goals are met by posting selfies to social media?
RQ 2: Do self-disclosure goals met by posting selfies vary by social media platform?
RQ 3: Do age and gender impact the self-disclosure goals met by posting selfies to social media?

**Method**

In order to measure the relationship between individuals’ selfie-posting behaviors and self-disclosure fulfillment, a web-based survey was put in the field after receiving IRB approval. Using Survey Monkey software, a 39-item questionnaire was developed. A five-point Likert-type scale was used to measure respondents’ reactions to multiple self-disclosure goals. The survey also measured individuals’ selfie-posting frequency on a variety of social media, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat and LinkedIn. Basic demographic information was collected from all participants in order to determine whether gender and/or age impacted self-disclosure motivations via selfie sharing, and whether those demographic variables impacted frequency of use of individual SNS.

Invitations to complete the survey were circulated on social media sites, including Facebook, Instagram and Twitter in March 2016. Social media users were asked to complete the survey and to share the link to the survey with their social media connections. Further invitations were sent to undergraduate and graduate students at a four-year University in the Midwest. The resulting snowball sample yielded 366 (N=366) responses.
Findings

A total of 366 participants contributed to the study. Most participants completed the question related to gender ($N=364$) with 73.9% of respondents identifying as female ($N=269$) and 26.1% identifying as male ($N=95$). Although the participants skewed female, this sample correlates to a similar study conducted by Bazarova and Choi (2014).

For age, 26% of respondents ($N=95$) reported their age as 23 or under. 25.7% of respondents ($N=94$) reported their age as between 24 and 34. 23% of respondents ($N=84$) reported their age as between 34 and 44. The remaining 25.4% ($N=93$) reported their age as between 45 and 78. These data provide support for a good representative cross sampling of the population.

Regarding ethnicity, all but one participant answered the question ($N=365$). Of the respondents, 89.3% ($N=326$) identified as Caucasian. The study lacked in minority representation with only 4.4% ($N=16$) identifying as African-American/Black, 2.2% ($N=8$) identifying as Native American, and 1.1% ($N=4$) each identifying as Hispanic/Latino, Middle-Eastern/Arab-American, and Asian/Asian-American. Additionally, less than 1% ($N=3$) identified as Other, citing a mix of races as their response.

Social media usage varied significantly among the apps surveyed, with Facebook scoring the highest usage at 98.1% ($N=359$) among responses (Table 1):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SNS Usage Platform</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instagram</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snapchat</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LinkedIn</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Social Media Platforms

RQ 1: Which self-disclosure goals are met by posting selfies to social media?

The self-disclosure goals provide very weak explanatory influence on why participants are posting selfies in a week or month, however the regression results were found to be statistically significant. When considering all the of the selfies participants posted across all social media platforms in the past week, the self-disclosure goals have a statistically significant combined effect ($Adj R^2 = .040$, $p< .01$), but only Information Storage & Entertainment ($\beta = .232$, $p< .05$), is a statistically significant individual self-disclosure goal (Table 2). When considering all the of the selfies participants posted across all social media platforms in the past month the self-disclosure goals have a statistically significant combined effect ($Adj R^2 = .038$, $p< .01$), and again only Information Storage & Entertainment ($\beta = .232$, $p< .05$), is a statistically significant individual self-disclosure goal (Table 3). Overall, the main self-disclosure goal that predicts why people are posting selfies on social media is to store information for future access and entertain others.

RQ 2: Do self-disclosure goals met by posting selfies vary by social media platform?
When looking at how many selfies participants have posted on specific social media platforms, different self-disclosure goals emerged as statistically significant predictors. The self-disclosure goals explained the most variance in how many selfies participants posted on Facebook in the past month (\(Adj R^2 = .132, p< .001\)), and the least variance in how many selfies participants posted on Twitter in the past week (\(Adj R^2 = .046, p< .01\)) (Table 2 and 3). This means that the combined effect of the self-disclosure goals in this sample was able to explain between just over thirteen to just under five percent of variance in number of selfies these participants in the sample are posting.

When examining which self-disclosure goals were most influential to posting selfies, the results were slightly different depending on the social media sites and the time frame being considered. Information Storage and Entertainment had a statistically significant positive influence on how many selfies participants posted on Facebook in the past month (\(\beta = .255, p< .01\)), but Information Storage and Entertainment had no statistical impact on how many selfies participants posted on Facebook in the past week. Information Storage and Entertainment had a statistically significant positive influence on how many selfies participants posted on Instagram in the past week (\(\beta = .221, p< .01\)); on Instagram in the past month (\(\beta = .221, p< .01\)); on Twitter in the past week (\(\beta = .214, p< .01\)); and on Twitter in the past month (\(\beta = .228, p< .01\)). Relational Development had a negative influence on posting selfies on Twitter in the past week (\(\beta = -.184, p< .01\)); and on Twitter in the past month (\(\beta = -.190, p< .01\)). As the relationship development was more important to the participants the less likely they were to post selfies on Twitter. Relationship Development did have a statistically significant positive influence on how many selfies participants posted on Facebook in the past month (\(\beta = -.139, p< .05\)); but had no influence on how many selfies participants posted on Facebook in the past week, nor did it have an influence on how many selfies were posted on Instagram in the past week nor month. Social Control and Resource Gain only had statistically significant positive influence on how many selfies participants posted on Instagram in the past month (\(\beta = -.125, p< .05\)). Information Sharing to Benefit Others only had a statistically significant positive influence on posting selfies on Facebook in the past week (\(\beta = .219, p< .01\)).

RQ 3: Do age and gender impact the self-disclosure goals met by posting selfies to social media?

Gender and age were added to the self-disclosure goal variables. Gender had no impact on how many selfies were posted overall or for any social media platform. Therefore, men are just as likely to post selfies as women according to the results from this sample. However, age had a statistically significant positive influence on posting selfies on Facebook in the past week (\(\beta = .134, p< .05\)); and on posting selfies on Facebook in the past month (\(\beta = .186, p< .01\)). Therefore, as age increased in the sample, participants were more likely to post selfies on Facebook. Conversely, age had a statistically significant negative influence on posting selfies on Snapchat in the past week (\(\beta = -.298, p< .001\)); and on posting selfies on Snapchat in the past month (\(\beta = -.276, p< .001\)). As the age in sample went down, participants were more likely to post selfies on Snapchat. These results indicate that older participants in the sample favored posting their selfies on Facebook while younger participants favored posing selfies on Snapchat. It is important to note that none of the self-disclosure goals had a statistically significant effect on posting selfies on Snapchat in this sample.

Most of the statistically significant results from the first regression held significance with the addition of age and gender to the models. However, the addition of age and gender
illuminated other self-disclosure effects on posting selfies. With addition of age and gender, Information Storage and Entertainment was a statistically significant predictor of posting selfies on Facebook in the past week ($\beta = .182, p < .05$). With the addition of age and gender, Identity Clarification was a statistically significant predictor of how many selfies participants posted on Twitter in the past week ($\beta = .167, p < .05$). However, with the addition of age and gender, Social Control and Resource Gain had no statistical influence on how many selfies participants posted on Instagram.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Clarification</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Instagram</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Snapchat</th>
<th>LinkedIn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relational Development</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>-.184b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Validation</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>-.020</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Control &amp; Resource Gain</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.074</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Expression &amp; Relief of Distress</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.081</td>
<td>-.140</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing to Benefit Others</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.219b</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Storage &amp; Entertainment</td>
<td>.232c</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>.221b</td>
<td>.214b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Adjusted R²**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Instagram</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Snapchat</th>
<th>LinkedIn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.040b</td>
<td>.105c</td>
<td>.059c</td>
<td>.046b</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Regression Tables for Posting Selfies in the Past Week

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Clarification</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Instagram</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Snapchat</th>
<th>LinkedIn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relational Development</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.139a</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>-.190b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Validation</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Control &amp; Resource Gain</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.125b</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Expression &amp; Relief of Distress</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>-.112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing to Benefit Others</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Storage &amp; Entertainment</td>
<td>.232a</td>
<td>.255b</td>
<td>.221b</td>
<td>.228b</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Adjusted R²**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Instagram</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Snapchat</th>
<th>LinkedIn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-.038b</td>
<td>.132c</td>
<td>.117c</td>
<td>.062c</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Regression Tables for Posting Selfies in the Past Month
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Clarification</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Instagram</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Snapchat</th>
<th>LinkedIn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.167&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational Development</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>-.187&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Validation</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>-.099</td>
<td>-.049</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Control and resource gain</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>-.073</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Expression and Relief of Distress</td>
<td>-.091</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>-.076</td>
<td>-.155</td>
<td>-.076</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing to Benefit Others</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.216&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Storage and Entertainment</td>
<td>.187&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.182&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.216&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.196&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.273&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.134&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-.068</td>
<td>-.298&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted R²</strong></td>
<td>.009&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.124&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.061&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.045&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.087&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>p < .05; <sup>b</sup>p < .01; <sup>c</sup>p < .001

Table 4: Regression Tables for Posting Selfies in the Past Week

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Clarification</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Instagram</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Snapchat</th>
<th>LinkedIn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational Development</td>
<td>-.051</td>
<td>.124&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>-.192&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.075</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Validation</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>-.013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Control and resource gain</td>
<td>-.036</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Expression and Relief of Distress</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.043</td>
<td>-.124</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing to Benefit Others</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Storage and Entertainment</td>
<td>.169&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.303&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.192&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.213&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.253&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.186&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.101</td>
<td>-.052</td>
<td>-.276&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female)</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted R²</strong></td>
<td>.089&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.165&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.123&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.059&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.074&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>p < .05; <sup>b</sup>p < .01; <sup>c</sup>p < .001

Table 5: Regression Tables for Posting Selfies in the Past Month
Discussion

Regarding the self-disclosure goals, results indicated participants posted selfies primarily to meet the information storage and entertainment self-disclosure function. Only three self-disclosure functions registered any statistical significance when posting selfies weekly. Participants posted selfies to Twitter weekly to meet identity clarification, relational development, and information storage and entertainment disclosure functions. Weekly posting to Instagram only registered statistical significance for the information storage and entertainment self-disclosure function. Posts to Facebook and Twitter met relational development and information storage and entertainment functions, and Instagram posting met only the information storage and entertainment function. Interestingly, LinkedIn registered no statistical significance for daily or weekly posting, but did register significance to meet the self-expression and relief of distress self-disclosure function for monthly posting.

Collected data indicated survey participants posted selfies to Twitter and to Instagram to fulfill the same self-disclosure functions. Posting for identity clarification, relational development, social validation, self-expression and relief of distress, information sharing to benefit others, and information storage and entertainment were all found to be statistically significant. For frequency of posting, Instagram presented as the most popular medium for daily posting, registering statistical significance when posting selfies for social control and resource gain, identity clarification, and relational development Facebook also registered significance for daily posting to meet the social control and resource gain self-disclosure function.

The importance of the relational development self-disclosure goal seems to somewhat contradict the findings of Bazarova & Choi (2014) that relational development was more prominent in Facebook wall posts and private messages, rather than in status updates. The selfies posted on Facebook by participants of our study were status updates, and were at least partially posted in an effort to further develop relationships with friends and family. However, relational development has been found as a main motivator for self-disclosure, generally speaking (Altman & Taylor, 1973; Lee et al., 2008).

Younger participants used Snapchat more frequently while older participants used Facebook more frequently. The results for age regarding weekly posting held true for monthly posting for Facebook and Snapchat. Snapchat emerged as the leader for daily posts with younger demographics; as the age of the participant decreased, the number of selfies to Snapchat increased. When looking at frequency of selfie-posting over the course of a week, age again emerged as a factor. Younger participants utilized Snapchat more frequently for posting selfies, and older participants posted more frequently to Facebook. Although the study found no statistical significance for social control and resource gain for any media platform, age was a related factor for LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook. Age was also a related factor when posting selfies for information storage and entertainment for all media except Instagram. Gender did not present as a factor. This conflicts with several earlier studies on selfie-posting on social media, including Ross, et al (2009) which found young women posted more selfies than men.

Conclusion

This study is a first step in determining how selfie-posting on various forms of social media platforms interacts with self-disclosure. Our collected data points toward entertainment and
information storage as the most popular self-disclosure goals for individuals posting selfies to social media, and that did not vary based on gender. Twitter users appear to post selfies for these reasons, but also identity clarification and relational development. Identity clarification may relate to the medium’s more public nature. Tweets are available to an unknowable number of Twitter users, unless the individual keeps their tweets private, whereas SNS platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and Snapchat tend to be targeted messages to “friends.” Therefore, it may be that Twitter users who post selfies do so to clarify their personality or other personal attributes to a public who does not know them on an interpersonal level.

Relational development was also found to be a significant form of self-disclosure for those posting selfies on both Twitter and Facebook, which may give us hints as to users’ reasons for choosing to share such photographic material on platforms. Future research should look more closely at the specific audiences for the selfies posted, and the audience for each posting. There may be correlation between the perceived or intended audience of the selfie and the self-disclosure goals. This research does not take that variable into account.

Instagram users were likely to post selfies to the platform for both entertainment and information storage purposes. Seeing as photos and videos are the only form of “post” that can be made on the medium, this finding gives us some insight into the general motivations for Instagram usage. These findings regarding selfie-posting on Instagram remained constant regardless of age.

As one might expect, younger SNS users posted selfies most often to Snapchat, while older users posted selfies most often to Facebook, reinforcing what is known about the demographics of the two SNS. Surprisingly, Snapchat users’ selfie-posting did not correlate with any of the commonly measured self-disclosure functions, which begs for further investigation. What motivates younger users to post selfies to this SNS platform? Seeing as it is the fastest growing platform amongst young users, it is important to determine how Snapchat differs from the other popular SNS platforms in terms of its perceived benefits and self-disclosure opportunities by its users.

The weaknesses of this survey involve the fact that survey research relies on self-reported data from users, rather than verifying the posted content via some form of content analysis. Also, female respondents outnumbered male respondents by a ratio of nearly three to one, which could impact the results. Future research should consider using a more detailed survey with additional questions that account for the number of friends or followers of each user, and include additional queries for each of the known self-disclosure goals. An open-ended question asking selfie-posters their reasons for posting selfies would also lead to more rich motivational data.

Future investigators may also want to include measures that would look into the so-called “selfie paradox,” to further determine why individuals seem to have more positive feelings about their own selfie-posting behaviors than others’. Additional study could help determine why individuals’ self-disclosure via selfies is interpreted less positively than posters expect. Our study focused solely on the posting of selfies and investigated the reasons for those posts. It did not look at the way those selfies were received by friends, family or other followers.
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The Analysis of Personal Supernaturalism Using World View Theory

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Abstract

This paper proposes using universal categories of world view theory as an analytical model to answer the question, what do people believe about personal supernaturalism? The model presented here examines how people conceptualize the supernatural in a scheme with six methodological questions corresponding to six primary themes associated with world view universal categories, including: 1) Self, the Issue of Life Force; 2) Other, the Issue of Earthly Other; 3) Relationship, the Issue of Life Experience; 4) Classification, the Issue of Spiritual/Moral Capacity; 5) Causality, the Issue of Causal Means; and 6) Time & Space, the Issue of Destiny. Notions concerning aspects of world view hold fundamental meaning for assumptions and beliefs concerning the supernatural and offer specific data by which comparison between diverse belief systems may be accomplished. It is hoped the methodological questions posed in this paper will aid research in religious studies and, in particular, personal supernaturalism.

Keywords: world view, supernaturalism, religion, categories, research methodology
Introduction

The very nature of comparative religion begs the question of just how much can be accurately assessed between differing religious traditions and practices from various socio-cultural and geographical contexts. Notions concerning a religious paradigm entail a complex network of inferences which add depth of meaning and a web of cognitive relationships. Theories about the very structure of cognition raise intriguing questions for the limits of comparative religion. Cognition is primarily an activity of categorization, thus investigating salient categories, category membership, and relations between members is a research task of comparative religious thought. This paper proposes using universal categories of world view theory as an analytical model to analyze personal supernaturalism.

The definition proposed for supernaturalism is the human assumption of an otherworldly reality that exists outside the observable universe and humanly appears to transcend the laws of nature. There are two primary categories of supernaturalism: 1) personal, and 2) impersonal. Personal religious systems center on living supernatural beings relating to earthly living beings. Incorporeal beings in personal supernaturalism exhibit a moral nature. Impersonal religious systems center around impersonal supernatural forces determining the nature of events. In impersonal supernaturalism, supernatural forces are amoral in nature (Hiebert, Shaw & Tienou, 1999).

Presented here is a world view theory as a guide to a world view analysis of personal supernaturalism. The question to be answered is, what do people believe about personal supernaturalism? The intent is to provide a researcher with a theoretical framework to explore personal supernaturalism as a particular religious phenomena in the human experience.

World View Theory

World view is recognized as a culturally specific cognition arranging thoughts and ideas about the world which in turn produce culturally specific behavior (Kearney, 1996). These cognitions are thought to be a kind of cultural blueprint for social function (Nsamenang, 1992). Levin describes world view as representing “a past that is culturally present as tradition” (1974, p. 227). World view is an unconscious structural mechanism which organizes and defines the nature of reality, the interpretive process or technique of reality, and the behavioral mechanism to cope with this perception of reality. World view is that which the person understands to be naturally so, and beliefs are based upon these mostly unconscious assumptions.

The fundamental organizational pattern of all world views is comprised of seven universal categories: Self, Other, Relationship, Classification, Causality, Time, and Space (Kearney, 1984). Each universal category exists as an arrangement of ideas and behavior specific to each culture as a means of making sense of the life experience. While the seven universal categories are firmly rooted in each culture, the content of these categories remains variable across cultures. It is these content variances which distinguish one world view from another.

The seven universal categories of world view theory are a fundamental tool in sorting out world view understanding. World view theory from its inception has been concerned with exploring universal categories simply because a universal structure can be used as a basis of cross cultural comparison (Redfield, 1952). Thus investigating the content of universals becomes a necessity for the methodological practice of comparative religion.
The model presented here examines how people conceptualize the supernatural in a scheme with six primary themes corresponding to world view universal categories, these are:

1. Self: Issue of Life Force
2. Other: Issue of Earthly Other
3. Relationship: Issue of Life Experience
4. Classification: Issue of Spiritual/Moral Capacity
5. Causality: Issue of Causal Means
6. Time and Space: Issue of Destiny

Each category has a primary research question which is delineated in greater detail by the subsequent outline of the section.

**Self: Issue of Life Force**

The Self is both a physical and spiritual entity (Witte, 1990); and as such, it is the composite nature of the person consisting of multiple physical and non-physical components allowing Self to function as a distinct human person (Coloques, 1993). Physical and non-physical components are considered intrinsic to Self and universal dimensions of self concept (Lock, 1981). The interaction of Self with Other is the core of world view, and Self is distinguished from Other in three dimensions: we/they, human/non-human, and nature/divinity (Kearney, 1975). Within the religious framework, we want to know what people believe about supernatural involvement with the life force of individual existence.

Immaterial elements of Self provide significant understanding about the nature of relationship between man and supernatural beings. The personal supernaturalistic world view is founded upon notions concerning psychical components of Self such as soul, spirit, and breath. The non-physical Self elements are often empowered by supernatural beings and offer insight into man’s reasoning on beginning, maintenance, and ultimate ending of life experience.

The research question of the Self category must answer: What is the nature of authority over life force by supernatural beings? Three areas of investigation address how and degrees to which supernatural beings influence the issue of life force (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Self: Issue of Life Force</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of authority over life force by supernatural beings?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give life giving energy to man?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustain life giving energy in man?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminate life giving energy of man?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: World View Methodological Questions for Self Category.

First is the question of whether any supernatural being supplies life giving energy to man. If so, does this same being sustain life energy throughout man’s life or does another supernatural entity support life? And thirdly, man has various ways of explaining death in supernaturalistic terms so a logical research inquiry would probe the nature of authority by the supernatural in terminating life giving energy of man.
Other: Issue of Earthly Other

Supernatural beings engage man by earthly means in addition to interacting with man on a personal level as in the case of life force issues. In the universal category of Other, the research inquiry is: What is the nature of exchange between Self and earthly Other supernatural beings influence? Three areas should receive consideration with the initial topic viewing the degree to which supernatural beings contribute what is needed for physical needs beyond man’s ability (see Table 2). The first area is meant to address the ecological function of religion. Supernatural beings often, in some way, have control/authority over nature so that man’s chances for survival are helped and natural resources can be exploited for man’s benefit.

A second area of investigation probes in what way supernatural beings are engaged for social rules governing order. The social function of religion is a key component to greater understanding of the efficacy of an organized system of faith which in turn allows for comparison to other religious world views. Beliefs about the supernatural tend to validate the “why” of social behavior, give moral imperative to the way of life in a society, and guide the value system. Further, the issue of earthly Other includes addressing the socio-cultural function of religion. Beliefs about the supernatural tend to lend definition to notions about “us vs. them” to guard a culture from outside threats and changes. It may be that outsiders are either broadly or narrowly defined and defined as a severe threat & untrustworthy or beneficial & welcomed. Whatever the delineation, discovering rules governing outsiders which are infused with some type of supernatural involvement are a research task.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other: Issue of Earthly Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of exchange between Self and earthly Other supernatural beings influence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide for physical needs beyond man’s ability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide for social rules governing order?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide for rules governing outsiders?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: World View Methodological Questions for Other Category.

Relationship: Issue of Life Experience

The distinction between Self and Other is the basis for Relationship as a universal category in world view theory. How Self relates to Other is the prime function of the Relationship universal. A research query for comparative religious studies is the ways in which man encounters supernatural beings in the life experience. Just what is the nature of supernatural influence in man’s individual initiative and response? One area of supernatural influence is the individual features of Self (see Table 3).

Underlying notions concerning significant physical and non-physical elements of Self across religions consistently show various types of supernatural involvement. Supernatural beings influence individual features of Self, and it is these relationships that need examination. Discovering key psychical elements such as soul, spirit, desire, emotion, etc., where the element is located in a person, who gives the element to the person, and the meaning associated with the element all contribute to increase understanding of the relationship between supernatural Other and man.
Relationship: Issue of Life Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the nature of supernatural involvement in man’s individual initiative and response?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influence of individual features of Self?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of the spiritual essence of man?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influencing man in the nature of supernatural beings?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: World View Methodological Questions for Relationship Category.

It is a task to examine what influential characteristics the supernatural exhibits on the spiritual essence of man. All religions include beliefs about the basic spiritual parts of a person. The spiritual components of Self give insight into notions concerning how one should conduct themselves in this life and perhaps the next. A third matter relating to life experience is the nature of supernatural beings and how inherent qualities of the supernatural promote participation of these beings in man’s life. Probing the nature and function of the divine and spirit world allows these religious beliefs to be discussed in a comparative manner.

Classification: Issue of Moral Capacity

The first classification an individual formulates is believed to be grasping a distinction between Self and Other. In essence, world view theory tries to relate the classification of things and the principles governing these things to the content of other world view dimensions. In the case of the relationship between Self and Other, comparative religion seeks to examine the issue of moral capacity in man from the intersection of the metaphysical world with humanity. Hence the research question posed by Classification is: What is the nature of supernatural authority over moral deportment? To fully answer this question, the researcher seeks a tripartite understanding (see Table 4).

The basic idea that supernatural beings are unseen forces of good and evil is rather common but just how much and in what way is a source of variability in religious thought. Alas, how much good and evil in man comes from supernatural beings is a principal research query. A natural succeeding area is investigating the degree to which supernatural beings provide the capacity for a person to act good or bad. This line of questioning has the potential for explaining how man ended up with the propensity for moral/immoral inclinations.

A final component in the issue of moral capacity is whether supernatural beings award consequences for good and evil actions. Supernatural beings whether it be a divine creator, ancestral spirits, demons, etc., are attributed power to award an individual with prosperity and blessing when they act correctly and/or make a person suffer bad consequences (illness, calamity) for acting wrongly (Pandian, 1991). Comparative studies along these lines allow the fundamental nature of the supernatural to be contrasted amongst religious world views.

Classification: Issue of Moral Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the nature of supernatural authority over moral deportment?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supernatural beings are unseen forces of good/evil?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supernatural beings energize the person with the ability to do right/wrong?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supernatural beings award consequences for good/evil actions?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: World View Methodological Questions for Classification Category.

Causality: Issue of Causal Means

Causal questions permeate religious paradigms with supernatural beings as one of the sources of power for causing both good and bad on earth (Malefijt, 1989). The research question which needs to be explored in relation to the issue of causal means is: What is the nature of supernatural authority over the casual forces in a person’s life experience? Notions behind what causes things to happen invariably include the activities of the supernatural.

Religious thought is inclined to interpret a bad or evil happening as either some kind of judgment for behaving wrongly or an attack by an evil spirit on a person. Good or positive events are associated with blessing for behaving morally upright. Those causal explanations assigning blame to supernatural beings should receive critical attention (see Table 5). Unpredictable, life-changing events are typically defined as those things that man endures but cannot control. For this reason, illness, drought, famine, death, accidents, and capricious events in general are explained through religious ideas with the suppositions that these are guided by supernatural beings.

The researcher seeks to know what supernatural beings are responsible for unpredictable happenings. A seminal interrogative is, what supernatural beings influence or control human behavior? With the capacity for morality/immorality comes the reality of a changeable nature of Self. Comparing and contrasting religious explanations for this volatile characteristic provides fundamental distinctions about the nature of a moral universe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causality: Issue of Causal Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of supernatural authority over the causal forces in a person’s life experience?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causal explanations assign blame to supernatural beings?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpredictability of life attributed to supernatural beings?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changeable nature of Self attributed to supernatural beings?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: World View Methodological Questions for Causality Category.

Time and Space: Issue of Destiny

Common in world views is the assumption each person is put into a culture/community not by chance but by either divine design or some other supernatural will. The issue of destiny is of prime importance to world view understanding of religion. Destiny or fate may be attributed to supernatural beings making the decisions. The suggested research question asks: What is the nature of supernatural authority over life experience? An initial focus addresses whether supernatural beings set one’s station in life.

A second inquiry should be made into how much earthly future is set by the supernatural. A common belief is that a person may diligently strive to gain wealth but it comes because some supernatural being is honoring that person for their effort. Supernatural intervention allows the fortune of a person, thus the premise that earthly life is supernaturally directed. A final element is recognizing to what extent supernatural beings are responsible for the result of mortality. A prevalent conviction is the belief supernatural beings (creator god, ancestor, and spirits) direct what happens to a person in death. Exploring the existence beyond death, which
may include heaven/hell, becoming an ancestor, or an afterlife as a servant or master, should receive research effort.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time &amp; Space: Issue of Destiny</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the nature of supernatural authority over life experience?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Station in life set by supernatural beings?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthly future set by supernaturally beings?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence beyond death set by supernatural beings?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: World View Methodological Questions for Time/Space Category.

**Conclusion**

Perhaps it is the universality of religion coupled with man’s basic inquisitive nature in which the field of comparative religion has its most primal roots. People seem to thirst for explanations revolving around the spiritual essence of humanity and the universe. Whatever the origin, the human need for moral order inevitably leads to socio-religious requirements for individual behavior. It would seem an instinctive directive for man to seek stability and continuity of conduct through a world view vested with supernatural authority. Besides guiding social order, religion also provides causal theory to make sense out of the inconsistent and unpredictable nature of life experience outside the control of Self and society. Religion does so by accounting for the forces of good and evil and explaining the ultimate authority over life and death.

Religious assumptions are a complex web entangled in the universal categories of world view by including notions of moral nature, spiritual autonomy, supernatural power, and causal forces of behavior. World view is what people believe is naturally so. Thus, understanding significant beliefs about personal supernaturalism becomes imperative to a fuller understanding of religion and culture. Notions concerning aspects of world view hold basic meaning for assumptions and beliefs concerning the supernatural and offer specific data by which comparison between diverse belief systems may be accomplished. It is hoped the methodological questions posed in this paper will aid research into what people believe to be naturally so in their religious life experience.

The applied theory presented here produces ethnographic data which may be described and compared with other such data in different ethnographic contexts. Comparative research in personal supernaturalism would extend scholarship in religious studies to capitalize on the awareness and understandings necessary for the global world in the twenty-first century. Field researchers are able to investigate both the ontological and epistemological elements of personal supernaturalism from a world view perspective. The implications for religious understanding then is available for general beliefs as well as specific assumptions about supernatural beings and their relationship with an individual.
References


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Crime Fiction and the City: The Rise of a Global Urban Genre

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Abstract

In the twentieth century, in the United States, the figure of the nineteenth century frontier pioneer metamorphosed into the hardboiled detective and crime fiction became urban. Unlike the English Golden Age detective who flitted from country house to rural vicarage, the original hardboiled gumshoe plied his (never her) trade on the mean streets of cities such as Los Angeles, New York or San Francisco. Beginning with Raymond Chandler's portrayal of Los Angeles in his Philip Marlowe novels, American hard-boiled writers, many of whom interrogate and challenge the genre in their work remain, faithful to this urban identification. To name but three, Walter Mosley's Easy Rawlins stories, like Chandler's, are set in Los Angeles; Sara Paretsky's V.I Warshawski's are set in Chicago, and James Sallis's Lew Griffin novels in New Orleans. Given the enormous influence and global popularity of the American model of hardboiled crime fiction it is no surprise that the recent outpouring of international crime fiction is also almost exclusively urban. This paper will, however, challenge the assumption that specific cities, such as the aforementioned Los Angeles, be seen as "characters" within the narratives, or that urban crime fiction is a reflection of the alienating nature of city life. Indeed the opposite may well be closer to the truth. This paper will analyse the relationship between the city and crime fiction with reference to the work of a number of writers from around the world.

Key words: detective stories, urban studies, crime fiction, Raymond Chandler
Crime fiction is largely associated with the city. Heather Worthington, in *Key Concepts in Crime Fiction* argues that “crime fiction developed as a genre it represented the perceived realities of crime and its connection with city living” (Worthington, 2011, p. 6). Lee Horsley meanwhile, in *Twentieth Century Crime Fiction*, goes a step further, describing hard-boiled crime fiction as “a manageable tale, a political myth containing the contradictions and ironies that bedevilled the efforts to adjust liberal ideas to the demands of an industrialized, urbanized nation” (Horsley, 2005, p. 75). This is a big claim, suggesting that the genre plays a major part both in understanding and containing the problems and contradictions of modern, urban life. Of course, not all crime fiction is urban, as the highly popular mystery novels belonging to the genre's Golden Age in the early and mid-twentieth century demonstrate. This paper will briefly show why the genre shed its associations with the countryside, before going on to describe the rise of city-based hard-boiled fiction in the United States and its subsequent proliferation around an increasingly urbanised world, and will conclude with a discussion of the significance of the urban space for contemporary crime narratives.

Most critics agree that the American hard-boiled fictional detective is the urban equivalent of the frontiersman (Horsley, 2005, p 74; Scaggs, 2005, p 64; Porter, 2003, p. 95), rural pioneer, or cowboy, becomes city detective. The hero is “the lone male, strong, ruggedly handsome, and resisting the confining, emasculating spaces of a domestic life” (Horsley, 2005, p 74). Not surprisingly, the archetypal city of hard-boiled fiction is Los Angeles, where the pioneer’s push westwards came to an end as it met the Pacific Ocean, urbanisation proliferated, and where, from 1939 to 1959, Raymond Chandler set the greater part of his Philip Marlowe novels, short stories and screenplays.

In Europe, the first detective narratives were also urban: Poe’s three short stories featuring the cerebral Chevalier Auguste Dupin are set in Paris, and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s world-famous consulting detective, Sherlock Holmes, lived at 221B Baker Street, in central London. True, Holmes, more often than not, conducts his investigations in the countryside, but it is Victorian London with which he is enduringly associated. It is also true that the Golden Age of English crime writing, led by Agatha Christie, is almost entirely set in country houses, villages, small, provincial towns, isolated coastal resorts or other, more exotic locations. The Golden Age included a number of writers such as Dorothy L. Sayers, Ngaio Marsh and Margery Allingham – among many others – who set their novels in similar places. According to poet and self-confessed crime fiction addict, W.H. Auden:

> Nature should reflect its human inhabitants, i.e., it should be the Great Good Place; for the more Eden-like it is, the greater the contradiction of murder. The country is preferable to the town, a well-to-do neighborhood (but not too well-to-do-or there will be a suspicion of ill-gotten gains) better than a slum (Auden, 1948, p. 408).

As Auden insisted, at the time, the rural setting virtually defined the genre. It now looks almost like an anomaly. A very large anomaly, it is true, but from the latter third of the twentieth century almost all crime fiction from around the world has been urban, as has almost all American crime fiction since its beginnings in the 1920s. The most obvious explanation for this is that nowadays, throughout the world, human beings mostly live in towns and cities, rather than in the countryside as they once did. Secondly, the setting of crime fiction in the countryside has become outmoded. Writers such as Agatha Christie or the comic fiction writer P.G. Wodehouse were creating a fantasy of rural England that never existed. Most nations do this – the construction of national identity through an idealised rural
past – which, once assimilated, loses its novelty and becomes redundant and repetitive. Finally, the countryside as separate space no longer exists for most people. Rural, as opposed to urban culture, is no longer significantly different. Village housing is often identical to that of the city; people commute to work, few are closely tied to the land and, above all, technology in the form of television and the Internet has created a society and way of life largely independent of place.

This is not to say that contemporary fictional detectives do not make an occasional foray into the countryside, but it is relatively infrequent. Those few detectives who remain obstinately tied to the land usually do so for quite specific reasons. Firstly, there is the portrayal of indigenous peoples. The neo-colonial writers Arthur Upfield and Tony Hillerman, whose fictional detectives were the Australian Aboriginal Detective Inspector Napoleon Bonaparte (Bony), of the Queensland police force, and the Navajo tribal policemen Joe Leaphorn and Jim Chee, respectively, are two examples. Secondly, more recent Australian crime fiction, such as Philip McLaren's *Lightning Mine* (2000) or Adrian Hyland's *Diamond Dove* (2010) continue this interest in Aboriginal communities, but, like Jane Harper's *The Dry* (2017) are also concerned with environmental crimes, an issue usually – though not exclusively – associated with rural regions. Finally, there are a very few books, such as American writer Charles Willeford’s 1988 novel *The Way We Die Now*, or Australian writer Garry Disher's novel *Bitter Wash Road* (2013), which explore contemporary rural life not as an idyll, but as a renewed site of deprivation and hardship.

Most modern crime narratives, though, are urban. The association of the city with crime and corruption goes back a long way. Raymond Williams in *The Country and the City* describes the contrast between the innocence of the country and the greed of the town as “commonplace in later Greek and Latin literature” (Williams, 1973, p. 46). The city was a place “of flattery and bribery, of organised seduction, of noise and traffic, with the streets unsafe because of robbers, with the crowded rickety houses and the constant dangers of fire” (Williams, 1973, p. 46). The urban rich of Rome kept country houses, but were not subject to the hardships of a working rural life. Over the centuries, whenever people made money, this pattern was repeated, and the dichotomy of innocent countryside versus corrupt city, was maintained. Marx, in his canonical work of American literary criticism, *The Machine in the Garden*, observes how first contact with America seduced Europeans with the idea of a new Arcadia: “Here was a virgin continent! Inevitably the European mind was dazzled by the prospect. With an unspoiled hemisphere in view it seemed that mankind actually might realize what had been thought a poetic fantasy” (Marx, 1964, p3). By the nineteenth century, with the ongoing drive westwards dominating the new nation’s imagination, urban Europe remained the model for all that was to be avoided: “Moving west means casting off European attitudes and rigid social forms and urban ways. (The city is an obsolete, quasi-feudal institution.)” (Marx, 1964, p. 238). Still today, one of the great founding myths of American identity is provided by *Walden* (Toureau, 1854), in which the self-sufficient man settles himself into nature for the betterment of his body and soul. This did not mean that new technology was to be eschewed. On the contrary, mass transportation, manufacturing and mechanisation was to become the means by which the American pastoral dream was to be realised. It did not happen, of course. Instead, industrial cities grew up to integrate factories, distribution and the accommodation of an industrial proletariat. *The Machine in the Garden*, written over half a century ago, confines itself to looking at canonical writers such as Henry Thoreau, Mark Twain, Herman Melville and Scott Fitzgerald who, Marx argues, obstinately insisted on representing America through pastoral fables in which the protagonist uneasily escapes to a rural idyll, such as Gatsby’s house on Long Island. These are, he claims
“unsatisfactory because the old symbol of reconciliation is obsolete” the “inspiring vision of a humane community has been reduced to a token of individual survival” and “new symbols of possibility” (Marx, 1964, pp. 364–365), are required.

In fact, when Marx was writing *The Machine in the Garden*, an alternative literary symbol was already well-established, though still a long way from achieving the academic recognition it enjoys today: the hard-boiled detective. Not that he is entirely free of the pastoral. As mentioned above, the hard-boiled urban detective evolved out of the rural pioneer and the iconic cowboy. There is also a great deal of Thoreau’s *Walden* in his make up, as some crime writers have recognised. Robert B. Parker’s Boston-based private detective, Spenser, makes frequent references to Thoreau, even to the extent of building a lakeside retreat in the woods, about which, of course, he is characteristically self-deprecating: “There were cabins,” he confesses, “along the lake close enough to keep you from feeling like Henry Thoreau, but it was secluded” (Parker, 1981, p. 96). Paul Auster, in *Ghosts*, the second novel of the *New York Trilogy*, goes so far as to make his two protagonists, Black and Blue, read *Walden*, though, significantly, both find the book hard going, and abandon it. Thoreau’s journey of rural self-discovery is no longer of much help to the denizens of the late twentieth century New York megalopolis. Blue, a private detective hired to spy on Black, confesses that he “thought that he was going to get a story, or at least something like a story, but this is no more than blather, an endless harangue about nothing at all” (Auster, 1986, pp. 162–3).

The quintessential hard-boiled detective is represented by Dashiell Hammett’s Continental Op, and he is unequivocally urban. He first appeared in 1923 as a short story in the pulp-fiction magazine *Black Mask* (Marcus 8), but it is in *Red Harvest*, published in 1928 and “[g]enerally taken to be the first novel of the new, hard-boiled type” (Porter, 2003, p. 98) that he is best remembered. The Op, like Thoreau’s ideal of the self-contained American man, is independent and individualistic; but he is also a man of violence. According to Christopher Breu in his 2005 study *Hard-Boiled Masculinities*, the novel “reveals the cultural costs of [the Op’s] ethic of amoral detachment and instrumental rationality, linking this ethic to the increasing rationalization of economic and social life in the 1920s” (Breu, 2005, p. 57). The Op, unlike the protagonists of the pastoral American novels analysed by Leo Marx, such as Scott Fitzgerald’s *Jay Gatsby*, makes no attempt to exile himself from the turbulent city, but steps right in, eyes wide open, obdurately determined to impose his will on the fractious populace, whatever the cost. If Thoreau had hoped that exposure to nature might awaken a man’s moral sensitivities, then Hammett seems to be saying that life in the city does the opposite. Merely a shift in perspective, perhaps, but Hammett recognises that the city is where people live in the twentieth century, disagreeable though it may be.

Breu argues that gender, and specifically white, working class masculinity, is also a key component of the hard-boiled genre:

> A primarily, though not exclusively, white conception of male identity, hard-boiled masculinity was surreptitiously modelled on an understanding of black masculinity, as vitally and violently primitive. Hard-boiled masculinity, in its externalization of masculinity as a prophylactic toughness, its investment in moral detachment, and its secret borrowing from the iconography of black masculinity, thus emerged as a modernist and class-inflected rejection of the Victorian concept of middle-class white manliness, which was structured around a conception of manhood as an internal moral quality, one that was defined as the opposite of the “primitive” forms of male identity.


ostensibly embodied by African Americans and other racialized groups” (Breu, 2005, p. 2).

This masculine identity is also urban, and profoundly industrial:

Male identity shifts from an interiorized notion of rationality to a more externalized one, paralleling the way in which shifts in management practices produced by Taylorism removed decision making and control from the individual laborer and replaced it with larger systemized forms of rationality of which the workers’ newly rationalized external actions were merely a part (Breu, 2005, p 32).

This is reflected in the hard-boiled style of writing: “[T]he celebrated economy and detachment of hard-boiled prose can be read as a textual analog to the streamlined and rationalized factory spaces produced by Taylorism and incipient Fordism in this period” (Breu, 2005, p. 58).

The confluence of elements making up the Prohibition-era industrial city, and so vividly portrayed in Hammett’s Red Harvest – the industry, the industrialists and employers, the workforce, unions, police department, bootleggers, strike-breakers and mobsters – inevitably lead to extreme levels of violence. Breu says that it is presented as somewhat akin to modern warfare: the trenches have been replaced by speakeasies, roadhouses, or the streets and apartments of the modern city, but the battle is just as chaotic and confusing, the weapons are just as deadly, and the struggle is as potentially pointless. The action, in fact, often exceeds any relationship to the solution of the mystery or resolution of the narrative (Breu, 2005, p. 14).

The hard-boiled detective, then, is a contradictory and rather self-destructive figure. He retains something of the Romantic and individualistic aspirations of Thoreau, but he lives and works immersed in violence and physicality. By employing his guns and his fists to eliminate the problems his rational mind has identified, he is all too likely to make matters worse, rather than resolve them. He is, or should be, a highly troubled man.

Hammett’s Red Harvest is unusual, almost unique, in its allegorical possibilities. Personville, the mining town where the action occurs, is fictional, and could be any industrial town in the United States. The Continental Op – we never learn his name – is an armed agent of the authorities. It is tempting to see him as not only representing law enforcement at a local level but also nationally and even internationally. His preferred tactic of indiscriminate destruction is all too similar to American government foreign policy over the last 120 years. For many, if not most, hard-boiled crime writers, however, the city is not an invented one and is therefore to a lesser extent allegorical. Raymond Chandler’s choice of Los Angeles proved a popular one, and later writers such as Ross MacDonald, Walter Mosley, Robert Crais and Michael Connelly followed his example. The symbolism of Hollywood is part of the attraction: nothing is as it seems, indeed is less than it seems, everyone is in disguise and hiding something, there is a great deal of noise and commotion, but at the heart of it all, an empty space. In The Big Sleep, a jaded Philip Marlowe laments the meaninglessness of it all: “It was the week after Thanksgiving [and] the stores along Hollywood Boulevard were already beginning to fill up with overpriced Christmas junk, and the daily papers were beginning to scream about how terrible it would be if you didn’t get your Christmas shopping done early. It would be terrible anyway; it always is” (Chandler, 1953, p. 9). For Walter Mosley, on the
other hand, the attraction of Los Angeles was the opportunity to rewrite the history of the city, particularly the Watts neighbourhood, through the perspective of a black private detective.

But Los Angeles is not alone as a site for crime fiction. To name but a few: Boston is home to Robert B. Parker’s Spenser series and Dennis Lehane’s Kenzie-Gennaro novels; New York to Lawrence Block’s Matthew Scudder series; Washington DC to George Pelecanos’s Nick Stefanos novels; New Orleans to (some of) James Lee Burke’s Robicheaux series and James Sallis’s Lew Griffin and Chicago to Sara Paretsky’s V.I. Warshawski series. The list could go on for many pages.

The influence of the American model of hard-boiled fiction, including its specific urban settings, has been enormously influential around the world. Ian Rankin’s Inspector John Rebus series is set in Edinburgh; Deon Meyer, Mike Nicol, Roger Smith and Margie Orford set their crime novels in Cape Town; Jo Nesbø’s Harry Hole novels are largely based in Oslo, Ken Bruen’s Jack Taylor resides in Galway, Peter Temple’s Jack Irish series is set in Melbourne, Manuel Vázquez Montalbán’s Pepe Carvalho series is set in Barcelona, while Mehmet Murat Somer’s novels about a transvestite sleuth who also manages a nightclub take place in Istanbul. Again, the list is by no means exhaustive; there are, no doubt, thickets of fictional detectives gumshoeing the streets of every city on Earth.

For some critics, the cities are important because their specific idiosyncrasies make them a character in the narrative in their own right. According to Andrew Kincaid, “the city itself functions as a central character, frequently determining the emotions of the hero as much as in any naturalist narrative” (Kincaid, 2010, p. 41). But just how the city is a character is hard to define. One aspect of a city’s character is its climate. Nordic noir is an obvious example with the gloom of the Scandinavian winter both reflecting and deepening the inner darkness of delinquents and detectives alike: “The seventh day before Christmas Eve broke with such freezing temperatures that people on the streets of Oslo felt they were being squeezed by a steel glove” (Nesbø, 2005, p. 138), we are told by the narrator of Jo Nesbø’s novel *The Redeemer*. This is a characteristic felt across northern Europe: the cold and snow in Scandinavia; the cold and rain in Scotland and Ireland. The same can be said, of course, about novels set in warm climates, such as John Burdett’s Sonchai Jitpleecheep series, set in Bangkok, and one is left with the sensation that mere climate, or weather, as defining trait, is a rather superficial measure of characterisation.

Another rather simple and obvious feature of the city is its traffic. This becomes one of the chief characteristics of Sara Paretsky’s V.I. Warshawski novels, set in Chicago. Indeed, so much time in the novels is set in traffic jams, with V.I. seething, complaining of fatigue, frustration and lost time, that the ingenious reader wonders why she does not take some other form of transport, or get a different job. Here she is in the tenth Warshawski novel, *Total Recall*, once again lamenting her hours behind the wheel: “At eight-thirty in the morning, traffic into the city was at a standstill. After last night, I couldn’t face another horrible commute” (Paretsky, 2001, p. 248). Warshawski’s, and Chicago’s, traffic problems are an ongoing metaphor both for Warshawski’s inability to force her way through the web of lies and deceit preventing the resolution of her case (although she gets there in the end), while at the same time representing the impenetrable, swamp-like nature of Chicago’s own insoluble urban problems of gridlock, pollution, and political and financial corruption. Interestingly, although Warshawski finally solves her cases, just as she finally manages to wrestle her way home through the traffic, she is not really able to offer solutions for Chicago’s problems in
any general sense. With reference to Paretsky’s Warshawski novels, Lee Horsley remarks that

the novels move towards a traditional form of resolution: the reader comes to understand fully the pattern of events; there is the satisfaction of villainy exposed and, in one way or another, punished. This is combined, however, with an inability on the part of the protagonist to resolve any of the larger crimes in which society’s established powers are implicated (Horsley, 2005, p. 270).

The city is too powerful for a single detective to resolve all its problems, only small, local victories can be won. If nothing else, Warshawski is symbolic of the kind of tenacity and moral rectitude that the city needs if it is ever to overcome its darker nature.

A third example of the city as character is provided by Ian Rankin’s crime novels, set in Edinburgh. Again, they make inevitable reference to the weather, and it is hard to avoid associating the cold, the dark and the wet with Rankin’s dour, depressive, alcoholic detective, John Rebus. It is, however, another characteristic of the city which interests Rankin most, and which led him to write his first John Rebus novel, *Knots and Crosses*. The narrator, who is focalized throughout on the main character, Detective Inspector Rebus, admits that “Edinburgh was a schizophrenic city, the place of Jekyll & Hyde, sure enough” (Rankin, 1987, p. 193). Edinburgh was the birthplace of Robert Louis Stevenson, and his famous Gothic novella, *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (1886), although set in London, is generally understood to be about Edinburgh, and possibly inspired by the double life of Deacon Brodie. As Rankin himself explains “I wanted to talk about the hidden Edinburgh and I was finding out a lot about the city that wasn’t making into the press – conspiracy, obstruction of justice, land deals, you name it – almost endemic criminal activity that wasn’t being dealt with, and it seemed to be taking place at quite a high level” (Plain, 2003, p. 56). This schizophrenia, or hypocrisy, is frequently referred to in the novels: the well-off and the tourists, unknowing or uncaring, often share the same space as the marginalised poor, before moving on: in *Knots and Crosses*, Rebus walks “along George IV Bridge, which took tourists and others over the city’s Grassmarket, safely away from that area’s tramps and derelicts, latter-day paupers with nowhere to turn” (Plain, 2003, p. 208).

Rankin’s use of the city as a character - albeit mentally disordered - allows the reader to attain an insight into the city that even an actual visit would not reach. Phil Hubbard suggests that:

Novelists and poets succeed in conveying and communicating the “sense of place” that is immanent in given locations better than actually being in that location could. This idea relies on the fact that literature evokes the experience of being in place eloquently, with the intensely personal and deeply descriptive language used by the writer able to convey the elusive genius loci inherent in a place (Hubbard, 2006, p. 69).

Ironically, *Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr Hyde* was set in London, not Edinburgh, though it seems none the worse for it. It is difficult to know how important specific settings are for urban crime fiction, but perhaps less so than some critics believe. One industry which has benefited from the detailed mapping of real cities in crime fiction is tourism: many cities such as Edinburgh, Reykjavik or Barcelona offer guided tours in which scenes from locally set crime novels are explored.
Novelists are not, however, usually commissioned by their local tourist boards to write their novels. Rather, as Rankin explains, they use the cityscape to depict the ills of modern society, as an anti-pastoral, to explore, through the medium of crime fiction, the corruption, injustice, violence and inequality of urban life. In consequence the city becomes a fearful place. As Andrew Kincaid puts it:

The city gets used as a phantasmagoric space onto which anxieties, fears, threats, and fantasies of all kinds can be projected, and that through the imaginative unleashing of violence, whether in mild or rampant form, one can, as a viewer or a reader, find partial, symbolic, though never conclusive, resolution to society’s contradictions (Kincaid, 2019, p. 47).

This association of the city with fear and isolation can be traced back in part to Marx and Engels. In *The Condition of the Working-Class in England*, Engels argues that

The brutal indifference, the unfeeling isolation of each in his private interest, becomes the more repellent and offensive, the more these individuals are crowded together, within a limited space. And, however much one may be aware that this isolation of the individual, this narrow self-seeking, is the fundamental principle of our society everywhere, it is nowhere so shamelessly barefaced, so self-conscious as just here in the crowding of the great city. The dissolution of mankind into monads, of which each one has a separate principle, the world of atoms, is here carried out to its utmost extreme (Engels, 1845, p. 57).

The idea of the city as alienating has since become widespread and, according to John Scaggs, demonstrates the similarity between the poetry of T.S. Eliot (especially *The Waste Land*) and the hard-boiled narratives of Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Chandler and Ross Macdonald. Urban dwellers, says Scaggs, lead “empty lives without meaning or significance, trapped in a city that is both London in 1922, and all modern cities” (Scaggs, 2005, pp. 70–1). Thomas Sowell, in *Marxism, Philosophy and Economics*, however, is sceptical of such assertions: “[t]he contemporary influence of the elusive and pretentious concept of “alienation” reaches well beyond the ranks of Marxists. A wide range of Western intellectuals promote the idea of widespread despair among the masses, the young, or particular social groups” (Sowell, 1985, p. 202). Sowell then goes on to reject this notion on the grounds that, contrary to fearing the alienating city, the masses pour into urban spaces in search of a better life.

Cities, obviously, are open to a variety of interpretations. One of their key characteristics is their complex structure. To newcomers and residents alike, much of the city is an unknown and mysterious space. Even long term citizens, familiar with their own neighbourhoods, find other parts of the city different and unknown. In similar vein to Sowell, Elizabeth Grosz argues that:

the slum is not inherently alienating, although for those used to a rural or even a suburban environment, it produces extreme feelings of alienation. However, the same is true for the slum dweller who moves to the country or the suburbs. It is a question of negotiation of urban spaces by individuals/groups more or less densely packed, who inhabit or traverse them: each environment or context contains its own powers, perils, dangers, and advantages (Grosz, p. 35).
Walter Benjamin, in *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism* suggests that the “original social content of the detective story was the obliteration of the individual’s traces in the big-city crowd” (Benjamin, 1955, p. 43) and that it is “the menacing [aspect] of the masses” in the city which “is the origin of the detective story” (Benjamin, 1955, p. 40). Certainly the fictional detective, both in his or her Golden Age incarnations, or as a hard-boiled private eye, provide comfort to the law-abiding, property-owning classes by restoring their disturbed *milieux* to their former serenity.

It is the fictional detective's task, then, to resolve, in Andrew Kincaid’s words, "society's contradictions," and to find his or her way through the urban maze with its hidden threats and perplexities, a task that only a very special man or woman can accomplish. As Raymond Chandler famously insisted in his essay, "The Simple Art of Murder" “down these mean streets a man must go who is not himself mean, who is neither tarnished nor afraid” (Chandler, 1953, p. 198). Intellect and rationality also play their part. Matthew Farish argues that fictional detectives such as Sherlock Holmes "deployed analytical reason and disciplinary technologies such as photography to (re)solve the mysteries of urban space, problems that frequently required disguise, deception, and the penetration of a murky urban labyrinth" (Farish, 2005, p. 98).

As mentioned above, the task of investigation and resolution is comforting. This has long been recognised as one of the chief attractions of the genre. Crime fiction over the last twenty years, or so, however – influenced greatly by postmodernist concepts of closure, or lack of, chronology and its interruption, and its questioning of metanarratives – has become much more challenging to its readers, not just in a technical, structural way, but in an ethical way too. We can no longer assume that the detective's hat is an unblemished white (as Hammett all too clearly foresaw). Similarly, the postmodern city is not the organised, rational, efficient neo-classical artefact that Enlightenment developers hoped it might be. According to Elizabeth Grosz, it is a "complex and interactive network which links together, often in an unintegrated and de facto way, a number of disparate social activities, processes, and relations, with a number of imaginary and real, projected or actual architectural, geographic, civic, and public relations" (Grosz, 1998, p. 32). The key words here are "unintegrated" and "disparate". There is less rationality than one would suppose, or might wish for, in the modern city. Again, the fictional detective comes to the rescue as he, unlike most other citizens, not only knows the city intimately, but by virtue of his profession, is able to go to those places, and talk to those people, as others cannot. He is a tiny ligature, a webspinner, binding the disparate social levels together. Author Ian Rankin says he “chose a policeman because they have access to all areas. He is the perfect figure because he can go to the Lord Provost’s private residence and ask questions, he can go to a junkie-filled tenement in Niddrie and ask questions; no doors are going to be closed to him or, if they are closed, they won’t be closed for long” (Plain, 2003, p. 56); the contemporary crime novel, in Ian Rankin’s words, allows the reader to discover those parts of the city where injustice lurks: “the city that wasn’t making it into the press” (Plain, 2003, p. 56).

The association of crime fiction with the city, then, is the result of various factors. Since antiquity the city has been condemned as a focus of corruption, injustice and violence, and modern crime fiction from the nineteenth century also based its detectives in large urban centres. Despite the rural setting of much Golden Age crime fiction in the early twentieth century, and the durability of Pastoralism as an idealised literary genre, almost all crime fiction from around the world is now urban. This reflects a rise in urban living, but more importantly, the consequences of industrialisation including the consolidation of an urban
proletariat and its associated model of working-class masculinity which provided the archetype for a particular kind of protagonist – the hard-boiled detective. Two traditional assumptions regarding crime fiction and the city: that specific urban settings are a "character" in their own right, and that cities are, by their very nature, alienating, are more difficult to sustain. Very often the characteristics of a particular city are both superficial and easily transferable, while the insistence that the city is a site of alienation is largely refuted by the behaviour of the detective him or herself who seems to be immediately comfortable in his or her urban milieu. As we have seen, cities are not inherently alienating, they simply require “negotiation of urban spaces by individuals/ groups more or less densely packed, who inhabit or traverse them” (Grosz, 1998, p. 35). Indeed, it is in the city that minority groups, the marginalised and the oppressed are best able to interact and flourish. It is the city which has long nurtured and given refuge to collectives whose existence elsewhere would be seriously compromised. This negotiation – whether it is undertaken with the fists or the intellect – is the fictional detectives’ particular task, sometimes for better, sometimes for worse.

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In Search of the Signature Pedagogies of Cultural Studies

Cultural studies scholars have recently delivered pessimistic diagnoses that the heyday of their discipline is over. As successful as the cultural studies project has been, it has recently been losing its appeal with undergraduates. The established scholars have left teaching, detaching cultural studies from its pragmatist roots and isolating the discipline in an ivory tower where it can, at worst, be reduced to impotent social criticism. Taking these observed shortcomings as its starting point, The pedagogies of cultural studies intends to reclaim the relevance of cultural studies by relocating pedagogy within the research tradition. The book reads, thus, as an epistemological and ontological repositioning of the cultural studies’ project, or even as a manifesto for the reappraisal of cultural studies.

The book is based on contributions to a symposium hosted by the University of Southern Queensland in Australia in 2014, the aim of which was to give attention to the “serious treatment of pedagogy as both a practice and a conceptual motif through which cultural studies might be (re)imagined” (p. 3). The volume contains eleven individual chapters, a foreword by Graeme Turner, one of those who have lamented the status quo of contemporary cultural studies in public, and an afterword, which is much needed to collect the diverse strains under an umbrella, by editor Andrew Hickey, Associate Professor in Communications at the University of Southern Queensland.

The foundation for the pedagogical approach is wisely found in the classics, such as in Henry A. Giroux, Lawrence Grossberg, and Raymond Williams, who have agreed upon the fact that the deepest impulse informing cultural studies in the old days was the desire to make learning...
part of the process of social change itself. In Williams’ spirit, Graeme Turner reasserts that teaching has been one of the fundamental ways of “doing cultural studies.” As Stuart Hall has remarked that it is practice to bring together theory and practice, the authors want to identify practices in which reflexivity forms the key category for shifting focus from textual critique to social action.

Community-engaged research may not only be a pragmatic choice but also an ethical response in the small regional universities where many of the contributors are employed. However, community-focused modes of scholarly practice are not typically measurable according to the standards of corporate university that the authors frequently criticize. While reading through the articles, I wondered whether the contributors were not marginalising themselves even further by consciously pushing cultural studies further in a direction not cutting favours with the neo-liberalist zeitgeist.

Perhaps for this reason the editor Andrew Hickey puts a considerable effort into arguing for the relevance and meaning of the “signature pedagogy” in cultural studies. Signature pedagogy of a discipline, a concept defined by Lee Schulman in 2005, comprises three levels: the implicit, deep, and surface structure. Consciously dismissing the surface structure, which would imply the concrete methods and didactics for learning and doing, Hickey argues that, by identifying the epistemological and ontological structures underlying the cultural studies project, the discipline can be restructured. According to Hickey, in the formation of the cultural studies identity, three contexts play a crucial role: the scholar-as-self, the discipline, and the institution. No matter how different the positions and approaches on the surface might be, cultural studies scholars subscribe to a standpoint of subordinate positionality and motivation for critical incursion into the world.

“Pedagogy” turns out to be a truly inclusive concept, which may be interpreted against the endeavour to contest the idea of pedagogy in formal education where it is typically limited to the classroom. According to Hickey (p. 3), pedagogy is “something situated within the research act, as demonstrated in academic public engagement, as something writ through scholarly social activism, and indeed as evidenced in the coming-to-be a cultural studies scholar.” For Kim Satchell, it is about “recognizing and employing creativity” (p. 74). In that very broad sense in which pedagogy is understood (and, in fact, never clearly and consistently delimited) in the volume, one has to ask what would not be pedagogical, particularly as the multidirectional pedagogical practice can even occur between human and non-human objects.

Without addressing methods, skills, and existing pedagogical practices within the settings of the contemporary university more explicitly, some of the reflections remain quite abstract and the individual authors’ accounts relatively idiosyncratic and not generalizable. This, of course, to a large extent boils down to the very nature of cultural studies, which has never been a unified project but rather a loose framework connecting researchers willing to reveal and recognize the structures of power in the cultural order. At their best, however, the contributions reach something very essential of the “becoming-to” aspect of cultural studies that is always implicit in its reflective processes, and deliver an inspiring account of becoming and being a cultural studies scholar.

In this sense, the result of the book is that the signature pedagogy cannot be systematized and must not either be totalized, but it is always up to unique combinations of the scholar-as-self who exercises reflexivity at a crossroads of a multitude of impulses, and it is there that one’s individual way of “doing cultural studies” emerges. To borrow Hickey’s words, to do cultural studies is “to read the world as it happens according to where it happens” (p. 207). The main virtue of The Pedagogies of Cultural Studies is to address cultural studies from the point of
the individual researcher, seen as a pedagogical agent, for it is there where the disciplinary re-articulation begins.