“Temporality and Historicality” in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* as the Clue to the Origin of Christian Theology

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Introduction

This philosophical approach to Christianity is also on display in the 1921 letter to Karl Löwith (chapter 11), in which Heidegger reveals his philosophical identity in “personal” and yet more-than-ontic statements like “I am a Christian theo-*logian*,” as one who strives to get to the bottom (logos) of Christian theo-*logy*; this is clearly the move of a philosopher of origins, albeit “in a new sense.” For the same letter maintains that “I am not a philosopher” in any traditional sense. The facticity of the “I am” seethes with the uniquely historical life that is Heidegger’s own, and it is out of this unique historical situation of what is “most my own” and toward it that Heidegger would philosophise and meditate on its sense.¹

I quote Theodore Kisiel’s quote, which intermixes an interpretation of the early Heidegger with personal quotes from Heidegger but not from his lectures or manuscripts, which were published much later in the Gestamtausgabe: these are Heidegger quotes from a personal letter to a student. Kisiel is right to highlight the ‘uniquely historical life’ that Heidegger makes his own. From this situation and ‘towards it’ indicates a genesis and motion. And out of this unique historical life and towards it contains a ‘sense’, according to Kisiel, that would determine what Heidegger would philosophise about. Ecstatically, the “I am” arises out of its own unique situation but is projected towards itself (not in linear, chronological time) as this arising: the unique swirl of being one’s time as a history that will have been read from a future that will never be known. This is the swelling up of time itself from in-dwelling that is not any point in space, which would otherwise determine a common sense representation or knowable concept of biographical-historical time.

But this extraordinary passage by Kisiel does not point to a simple, historical autobiography by Heidegger. What is the most personal, the own-most dimension of Heidegger’s life, towards which and out of which Heidegger would philosophise is a statement that belongs to neither traditional academic philosophy as it was understood in Heidegger’s day; nor is it reducible to mainstream Christian theological dogmatics that remains with the confines of faith, namely Trinity, Christology, etc.² The unique historical life is attached to the statement of personal

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² Karl Barth’s 13 volume *Church Dogmatics* is the preeminent example of the 20th century theology that is creative and quite ingenious but remains within the confines of dogmatic faith and its historical doctrines.
self-revelation—namely “I am a Christian theo-logian.” But getting to the origin, the ‘bottom (logos)’ of Christian ‘theo-logy’ as Kisiel puts it, means thinking in a new sense—one that must destroy and overcome the history of metaphysics and the classical dogmas of Christian theology from Augustine to the present.

We must bracket initially what it means to say one is getting at the very logos/truth and origin of Christian theology from the standpoint of what is other to Christian faith or belief. At first glance, the meaning of this eventful appropriation and the reduction of the author’s intention is obscure. In other words, Heidegger’s statement about being a ‘Christian theo-logian’ says nothing about his lapsed faith commitment to Catholic Christianity; nor is it about someone setting out to repeat the contents of the history of metaphysics applied to working out the mysteries of Christian faith. Neither a theologian in any recognisable sense nor a secular-academic philosopher the gestures of the early life of Heidegger needs to be rethought as a heterodox appropriation of faith’s dogmatic content turned against itself. That is the appropriation of one’s own life and its meaning is what is at issue.

But the event of appropriation, i.e. taking one’s time up as a uniquely historical life, occurs in an uncanny ontological self-attestation. Such testimony about one’s self is a type of calling that seeks to get to the bottom of Christianity, albeit in a ‘new way.’ To understand the ‘unique historical life’ out of which, as in ecstatically standing out of itself and turning in towards itself, is the problem of the “I am.” ‘Who is it that men say I am?’ and the problem of ‘I am who I am’ shows how both the Christian God of the New Testament and the Jewish God of the Hebrew Bible link the problem of being and time in unique ways. An appreciation of both is required to probe phenomenologically the logos-origin of Christian theology itself without subscribing to the doctrines of faith in mainstream Christian theology, i.e. the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the one person in the Triune God. Surprisingly, this has nothing to do with the dogmatic contents of biblical theology (New Testament theology in particular) and the history of systematic attempts to explicate doctrines such as the Trinity or Christology (or the mystery of God’s Incarnation in the Son); for all those doctrines presuppose the a priori stature of the Bible from which all theology arises, and if you are religious, the Bible is an indisputable attestation of God’s real words and deeds in human history. So what are we to

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3 I am not concerned with recovering historically or biographically the intention behind Heidegger’s often-quoted utterance about being a ‘Christian theo-logian.’ This is a slight homage to the phenomenological enterprise. Rather, I am interested in a creative philosophical encounter with the essential effects of the utterance even though my project may do ultimate injustice to Heidegger’s original meaning if the latter is something that can even be discerned. In short, I want to bring to life the utterance as if I were stating that about myself.

4 As did the early Church fathers (Western and Eastern), the greatest of which were Augustine and Maximus the Confessor, to Thomistic Scholasticism of the Middle Ages to the giants of the 20th century on the Protestant and Catholic sides alike, for example Barth and Rahner respectively. Christian theologians probe the depths of the Incarnation, the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the workings of the Holy Spirit in the earthly time of the Church as a witness to the Eucharistic presence of Jesus Christ who died for our sins and was raised. As Barth’s Church Dogmatics attest Christianity is always caught between the time of fulfillment (God sending the Son as an in-breaking event in human history) and time of witness (today’s earthly Church which descends from the first witnesses of Jesus) inspired by the Holy Spirit as to the meaning of Christ’s Resurrection and future return. Hence by contrast Heidegger is neither a Christian philosopher nor a Christian theologian in that sense.

5 This is in reference to the newness mentioned in the 1919 letter to Father Krebs where Heidegger announces his break from Catholic faith but not his profound interest in thinking Christianity and metaphysics in an unheard of way: “Epistemological insights that extend to the theory of historical knowledge have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me—but not Christianity and metaphysics, which, however [I now understand] in a new sense.” See Kisiel and Sheehan, p. 96.
make of this personal statement by Heidegger that Kisiel attaches to the notion of a ‘unique historical life?’ My hypothesis about Kisiel’s statement about Heidegger as a ‘philosopher of origins’ getting to the bottom/logos of Christian theology is singular. To re-inscribe oneself in the New Testament to the origin or source from which its proclamation arose is not an act of empirical historical or archaeological investigation. Rather, to re-inhabit the Word/the text from within and to carve out a new consciousness within the secret-inner-messianic consciousness of Jesus means a total alternation of our relational sense: it means a turning within, away from and out of the proclamation that has been handed down through history in theological doctrine and buttressed by the metaphysical foundations of the West. It means destroying theology (Western and Eastern) and its metaphysical ideas (Augustine to Hegel) to get at a new beginning, something unheard of in the history of Western philosophical thought. The question serves as a bridge to Being and Time, which is the ultimate focus of this paper.

Text

What stands before us is the entire problematic of reframing the question of the meaning of Being, which is the achievement of Heidegger’s main work Being and Time. This work includes time as the horizon to understand Being and the nexus of temporality and historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) to understand the appropriation of one’s own life and its temporal structure. It as if it were the question of Being – as a history unfolding- is really the question of a dynamic movement of an “I am” that is not equivalent to the historical destiny of a great person in history, say Isaac Newton. One can say ‘I am’ the question of Being and hence a ‘unique historical life,’ but the ‘I am’ is not tied to or located in a human subject. There is no intention here of reproducing the subject-object split that plagues Western philosophy since the birth of the Cogito in Descartes. Rather, the Being (I am) that questions Being’s meaning is “Dasein,” and the Being of Dasein in its historic singularity is the question of Being in terms of the root phenomenon of time. Dasein is the question of Being in terms of the timing and timeliness of the question of the meaning of Being in general.

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6 This is Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of the German term ‘historicality.’ The is not historiography, the history of interpretations of what history is, nor a theory of history in terms of its philosophical structure. 6 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, Harper and Row, 1962), p. 427. In footnote 2 on page 427, the translators refer us back to footnote 2 on page 31 of the Introduction to Being and Time in which Geschichtlichkeit as ‘historicality’ is contrasted with Historizität. Ibid., p. 31. The latter refers to the normal understanding of ‘being-historical’ as being-finite within time at a particular chronological-historical date. It can also mean being embedded in ‘historical present’ or a present that tries to understand itself in historical relation to the past, say when we think of events occurring in our present as the historical legacy of something that began in the past, say the Civil Rights movement in America. For more on the problem of time and history in 20th century philosophies of history, see Rajesh Sampath, Four-Dimensional Time (University Press of America, 1999).

7 Or rather, as the dynamic movement itself, not ‘in’ the movement. There is no metaphysical representations with their immediate sense of notional presence, such as “I am in motion” (like a train) or “I am motion” (gravitational expanse of the universe’s space-time). There is nothing spatial/physical about the question of movement in fundamental ontology.

8 That is, Dasein is a question, but it is not a subject that is questioned as to its subjectivity- a ‘rock, angel, man or God’- to use registers from Heidegger’s famous “The Letter on Humanism.” See David Farell Krell, ed., Basic Writings (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2008), p. 234. This is where many novices who, when first exposed to Heidegger, flounder by asking ‘what’ or ‘who’ Dasein ‘is.’ Dasein is not a subject, self, person, soul, ego or consciousness. As long as Dasein ‘is’ (with its many possibilities ‘to be’), however, it is incomplete. That’s all we know for sure. For a good recent overview of Being and Time, see Mark Wrathall and Max Murphy’s “An Overview of Being and Time” in Mark Wrathall, ed.,
History is temporalised not because it is in time (as an unchanging substrate) but because time constitutes the question of what it means for a historical life to unfold along with the attestation of that unfolding in a unique sense. To reckon the meaning of the question (of that unique historical life unfolding) is just as paramount to seeking the meaning or answer to the question of Being. This is what separates Heidegger’s undertaking from the entire history of metaphysics. Hence Being and Time is not concerned with history as traditionally understood—namely the dead object of the past (say a biography of Napoleon) or a future reflection on the journalistic present, say the re-election of the current U.S. President, once it will have become past. It is not concerned with the present period from which we derive the past or the future and all interrelations between the three dimensions of time in a mindless, iterative infinity. Ironically, being finite as time, and not in time, means transcending both the infinity of time as an endless passing of ‘nows’ and the negation of time as eternity or timelessness. More specifically, it means to transcend simultaneously both ideas of an ‘end’ and ‘endlessness.’ And a deeper, more uncanny destruction of the tradition indicates transcendence of the distinction between a.) the simultaneity of an end of linear time and the de-facto eternity that replaces it and b.) the succession of an end to time to an eternal state that presumably follows it (time). In short, to be finite time itself means we cannot turn to beings who live and die in time (say atheistic human beings) or the Being who by dying conquered death itself and was raised, namely Jesus Christ, or the God of Christianity.

In other words, to understand the Kisiel passage we must dive right into Division II of Being and Time, which in many ways is the transcendental philosophical reflection on the ‘facticity of the “I am” that is the unique historical life. Division II is replete with so many mysteries that are ripe for reconstruction but not for the purpose of understanding the aim and goal of fundamental ontology, i.e. or what is stated in the introduction to Being and Time. The unique historical life relates to that being which will reveal the buried ‘origin’ or logos of Christian theology itself.9 This means entering into perplexing statements that relate the “I am” to the

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9 And to state the obvious Christian theology has to do with the mystery of a certain figure, namely Jesus the historical man, construed as God. As Kierkegaard once stated this is the paradox of the ‘eternal becoming historical.’ From the Philosophical Fragments. However, for Heidegger, the point is not to dwell in this paradox as if it is readily accepted from the standpoint of Christian faith: that the eternal God became man in the Incarnation known as Jesus Christ. Heidegger is out to destroy all attempts to subsume time under eternity, temporally reconstitute the ‘I am’ in the now, relate time and eternity in some other category (kairos), or dialectically synthesise the difference of time and eternity in a new concept, i.e. a bastardised version of Hegel. As a matter of fact, Heidegger is not concerned with the history of the philosophy or theology of time and eternity period. This evident in his 1924 lecture The Concept of Time, trans. William McNeill (San Francisco: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992). The question is not what is time but ‘who is time?’ See The Concept of Time, trans. William McNeill (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992) p. 22E. He asks whether Dasein (being-there) is the question about being one’s time. See Ibid. Hakhamanesh Zangeneh takes it one step further in making a separation between the theological treatment of time as kairos and Being and Time’s exploration of ecstatic temporality. Zangeneh argues that although the early writing dealt with kairos, the time problem in Being and Time departs from it: “we thus claim that the ekstasis of authentic presence is neither reducible to an eschatological nor to a chronological kairos and furthermore, that the successor to kairos in Being and Time is more likely to be Jemeinigkeit than Augenblick.” See “Phenomenological Problems for the Kairological Reading of Augenblick in Being and Time,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19:4 (2011): 539. I will return to this thesis later in
mystery of time, but not in any simple ontic or human sense. Heidegger does not assume being-in-time as the starting point to understand the relational event of the being of time in terms of being as time and vice-versa. Indeed we must repeat what Heidegger asks in a poignant moment in the last chapter of Being and Time to consider the following: “All Dasein’s behavior is to be interpreted in terms of its Being—that is, in terms of temporality. We must show how Dasein as temporality temporalis a kind of behavior which relates itself to time by taking it into its reckoning.”

So here it is out in plain sight. Dasein’s Being is Temporality but not as an object of metaphysical speculation. Dasein as temporality is a temporalizing event that has to relate to time while reckoning it as a mystery. The singularity of such a reckoning of time as time is the mystery of a relation seeking to disclose itself. The reckoning of time is temporalised as an event relating to the reckoning. There has to be an own-most relation to time in the self-reckoning of time. Needless to say, Being, Time and Transcendence are not separate topics, but in their interrelated togetherness—as an Event—take us far beyond anything postulated in the history of Western metaphysics and therefore that canon (Western metaphysics) that constitutes the philosophical foundations of Christian theology.

When we say time ‘is,’ we automatically divorce time from being-present, which is normally used in the copula to connect a subject with a predicate. And when we inquire into being (the meaning of “is”) as time, we suspend the present, which tends to dominate two non-presents, namely the past and future, in the history of metaphysics. The crosswise negation of time as reducible to being and being as reducible to time has a long history in Heidegger’s reflections before and after Being and Time. However, my objective is not to trace this history and offer commentary. Instead my work takes a different turn.

the paper and question its fundamental assumptions. Simply put, I will not focus on kairos (the fulfillment of time in the Incarnation of the Son). Rather, I want to isolate the human Jesus’s being-towards-death transcendentally explicated in a manner irreducible to faith in comparison with Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein and being-towards-death in Being and Time. Neither Jesus’s apperception of death nor Dasein’s greatest possibility to be (‘death as the possibility of impossibility’) can be construed in ordinary, human terms. There is no concern here for religious registers of ‘guilt, anxiety, fallenness, temptation, trial and tribulation, suffering, humiliation, insecurity’ which is the legacy of Luther’s impact on Heidegger on the problem of sin. For those matters, see Karl Clifton-Soderstrom, “The phenomenology of religious humility in Heidegger’s reading of Luther,” Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2009): 171-200. My project, however, needs a being other than the human to probe the death problem for Jesus and Dasein.

10. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 457. Hakkamanesh Zangeneh takes it one step further in making a separation between the theological treatment of time as kairos and Being and Time’s exploration of ecstatic temporality. See “Phenomenological Problems for the Kaiological Reading of Augenblick in Being and Time.”

11. In the concluding moments to the introduction of Being and Time, Heidegger states: “Being is the transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of Dasein’s Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and necessity of the most radical Individuation. Every disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis.” Ibid., p. 62. For more on the problem of truth in Being and Time see Denis McManus’s “Heidegger on Skepticism, Truth, and Falsehood” in The Cambridge Companion to Being and Time, p. 239-259.

My hypothesis is nowhere to be found explicitly in *Being and Time*. To repeat the hypothesis: the relation between being and time in the secret messianic consciousness of a unique historical life, namely Jesus heading towards his death (but not His resurrection), requires an uncanny cohabitation of two entities, Jesus of the Gospels in the New Testament and Dasein of *Being and Time*, that will be transplanted within Division II of *Being and Time*. The purpose is to reconstruct the missing Division III.\(^{13}\) Having said that, the act is not one of historical reconstruction of a purely secular understanding of *Being and Time* as to replant it within the soil of theology. The work is not a defense of Christian theology and its complex faith structures.\(^{14}\) At stake is the revelation of truth itself, which means the enterprise is transcendental, and not ontically determined by any of the human sciences.\(^{15}\) However, juxtaposing Jesus and Dasein does not mean substituting one for the other in the attempt to discuss the other. But in this exercise the ‘unique historical life out of which and towards which’ I will philosophise is an attempt to articulate the missing Division III of *Being and Time*. At stake is the revelation of the *Being of God’s time* and the *Time of God’s being itself*.\(^{16}\)

This requires the ‘radical individuation’ to think from out of and towards the ‘unique historical life’ that is the very Being of the questioner, namely Dasein, which necessitates a transcendental reckoning of time as a self-relation: the only Being that can reveal time for what it ‘is’ above and beyond beings – and hence transcendentally – but *to* humans (or beings in time who live and die) is God. But what God, whose God? Saying that God ‘is’ Being, or a being, is too simple: that would be a problem for Christian theology and its indefatigable history. Relating God to the ontological difference of Being and beings is a first step, but not the last; that is a project for the philosophy of religion. What is not spoken of here is the God of Christian dogmatic faith (as described in the New Testament’s proclamation by Paul and interpreted in the history of systematic constructions of dogma). Rather, we speak of the *Being of God’s Time* appropriated out of and towards the hidden logos or origin of Christian truth. That is we speak out of and towards the source called the missing division III of *Being and Time*.

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13 I am referring to the title of the section in Part I of *Being and Time*, namely ‘time and Being,’ which is mentioned on the concluding pages of the Introduction to *Being and Time* called Section 8: Design of The Treatise. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 64. As everyone knows this missing Division III was never published with the first two divisions of *Being and Time*.

14 One can admire the great philosophical attempts in 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century systematic theology to reckon the mystery of time, history and being, namely Barth, Tillich, Rahner and Pannenberg.

15 That is any philosophy that begins from the standpoint of the human being (say any analytic philosophy that has its roots in empiricism or logical positivism or moral psychology) or any natural or social science that reflects on the nature of human beings, i.e. biology, sociology, anthropology, psychology, economics, etc. This - as Heidegger attests in the introduction to *Being and Time* – also has to include theology, which tries to explicate faith in terms of the relation of human beings to God. When theology searches for foundations to this relation without first questioning the meaning of Being itself, then it is no different from the ontic human sciences. Ibid., p. 30-31.

16 Jesus says “I am the truth, the way and the life” (Gospel of John, 14:6). From that point, the “I am” is linked to truth, which is linked to life as motion and hence time, but not a life in time. Jesus says “I am not of this world” (Gospel of John 18:36). This is the life of time and the time of life. This is the ultimate life called time. To appropriate this event, and turn it around so that it stands outside of itself (outside the faith that proclaims Jesus Christ as God) is ecstatic indeed. This is precisely what this paper will argue. It is an appropriation of this religious story, which requires its total transmogrification, within the philosophical categories offered in partial forms throughout *Being and Time*; and the strangeness of the undertaking makes the work utterly opposed to any kind of theological justification for Christianity.
The doubling of Jesus in a repetition of the original points to a figure that is not quite a ‘2\textsuperscript{nd} coming.’ Therein lies the justification to reread Division II of *Being and Time* while appropriating it to reconfigure the figure of Jesus beyond Christian theology in a transcendental philosophical act: for Being is transcendence and the ‘phenomenological truth or disclosing of Being’ as transcendence is transcendental truth.\(^{17}\) To repeat, however, the ‘one’ who asks about the question of the meaning of Being as transcendence ‘is’ Dasein, and Dasein ‘is’ at its root *temporality*. The highest mystery is the saying that temporality ‘is’ at all without saying that it is present like a thing by being divided by what is no longer, or past, and yet to be, or future. The most radical individuation that is a unique historical life absorbs and hence evacuates all of metaphysics and theology into the singular act of articulation. Time has to become Other to what it has been traditionally conceived in Western philosophy and religion. And this articulation will be the missing Division III of *Being and Time*.

So this investigation begins with several crucial distinctions and relations between the way *Being and Time* discusses how Dasein is ‘its time’ and how its being’s meaning is rooted in the phenomenon of temporality and the larger ‘horizon’ that is called time by which we have any chance to understand Being. We must inquire deeply into these structures while inscribing them in and within the sayings by Jesus on his time and hour that run rampant throughout the Gospels. Inversely, we need to take those statements and suture them back into the blank spaces of Division II to see what remains unarticulated. What is unarticulated can be articulated as the missing Division III.

**John 12: 27**: “I am troubled now. Yet what should I say? ‘Father, save me from this hour?’ But it was for this purpose that I came to this hour…”\(^{18}\)

The question is how to re-inhabit this quote and speak from within it without driving towards the end result of the Gospels—the trial, death and resurrection of Jesus as the Christ. A certain fear and trembling takes us over when we try to stay with this quote. It reflects the peak anxiety of a man who as God must die as a man to reveal the true nature of God’s purpose, which is the conquest of death as something final. The anxiety is not ontic or derived from some bodily-cognitive psychology. The hour permits the recollection of a resolute decision to come to one’s time but for a purpose that will transcend all time. Death will become other to itself in the moment of its own eclipse but not before it happens like it happens to any human, i.e. like a death sentence. Jesus was born to come to this hour; the purpose of his being was to come to this hour. The double movement, the approach to the hour and the hour approaching, however, is not one of a being flowing in linear time as it ages while time itself remains unchanged (Kant’s notion of substance as an analogy of experience in the *Critique of Pure Reason*).\(^{19}\)

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\(^{17}\) *Being and Time*, p. 62.


\(^{19}\) One can show that in an entirely different attempt to Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* struggles with this very issue in “Revealed Religion” and “Absolute Knowing” the last sections of the work: (CC.) Religion and (DD.) Absolute Knowing. See G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). We will return to this issue because Heidegger’s *Being and Time* ends with an all-out confrontation with Hegel’s *Phenomenology* on the problem of Spirit, the temporalizing of temporality and movement. Prior to all of his however is Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* on the question of motion, which cannot be ignored. Heidegger knew this throughout his life and in several important lecture courses on Aristotle beginning in 1922.
Hence we do not move to an idea of the death of death, a negation of negation, and the resumption of time (which means everything must come to an end) back into eternity.

*Being and Time* re-inscribed in the New Testament Gospels to expound the nature of time for God’s death is tantamount to writing the missing Division III of *Being and Time*. And yet we know that Division III never appeared and that is why it is ‘missing.’ Why else would *Being and Time* declare in the last moment of Division II that time itself is the horizon for understanding Being, which is transcendence or God, and phenomenological disclosure of Being as transcendental truth, i.e. revealing the truth of God or the apocalypse, which means revelation or disclosure of revelation itself? Time is the horizon for understanding God? And then why would the title of the alleged Division III of *Being and Time* be called ‘time and Being?’ Could this point to ‘time and God’s Being’ or ‘God’s time and Being?” as an interrelational event of the truth of disclosure and the disclosure truth? But what is spoken of here is neither succession nor simultaneity within the interrelational event. My hypothesis is that the missing Division III was pointing to the time of God’s Being (the event of choosing death) and the Being of God’s time (the nature of that choice) revealed, which means a unique relation between God, His time and his approach towards death. But to repeat, nothing in the history of Christian theology, particularly its Aristotelian metaphysical foundations in medieval scholasticism, can help us in this endeavor. It means overcoming the dogmatic proclamation of Christian truth: that one must believe in the Resurrection, which overcame death, and resumers either a time that goes on forever as if the life before death is similar to the life after death; or it negates time itself in an invisible, amorphous timelessness or etherealernity that is promised by faith, i.e. a limitless cloud of love. Either way, for religious belief (not Dasein), death has to be crossed over to another side that can never been seen but only believed.

Hence the full revelation of what Being ‘is’ means revealing what the Being of the ‘Christian God’s time’ is as much as it is about the time of the Christian God’s Being coming to an End; and that is not something that merely repeats the doctrines of Christian faith—namely the 1st Coming-Incarnation, Trinity, Christology, the idea of the parousia or 2nd coming in Paul’s corpus or Gospel sayings attributed to Jesus about eschatology—“You will see the Son of Man coming in the clouds” (Matthew 26: 64). Nor does it remain with the content that we have in Divisions I and II of *Being and Time*, namely the ontological difference of Being and beings, the question of the meaning of Being, Dasein whose Being is the question, grounded Care, grounded in temporality whereby time is the horizon for understanding Being. However, the

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20 This also means we cannot follow those attempts to say that *Being and Time* merely conceals its derivation and dependence upon Christian theology precisely in its avowed and explicit attempt to distance itself from theology and relegate the later to ontic science like all other uncritical, non-primordial sciences devised by the human mind. For a critique of *Being and Time*’s illusory secularism and atheism and its occluded dependence on Christian theology, see Cf. Fergus Kerr, *Immortal Longings Versions of Transcending Humanity* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), p. 47: “Heidegger’s attitude to Christian theology, hostile at one level, overtly and explicitly so, attributing the monstrous invention of the transcendental subject to Christian theology, is also proprietorial, indeed exploitative of and even parasitical upon Christian theology...It may be said, without much exaggeration, that almost every philosophical innovation in *Sein und Zeit* may easily be traced to a theological source.” For the opposite claim, see Zangeneh: “It is our argument that the methodological and architectonic strictures of *Sein und Zeit* prevent assimilating the earlier concept of kairos to the Augenblick of authentic temporality.” Zangeneh, p. 540. Both of these statements may be true even though they contradict one another, but it is not the concern of my paper to resolve the debate. I am setting out to write the missing Division III by writing Division I and II of *Being and Time* into the *New Testament* to shoot out another text; and I not trying to derive *Being and Time* from the biblical theology of the *New Testament*. Only one committed to Christian faith would attempt that derivation.
event decides on the fate of the Christian God (beyond Christian faith) and how we understand time anew on the basis of the event.\textsuperscript{21} Then only can we really see the full force and intention of \textit{Being and Time} while trying to surpass it.

Speaking against God- opposing God, being prior to God and taking the place of God. A fourfold event. How this is done becomes the overriding question. Re-inscribing in the New Testament Gospels’ sayings by Jesus about His time, hour, day and death an appropriation of Division II of \textit{Being and Time} on death, time, and historicality will yield the missing Division III of \textit{Being and Time}. But the event – ‘the moment of vision’ (Augenblick) - of this complex movement (Bewegtheit) of re-inscription and appropriation is irreducible to both the \textit{New Testament} and \textit{Being and Time}.\textsuperscript{22} The entwining (non-circular and non-linear) movement is a relational event whose ontological consequences have to be explicated in this investigation. One can question the importance of all these abstractions and the ultimate intention behind all these aggressive pontifications.

\textsuperscript{21} I contrast my work from that of the polymath philosopher Alain Badiou who relies on mathematical complexities within a neo-Marxist philosophical bent to challenge the way French philosophy has conceived of the event, for example Derridean deconstruction or the poststructuralist philosophies of Gilles Deleuze. I intend to appropriate the deep linguistic biblical registers of the New Testament Greek and the Hebrew Bible while constructing new ontological content that arises out of a reconstruction of Division II of \textit{Being and Time}: the latter as we all know concludes with a confrontation with Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}. As far as I can tell I cannot find even a trace of this project in Badiou’s philosophical works.

\textsuperscript{22} Ultimately my investigation will require a return to the 1920-21 \textit{Phenomenology of Religious Life} lectures, particularly Heidegger’s remarks on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Letter of Thessalonians Chapter 2, which introduces the problem of the Antichrist. See \textit{The Phenomenology of Religious Life}, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2004), p. 75-79 and 109-110. Needless to say what Heidegger describes in those lectures about time, the Antichrist and eschatology is not readily apparent in Division II of \textit{Being and Time} that discusses such topics as authentic ecstatic temporality, the everyday, inauthentic registers of time, within-time-ness as the source of the ordinary conception of (infinite, linear) time, world-time and datability, and finally the discussion about the connection between Spirit and Time in Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}. Furthermore, Heidegger discusses Paul’s Thessalonians and not sayings by Jesus about time and death in the Gospels, particularly the Gospel of John. The latter is my aim in reconstructing the mission Division III without repeating the statements in either the \textit{Phenomenology of Religious Life} lectures or Divisions I and II of \textit{Being and Time}. Therefore I do not feel need to establish a connection between the early lectures on religion and \textit{Being and Time} to advance my hypothesis about the missing Division III. Having said that, I will have to return to the early lectures on religion to make the separation clear. For more on the connection between the early religious life of Heidegger, his appropriation of the phenomenological method for religious study and its consequences for the development that led to the conceptualisation of \textit{Being and Time}, see Alfred Denker, “\textit{Being and Time: A Carefully Planned Accident?”} in \textit{The Cambridge Companion}, p. 54-83. Also see Matheson Russell, “Phenomenology and Theology: Situating Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion,” \textit{Sophia} 50:4 (2011): 641-655. Russell argues that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is not merely a secularisation of primitive Christian faith (the claim of Macquarrie, Caputo, and Dreyfus), and avowedly, on the surface, one cannot simply find the possibility of Christian faith (whether medieval Scholasticism or Luther’s reformed/destruction of the metaphysical tradition) in \textit{Being and Time}. See Russell, p. 647. With regard to the relation of the early religious lectures and \textit{Being and Time} he states, “To the extent that his phenomenology of religious life \textit{does} prepare the way for the account of human Dasein in \textit{Being and Time}, nothing essentially ‘religious’ remains in it.” Ibid., p. 651. This corroborates what Sean McGrath says- “In \textit{Being and Time}…the theological has so many qualifiers around it that we are discouraged from asking questions about it.” See \textit{Heidegger: a (very) critical introduction} (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008), p. ix. McGrath will go on to question the tenability of the separation of ontology from theology. For an interesting analysis of Heidegger, St. Paul and the idea of eschatology, see Denis McManus, “Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and St. Paul on the Last Judgment: On the Roots and the Significance of the ‘Theoretical Attitude,’ \textit{British Journal of the History of Philosophy} (2012): 1-22.
I am not concerned with whether Heidegger’s philosophy is a ‘secularisation’ of primitive Christianity buried beneath the excrescence of a dead medieval Scholasticism and the ‘onto-theological constitution of its metaphysics.’ Nor I am concerned with seeking out the theological roots of Heidegger’s philosophy even though he and others may claim that his philosophy is rabidly a-theistic. To repeat, this paper is not interested in intellectual history and or a genealogical reconstruction of Heidegger’s true intentions and the contradictions that are displayed in his published works and what that could mean for the relation between theology and the philosophy of religion. We have to tread a path, making it new, as opposed to discovering a new path that has yet to be taken. Creation is harder than discovery; the former is active and intentional, albeit obscure, and the latter is passive, even accidental, albeit something that can be more readily followed.


24 If one is interested in that line of investigation, see Matheson Russell’s article which provides a good summary of the history of works on the topic while adding his own nuanced claim: Heidegger’s theological roots (the break from medieval Scholasticism and the movement to Protestant thinkers such as Luther and Kierkegaard) make problematic Heidegger’s own claims about the incompatibility of two poles—namely fundamental ontology (Being and Time as a new type of philosophical inquiry or questioning that destroys the ossified history of metaphysics) and the non-philosophical/non-systematic theological attempts to understand in existential terms the mysteries of Christian faith in terms of vital/living impulse and not as a system of concepts.

25 We are inspired by the concluding moments to the preface of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: “But from this we must often distinguish the more gradual effect which corrects, too, contemptuous censure, and gives some writers an audience only after a time, while others after a time have no audience left.” See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 45.