<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Notes on Contributors</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ethics of Disobedience in Shakespeare’s Henry V</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jason Gleckman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Proper Action and Virtue: An Essay on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Karuzis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy and the Demands of Love</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Piper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Temporality and Historicality” in Heidegger’s Being and Time as the</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clue to the Origin of Christian Theology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajesh Sampath</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes on Contributors

**Editor: Michael O’Sullivan** is an associate professor in the Department of English at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His publications include Academic barbarism, universities and inequality (2016), The Future of English in Asia: Perspectives on language and literature (2016), and The incarnation of language: Joyce, Proust, and a philosophy of the flesh (2008).

**Jason Gleckman** is Associate Professor of English at the Chinese University of Hong Kong where he teaches courses in composition, film, and early modern literature. His work on Shakespeare and other English authors has appeared in such journals as Early Modern Literary Studies, Moreana, Reformation, Texas Studies in Literature and Language, Shakespeare, and Spenser Studies.

**Joseph Karuzis** is a native of Boston, Massachusetts, USA. He is a long term resident of Japan. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy at Hokkaido University. He is currently a postdoctoral researcher in the Graduate School of Letters and a faculty member in the Graduate School of Environmental Earth Sciences at Hokkaido University. Dr. Karuzis’ main research interests are in ancient Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle.

**Dr. Mark Piper** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at James Madison University. His principal research interests are in normative ethical theory, with a special concentration on the topics of autonomy and well-being. He also has interests in applied ethics and metaethics. He is the co-editor of Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender (Oxford University Press, 2014), and has published articles in numerous anthologies and American and European journals.

**Rajesh Sampath** is Associate Professor of the Philosophy of Justice, Rights and Social Change. He is the Associate Director of the Graduate Program in Sustainable International Development and Lead Investigator at the Center for Global Development and Sustainability at the Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University. His research is on the intersection of philosophy, comparative religious studies, theories of justice and sustainable development.
As we know, one important component of the methodology of deconstruction involves analyzing the logic of binary oppositions, particularly those binaries wielding great cultural and ideological influence, such as presence/absence, speech/writing, male/female, etc. A deconstructive methodology approaches such binaries from a variety of perspectives, including identifying them and explicating the structure in which they mutually function; this structure usually means that one element of the binary pair largely defines the structure of the whole, dominating and marginalizing the other. Deconstruction also incorporates historical processes and does so in at least two ways; first, by what Jacques Derrida in *Positions* calls ‘a phase of overturning,’ an effort to reverse ‘the hierarchy at a given moment.’ Perhaps more importantly, however, is the second mode of this Derridean ‘double science,’ transcending the very structure of a given binary opposition by articulating ‘the irruptive emergence of a new “concept,” a concept that can no longer be, and never could be, included in the previous regime’ (41-2).

In examining the processes of historical change as they relate to binary oppositions, we might look at one of the most powerful binary oppositions characterizing the early modern period: that between obedience and disobedience. In particular, this paper argues that Shakespeare’s *Henry V* offers a demonstration of the complex interactions between these terms and also outlines ways in which their dynamic was being transformed in the early modern period. Specifically, I argue that in this play, we can observe disobedience becoming a virtue in its own right, an essential quality of the ambitious English individual. In effect, *Henry V* offers a new pedagogy of obedience and disobedience wherein it becomes less and less possible to distinguish the two traits.

I

The early modern period was one that praised obedience highly and vehemently opposed disobedience. The Elizabethan homily entitled ‘An Homily Against Disobedience and Willful Rebellion’ prepared in 1571 in the light of the ‘Northern Rebellion’ against Queen Elizabeth I offers a concise reminder of what E.M.W. Tillyard was to famously call *The Elizabethan World Picture*, a complex model of the universe that insisted on the interactions of all created things and, crucially, on the necessity of obedience in maintaining this world order. The homily begins by emphasizing that people are the obedient subjects of God and the very fall of man resulted from disobedience to God’s commands:

And as GOD would haue man to be his obedient subiect, so did he make all earthly creatures subiect vnto man, who kept their due obedience vnto man, so long as man remayned in his obedience vnto GOD: in the which obedience if man had continued still, there had beene no poourty, no diseases, no sickenesse, no death, nor other miseries wherewith mankinde is now infinitely and most miserably afflicted and oppressed (Homily II.21.1-15-21)
Eventually, the homily comes to the question: ‘What shall Subiects doe then? shall they obey valiant, stout, wise, and good Princes, and contenme, disobey, and rebell against children being their Princes, or against vndiscreet and euill gouernours?’ (Homily II.21.1-177-9). The brief, predictable answer – ‘God forbid’ -- stresses that obedience is so essential to the proper functioning of the world, in both its political and metaphysical dimensions, that disobeying even wicked rulers can produce chaos: ‘all sinnes that may bee committed against man, who seeth not that they bee contained in rebellion?’ (Homily II.21.3-653-4). This homily drives its point home with statements such as the following:

Wherefore good people, let vs, as the children of obedience, feare, the dreadfull execution of GOD, and liue in quiet obedience, to bee the children of euerlasting Saluation. For as heauen is the place of good obedient subiectes, and hell the prison and dungeon of rebels against GOD and their Prince: so is that Realme happy where most obedience of subiects doth appeare, being the verie figure of heauen. (Homily II.21.3-816-21)

Homilies such as this one represented the official position of the Church of England and were ordered to be read weekly in Sunday worship services. In their effective conjunction of religious and political ideologies (and particularly by raising the specter of civil war) such documents set the tone for authoritative discourse in the early modern English nation. And as Tillyard’s book makes abundantly clear, such language was by no means restricted to the pulpit and the crown. Tillyard opens his study by citing similar sentiments from a literary source, Ulysses’s speech on disobedience from Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida, a speech that analogises between the position of the Sun in the heavens and the monarch on the throne and insists on the chaos which will result if ‘degree’ is not maintained and the subordinate does not obey the superior.

In short, obedience was the watchword of the early modern period, the foundation of the relationships between parents and children, husbands and wives, masters and servants, kings and subjects, aristocrats and commoners, and most importantly, humans and God; both the Old and New Testaments are veritable textbooks about the virtues of faithful obedience and the sinfulness of distrusting God. Early modern Protestant writers such as Luther, Tyndale, and Calvin all wrote on the necessity of obedience to secular authorities, and Catholic writers too emphasised the need to obey the teachings of the Church.1 Almost a century after the ‘Homily Against Disobedience’ was written, John Milton’s epic Paradise Lost begins in almost the same manner, referring to ‘Man’s First Disobedience and the Fruit’ thereof (1.1); it is certainly possible to argue that Paradise Lost is a sustained paean to the virtues of obedience.

I would stress here that even on occasions when disobedience was encouraged, it was usually conveyed as obedience to some higher principle. For example, in King Lear, the nameless servant who tries to stop his master Cornwall from blinding the helpless Gloucester says: ‘I have served you ever since I was a child/but better service have I never done you/than now to bid you hold.’ In his analysis of the scene, Richard Strier argues persuasively that here ‘Shakespeare is presenting the most radical possible sociopolitical act in a way that can only be interpreted as calling for his audience’s approval’ (119). Yet even as Strier uses this example to stress Shakespeare’s skepticism towards the power of secular authority, he must also acknowledge that the servant’s act is not only an act of disobedience, but also a display of...

---

1 For useful summaries of the role played by obedience in early modern England, see the essays by Richard Rex and Richard L. Greaves.
obedience, even loyalty. The servant rejects his master’s spoken wishes but he obeys higher laws – those of his God and his ‘conscience’. These forces influence him to serve his master’s better nature instead of his master’s angry impulses. To resist or even disobey a king can be obedience to God.

Strier in his essay seeks in his essay to find spaces for disobedience in Shakespeare’s world, but it seems that in the early modern period the language of disobedience has little maneuvering space; it always becomes transformed into obedience to something higher. Thus the challenge posed by competing forms of obedience (for instance, in King Lear, a servant’s conflicting duties to his master and to his conscience) are reconciled simply by hierarchizing the demands of obedience; when God and king conflict, the virtuous person must obey God. For some, of course, obeying God was by definition to obey the rulers He had selected; the ‘Homily Against Disobedience’ presents this view. For others, however, obedience to God and obedience to kings could be fundamentally different. Catholics who opposed Queen Elizabeth I did so on the basis of obedience to the Roman Catholic Church; Protestant radicals, such as John Ponet, who advocated the murder of Catholic Queen Mary I argued their position in almost identical ways, stressing that obedience was owed to God and not to unlawfully empowered princes.

As can be seen from these examples and from the perspective of a deconstructive methodology, obedience has numerous ways of consolidating its conceptual power in both political and religious contexts. In early modern consciousness, it is readily associated with such ideas as ‘law’ and ‘conscience’ and actions like ‘love’ and ‘service.’ As Anthony Low points out in a discussion of obedience in Paradise Lost, ‘Only love can make service palatable. Without love, service to God becomes nothing but empty knee-worship, “warbl’d Hymns” and “Forc’t Hallelujahs”’ to use the words of Satan’s cynical cohort, Mammon’ (Low 353). In Paradise Lost and in Christian thought generally, such obedience is so powerful as to ally itself with terms that one might expect to usher in an ethos of disobedience. For instance, Christian “freedom” for Milton means not the absolute freedom to do whatever what wants, but a freedom that is keenly aware of its responsibilities to obey those in power.

Of course as obedience becomes associated with an extensive range of virtues, so too disobedience becomes associated with such sins as perverse self-will and dissimulating hypocrisy. In this sense, disobedience is constructed as the dangerous simulacrum of obedience, that merely superficial loyalty that characterises flatterers and traitors. As Christopher Pye points out in a discussion of treason in early modern England, some modes of disobedience could be so terrifying as to become unspeakable, opening the mind to thoughts and concepts that simply should not be entertained. As Pye notes, when it came to early modern treason, even thinking about it was a punishable crime (117).

As a result of such cultural constructions, it may have been nearly impossible to imagine an ethical alternative to obedience in the early modern consciousness. For example, John Milton’s contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, had a very different view of social relationships than Milton and a very different vocabulary. But for both writers, disobedience is almost inseparable from rebellion and destruction, narrow-minded and shortsighted self-will. In Hobbes’s blunt formulation: ‘every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to
save, or destroy him’ (153). While Milton would reject the brutality of the language he would not object to Hobbes’s insistence on obedience as the ultimate guarantor of social stability.

In the light of these examples, a difficult question can be raised: ‘what would it mean to articulate a viable theory of disobedience in the early modern period?’ This possibility is suggested, perhaps, by Christopher Marlowe's plays where subversion is entertained for the sake of it, or at least for the sake of entertainment. Other plays, including Shakespeare's *Henry V* also suggest this option; Henry V claims, for instance, that the villainous Lord Scroop can have no reason to rebel against him, except a love of ‘the name of traitor’ for its own sake (2.2.120).

Yet while this is one of the positions expressed in *Henry V* in relation to obedience and disobedience, the play as a whole has a more complex view of the relationship between the two terms. Indeed, I think *Henry V* offers a fuller exploration of the concepts of obedience and disobedience in relation to English politics and nationalism than that seen in playwrights such as Marlowe. This paper argues in effect that the play encourages members of the English nation to conceive themselves as both obedient and disobedient simultaneously.

II

On the surface, such a reading of *Henry V* seems to contradict the impulses of a play that appears to encourage the most emphatic modes of both secular and religious obedience.² In *Henry V*, civil rebellion is characterised as the greatest of sins, associated with ‘treason and murder’ (2.2.105), directly inspired by the forces of Satan (2.2.111-125), and fully analogous to the original ‘fall of man’ (2.2.142). As Grey, one of the traitors, puts it after Henry upbraids him: “Never did faithful subject more rejoice/At the discovery of most dangerous treason/Than I do at this hour joy o’er myself,/Prevented from a damned enterprise” (2.2.160-4). It is as if Grey rejoices to see the great chain of being restored, with Henry V as God’s properly chosen monarch, even if the cost of such a recognition is his own imminent death. The play’s insistence on presenting Henry as both religiously and politically glorious is offered early on, so that audiences cannot fail to overlook it. The Archbishop of Canterbury comments, privately, about Henry’s qualities as follows: ‘the breath no sooner left his father’s body/But that his wildness, mortified in him,/Seemed to die too; yea, at that very moment . . . ‘ (1.1.25-7). By stressing the instantaneous nature of the change from Prince Hal to Henry V, Shakespeare deliberately mystifies politics by evoking instead the concept of the king’s two bodies, a theory that fully participates in the logic of obedience as a divinely sanctioned concept. At the very moment Hal becomes king, he serves not his own impulses but acts as a conduit for rules of universal order that are ultimately guaranteed by God. Thus those who

² For instance, in their well-known essay on *Henry V*, Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield write that ‘*Henry V* is only in one sense “about” national unity: its obsessive preoccupation is insurrection’ (216). Hence, ‘What really torments Henry is the inability to ensure obedience’ (218). Interestingly, the evidence cited for this claim involves such things as Henry’s contempt for his people, such as his references to the common man as a ‘wretched slave’ and a ‘lackey.’ To Dollimore and Sinfield, these remarks indicate ‘the king’s fear of being disobeyed and opposed’ (218). This essay argues, however, that the king’s fears are more focused on losing the war with France, and in such a context the contempt he displays for some of his subjects also includes a distaste for their obedience.
follow the king’s command and fight on Crispin’s’ Day will be freshly remembered always -- as will all the conditions of this battle in which God fought on the side of England. In short, one can argue that disobedience in *Henry V* is figured as demonic and perverse, associated with unproductive subversion for its own sake.

And yet disobedience is also praised in this play, figured as an interpersonal mode that can empower both the subject and recipient of disobedience. Moreover, it is in the surprising context of war and the proper behavior of soldiers – a context that might seem to emphasise obedience more than any other -- that such productive disobedience takes shape. To begin with a small example, *Henry V* refers at one point to a captain who serves him loyally, Sir Thomas Erpingham. Henry imagines that Erpingham lacks confidence in him and that Erpingham believes England will lose the upcoming battle at Agincourt. Henry is asked whether or not Erpingham has ‘told his thought to the King’ (4.1.100) and Henry responds, ‘No, nor it is not meet he should. . . .no man should possess him [the king] with any appearance of fear, lest he by showing it, should dishearten his army’ (4.1.101-12). Here, Erpingham is portrayed as a good soldier and perhaps more, worthy of being a good leader. What makes him so is his ability to take the initiative when it comes to determining the nature of obedience. He decides for himself what information to share with his king, and although his decision is an obedient one (since it conforms with the king's own wish not to be informed of his soldiers’ fears) it is also disobedient to the degree that it demonstrates lack of faith in the king’s mission and by extension the level of divine approval given for that mission. Erpingham calls the king’s men outcasts, ‘even as men wrecked upon a sand, that look to be washed off at the next tide’ (4.1.98-9); he does not fervently believe in the king’s ability to carry out his aims, suggesting lack of faith if not disloyalty, qualities usually associated with disobedience. Yet Erpingham’s disobedience is fully approved by the king since it aids the king’s objectives. Erpingham, in other words, is concerned with the success of the king's mission and does not wish to jeopardise it; yet at the same time, he believes that true obedience at least occasionally involves withholding part of oneself from the figure to whom obedience is owed.

When the stakes of battle become even greater, the potential disobedience of Henry's soldiers becomes an essential element of the king’s power. As he threatens the French at Harfleur, Henry makes clear that his very authority stems from the potential disobedience of those soldiers whom Henry cannot control when they are ravaging a city:

> We as may bootless spend our vain command  
> Upon th’enraged soldiers in their spoil  
> As send precepts to the leviathan  
> To come ashore. (3.3.24-7)

Yet this lack of control is both a weakness, a limitation of the king’s ability to command obedience, and a strength, since the disobedience of his soldiers can also serve the king’s larger aims.
In the play’s most extensive discussion of the nature of obedience, Henry debates its meaning and significance with two of his common soldiers, Bates and Williams, on the eve of the St. Crispin’s Day battle. The men’s conversation begins by suggesting a tremendous value for the virtue of obedience. Bates says that he is a loyal subject to the king: ‘we know enough if we know we are the King’s subjects. If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us’ (4.1.131-3). Bates thinks that to obey a king is not only to be a dutiful subject but also to be a faithful religious man, one who will be forgiven by God for the crimes he may commit as a result of his obedience to his lawful king.

Yet by the time the conversation is over, obedience has lost much of its value. In the first place, as Vivienne Westbrook points out in her discussion of obedience in this play, Bates’s obedience is insufficiently fervent; in the early modern period, following earlier configurations of Christian obedience, “mindless obedience to the Law was not Obedience at all” (78). In this sense, despite his uncompromising devotion to the king’s cause, Bates’s mode of obedience is disturbingly passive; obedience becomes a lesser virtue, appropriate to weak-minded followers. Alexander Leggatt in this context calls it “an equivocal virtue, freeing underlings from moral responsibility” (133). Indeed, by the time the scene ends, both Bates and Williams have specifically repudiated Bates’s original view of obedience. Williams says, ‘’Tis certain, every man that does ill, the ill upon his own head; the King is not to answer it,’ and Bates himself concurs: ‘I do not desire he should answer for me, and yet I determine to fight lustily for him’ (4.1.185-8).

It appears that obedience is not precisely what is being solicited by Henry V nor, by extension, by the Christian God who is so often evoked in the play. Such obedience certainly does not provide the subject with many rewards. In theological terms, obedience to a secular ruler cannot bring the subject closer to God as Bates would have it; it cannot ‘wipe’ away the crimes that are committed in its name. In contrast, ‘every subject’s soul is his own’ (4.1.176-7) and, as Henry puts it, obedience to one’s master is only one of our many duties. The son who is responsible for his father’s ‘merchandise’ (4.1.148) or the servant who carries his employer’s ‘money’ (4.1.152) is not necessarily divinely blessed for fulfilling that particular duty. Obedience thus takes shape as one duty among others; to use the terminology of Shakespeare’s Reformation age, the damned (or reprobate) soul as well as the saved (or elect) person is capable of obedience, and even of doing good as a result of obedient behavior.

Perhaps more interesting than the weakness of obedience in theological terms is that it cannot greatly help the subject in a secular forum either. After the soldiers depart, Henry presents his first and only soliloquy, wherein he sarcastically reinforces the conclusions of the previous scene:

Upon the king! “Let us our lives, our souls,
Our debts, our careful wives,
Our children and our sins lay on the King!”

We must bear all. O hard condition,
Twin-born with greatness, subject to the breath

Of every fool whose sense no more can feel

But of his own wringing! (4.1.227-33)

People give their obedience to their king and expect some reward for doing so, but Henry refuses to provide one. He will not take responsibility for the ‘sins’ of his subjects, any more than he will accept the burden of their ‘lives . . . souls . . . debts . . . careful wives [or] . . . children.’ To submit to such demands would be to cater to the ‘breath/of every fool’ and Henry does not intend to create a nation of fools. He mocks ‘the slave’ who ‘in gross brain little wots/What watch the King keeps to maintain the peace,/Whose hours the peasant best advantages’ (278-81). Instead of admiring peace-loving peasants, Henry seems to consider them inert and unproductive, contributing little to their nation. In contrast, Henry seeks those who, like himself, are on the ‘watch’ for chances to benefit from their opportunities. In this play, the primary opportunity is the war against France, but in Shakespeare’s time, there were many other ways to achieve success in expansionist enterprises – not only through Essex’s attempts to subdue Ireland (a significant subtext of Henry V) but in other economic contexts as well. In this challenging environment, the ‘obedience’ associated with the common man, whether peasant or soldier, is not praised. In fact, Henry, in his discussion of war as God’s battlefield (4.1.165-72), almost implies that the very purpose of this obedient soldier is to die in the ‘king’s quarrel’ which, in Henry’s syntax, seems indistinguishable from the ‘vengeance’ of God: ‘War is his beadle, war is his vengeance; so that here men are punished for before breach of the King’s laws in now the King’s quarrel.’ (4.1.168-70). Henry’s subjects, in other words, are perhaps better off if they do not rely on their king who will not ‘bear all’ their burdens for them (4.1.230).

However, in contrast to the pathetic ‘wretched slave’ who ‘can sleep so soundly’ every night with ‘a body filled and vacant mind,’ thinking that others will take responsibility for him, there is another mode of soldiership hinted at in Henry V, one that has more affinities with Henry’s own complex rhetorical approaches. As he continues to discuss the nature of war with Bates and Williams, Henry offers a lesson to these men:

Therefore should every soldier in the wars do as every sick man in his bed, wash every mote out of his conscience, and dying so, death is to him advantage; or not dying, the time was blessedly lost wherein such preparation was gained; and in him that escapes,
it were not sin to think that, making God so free an offer, he let him outlive that day to see his greatness and to teach others how they should prepare (4.1.177-84).

These words provide more than a traditional theological consolation for dying courageously as a good Christian. They also offer a lesson to survivors: that the man who outlives the king’s battles can use this very survival to empower himself. The possessive pronoun ‘his’ that precedes ‘greatness’ might refer not only to God but to the soldier himself, one who has become ‘greater’ not only through fighting but through effective self-presentation; what such a soldier is preparing for is thus not only to die but how to present himself after the battle is over.

The most famous speech in Henry V, the Crispin’s Day speech, provides further evidence for this line of interpretation. Its purpose is not only to urge the soldiers to fight and win but to imagine the beneficial political consequences of doing so. In some of Shakespeare’s most potent writing, Henry V says that “He that outlives this day and comes safe home/Will stand a-tiptoe when this day is named/And rouse him at the name of Crispian. . . Then will he strip his sleeve and show his scars,/And say “These wounds I had on Crispin’s day” . . .’ (4.3.41-48). The speech continues, gloriously, in a similar vein and its words attest to the power of language in self-creation. The subject does not attain power through obedience (fighting the battle) so much as through presenting the circumstances of that battle in ways that make one seem heroic. It is not, therefore, Henry V’s admonitions to obedience that empower his men; rather it is the way his rhetoric urges people to create themselves – by utilizing obedience as one tool among others. “For he today that sheds his blood with me/Shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile,/This day shall gentle his condition’ says Henry (4.3.61-3). As the next line makes fully clear (‘And gentlemen in England now abed’ [4.3.64]), Henry does not actually intend to reward the obedience of his men with noble titles. Rather, the gentling of these soldiers’ ‘condition’ is in their own hands, making of this day what they will. And a great deal was made from examples such as this one – and in fact this particular example -- in enabling the English nation to its imperial and industrial successes on the world stage.3

III

Clearly, Henry V’s lessons are not easy to learn. Many characters in this play (as in the earlier plays featuring Henry -- 1 Henry IV and 2 Henry IV) try to attain Henry V’s pedagogical power but are not successful. Pistol, for example, tries to fashion himself along the lines of Henry’s recommendations, as a heroic warrior. But Gower offers a long deprecatory analysis of Pistol’s efforts at self-fashioning: ‘Why,’tis a gull, a fool, a rogue, that now and then goes to the wars to grace himself at his return into London under the form of a soldier’ (3.6.66-8). Even Falstaff’s boy page recognises Pistol’s incapacity to attain the obedience of others: ‘I did never know so full a voice issue from so empty a heart’ (4.4.66-7). Pistol would behave like a solider but, aside from his cowardice, one of his problems is that his language is insufficiently

3 For instance, Laurence Olivier’s 1944 film of Henry V is dedicated ‘to the Commandos and Airborne Troops of Great Britain – the spirit of whose ancestors it has been [sic] humbly attempted to recapture . . .’ (Chapman 245). The chorus’s Prologue to Act 1 offers a similarly solicitous and empowering gesture by referring to its audience as ‘gentles all’ (Prologue 8). See Joel Altman’s essay for some thoughts on how Henry V worked on its audiences’ imaginations in the context of the Earl of Essex’s 1599 expedition to Ireland.
disobedient. He has mastered iambic pentameter, but his milieu remains resolutely pre-Shakespearean; ‘I will have forty moys,/Or I will fetch thy rim out at thy throat/In drops of crimson blood’ is a typical example of his style (4.4.13-15). Falstaff had used a similar superficial approach when mimicking Henry IV in the famous tavern scene of 1 Henry IV (‘There is a thing, Harry, which thou hast often heard of, and it is known to many in our land by the name of pitch’ [2.4.406-8]), and the result of that scene was the almost ritualistic transfer of power from Falstaff, the old king, to Henry V the new king: “I do, I will” says Hal, affirming Falstaff’s eventual fate. Pistol likewise is merely obedient to an older idiom (‘this roaring devil i’th old play’ [4.4.70-1]), lacking the initiative that would allow him to emerge from the invasion of France with greater rather than lesser prestige.

Fluellen likewise, is not fully able to utilise Henry V’s lessons to fashion a self of his own. Pistol speaks in iambic rhythms he associates with the nobility because he has seen too many stage plays; Fluellen takes his idiom instead from the many Latin texts he has read which he translates too literally into English. Consequently he is little attuned to the subtleties of English; he does not see, for instance, the difference between Alexander the Great and ‘Alexander the Pig’ (4.7.12). Such differences in phrasing are inconsequential to Fluellen: ‘is not pig great? The pig, or the great, or the mighty, or the huge, or the magnanimous, are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations” (4.7.15-18). Henry V, however, teaches that rhetoric is an essential element of success, one that might, for instance, prevent the English from laughing quite so loudly at the Welsh. In such ways, Henry V continues to provide opportunities for his men --not only the chance for his soldiers to pillage from the French but also to advance themselves once the war is over if they can avail themselves of his lessons and integrate some disobedience into their sense of duty.

As part of the process by which this play articulates the nature of the empowered subject, one who combines obedience and disobedience, Henry V may even offer a specific faculty that mediates between obedience and disobedience: that of imagination. The play’s chorus repeatedly urges its audience to let its ‘imaginary forces work’ (1 Prologue 18) on the play’s content, turning history into drama, mediating between the ‘flat unraised spirits’ (1 Prologue 9) or players who enact the drama and the glorious potential of England’s military might, embodied in Henry V himself. In one sense, these comments of the chorus enjoin obedience. In allowing one’s imagination to be swayed by the words of the chorus, one is swept away by the tide of nationalistic fervor, thus allowing one to accept numerous assumptions the play puts forth about England’s military power and providential righteousness in war. The play proposes that England has a right to rule other nations such as France (and perhaps by extension, Ireland), that England can successfully invade and conquer France, and that those who oppose Henry V are rightfully discovered and punished. If one imagines oneself opposed to the English mission, one’s imagination is similarly controlled -- but rather than empowerment, the result is victimisation. The citizens of Harfleur are encouraged to imagine their wives and children assaulted if they refuse to participate in Henry’s project. Henry’s rhetoric conjures up such

---

4 In a variation of this argument, Jeffrey Knapp suggests that what is happening in Henry V is not that the imagination is being harnessed to support a war, but that it is being nurtured by Henry (and by Shakespeare) to strengthen the theatre, which is, after all, a primary site of the imagination.
vivid images of their defeat (‘in a moment look to see/The blind and bloody soldier with foul hand/Defile the locks of your shrill-shrieking daughters’ [3.3.33-5]) as to make the prospect of resisting Henry’s wrath a terrifying one.

However, in Henry V, the imagination does not only direct subjects towards obedience, but also towards independence and subversion. To utilise one’s imagination in relation to Henry V is not only to accept the directives of king or chorus, but also to behave disobediently by remembering elements of the history of Henry V that the play deliberately, aggressively effaces: the king’s untimely death, the resultant War of the Roses, the actual reasons for Cambridge’s betrayal of Henry, the impracticality of England ruling France, and the actual battle causalities which Shakespeare presents as limited to twenty-nine persons (4.8.104-7).

One scene in the play seems specifically aimed at highlighting such ludicrousness and again in service to the functioning of the imagination. We are told of the tragic deaths of two of the dead nobles, York and Suffolk, but the situation is so deliberately archaic that it raises the question about what sort of mode of heroic death would be less anachronistic and more suitable for late sixteenth-century warfare. The play may not provide answers, but in the tension between the manner of York and Suffolk’s deaths, ‘a testament of noble-ending love’ (4.6.27) and the words of Henry a few seconds later, “every soldier kill his prisoners” (4.7.37), lie the poles that people would have to negotiate in order to become useful citizens to an increasingly powerful England. In this sense, York and Suffolk’s deaths are indeed a testament to a sort of love that can only be seen as having ended, albeit nobly, along with the ideologies of obedience that had accompanied it.

At one point in the play, Henry V uses his own imagination to explore the contours of the English nation, trying to configure a sense of kingship that is not precisely dependent upon obedience, and hence might be more appropriate to the early modern period. In imagining this new form of kingship, what Henry rejects first, and perhaps predictably, is ceremony:

And what have kings that privates have not too,

Save ceremony, save general ceremony?

And what art thou, thou idol ceremony?

What kind of god art thou . . . (4.1.235-8)

As many critics, including Stephen Greenblatt and David Scott Kastan have argued, the early modern period was beginning to aggressively question the concept of ceremony, particularly in the context of a Protestant England that wished to attack Catholics for embracing it. Thus speaking perhaps as a good Protestant, Henry V mocks ‘the balm, the sceptre and the ball,/The sword, the mace, the crown imperial,/The intertissued robe of gold and pearl,/The farced title running ‘fore the king,/The throne he sits on . . . ’ (4.1.257-260). David Scott Kastan comments in relation to these lines that Henry recognises here the fact that ceremonies are mere ‘props for the mystification of power’ (121). Stephen Greenblatt notes similarly that such an attack on ceremony can even be used as an attack on religion itself, given the longstanding symbiosis between the two. As Greenblatt puts it in his famous essay ‘Invisible Bullets’ that also deals
with *Henry V*: ‘We have then, as in Machiavelli, a sense of religion as a set of beliefs
manipulated by the subtlety of priests to help instill obedience and respect for authority’ (26).
Both Greenbelt and Kastan can also conclude that such subversion of religion is (as King James
himself recognised) potentially subversive of that secular priest, the king. Thus Kastan can
take this argument yet a step further, commenting that the theatre is one of the main cultural
contexts for making such subversion concrete; to see a player act as a king is also to empower
oneself to see a king without his clothes, without the trappings of ceremony, as a mere player
(120).

As Kastan, Greenblatt and others note, *Henry V*, like other Protestants, is, in his words about
ceremony, effectively deconstructing the concept to suggest that its ‘signified’ (the spiritual
qualities posses by those who are supposed to be ceremoniously obeyed) is actually lacking
and that the ‘signifiers’ (those “thrice gorgeous” trappings [4.1.263]) are in fact in control of
the sign system. In such a context, these critics suggest that what Henry is seeking is a new
semiotic, a more reliable way to maintain power. Surely in this soliloquy, the inspired king
does seem to be on the verge of offering some new definition of kingship, one that rejects
ceremony yet somehow remains ‘theatrical.’ Kastan suggests that this new definition involves
promoting rhetoric and spectacle, ‘pageant and progress’ (117) as that which can attain power;
in this context ‘rule’ becomes ‘role’ and ‘power passes to him who can best control and
manipulate the visual and verbal symbols of authority’ (121).

Without disagreeing with Kastan’s basic point about the value of rhetoric and spectacle in
formulating power in the early modern period, I would point out that Kastan's focus on such
terms as ‘control’ and ‘manipulate’ suggests that the aim of Henry (and by extension such
monarchs as Elizabeth I and James I) is to continue to enforce obedience but in a more effective
way.5 As such, Henry would want to generate an alternative to ceremony that can more reliably
and potently induce the same effects: ‘awe and fear in other men’ (4.1.244).

I would propose, in contrast, that it is not Henry’s primary aim to produce ‘awe and fear’. As
we have seen, these are qualities associated with obedience, but also with the passivity and
foolishness of the type who Henry consistently insults, especially in this speech, as ‘slave’ and
‘peasant,’ ‘lackey’ and ‘wretch’ (4.1.265-281). After all, Henry’s shrewd advisors are not
drawn to him out of awe and fear, although they politely use such ceremonious language when
they speak. Instead they follow him out of an ever-increasing awareness of what he can do for
them. For Canterbury, there is the hope that Church lands will not be possessed by a rapacious
King like Henry VIII, and for all the plays’ characters we might imagine similar inducements
to serve the king. In such a new, pre-modern version of kingship, the king does not rule by
commanding obedience, controlling and dominating his subjects, but by offering the possibility
of using their imagination in conjunction with his own. In this way, Henry’s function within

---

5 As Dollimore and Sinfield point out, another problem with a version of kingship that relies on
‘ceremony’ is that ‘ceremony’ is easy to fake: ‘the same ceremonies or role-playing which constitute
kingship are the means by which real antagonisms can masquerade as obedience – “poison’d flattery”
(218).
the play is to create subjects who are as independent and ambitious as the King himself and equally able to manipulate others and circumstances for their own benefit.  

IV

I close with a notation to the play’s first specific reference to the quality of obedience, in a speech by the Archbishop of Canterbury. Canterbury’s words follow the comments of his fellow Churchman, the Bishop of Ely, who uses the metaphor of music to describe the proper, obedient functioning of the commonwealth: ‘For government, though high and low and lower/Put into parts, doth keep in one concert,/Congreeing in a full and natural close/Like music’ (1.2.180-3). Canterbury continues the thought, bringing up the Virgilian trope of the nation as a beehive. This motif is usually put forth as a way to stress the need for order and structure in any society (natural, divine, or human); the key term to explain the necessary oil that lubricates this complex mechanism is precisely obedience. The Archbishop puts it as follows:

Therefore heaven doth divide

The state of man in diverse functions,

Setting endeavor in continual motion,

To which is fixed, as an aim or butt,

Obedience. (1.2.183-7)

However, obedience in this speech does not function in its usual manner. For example, in the similar speech by Ulysses in *Troilus and Cressida*, obedience is seen in its usual way, praised as the essential quality for maintaining social stability which is equated with maintenance of an aristocratic hierarchy. For Ulysses, the failure of Achilles to obey the great chain of command is the key problem. But when Canterbury talks of obedience, he does not, as Ulysses does, align it with order or hierarchy or any centralised regulatory structure. This is especially surprising since the speech begins in the expected manner, praising the pedagogical facility of obedience to ‘teach/The act of order to a peopled kingdom’ (1.2.188-9). Yet while Shakespeare perhaps began by writing a speech about obedience, as the lines continue, the ideal polis Canterbury imagines and Henry V symbolises is not characterised by obedience but by multiplicities of perspective and variations in occupation, or calling. This is a kingdom that works not obediently but ‘contrariously’ (1.2.206) and its monarch does not command or desire obedience so much as initiative and ambition. These aims may entail disobedience as well as obedience, such as that displayed by the bee soldiers (analogous to those Elizabethan pirates like Francis Drake whom Elizabeth criticised in public but may have appreciated in private) who merrily ‘pillage’ the belongings of the enemy and diffuse such riches throughout the country. In such a polis, the enemy is not the disobedient but the unproductive person, the

---

6 As Kastan notes, such ‘empowering’ of the English subject eventually led to the execution of Charles I.
‘lazy yawning drone’ (1.2.204) who may obediently follow the rules but makes little contribution to the economic growth of the nation.

In contrast, the successful English engage in continual work, and such work is often the work of imagination, that “quick forge and working-house of thought” (5.0.23), a political skill which is constantly devising plots and plans and which serves its possessor even more than it serves one’s king. In such a context, we can observe the binary opposition between obedience and disobedience taking on more of its modern shape and less of its medieval one. In today’s world, obedience is generally a superficial virtue, appropriate to some contexts but largely discredited in the light of world wars and experiments in social psychology like those of Stanley Milgram; Milgrim’s conclusion to his frightening demonstrations of people’s willingness to inflict pain on others rather than disobey authority is that:

Men do become angry; they do act hatefully and explode in rage against others. But not here. Something far more dangerous is revealed: the capacity for man to abandon his humanity, indeed, the inevitability that he does so, as he merges his unique personality into larger institutional structures (188).

In these contexts of modern, liberal democracy where it is incumbent upon all of us to develop a ‘unique personality,’ obedience is an uncomfortable position to inhabit. This feeling may account for the numerous twentieth-century studies of Henry V that stress the disturbing consequences of the play’s admonitions to obedience; such readings highlight the many ways in which obedience to the King means complicity in his foolhardy war ventures and imperialist rhetoric. Many critics take this argument further, suggesting, sensibly enough, that the play itself predicts this reception and subverts the character of Henry consciously and deliberately; moreover, these critics suggest audiences watching the first performances of the play in 1599 would have been as alert as we are today to the subversive qualities in the play’s presentation of the king’s character.7

What such studies may overlook in their presentation of how Henry V functions is that it is not only the play, but also the man, who exhibits this ‘conscious’ awareness of his own multifaceted nature. As such, it is Henry’s own rhetoric that largely fashions the frustrating intermixture of praise and criticism of Henry that characterises the play.8 Careful examination of Henry’s language leads, moreover, not only to a sense of Henry as a person, but also to the nature of an early modern England that his rhetoric may have, to some degree, produced, and certainly must have reflected. For, as Claire McEachern has argued, in imagining Henry, Shakespeare is not precisely creating a ‘character’ but representing something both literal and symbolic; one might say Shakespeare is envisioning a more politically nuanced conception of the theory of ‘The King’s Two Bodies’ so ably articulated by Ernest Kantorowicz and which

7 It certainly seems hard for any audience to overlook Henry’s self-contradictory nature; he can, at one point, stress the responsibility he has for the souls of his subjects (1.2.24-8) and, later, and with equal sincerity, argue that he has none. He can, even within the space of a single line of dialogue, see a fellow soldier as both ‘vile’ and as his ‘brother’ (4.3.62).

8 As Altman summarises these positions, ‘Shakespeare is either celebrating the mirror of all Christian kings, criticizing his calculatingly brutal Realpolitik, or being amazingly large-minded in contemplating both possibilities” (2).
appears often in discussions of this play. In *Henry V*, this theory becomes not only a theory of kingship but also of nationhood; and the contradictions that constitute the “king’s two bodies” theory (the king is both a man and a semi-divine figure) are also the contradictions of an emerging nation. One important aspect of this self-contradictory rhetoric, explored in this essay, is the nature of obedience and disobedience as Henry imagines them and disseminates them among others. For Henry, we might say, the structure of this binary opposition is that obedience is to be enjoined – Henry constantly reminds us of the King’s subordination to God and the duty of his subjects to follow his commands – but also disobedience, in Henry’s frequent suggestions that the qualities of obedience are not adequate offerings to this semi-divine ruler.

In the end, what I am arguing is that Henry seeks in his subjects not obedience but rather indications that they can be like him: seeing many things at once and from multiple perspectives, and capable of acting decisively to further their own interests. One can assert, as Greenblatt does, that such a method of conceptualizing kingship is strongly absolutist: ‘In the ideological apologies for absolutism, the self-interest of the monarch and the interest of the nation are identical, and both in turn are secured by God’s overarching design’ (60). Yet such formulations seem to describe a medieval mode of obedience rather than an early modern one. In the early modern period, as reflected in *Henry V*, the nation is not exactly coextensive with Henry’s personal aims. Rather than representing an aspiration towards successful absolutism as Greenblatt would claim or a ‘powerful Elizabethan fantasy’ of ‘a single source of power in the state’ (as opposed to the debilitating aristocratic infighting that in fact characterised English politics in 1599) as Dollimore and Sinfield argue, Henry can be said to represent the transformation of English political life from a monarchy to what might be termed a Parliamentary Republic – one where competing interests are nurtured and not only seen as obstacles to development. As such, Henry is a sort of composite man, embodying at the same time monarchy and Parliament, past and future. Henry is the medieval warrior King of England who died in 1422 and enjoined obedience to his royal will as the manifestation of God; but he is also the figure presented in the frontispiece to Hobbes’s *Leviathan* of 1651 -- a symbolic representation of a nation in the form of a single man.

Thus if England is to perpetuate Henry’s power, this play is saying that the emerging nation must produce men who are like Henry – they cannot be monarchs but they can be hypnotic and alluring and persuasive and charismatic, like the Chorus itself which echoes Henry by evoking simultaneously his language of glorious self-promotion and wry self-mockery. In the end, what Henry does for this audience is to teach it; he teaches his subjects that they can become empowered by using the skilful political techniques he deploys, rhetoric foremost among

---

9 McEachern, in writing about *Henry V*, concludes that she would ‘urge the rehabilitation of ideology as the enabling medium of collectivity as well as that which [quoting Dollimore and Sinfield, 211-12] “legitimates inequality and exploitation”.’

For a related reading, see Jonathan Baldo’s “’Into a Thousand Parts’” which emphasises the importance of Parliament in Shakespeare’s *Richard II* and *Henry V*. As Baldo puts it, ‘devices by which the realm is presented in *Henry V* more nearly resemble the modern representative principle imputed to Commons than the medieval, mystical notion of the king as representative body of the kingdom . . . [the play] oscillates between the representational aspect of commons and the idea of a self-representative nobility” (71).
Hence the final words of the French King (‘that never war advance/his bleeding sword ‘twixt England and fair France’ [5.2.348-9]) can serve both as a closing prayer for peace and a threatening reminder, perhaps especially relevant in the context of Ireland, that peace between England and France requires an end to English military occupation. By understanding Henry’s complex duplicities, audiences too can constitute themselves, as the French King does here, within languages of obedience and disobedience simultaneously, stressing the necessity of an ordered commonwealth even as all its members act, as Henry V does, for their own particular ends.

There are many critical views regarding how Henry V transforms its audience. Knapp, for example, argues (in contrast to Altman) that the play could make its initial audiences more peace-loving, attaining a ‘fellowship transcending class’ and even making the theatre a more ‘peaceable institution’ – in specific contrast to the more violent discourses of aristocracy, monarchy, and even religion (136; emphasis in original).

In 1558, the year Elizabeth ascended the throne, the English finally surrendered Calais, the last part of its Continental empire, back to France. See Jonathan Baldo’s ‘Wars of Memory’ for a discussion of this aspect of Henry V in the context of historical memory.
References


On Proper Action and Virtue: An Essay on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*

Joseph Karuzis
Hokkaido University, Japan

Abstract

This paper will discuss and analyze specific arguments concerning moral virtue and action that are found within the ten books of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. *Eudaimonia*, i.e. well-being, or happiness, is the highest good for people, and in order to achieve this, a virtuous character is necessary. A virtuous character is cultivated, and the life of a virtuous human is a life that is lived well, and is lived according to moral virtues which are developed through proper habits. It is through this development and practice of moral virtues by which one achieves *eudaimonia*, for this well-being is achieved by partaking in actions that are virtuous. The study of ethics for Aristotle is a practical science. Although through the study of ethics one may acquire theoretical knowledge, it is practical knowledge, or practical wisdom, that is most important for Aristotle when engaged in a search to define and cultivate a life that is well-lived. The topics and arguments contained within this paper will be of interest and relevance to both those who are interested in ancient Greek philosophy and to those that are concerned with ethics in the modern world. For this paper will also present situations from the modern world that are either examples of virtuous activity or its opposite. Such a study into Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* will offer insightful perspectives on proper action and virtue that is rooted in ancient Greek philosophy and remains relevant in our modern world.
Introduction

The *Nicomachean Ethics* is perhaps one of the most important philosophical treatises within the Western philosophical tradition. Part of the reason this is so is because it is the first treatise on ethical theory ever written. Another reason is that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle describes with great subtlety and insight, the components and actions required for living a well-lived life. Within the ten books located in this text, which is named after his son Nicomachus, Aristotle discusses *eudaimonia*, i.e. happiness or flourishing, *arête*, i.e. virtue, justice, *akrasia*, i.e. weakness of the will, self-restraint, friendship, and pleasure. In order to understand Aristotle’s approach to ethical theory we should be cognizant of his three-fold division of the sciences into the theoretical, the practical, and the productive. The theoretical sciences are composed of the subjects such as *prote philosophia*, i.e. metaphysics, and in addition to that physics, and natural philosophy. The theoretical sciences for Aristotle mainly involve investigations dedicated to hypostasizing the conceptualization of the nature of the universe. Those engaged in research of the theoretical sciences do so in order to seek knowledge for its own sake. The practical sciences are concerned with the study of proper action and proper behavior. Ethics and politics are subjects that are found within the sphere of the practical sciences. The practical sciences are contrasted with the theoretical sciences in the sense that the former is concerned with gaining knowledge and doing something specific with it, while the latter is concerned with knowledge for its own sake. The productive sciences are concerned mainly with craftsmanship and the creation of products or artefacts, such as houses, or tables. Carpentry, medicine, agriculture and rhetoric are all found within the sphere of the productive sciences. Their aim is to create something is useful and productive to humans. Within the three-fold division of the sciences varying degrees of precision are necessary with regards to the various sciences, and Aristotle raises this point at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, exhibit much variety and fluctuation, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also exhibit a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each of our statements be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits: it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1094a12-27.)

In the above passage Aristotle advises us to be aware of the variations in precision related to the various sciences. On the one hand, sciences such as mathematics and physics demand exact answers, and demonstrative proofs to show precise solutions. Such a high degree of precision seems to be reserved for subjects located within the sphere of the theoretical sciences, due to the fact that the truths we are searching for in those studies are not subject to change, they are fundamental and eternal truths concerning the nature and abstract reality of the universe. Another area that demands great precision is logic, a subject matter not located within the three-fold division of the sciences due to its special nature of investigating the correct principles of
argumentation. These logical principles do not belong to one particular science because they can be applied to and used within all the sciences as the appropriate tool to discern between correct and fallacious reasoning. Aristotle’s treatises on logic are found within an organised group of works under the title of Organon. On the other hand, in the practical and productive sciences, such a high degree of precision is not required due to the limitless permutations that exist within the productions, actions and behaviors found in human nature. In the cases of things involved with human nature, we can only be as precise as the subject matter itself. Ethics is one of these studies that does not demand exact precision, for the study of virtue and human nature can be expressed through generalizations formed through reasoned arguments based on perceptions observed in our world. Therefore it is with reasoned argumentation and an appropriate degree of precision with which we approach the study of ethics.

Teleology in the Ethics

Throughout his writings, Aristotle identifies and argues for the existence of a final cause in nature. To say that something has a final cause is to state that its existence has a goal or purpose. A teleological account, then, maintains that something exists for a specific purpose. Teleological explanation can be found throughout Aristotle’s corpus, from his biological works, to his metaphysical works, and his ethical works. His arguments for a final cause are found in his exposition of the doctrine of the four causes, such as is found in Physics, Book II, chapter three, where he states:

Again, in the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. (‘Why is he walking about?’ We say: ‘To be healthy’, and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as a mean towards the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health. All these things are for the sake of the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities, others instruments. (Physics, Book II, 194b33-195a2.)

When we do something for the sake of which something is done, we do it with a goal that aims at the end. In the above passage Aristotle identifies actions or activities, processes and instruments or things that are goal directed, or teleological in nature. In all of the above examples that Aristotle mentions, all of them aim for or were made for the creation of health. When we do things, such as walking, it is important to consider what the purpose of that action is so that we may determine our overall reasons for existence. If we walk in order to be healthy, then a part of our purpose in life is to exist with health.

In his treatise the Generation of Animals Aristotle discusses certain organs and natural bodily functions of various animals which are also teleological in nature. In his discussion of living organisms in general he states the following.

Everything then exists for a final cause, and all those things which are included in the definition of each animal, or which either are for the sake of some end or are ends in themselves, come into being both through this cause and the rest. (Generation of Animals, Book V, 778b 11-13.)

Since all living organisms and their parts exist with a specific purpose, it is up to the natural philosopher to investigate what that purpose is. The functions of certain organs or parts of the
body may be dismissed as existing through necessity, however Aristotle criticises such a dismissal.

Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all the operations of nature. Now they are necessary, it is true, but yet they are for a final cause and for the sake of what is best in each case. Thus nothing prevents the teeth from being formed and being shed in this way; but it is not on account of these causes but on account of the end; these are causes in the sense of being the moving and efficient instruments and the material. (*Generation of Animals*, Book V, 789b3-8.)

As we see from the *Generation of Animals*, teleological explanation plays a central role in the description of the functions of certain biological processes and organs. Although it may be true that our organs and parts are necessary for our proper functioning, they do not exist *because* of necessity. These processes and organs function with a natural aim, i.e. in the case of the general subject of the *Generation of Animals*, the organs and functions related to embryology, it is that of reproduction. Humans, then, partake in conscious and unconscious actions that contain specific ends in sight. We walk in order to be healthy, and our livers and kidneys perform their natural functions for the same reason. Furthermore, we create drugs and artefacts such as surgical instruments with the final goal of health in mind. With teleological explanation playing such a central role in Aristotle’s thought, perhaps it would be insightful to explore the role it plays in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. This paper will explore teleological explanation in the Nicomachian Ethics and will identify which proper actions lead to the best type of life worth living.

At the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle proposes that there indeed exists something in human nature that is sought after for its own sake, and nothing else. Furthermore, thinks Aristotle, all other things in the world are sought after for the sake of this one thing. This one thing Aristotle calls the good, or the highest good. In the following passage from the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle states that this highest good is the end we are seeking.

> Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1094a1-6.)

In this first passage at the outset of the *Nicomachean Ethics* we can clearly see Aristotle’s teleological approach to the study of ethics and its relation to human nature. As natural processes or biological processes have goal-oriented functions, so too do the actions and choices found in human nature. Teleological explanation applies to not only some actions and choices, but to all actions and choices. Furthermore, the goal of every action and choice is the same thing: the attainment of the good. Therefore it could be said that perhaps the function of all human behavior, i.e. all human actions and choices, is to attain the good. The attainment of this good, the goal of all actions and choices, is, for Aristotle, superior to the activities leading to its acquisition because it is the reason why humans partake in those activities. This good is sought after and acquired for its own sake, as is stated in the following passage.
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what we should? (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1094a18-25.)

Actions and choices are done deliberately, and with consideration. This consideration concerns the end at which the action or choice aimed at, and as with all actions and choices in human nature this end is the highest good. Aristotle further states that all things desiderative to human nature are so because of this goal we are seeking. The study of ethics, then, for Aristotle, is teleological in nature because the acquisition of understanding what the goal is in our actions and choices will assist us in determining the proper course of action in order to attain that goal.

**Eudaimonia**

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, chapter seven, Aristotle argues that the greatest good that humans can attain is also the most complete and final end. It is to this end that all things are done, even if some other things are considered mistakenly by some to be ends in themselves. For this is a complete end, for attaining it is attaining the highest good.

Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1097a25-35.)

In our actions and choices certain things such as wealth or instruments are chosen as ends. However, wealth or instruments or possessions are clearly acquired for the sake of something else, and not for the sake of themselves. For clearly the acquisition of wealth is not only to possess it, but to use it in order to attain something else. Aristotle thinks that this something else is more worthy of pursuit than other ends because it is the most final, i.e. it is the ultimate goal that humans strive for. This greatest good is happiness, or *eudaimonia*.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1097b1-7.)
Eudaimonia, then, is the greatest good because all of the virtues are ultimately chosen because of it. Likewise, happiness, or human flourishing, is never chosen for any other end, for it is an end unto itself. It is important to state here that for Aristotle *eudaimonia* is not an emotion, nor is it a state. Eudaimonia for Aristotle is a function, or activity, of man. Just as musicians and artists have a function, namely, to create beautiful things, so too do the human organs have functions, such as the eye, which is used for perception. Other species of animals also have eyes and so forth, therefore it would not be correct to say that it is the sole function of humans to perceive, or to merely persist throughout life, such as the plants. There must be a goal in life that is particular to humans, a goal that is bound up with the possession of a special faculty that separates us from other living things found in our world. Aristotle continues this line of argument in the following passage.

There remains, then, an active life of the element that has reason; of this, one part has it in the sense of being obedient to reason, the other in the sense of possessing reason and exercising thought. And, as ‘life of the rational element’ has two meanings, we must state that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies reason, and if we say ‘a so-and-so’ and ‘a good so-and-so’ have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence of goodness being added to the name of the function (for the function of a lyre player is to play the lyre and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well): if this is the case [and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate virtue: if this is the case], human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete.

But we must add ‘in a complete life’. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1098a1-19.)

Aristotle posits that our rational element in conjunction with action is what we are searching for rather than the mere passive possession of reason when attempting to discern the function of man. Just as a lyre-player and good lyre-player are differentiated according to the ability of their functions, so too is goodness added to the appropriately functioning man that carries out actions well. What just is a properly functioning man? We see in the above passage for Aristotle that it is a man that commits good deeds and virtuous actions that are based on reason. Such virtuous actions must be practiced over a lifetime, though, for Aristotle stresses that *eudaimonia* is a much deeper idea than mere temporary happiness. In order to attain *eudaimonia* it will now be necessary to analyze Aristotle’s arguments concerning virtue and action.

**Virtue and Action**

We are not born virtuous. Depending of the type of virtue, we acquire it either through habit or instruction. Aristotle identifies two different types of virtues; moral virtue and intellectual virtue. Moral virtues such as temperance or courage are acquired through habit, while intellectual virtues such as practical wisdom or philosophical wisdom are acquired through
instruction. Habits are types of activities, and they can be done well or poorly. Good habits done well are actions that develop moral virtues. In order to become good at something, one must practice at it devoutly, and the same is true for the moral virtues, we become good by practicing good actions and deeds. Therefore it can be said that the state of our characters depends upon the practicing of good actions that in turn actually make us good. What in actuality comprises a good action? Aristotle is quite aware of the negative results that excess and deficiency create in respect to different aspects of life and his awareness of this extends to his ethical theory as well. In the following passage Aristotle posits that deficiency and excess are to be avoided not only in relation to habits that affect the body but also habits that contribute to the development of virtues.

First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of such things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must use the evidence of sensible things); exercise either excessive or defective destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and does not stand his ground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible, temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean. (Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 1104a11-26.)

An excess or deficiency of anything in almost any situation is not what we should seek. Too much water or too little water both have destructive effects on the human body. So does too much or too little exercise. This is why nutritionists and physiologists conduct research on determining the best amounts of things for the human body. They are searching for what is best, and as delineated by Aristotle above, the best is that which lies in betwixt deficiency and excess. Aristotle identifies the mean, or the intermediate, as that towards which we should strive in our actions in the development of the virtues. The virtues are, for Aristotle, states of character, and in order to develop the best states of character one must choose their actions accordingly, and when doing so choosing that which is intermediate in the appropriate situation. Aristotle raises the moral virtue courage as an example. A deficiency of courage makes one a coward, and with too much courage one ignores imminent danger and becomes rash.

A wonderful example of courage from ancient Greece is found in Apollonius Rhodius’ Argonautica. In this Greek epic poem Jason and the Argonauts partake in a mythic voyage by land and sea in search of the Golden Fleece. Much of what they encounter on their voyage is dangerous and life threatening, especially the circumstances they confront on Crete. While attempting to land on Crete they become engaged in a confrontation with Talos, a giant man made from bronze. He is the guardian of Crete that circled the island three times a day. Talos hurls boulders at their ship, and they are unable to moor their ship in the harbor. Spears and rocks are no match for a bronze giant, so they rightly make the decision to flee. Refusing to yield to what is more powerful and more dangerous is a sign of rashness. However, with the advice and help of Medea, Jason is made aware of a weakness in the ankle of Talos, and they suspend their escape with this new knowledge and stop their boat just far enough in the sea to be safe from the hurling boulders. During this encounter Talos scrapes his ankle against a
sharp rock and his ichor, or sacred fluid, flows out from his body and he is killed. Jason and the Argonauts then spend the night on Crete. Jason and the Argonauts can be said to be courageous due to this and other courageous acts. Perhaps it is due to their experience and practice of being courageous in other situations that assisted them in striving for the intermediate in the above confrontation. Fleeing is the correct action when encountering a bronze giant, and should not be called cowardice, however, if somehow a chance or weakness is found that may allow for victory in the face of defeat, then it is courageous to stay and fight. Courageous acts create the virtue, or a state of character that we call courage. Concerning virtue and the intermediate Aristotle states the following.

Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by reason, and by that reason by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect of what it is, i.e. the definition which states its essence, virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme. (**Nicomachean Ethics**, Book II, 1106b36-1107a8.)

A choice is a type of action, and therefore virtue is a result of making the best choices in relation to the proper type of action. The intermediate is that which falls equally between excess and deficiency. The intermediate, then, is a type of equality between those two extremes. The intermediate is also not some equal found amongst objects, for it is a relative mean determined by individuals that possess practical wisdom, or *phronesis*. Those that possess *phronesis* are capable of determining that the intermediate is relative due to their reasoning. The intermediate itself, in particular circumstances, however, is apprehended through perception, not reason. Aristotle states this in the following passage.

The man, however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception. So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate state is in all things to be praised, but that we must incline sometimes towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit the intermediate and what is right. (**Nicomachean Ethics**, Book II, 1109b 17-26.)

Reason determines that the mean is a relative intermediate, however perception leads to understanding what is the intermediate in various situations. Although reason tells us that an excess of food or drink of a certain amount is a type of indulgence, it is through our own perception by which we come to an understanding of the right amount of food or drink we should consume. Therefore, temperance, or self-restraint, the intermediate between the excess of indulgence, and the deficiency of boorishness or total abstinence, is determined by our choices. These choices are manifested into actions which in turn if carried out appropriately result in virtue. This is not an easy thing to do, though, as Aristotle warns us in the following passage.

That moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency, and that it is such because its
character is to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated. Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for everyone but for him who knows; so, too, anyone can get angry—that is easy or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble. (Nicomachean Ethics, Book II 1109a20-29.)

For Aristotle eudaimonia, or human flourishing is distinguished from fleeting happiness because the development of virtue takes a lifetime of practice, and because it is not easy to always grasp the intermediate. In fact, in the above passage Aristotle says it is a difficult thing to be good, and this is because being good rests upon the ability to grasp the intermediate, which is also in itself something that is not easy. It takes a lifetime of practice with reason by which our actions create virtues, or states of character. The possessor of phronesis may attain eudaimonia, then, because he has both the practical wisdom necessary to distinguish amongst reasoned choices, and the ability to judge what is appropriate in particular situations.

Perhaps for Aristotle teleology was as apparent in human nature as it was to him in biological processes. If there is a final end to human nature then the actions and choices it is composed of become in a way functional processes that resemble the biological processes found in living organisms in that they all have a purpose. The then so-called functional processes (i.e. all actions and choices) of human nature aim at a positive goal. For biological processes the goal is the healthy overall existence of an organism. For the functional processes of human nature it is the attainment of eudaimonia. Aristotle posits the idea of striving for the intermediate in relation to actions and choices because the extremes, i.e. excesses and deficiencies fail to cultivate moral virtues which through practice lead to phronesis and eudaimonia.

The Best Life Worth Living

In searching for what this highest good is Aristotle in Book I, chapter 5 and Book X, chapters 7 and 8 identifies three general types of lives and their corresponding types of happiness. The first is the life dedicated to enjoyment, for the men who lead this type of life are only concerned with pleasure. Aristotle thinks that most men lead lives of this kind, and that they are vulgar and resemble beasts in their actions, and that they mistakenly identify happiness with pleasure. The second type is the political life. Those that live this kind of life pursue honor, for they think that is what happiness is. Aristotle also dismisses those that lead this life as mistaken. Honor, the end of the political life, is not necessarily an awful thing, however, Aristotle notes that it is usually given to men by someone else, and that one is not truly in possession of honor because it can also be taken away. Aristotle is searching for something deeper, something essential in humans that cannot be taken away and something that is not transient. The third type of life is the contemplative life, which Aristotle identifies as the type of life that comprehends and strives for eudaimonia. Aristotle posits such an idea in the following passage.

If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its
proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said. (Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, 1177a11-18.)

Aristotle here is concerned with identifying what eudaimonia is and what activity can properly grasp after it. Since it is the best type of happiness, it will correspondingly be found to be the supreme part of humans. Aristotle equates this with divinity, and confirms that it is the contemplative life that can properly grasp for and attain such happiness. The contemplative life is divine in the sense that the human element required for this activity is a faculty of the intellect, or nous. For Aristotle nous is divine because it is eternal and it is a non-sensible substance. Concerning nous and the contemplative life Aristotle states the following.

Now this would seem to be in agreement both with what we said before and with the truth. For, firstly, this activity is the best (since not only is reason the best thing in us, but the objects of reason are the best of knowable objects); and, secondly, it is the most continuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything. And we think happiness ought to have pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of philosophic wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest of virtuous activities; at all events the pursuit of it is thought to offer pleasures marvelous for their purity and their enduringness, and it is to be expected that those who know will pass their time more pleasantly than those who inquire. (Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, 1177a18-27.)

Here Aristotle asserts some reasons why the contemplative life is the best type of life worth living. It may seem to some that the contemplative life lacks action or activity, however, this is not true. It is for Aristotle the best activity because of the ideas that the faculty of nous thinks about are the best ideas that humans can be cognizant of. Another reason is the duration of the activity involved in the contemplative life. A person can be engaged with the best ideas using the best faculty available to him or her longer than any other kinds of virtuous actions. The study of philosophy and the acquisition of philosophical wisdom are also more copacetic than other virtuous activities due to the nature of the content of the objects of understanding.

Consequently, what should we do with this study of ethics? Well, perhaps it would be best to carry on, with reasoned purpose, aware that our good actions make us good in that our virtues are developed, and this, in turn, leads to a well-lived life. Attaining eudaimonia in actuality might be a difficult task to accomplish, however, if we listen to Aristotle, it becomes clear that a life dedicated to the cultivation of virtues is the best type of life worth living, and it is a type of life that is indeed truly worth pursuing.
References

Abstract

J. David Velleman has argued that what it makes sense to care about out of love for someone is the unimpeded realisation of her autonomy. Although Velleman refers to both Kantian and perfectionist notions of autonomy, a close look at his argument shows that the form of autonomy that he employs actually amounts instead to personal autonomy. I argue that there are in fact no value constraints on the objects of autonomous choice on this account of autonomy. The upshot of this claim is that a person may exercise personal autonomy without satisfying many other important normative demands. This suggests that Velleman’s endorsement of the unimpeded realisation of one’s beloved’s autonomy is wrong, insofar as a beloved’s autonomous choice may, in securing her personal interests, thwart her achievement of important goods, especially moral goods. In such cases, we have reason to hinder the unimpeded realisation of our beloved’s autonomy, precisely out of love for her.

Keywords: autonomy, love, Velleman, Kant, Aristotle, perfectionism, prudential value
Introduction

What is it to love someone, and what should my love lead me to want for those that I love? In “Beyond Price”, J. David Velleman (2008) has answered both of these questions by referencing the central place of rational autonomy in love. Love, according to Velleman, is an appreciative response to the value of a person’s rational autonomy. Velleman gives autonomy pride of place because, in his view, being autonomous is “essential to – perhaps definitive of – being a person” (Velleman 2006, 16-44, 43). In loving someone, we are phenomenologically seized by a “vivid awareness of [another’s] personhood, consisting in [his] rational autonomy” (Velleman 2008, 204); we view that person as “a self-aware autonomous other – a person who is a self to himself, like us” (Velleman 2008, 199). Unlike respect, however, which “arrests our self-interested designs on a person”, love “arrests our emotional defences against him, leaving us emotionally vulnerable to him” (Velleman 2008, 201). Furthermore, by “disarming our emotional defences”, love makes us susceptible to caring about “the unimpeded realisation of [the beloved’s] personhood” (Velleman 2008, 205). Specifically, loving someone means wanting him to realise his autonomy fully, because that is what his good consists in:

Things are worth caring about [in a sustained way] because desires so sustained give structure and unity to [one’s] life, thereby providing scope for the fullest realisation of [one’s] autonomy. And the fullest realisation of [the beloved’s] autonomy is what it would make sense to care about out of love for the person (Velleman 2008, 210).

In response to Velleman, Jeanette Kennett (2008) has argued that although Velleman is “exactly right” to hold that out of love for others we should want the full flourishing of their autonomy, he is wrong to hold that the arresting awareness of the beloved’s value only involves recognition of the beloved’s rational autonomy: “Other capacities and qualities, which may precede or outlast and sometimes even undermine our rational will, may be part of the true and proper self of a person” (Kennett 2008, 214). According to Kennett, then, although “it does make sense for us to want the realisation of the beloved’s autonomy for his own sake…autonomy may more often be that which we want for the beloved, rather than the value to which we already respond in the beloved” (Kennett 2008, 214). For Kennett, the value of persons primarily resides not in their possession of rational autonomy, but rather in their capacity to value; and she denies that all cases of valuing can be reduced to acts of autonomous willing.

I think that Kennett is quite right to challenge the primacy of rational autonomy in Velleman’s account of what we respond to when we love someone, but I think that her critique should be extended further. In the present paper I argue that Velleman is wrong to hold that love demands promoting the unimpeded realisation of the autonomy of the person one loves. A clearer understanding of what autonomy as understood by Velleman actually amounts to shows that although the full realisation of one’s autonomy may be good for one in a prudential sense (in terms of making her life more satisfying for her)\(^1\), the flourishing of autonomy may lead to other important types of goodness not being so served; and when this is the case, we have

---
\(^1\) In the present paper I understand prudential value (roughly) as the value that is present when a person’s life is going well for her in the sense of being satisfying for her to experience. It should be noted, however, that other (less subjective) conceptions of prudential value have been defended. I will not enter into that debate here. For an excellent discussion of the variety of conceptions of prudential value, see Daniel Haybron (2008).
reason to disregard or even hinder the full flowering of our beloved’s autonomy, precisely out of love.²

Velleman on Autonomy

The core meaning of autonomy is ‘self-government’ or ‘self-determination’, but this general concept has given rise to several different conceptions of autonomy which are at odds with each other in various ways. Hence, when one speaks about ‘autonomy’, it is pivotal to clarify the kind of autonomy that one has in mind. In the present section I reconstruct Velleman’s discussion in an attempt to provide just this kind of clarification. I then go on to argue that the conception of autonomy that Velleman seems to be using creates problems for his claims regarding the demands of love in relation to autonomy support.

Curiously, Velleman goes into little detail when it comes to explicating what he understands by ‘rational autonomy,’ and when he does explicate his understanding of the concept, he seems to give mixed and even inconsistent accounts. I believe that Velleman eventually endorses a notion of autonomy that functionally amounts of personal autonomy, but showing this requires some unpacking.

Velleman first mentions rational autonomy in association with Kant’s understanding of the relation between rational autonomy and respect. Paraphrasing Kant, Velleman writes that to act autonomously “we must act under the guidance of reasons”, which involves regarding someone “as having the moral law within him” (Velleman 2008, 202). At this point Velleman’s understanding of autonomy seems to parallel Kant’s: to be autonomous is to act under the guidance of reasons in conformity with the moral law.

Velleman’s next reference to autonomy, however, moves in the direction of a perfectionistic account of autonomy as a key component in one’s flourishing. After first adopting and adapting Stephen Darwall’s (2004) theory of welfare as rational care by arguing that love, rather than sympathetic concern, is the more fitting form of concern in relation to which a person’s interests should be defined, and then endorsing Connie Rosati’s (2006) suggestion “that what it makes sense to care about out of love for a person is the preservation of the value or the valuable condition to which love is an appreciative response” (Velleman 2008, 197). Velleman writes:

My conception of love, when combined with the views of Darwall and Rosati, favors an Aristotelian conception of a person’s interests. What it makes sense to care about out of love for a person is the unimpeded realisation of his personhood, which might be described as his flourishing, in that sense of the term which is used to translate Aristotle’s eudaimonia (Velleman 2008, 205).

Velleman goes on to draw a strong relation between the exercise of one’s autonomy and “the unimpeded realisation of his personhood”. This characterisation of autonomy sits uneasily with the earlier Kantian conception, however. Here developing one’s autonomy is being described as a crucial part of a person’s interests, as a core part of a person’s flourishing. Although it may be possible to wed this view with the Kantian view of autonomy, it is not

² Although I draw upon intuitions that I would consider relatively unproblematic regarding love and its demands in what follows, providing a fully developed theory of the same is outside the bounds of the present paper. My purposes in this essay are primarily critical.
obvious that this is appropriate. Talk of ‘interests’ and ‘flourishing’ suggests a connection between autonomy and self-interest that Kant wished to deny, at least in the sense that Kant saw us as under a rational obligation to subsume the desire for happiness – our own, or that of others – to the demands of morality when these come into conflict. True, Aristotle’s notion of the *eudaimon* is a normative notion that incorporates certain ethical constraints on character, but what is served by the exercise of autonomy within a eudaimonistic framework is not fealty to morality, but the well-being or happiness of the agent.

Velleman goes on to flesh out his understanding of supporting the autonomy – that is, the “unimpeded realisation of personhood” – of those one loves by discussing his coming to care for his adolescent sons’ interests: lacrosse, Morris dancing, poetry slams and photography. Velleman notes that he came to find himself caring about his sons’ progress in these pursuits, “no matter how little intrinsic value I might have been inclined to see there in advance”, because they were signs of his sons’ coming into “full realisation of their autonomy” (Velleman, 2008, 205). Doubtless Velleman’s interest in his sons’ burgeoning autonomy is praiseworthy, yet here it can be seen that the connection with Kantian autonomy seems to have been rendered even more tenuous. Not only are his sons’ autonomous choices disassociated from explicit connection to the moral law – they seem to have been motivated rather by inclination and a desire for private happiness – but they are also admitted by Velleman to have potentially little intrinsic value in his eyes, which would be impossible if Velleman accepted the Kantian understanding of the nature of autonomous choice.

It may be objected that Kant established imperfect duties to self and duties to others within his moral philosophy, and that incorporating these notions provides Velleman with the resources to retain an association between his understanding of autonomy and Kant’s. Imperfect duties to self include an imperfect duty to cultivate one’s natural powers. Duties to others include the duty to make others’ ends one’s own, at least to some extent. In one sense these reminders are very helpful: we can certainly make sense of how Kant could hold that an autonomous (moral) agent could be virtuous when seeking her own perfection, or could be virtuous when concerned with helping others’ attain their ends. In a more important sense, however, these reminders are beside the point. I am not arguing that Kantian autonomy is *incompatible* with self-cultivation or benevolence. My point, rather, is that Kant’s understanding of what it means to exercise autonomy as such has nothing to do with satisfying one’s inclinations. Velleman has claimed that love for his sons demands that he seek the full realisation of their autonomy, the exercise of which consists in developing and exploring various (and shifting) interests. Yet this is not what the exercise of autonomy consists in for Kant. For Kant, the exercise of autonomy is essentially linked to freedom from inclination and the possibility of adherence to the moral law that that freedom permits. In short, saying that self-actualisation or concern for others’ interests are compatible with Kantian autonomy is a far cry from saying that the exercise of Kantian autonomy consists in these things. My claim is that Velleman’s account of autonomy moves away from Kant to the extent that he claims that autonomy is a matter of exploring interests such as Lacrosse or Morris dancing. Even if the maxims associated with the latter pursuits pass the Categorical Imperative test, this does not mean that engaging in the content of those maxims is the exercise of autonomy. Based on these considerations, it seems that Velleman’s actual interest is not in a Kantian but rather in a perfectionist understanding of autonomy as a core component in human well-being.

---

3 See Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, MS 6.444 (translated by Mary Gregor)
4 See Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, MS 4.423 (translated by Mary Gregor)
Velleman’s later appropriation of Harry Frankfurt’s (1998) account of caring, however, brings the suspicion that Velleman is actually concerned with the relation between love and support for the flourishing of a still different kind of autonomy, namely personal autonomy. Velleman quotes Frankfurt with approval when the latter writes:

Caring is important to us for its own sake, insofar as it is the indispensably foundational activity through which we provide continuity and coherence to our volitional lives. Regardless of whether its objects are appropriate, our caring about things possesses for us an inherent value by virtue of its essential role in making us the distinctive kind of creatures we are (Frankfurt 1998, 162-3).

The point that Velleman makes here is that choosing things to care about is a central aspect of realizing one’s autonomy, and is valuable for persons because it gives their lives continuity, unity, and coherence. This is certainly plausible, yet here once again it seems clear that the connection with Kant’s notion of autonomy has gone by the wayside, for Kant certainly could not have accepted that autonomous choosing can take place “regardless of whether its objects are appropriate.” More strikingly, the connection with the perfectionist understanding of autonomy seems to have been rendered tenuous at best, for it seems doubtful that perfectionistic accounts of autonomy can sit comfortably beside the idea that what one chooses to care about is only constrained by the condition of giving one’s life unity and coherence. This condition seems too thin to constitute the condition of a plausible perfectionism, for choices that satisfy this condition well might be opposed to other perfections constitutive of flourishing – including, say, perfections of rationality or sociality. Aristotle, at the least, would have accepted the view that the unimpeded expression of one’s autonomy is constitutive of flourishing only if some further conditions regarding rationality or nobility were put on the objects of caring. A contemporary perfectionist like Thomas Hurka – who explicitly defends autonomy as a valid component of Aristotelian perfectionism – would agree:

A…serious impediment [to the absolute value of autonomy] comes from the recognition of perfections other than autonomy. No plausible value theory can treat free choice as the only intrinsic good. It must acknowledge some other goods, so that, for example, freely chosen creativity is better than freely chosen idleness, and autonomous knowledge is better than autonomous ignorance…A plausible broad perfectionism, then, can treat autonomy only as one good among others, which may sometimes be outweighed (Hurka 1996, 148-9).

As it stands, then, the condition espoused by Velleman for the objects of autonomous choice – that they give unity and coherence to the lives of the choosers – seems far too thin to support either a robust Kantian or perfectionist reading of autonomy. A Kantian understanding of autonomy must constrain the objects of choice within moral parameters, and must have no determining reference to inclination or happiness. And flourishing, on any plausible perfectionist model, demands far more than developing one’s capacity to autonomously choose objects of care that give one’s life unity and coherence.

It is clear that Velleman wants to consider autonomy as a perfectionist value in the Aristotelian sense. The point that I would like to press, however, is that, as it stands, Velleman’s understanding of rational autonomy seems to amount to no more than personal autonomy. It doesn’t matter overmuch if the nomenclature is resisted, so long as the practical implications of the conception of autonomy defended by Velleman are what I believe them to be. And it is these implications, I believe, that yield difficulties for Velleman’s endorsement of seeking to
bring about the full flowering of autonomy for those we love. To see why this is the case, though, it is necessary to say a bit more about personal autonomy.

**Personal Autonomy**

Put most generally, personal autonomy is the property possession of which allows a person to effectively express his or her authentic identity (Frankfurt 1988, Dworkin 1988). One’s identity is authentic when a preponderance of the parts that make up one’s identity – one’s values, preferences, wants, beliefs, aims, goals, desires, and so forth – are reflectively endorsed in a procedurally independent manner. Reflective endorsement thus constitutes a person’s identification with the aspects of her identity. One is then autonomous when one possesses the internal capacities and enjoys the external enabling conditions necessary for the effective expression of one’s authentic identity in action. Importantly for the present discussion, possessing autonomy both requires and reinforces a certain unity and coherence in one’s identity; for without such coherence, one’s identity would be too fractured to allow for effective self-determination. To be personally autonomous, then, is to be self-determining: to be effective in the expression of one’s unified, authentic self.5

The only constraints on this kind of self-determination are formal (in a sense to be explained below). One has already been mentioned: one’s authentic self must be relatively unified. A second constraint is this: one must have a positively valenced attitude towards the self that one reflectively endorses as authentic. Although it is possible to defend the idea – as Marina Oshana (2005) has – that a wider notion of authenticity should incorporate aspects of character that one merely acknowledges but does not value, the kind of authenticity that is relevant for personal autonomy must be positively valued. The reason for this constraint is provided by the nature of personal autonomy. Personal autonomy, as self-determination, only makes sense as the determination of oneself in accordance with aspects of oneself that one values. It would be highly counterintuitive to hold that one would, with the robust awareness and control constitutive of autonomy, choose to determine oneself in accordance with aspects of oneself that one does not value, at least in some way or to some extent. To choose to so determine oneself would indicate either that one in fact does value those aspects, or that autonomy is not present. The third constraint on the determination of the authentic self follows from the second: succeeding in fulfilling aspects of one’s authentic identity in autonomous choice brings satisfaction. One’s autonomous choices, as expressions of one’s authentic identity, concern those aspects of oneself that matter most to one in terms of who one is or wants to be, and when such choices are satisfied, a sense of personal fulfilment results.

Crucially, it should be noted that nowhere in the above elaboration of the constraints on authentic identity were substantive value constraints – that is, particular values or ways of life that must be endorsed – introduced. This is an admission of prudential pluralism: different people have different authentic identities, and take satisfaction in a wide variety of different practices, activities, and ways of life. Some people – Velleman’s sons, for instance – may take deep satisfaction from caring about photography and lacrosse; others may find these activities boring or distasteful. Autonomous choices, as expressions of one’s authentic identity, share this normative content-neutrality. There are no substantive value constraints on the objects of

---

5 Supporting this conception of autonomy clearly requires some important assumptions about the nature of the self, self-knowledge, and self-control, among other things. For the purposes of the present discussion I will assume that this kind of autonomy is possible.
autonomous choice. This important claim about the nature of autonomous choice will, I shall argue, form the shoals against which grates Velleman’s endorsement of helping the full flowering of our beloved’s autonomy.

**Autonomy and the Demands of Love**

If we love someone, according to Velleman, we will wish to bring about her good for her sake, and the good of a person is seen as the flowering of her rational autonomy. But if the kind of autonomy that Velleman explicates amounts, at the end of the day, to no more than personal autonomy – as it seems to – then it becomes hard to see how the imperative to support the unimpeded development of one’s beloved’s autonomy necessarily follows. The problem, as I have already hinted, is that the expression of personal autonomy is not constrained by any substantive values whatsoever. All that is required is the satisfaction of the formal conditions of (i) unity and coherence of identity, (ii) a positively valenced attitude toward the aspect of self that one seeks to express in autonomous choice or caring, and (iii) the presence of deep satisfaction when that choice is fulfilled. The problem is that fulfilling these conditions is consistent with autonomously choosing in a manner that is antithetical to a wide variety of important moral and perfectionist goods.

Take the case of someone I loved, whom I will call Arthur. Arthur was in many ways a very good person, and more often than not I had no problems supporting what he cared about, insofar as his choices were both satisfying to him and moral – even noble. But Arthur was also an inveterate racist. His racism brought a certain unity and coherence to his worldview and action, and he received satisfaction from being aware of, or even causing, the enrenchment of racial prejudice. Now, there is a sense in which satisfying Arthur’s racism was good for Arthur: it was prudentially good for him in that it made his life go better from his perspective, and unquestionably brought him personal satisfaction. But I believe that most of us would say that it is not good for him in all senses – certainly not morally. I loved Arthur, but I would consider myself a poor beloved if I did not try to challenge the flowering of his autonomous will in such cases for his own sake, and out of love for him, even if it made him unhappy. Of course there are different ways to do this, and perhaps the most loving would be to seek to effect that goal with a concomitant expression of compassion, and a sustained attempt to speak in terms of reasons rather than to resort to forms of manipulation or deception.

Loving someone brings with it a concern for that person’s good, but the totality of what is good for a person – what one should support and promote – is not confined to what is prudentially good for him (that is, what satisfies his personal interests). Moral goods such as the

---

6 The only possible exception to this claim comes from the idea that we cannot reflectively endorse ways of life that involve a focus upon certain (putative) intrinsic prudential ‘evils’ such as death, pain, and suffering as such (that is, without inclusion within a wider valuational system that renders such prudential evils meaningful). In claiming that autonomy is content-neutral – this one possible exception notwithstanding – I am taking issue with theorists who defend substantive accounts of personal autonomy. As I will not provide here a robust defence of this view, I refer the reader to what I believe to be an excellent defence of the content-neutrality of autonomous choice: see Friedman (2003), 19-25.

7 It might be interjected that more needs to be said at this point as to why the lover’s set of moral norms should become reasons to which the beloved’s autonomous self should be responsive, given that the lover’s norms could very well be arbitrary or mistaken. This concern is very well taken, but this, it seems to me, is a separate discussion that is unnecessary to resolve in order to make progress in the present work. I might also note that I have chosen the case of Arthur partially because the racist norms that he accepted are, to most minds, quite clearly immoral.
development of capacities for compassion and justice, and perfectionist goods such as the
development of capacities for rationality and sociality, should also play a part. Aesthetic goods
should as well. These different kinds of goods, it must be noted, are conceptually distinct.
Although they certainly can exist together – one can derive prudential value from being moral,
for example – there is no logical or conceptual guarantee of an inherent connection between
them. One may derive prudential value from objects, events, states of affairs, and activities
that entirely lack moral, perfectionist, or aesthetic value (see Sumner 1996, 20-25). And it is
precisely this conceptual separation that drives the necessity to challenge a beloved’s
(admittedly prudentially valuable) personal autonomy when it threatens important goods of
other kinds.

Velleman writes, “Not all of [one’s] ends are of significant importance to his good – only those
which he cares about in the way that sustains his desire for them. Things are worth caring
about in that way because desires so sustained give structure and unity to his life, thereby
providing scope for the fullest realisation of his autonomy” (Velleman 2008, 210). Yet if one’s
beloved can gain unity and structure in his life through the realisation of autonomous choices
that are morally questionable or even depraved, then it becomes hard to see how one’s loving
that person would require supporting the full realisation of his autonomy. The root problem in
Velleman’s account is that the notion of autonomy that he defends seems to allow for such
unacceptable expressions of autonomy; and as a result, his explication of the demands of love
is rendered untenable.

Modifying Velleman’s Account

At this point, it might seem that modifying Velleman’s account to avoid the unwanted
conclusions just mentioned would be an easy matter of introducing or clarifying further
constraints on the objects of autonomous choice. Velleman could do this, for instance, by
retreating to a Kantian conception of autonomy, in accordance with which all of the objects of
autonomous choice will be morally permissible. Or Velleman might develop further the latent
perfectionist resources in an Aristotelian account of flourishing. Velleman did not avail
himself of these options in “Beyond Price”, and the only condition that he introduces on the
object of autonomous willing – that it conduce to the unity and coherence of the chooser’s life
– is, as we have seen, satisfied by personal autonomy. But such a modification, it might seem,
would be relatively straightforward. I do not believe that it would be, however, for at least two
reasons.

First, by adding further conditions on the objects of autonomous willing, Velleman would be
forced to disavow his endorsement of Frankfurt’s account of caring, which explicitly involves
the accession that the importance of caring for something – bringing unity and coherence to
one’s life – is independent of the value of the object of choice. On a revised account that
includes further conditions on supportable or acceptable objects of autonomous choice, the fact
that a beloved cares about something – however deeply – would, by itself, provide little reason
to seek to secure or promote it out of love for the beloved, no matter how beneficial it might
be in terms of conducing to the unity and coherence of the beloved’s life. A sustained desire
for something that brings unity and coherence to one’s life – however strong – would not, of
itself, be enough to generate weighty demands for its support.

Second, and relatedly, Velleman would have to introduce an asymmetry in his view between
what we appreciatively respond to when we love someone and what we should want for the
beloved’s own sake. Velleman holds the view that when we love someone, we focus
“appreciative attention solely on him...Each person is special in the sense that he deserves to be valued singularly in this manner, as he is in himself” (Velleman 2008, 200). On this view, what we love about someone is unique to him: the particular expression of their autonomy. On the view of autonomy defended by Velleman, there is a symmetry between what we respond to when we love someone (the unique expression of their autonomy), and what we should want for the beloved’s sake (the flourishing of the unique expression of their autonomy). Yet if Velleman introduces perfectionist or moral constraints on the expressions of autonomy that deserve support, an asymmetry results: on the one hand, one loves someone in all of their uniqueness, but on the other, what one wants for the beloved is not necessarily indexed to the unique expressions of their autonomy. This would be the case, for example, when those whom we love autonomously choose ends that are unacceptable from a moral or perfectionist point of view. The result of this asymmetry is a weakening of the view that what love demands in relation to the beloved is indexed precisely to the beloved. On this new view – and in accordance with the consequences of giving up endorsement of Frankfurt’s account of caring – what love demands may often have nothing to do with what the beloved actually cares about. Indeed, it may concern promoting something the beloved actually hates, something that would make the beloved’s life prudentially worse (although in as loving a manner as possible, of course). Some – myself included – would consider such a modification an improvement, but it would require a not inconsiderable modification of Velleman’s views on what love demands in relation to the beloved.

**Conclusion**

In this paper I have not sought to provide an alternative to Velleman’s theory of love, or to proffer a complete alternative to his view of the demands of love. And certainly much more needs to be said about how to balance the demands to support different kinds of goodness. My goal has been to uncover the form of autonomy operative in Velleman’s account, and to show that a clearer understanding of its nature suggests the desirability of a revision of Velleman’s views consisting of an explicit introduction of constraints on support for the autonomy of one’s beloved. Perhaps a wider aim has been to temper an apparently widespread confidence in the categorical correctness of respecting the autonomy of others (where ‘respect’ is understood as allowance and enablement). I have not meant to imply that developing the capacity for personal autonomy in one’s beloved is unimportant. Without question it is – especially in relation to the prudential value gained by the autonomous person from expressing her authentic self through fulfilled autonomous choice. But it is not an absolute value; and in cases where the full expression of a beloved’s autonomy would hinder the development of other important goods, one’s love for another requires that one thwart their autonomy, precisely out of love.
References


Contact email: pipermc@jmu.edu
“Temporality and Historicality” in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* as the Clue to the
Origin of Christian Theology

Rajesh Sampath
Brandeis University, US

Introduction

This philosophical approach to Christianity is also on display in the 1921 letter to Karl Löwith (chapter 11), in which Heidegger reveals his philosophical identity in “personal” and yet more-than-ontic statements like “I am a Christian theo-logian,” as one who strives to get to the bottom (logos) of Christian theology; this is clearly the move of a philosopher of origins, albeit “in a new sense.” For the same letter maintains that “I am not a philosopher” in any traditional sense. The facticity of the “I am” seethes with the uniquely historical life that is Heidegger’s own, and it is out of this unique historical situation of what is “most my own” and toward it that Heidegger would philosophise and meditate on its sense.¹

I quote Theodore Kisiel’s quote, which intermixes an interpretation of the early Heidegger with personal quotes from Heidegger but not from his lectures or manuscripts, which were published much later in the Gestamtausgabe: these are Heidegger quotes from a personal letter to a student. Kisiel is right to highlight the ‘uniquely historical life’ that Heidegger makes his own. From this situation and ‘towards it’ indicates a genesis and motion. And out of this unique historical life and towards it contains a ‘sense’, according to Kisiel, that would determine what Heidegger would philosophise about. Ecstasically, the “I am” arises out of its own unique situation but is projected towards itself (not in linear, chronological time) as this arising: the unique swirl of being one’s time as a history that will have been read from a future that will never be known. This is the swelling up of time itself from in-dwelling that is not any point in space, which would otherwise determine a common sense representation or knowable concept of biographical-historical time.

But this extraordinary passage by Kisiel does not point to a simple, historical autobiography by Heidegger. What is the most personal, the own-most dimension of Heidegger’s life, towards which and out of which Heidegger would philosophise is a statement that belongs to neither traditional academic philosophy as it was understood in Heidegger’s day; nor is it reducible to mainstream Christian theological dogmatics that remains with the confines of faith, namely Trinity, Christology, etc.² The unique historical life is attached to the statement of personal


² Karl Barth’s 13 volume *Church Dogmatics* is the preeminent example of the 20th century theology that is creative and quite ingenious but remains within the confines of dogmatic faith and its historical doctrines.
self-revelation—namely “I am a Christian theo-logian.” But getting to the origin, the ‘bottom (logos)’ of Christian ‘theo-logy’ as Kisiel puts it, means thinking in a new sense—one that must destroy and overcome the history of metaphysics and the classical dogmas of Christian theology from Augustine to the present.

We must bracket initially what it means to say one is getting at the very logos/truth and origin of Christian theology from the standpoint of what is other to Christian faith or belief. At first glance, the meaning of this eventful appropriation and the reduction of the author’s intention is obscure. In other words, Heidegger’s statement about being a ‘Christian theo-logian’ says nothing about his lapsed faith commitment to Catholic Christianity; nor is it about someone setting out to repeat the contents of the history of metaphysics applied to working out the mysteries of Christian faith. Neither a theologian in any recognisable sense nor a secular-academic philosopher the gestures of the early life of Heidegger needs to be rethought as a heterodox appropriation of faith’s dogmatic content turned against itself. That is the appropriation of one’s own life and its meaning is what is at issue.

But the event of appropriation, i.e. taking one’s time up as a uniquely historical life, occurs in an uncanny ontological self-attestation. Such testimony about one’s self is a type of calling that seeks to get to the bottom of Christianity, albeit in a ‘new way.’ To understand the ‘unique historical life’ out of which, as ecstatically standing out of itself and turning in towards itself, is the problem of the “I am.” ‘Who is it that men say I am?’ and the problem of ‘I am who I am’ shows how both the Christian God of the New Testament and the Jewish God of the Hebrew Bible link the problem of being and time in unique ways. An appreciation of both is required to probe phenomenologically the logos-origin of Christian theology itself without subscribing to the doctrines of faith in mainstream Christian theology, i.e. the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the one person in the Triune God. Surprisingly, this has nothing to do with the dogmatic contents of biblical theology (New Testament theology in particular) and the history of systematic attempts to explicate doctrines such as the Trinity or Christology (or the mystery of God’s Incarnation in the Son); for all those doctrines presuppose the a priori stature of the Bible from which all theology arises, and if you are religious, the Bible is an indisputable attestation of God’s real words and deeds in human history. So what are we to

---

3 I am not concerned with recovering historically or biographically the intention behind Heidegger’s often-quoted utterance about being a ‘Christian theo-logian.’ This is a slight homage to the phenomenological enterprise. Rather, I am interested in a creative philosophical encounter with the essential effects of the utterance even though my project may do ultimate injustice to Heidegger’s original meaning if the latter is something that can even be discerned. In short, I want to bring to life the utterance as if I were stating that about myself.

4 As did the early Church fathers (Western and Eastern), the greatest of which were Augustine and Maximus the Confessor, to Thomistic Scholasticism of the Middle Ages to the giants of the 20th century on the Protestant and Catholic sides alike, for example Barth and Rahner respectively. Christian theologians probe the depths of the Incarnation, the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the workings of the Holy Spirit in the earthly time of the Church as a witness to the Eucharistic presence of Jesus Christ who died for our sins and was raised. As Barth’s Church Dogmatics attest Christianity is always caught between the time of fulfillment (God sending the Son as an in-breaking event in human history) and time of witness (today’s earthly Church which descends from the first witnesses of Jesus) inspired by the Holy Spirit as to the meaning of Christ’s Resurrection and future return. Hence by contrast Heidegger is neither a Christian philosopher nor a Christian theologian in that sense.

5 This is in reference to the newness mentioned in the 1919 letter to Father Krebs where Heidegger announces his break from Catholic faith but not his profound interest in thinking Christianity and metaphysics in an unheard of way: “Epistemological insights that extend to the theory of historical knowledge have made the system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me—but not Christianity and metaphysics, which, however [I now understand] in a new sense.” See Kisiel and Sheehan, p. 96.
make of this personal statement by Heidegger that Kisiel attaches to the notion of a ‘unique historical life?’ My hypothesis about Kisiel’s statement about Heidegger as a ‘philosopher of origins’ getting to the bottom/logos of Christian theology is singular. To re-inscribe oneself in the New Testament to the origin or source from which its proclamation arose is not an act of empirical historical or archaeological investigation. Rather, to re-inhabit the Word/the text from within and to carve out a new consciousness within the secret-inner-messianic consciousness of Jesus means a total alternation of our relational sense: it means a turning within, away from and out of the proclamation that has been handed down through history in theological doctrine and buttressed by the metaphysical foundations of the West. It means destroying theology (Western and Eastern) and its metaphysical ideas (Augustine to Hegel) to get at a new beginning, something unheard of in the history of Western philosophical thought. The question serves as a bridge to Being and Time, which is the ultimate focus of this paper.

Text

What stands before us is the entire problematic of reframing the question of the meaning of Being, which is the achievement of Heidegger’ main work Being and Time. This work includes time as the horizon to understand Being and the nexus of temporality and historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) to understand the appropriation of one’s own life and its temporal structure. It as if it were the question of Being – as a history unfolding- is really the question of a dynamic movement of an “I am” that is not equivalent to the historical destiny of a great person in history, say Isaac Newton. One can say ‘I am’ the question of Being and hence a ‘unique historical life,’ but the ‘I am’ is not tied to or located in a human subject. There is no intention here of reproducing the subject-object split that plagues Western philosophy since the birth of the Cogito in Descartes. Rather, the Being (I am) that questions Being’s meaning is “Dasein,” and the Being of Dasein in its historic singularity is the question of Being in terms of the root phenomenon of time. Dasein is the question of Being in terms of the timing and timeliness of the question of the meaning of Being in general.

---

6 This is Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of the German term ‘historicality.’ The is not historiography, the history of interpretations of what history is, nor a theory of history in terms of its philosophical structure. 6 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, Harper and Row, 1962), p. 427. In footnote 2 on page 427, the translators refer us back to footnote 2 on page 31 of the Introduction to Being and Time in which Geschichtlichkeit as ‘historicality’ is contrasted with Historizität. Ibid., p. 31. The latter refers to the normal understanding of ‘being-historical’ as being-finite within time at a particular chronological-historical date. It can also mean being embedded in ‘historical present’ or a present that tries to understand itself in historical relation to the past, say when we think of events occurring in our present as the historical legacy of something that began in the past, say the Civil Rights movement in America. For more on the problem of time and history in 20th century philosophies of history, see Rajesh Sampath, Four-Dimensional Time (University Press of America, 1999).

7 Or rather, as the dynamic movement itself, not ‘in’ the movement. There is no metaphysical representations with their immediate sense of notional presence, such as “I am in motion” (like a train) or “I am motion” (gravitational expanse of the universe’s space-time). There is nothing spatial/physical about the question of movement in fundamental ontology.

8 That is, Dasein is a question, but it is not a subject that is questioned as to its subjectivity- a ‘rock, angel, man or God’- to use registers from Heidegger’s famous “The Letter on Humanism.” See David Farrell Krell, ed., Basic Writings (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2008), p. 234. This is where many novices who, when first exposed to Heidegger, flounder by asking ‘what’ or ‘who’ Dasein ‘is.’ Dasein is not a subject, self, person, soul, ego or consciousness. As long as Dasein ‘is’ (with its many possibilities ‘to be’), however, it is incomplete. That’s all we know for sure. For a good recent overview of Being and Time, see Mark Wrathall and Max Murphy’s “An Overview of Being and Time” in Mark Wrathall, ed.,
History is temporalised not because it is in time (as an unchanging substrate) but because time constitutes the question of what it means for a historical life to unfold along with the attestation of that unfolding in a unique sense. To reckon the meaning of the question (of that unique historical life unfolding) is just as paramount to seeking the meaning or answer to the question of Being. This is what separates Heidegger’s undertaking from the entire history of metaphysics. Hence Being and Time is not concerned with history as traditionally understood—namely the dead object of the past (say a biography of Napoleon) or a future reflection on the journalistic present, say the re-election of the current U.S. President, once it will have become past. It is not concerned with the present period from which we derive the past or the future and all interrelations between the three dimensions of time in a mindless, iterative infinity. Ironically, being finite as time, and not in time, means transcending both the infinity of time as an endless passing of ‘nows’ and the negation of time as eternity or timelessness. More specifically, it means to transcend simultaneously both ideas of an ‘end’ and ‘endlessness.’ And a deeper, more uncanny destruction of the tradition indicates transcendence of the distinction between a.) the simultaneity of an end of linear time and the de-facto eternity that replaces it and b.) the succession of an end to time to an eternal state that presumably follows it (time). In short, to be finite time itself means we cannot turn to beings who live and die in time (say atheist human beings) or the Being who by dying conquered death itself and was raised, namely Jesus Christ, or the God of Christianity.

In other words, to understand the Kisiel passage we must dive right into Division II of Being and Time, which in many ways is the transcendental philosophical reflection on the ‘facticity of the “I am” that is the unique historical life. Division II is replete with so many mysteries that are ripe for reconstruction but not for the purpose of understanding the aim and goal of fundamental ontology, i.e. or what is stated in the introduction to Being and Time. The unique historical life relates to that being which will reveal the buried ‘origin’ or logos of Christian theology itself.9 This means entering into perplexing statements that relate the “I am” to the

9 And to state the obvious Christian theology has to do with the mystery of a certain figure, namely Jesus the historical man, construed as God. As Kierkegaard once stated this is the paradox of the ‘eternal becoming historical.’ From the Philosophical Fragments. However, for Heidegger, the point is not to dwell in this paradox as if it is readily accepted from the standpoint of Christian faith: that the eternal God became man in the Incarnation known as Jesus Christ. Heidegger is out to destroy all attempts to subsume time under eternity, temporalise eternity in the now, relate time and eternity in some other category (kairos), or dialectically synthesise the difference of time and eternity in a new concept, i.e. a bastardised version of Hegel. As a matter of fact, Heidegger is not concerned with the history of the philosophy or theology of time and eternity period. This evident in his 1924 lecture The Concept of Time, trans. William McNeill (San Francisco: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992). The question is not what is time but ‘who is time?’ See The Concept of Time, trans. William McNeill (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992) p. 22E . He asks whether Dasein (being-there) is the question about being one’s time. See Ibid. Hakhmansesh Zangeneh takes it one step further in making a separation between the theological treatment of time as kairos and Being and Time’s exploration of ecstatic temporality. Zangeneh argues that although the early writing dealt with kairos, the time problem in Being and Time departs from it: “we thus claim that the ekstasis of authentic presence is neither reducible to an eschatological nor to a phronological kairos and furthermore, that the successor to kairos in Being and Time is more likely to be Jemeinigkeit than Augenblick.” See “Phenomenological Problems for the Kairological Reading of Augenblick in Being and Time,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19:4 (2011): 539. I will return to this thesis later in
mystery of time, but not in any simple ontic or human sense. Heidegger does not assume being-in-time as the starting point to understand the relational event of the being of time in terms of being as time and vice-versa. Indeed we must repeat what Heidegger asks in a poignant moment in the last chapter of *Being and Time* to consider the following: “All Dasein’s behavior is to be interpreted in terms of its Being- that is, in terms of temporality. We must show how Dasein as temporality temporalises a kind of behavior which relates itself to time by taking it into its reckoning.”

So here it is - out in plain sight. Dasein’s Being is Temporality but not as an object of metaphysical speculation. Dasein as temporality is a temporalizing event that has to relate to time while reckoning it as a mystery. The singularity of such a reckoning of time as time is the mystery of a relation seeking to disclose itself. The reckoning of time is temporalised as an event relating to the reckoning. There has to be an own-most relation to time in the self-reckoning of time. Needless to say, Being, Time and Transcendence are not separate topics, but in their interrelated togetherness—as an Event—take us far beyond anything postulated in the history of Western metaphysics and therefore that canon (Western metaphysics) that constitutes the philosophical foundations of Christian theology. When we say time ‘is,’ we automatically divorce time from being-present, which is normally used in the copula to connect a subject with a predicate. And when we inquire into being (the meaning of ‘is’) as time, we suspend the present, which tends to dominate two non-presents, namely the past and future, in the history of metaphysics. The crosswise negation of time as reducible to being and being as reducible to time has a long history in Heidegger’s reflections before and after *Being and Time*. However, my objective is not to trace this history and offer commentary. Instead my work takes a different turn.

the paper and question its fundamental assumptions. Simply put, I will not focus on kairos (the fulfillment of time in the Incarnation of the Son). Rather, I want to isolate the human Jesus’s being-towards-death transcendentally explicated in a manner irreducible to faith in comparison with Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein and being-towards-death in *Being and Time*. Neither Jesus’s apperception of death nor Dasein’s greatest possibility to be (‘death as the possibility of impossibility’) can be construed in ordinary, human terms. There is no concern here for religious registers of ‘guilt, anxiety, fallenness, temptation, trial and tribulation, suffering, humiliation, insecurity’ which is the legacy of Luther’s impact on Heidegger on the problem of sin. For those matters, see Karl Clifton-Soderstrom, “The phenomenology of religious humility in Heidegger’s reading of Luther,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 42 (2009): 171-200. My project, however, needs a being other than the human to probe the death problem for Jesus and Dasein.

---

10 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 457. Hakhamanesh Zangeneh takes it one step further in making a separation between the theological treatment of time as kairos and *Being and Time*’s exploration of ecstatic temporality. See “Phenomenological Problems for the Kairological Reading of Augustinian in *Being and Time*.”

11 In the concluding moments to the introduction of *Being and Time*, Heidegger states: “*Being is the transcends pure and simple. And the transcendence of Dasein’s Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and necessity of the most radical Individuation. Every disclosure of Being as the transcends is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentals.*” Ibid., p. 62. For more on the problem of truth in *Being and Time* see Denis McManus’s “Heidegger on Skepticism, Truth, and Falsehood” in *The Cambridge Companion to Being and Time*, p. 239-259.

My hypothesis is nowhere to be found explicitly in *Being and Time*. To repeat the hypothesis: the relation between being and time in the secret messianic consciousness of a unique historical life, namely Jesus heading towards his death (but not His resurrection), requires an uncanny cohabitation of two entities, Jesus of the Gospels in the New Testament and Dasein of *Being and Time*, that will be transplanted within Division II of *Being and Time*. The purpose is to reconstruct the missing Division III. Having said that, the act is not one of historical reconstruction of a purely secular understanding of *Being and Time* as to replant it within the soil of theology. The work is not a defense of Christian theology and its complex faith structures. At stake is the revelation of truth itself, which means the enterprise is transcendental, and not ontically determined by any of the human sciences. However, juxtaposing Jesus and Dasein does not mean substituting one for the other in the attempt to discuss the other. But in this exercise the ‘unique historical life out of which and towards which’ I will philosophise is an attempt to articulate the missing Division III of *Being and Time*. At stake is the revelation of the *Being* of God’s time and the *Time* of God’s being itself.

This requires the ‘radical individuation’ to think from out of and towards the ‘unique historical life’ that is the very *Being* of the questioner, namely Dasein, which necessitates a transcendental reckoning of time as a self-relation: the only *Being* that can reveal time for what it ‘is’ above and beyond beings – and hence transcendentally – but *to* humans (or beings in time who live and die) is God. But what God, whose God? Saying that God ‘is’ *Being*, or a *being*, is too simple: that would be a problem for Christian theology and its indefatigable history. Relating God to the ontological difference of *Being* and *beings* is a first step, but not the last; that is a project for the philosophy of religion. What is not spoken of here is the God of Christian dogmatic faith (as described in the New Testament’s proclamation by Paul and interpreted in the history of systematic constructions of dogma). Rather, we speak of the *Being of God’s Time* appropriated out of and towards the hidden logos or origin of Christian truth. That is we speak out of and towards the source called the missing division III of *Being and Time*.

---

was no consideration of theology in the discussion, one could say that for Heidegger time ‘is’ (*Being*) transcendent as truth disclosed as event, which is never an event in space and time, say an earthquake.

13 I am referring to the title of the section in Part I of *Being and Time*, namely ‘time and *Being,*’ which is mentioned on the concluding pages of the Introduction to *Being and Time* called Section 8: Design of The Treatise. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 64. As everyone knows this missing Division III was never published with the first two divisions of *Being and Time*.

14 One can admire the great philosophical attempts in 20th century systematic theology to reckon the mystery of time, history and *being*, namely Barth, Tillich, Rahner and Pannenberg.

15 That is any philosophy that begins from the standpoint of the human being (say any analytic philosophy that has its roots in empiricism or logical positivism or moral psychology) or any natural or social science that reflects on the nature of human beings, i.e. biology, sociology, anthropology, psychology, economics, etc. This - as Heidegger attests in the introduction to *Being and Time* – also has to include theology, which tries to explicate faith in terms of the relation of human beings to God. When theology searches for foundations to this relation without first questioning the meaning of *Being* itself, then it is no different from the ontic human sciences. Ibid., p. 30-31.

16 Jesus says “I am the truth, the way and the life” (Gospel of John, 14:6). From that point, the “I am” is linked to truth, which is linked to life as motion and hence time, but not a life in time. Jesus says “I am not of this world” (Gospel of John 18:36). This is the life of time and the time of life. This is the ultimate life called time. To appropriate this event, and turn it around so that it stands outside of itself (outside the faith that proclaims Jesus Christ as God) is ecstatic indeed. This is precisely what this paper will argue. It is an appropriation of this religious story, which requires its total transmogrification, within the philosophical categories offered in partial forms throughout *Being and Time*; and the strangeness of the undertaking makes the work utterly opposed to any kind of theological justification for Christianity.
The doubling of Jesus in a repetition of the original points to a figure that is not quite a ‘2nd coming.’ Therein lies the justification to reread Division II of *Being and Time* while appropriating it to reconfigure the figure of Jesus beyond Christian theology in a transcendental philosophical act: for Being is transcendence and the ‘phenomenological truth or disclosing of Being’ as transcendence is transcendental truth. To repeat, however, the ‘one’ who asks about the question of the meaning of Being as transcendence ‘is’ Dasein, and Dasein ‘is’ at it root *temporality*. The highest mystery is the saying that temporality ‘is’ at all without saying that it is present like a thing by being divided by what is no longer, or past, and yet to be, or future. The most radical individuation that is a unique historical life absorbs and hence evacuates all of metaphysics and theology into the singular act of articulation. Time has to become Other to what it has been traditionally conceived in Western philosophy and religion. And this articulation will be the missing Division III of *Being and Time*.

So this investigation begins with several crucial distinctions and relations between the way *Being and Time* discusses how Dasein is ‘its time’ and how its being’s meaning is rooted in the phenomenon of temporality and the larger ‘horizon’ that is called time by which we have any chance to understand Being. We must inquire deeply into these structures while inscribing them in and within the sayings by Jesus on his time and hour that run rampant throughout the Gospels. Inversely, we need to take those statements and suture them back into the blank spaces of Division II to see what remains unarticulated. What is unarticulated can be articulated as the missing Division III.

**John 12: 27:** “I am troubled now. Yet what should I say? ‘Father, save me from this hour?’ But it was for this purpose that I came to this hour…”

The question is how to re-inhabit this quote and speak from within it without driving towards the end result of the Gospels—the trial, death and resurrection of Jesus as the Christ. A certain fear and trembling takes us over when we try to stay with this quote. It reflects the peak anxiety of a man who as God must die as a man to reveal the true nature of God’s purpose, which is the conquest of death as something final. The anxiety is not ontic or derived from some bodily-cognitive psychology. The hour permits the recollection of a resolute decision to come to one’s time but for a purpose that will transcend all time. Death will become other to itself in the moment of its own eclipse but not before it happens like it happens to any human, i.e. like a death sentence. Jesus was born to come to this hour; the purpose of his being was to come to this hour. The double movement, the approach to the hour and the hour approaching, however, is not one of a being flowing in linear time as it ages while time itself remains unchanged (Kant’s notion of substance as an analogy of experience in the *Critique of Pure Reason*). 

---

17 *Being and Time*, p. 62.
19 One can show that in an entirely different attempt to Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* struggles with this very issue in “Revealed Religion” and “Absolute Knowing” the last sections of the work: (CC.) Religion and (DD.) Absolute Knowing. See G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). We will return to this issue because Heidegger’s *Being and Time* ends with an all-out confrontation with Hegel’s *Phenomenology on the problem of Spirit, the temporализing of temporality and movement. Prior to all of his however is Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* on the question of motion, which cannot be ignored. Heidegger knew this throughout his life and in several important lecture courses on Aristotle beginning in 1922.
Hence we do not move to an idea of the death of death, a negation of negation, and the resumption of time (which means everything must come to an end) back into eternity. *Being and Time* re-inscribed in the New Testament Gospels to expound the nature of time for God’s death is tantamount to writing the missing Division III of *Being and Time*. And yet we know that Division III never appeared and that is why it is ‘missing.’ Why else would *Being and Time* declare in the last moment of Division II that time itself is the horizon for understanding Being, which is transcendence or God, and phenomenological disclosure of Being as transcendental truth, i.e. revealing the truth of God or the apocalypse, which means revelation or disclosure of revelation itself? Time is the horizon for understanding God? And then why would the title of the alleged Division III of *Being and Time* be called ‘time and Being?’ Could this point to ‘time and God’s Being’ or ‘God’s time and Being?’ as an interrelational event of the truth of disclosure and the disclosure truth? But what is spoken of here is neither succession nor simultaneity within the interrelational event. My hypothesis is that the missing Division III was pointing to the time of God’s Being (the event of choosing death) and the Being of God’s time (the nature of that choice) revealed, which means a unique relation between God, His time and his approach towards death. But to repeat, nothing in the history of Christian theology, particularly its Aristotelean metaphysical foundations in medieval scholasticism, can help us in this endeavor. It means overcoming the dogmatic proclamation of Christian truth: that one must believe in the Resurrection, which overcame death, and resumes either a time that goes on forever as if the life before death is similar to the life after death; or it negates time itself in an invisible, amorphous timelessness or ethereal eternity that is promised by faith, i.e. a limitless cloud of love. Either way, for religious faith (not Dasein), death has to be crossed over to another side that can never been seen but only believed.

Hence the full revelation of what Being ‘is’ means revealing what the Being of the ‘Christian God’s time’ is as much as it is about the time of the Christian God’s Being coming to an End; and that is not something that merely repeats the doctrines of Christian faith—namely the 1st Coming-Incarnation, Trinity, Christology, the idea of the parousia or 2nd coming in Paul’s corpus or Gospel sayings attributed to Jesus about eschatology—“You will see the Son of Man coming in the clouds” (Matthew 26: 64). Nor does it remain with the content that we have in Divisions I and II of *Being and Time*, namely the ontological difference of Being and beings, the question of the meaning of Being, Dasein whose Being is the question, grounded Care, grounded in temporality whereby time is the horizon for understanding Being. However, the

---

20 This also means we cannot follow those attempts to say that *Being and Time* merely conceals its derivation and dependence upon Christian theology precisely in its avowed and explicit attempt to distance itself from theology and relegate the later to ontic science like all other uncritical, non-primordial sciences devised by the human mind. For a critique of *Being and Time*’s illusory secularism and atheism and its occluded dependence on Christian theology, see Cf. Fergus Kerr, *Immortal Longings Versions of Transcending Humanity* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), p. 47: “Heidegger’s attitude to Christian theology, hostile at one level, overtly and explicitly so, attributing the monstrous invention of the transcendental subject to Christian theology, is also proprietary, indeed exploitative of and even parasitical upon Christian theology...It may be said, without much exaggeration, that almost every philosophical innovation in *Sein und Zeit* may easily be traced to a theological source.” For the opposite claim, see Zangeneh: “It is our argument that the methodological and architectonic strictures of *Sein und Zeit* prevent assimilating the earlier concept of *kairos* to the *Augenblick* of authentic temporality.” Zangeneh, p. 540. Both of these statements may be true even though they contradict one another, but it is not the concern of my paper to resolve the debate. I am setting out to write the missing Division III by writing Division I and II of *Being and Time* into the *New Testament* to shoot out another text; and I not trying to derive *Being and Time* from the biblical theology of the *New Testament*. Only one committed to Christian faith would attempt that derivation.
event decides on the fate of the Christian God (beyond Christian faith) and how we understand time anew on the basis of the event.\textsuperscript{21} Then only can we really see the full force and intention of \textit{Being and Time} while trying to surpass it.

Speaking against God- opposing God, being prior to God and taking the place of God. A fourfold event. How this is done becomes the overriding question. Re-inscribing in the New Testament Gospels’ sayings by Jesus about His time, hour, day and death an appropriation of Division II of \textit{Being and Time} on death, time, and historicality will yield the missing Division III of \textit{Being and Time}. But the event – ‘the moment of vision’ (Augenblick) - of this complex movement (Bewegtheit) of \textit{re-inscription and appropriation} is irreducible to both the New Testament and \textit{Being and Time}.\textsuperscript{22} The entwining (non-circular and non-linear) movement is a relational event whose ontological consequences have to be explicated in this investigation. One can question the importance of all these abstractions and the ultimate intention behind all these aggressive pontifications.

\textsuperscript{21} I contrast my work from that of the polymath philosopher Alain Badiou who relies on mathematical complexities within a neo-Marxist philosophical bent to challenge the way French philosophy has conceived of the event, for example Derridean deconstruction or the poststructuralist philosophies of Gilles Deleuze. I intend to appropriate the deep linguistic biblical registers of the New Testament Greek and the Hebrew Bible while constructing new ontological content that arises out of a reconstruction of Division II of \textit{Being and Time}: the latter as we all know concludes with a confrontation with Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}. As far as I can tell I cannot find even a trace of this project in Badiou’s philosophical works.

\textsuperscript{22} Ultimately my investigation will require a return to the 1920-21 \textit{Phenomenology of Religious Life} lectures, particularly Heidegger’s remarks on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Letter of Thessalonians Chapter 2, which introduces the problem of the Antichrist. See \textit{The Phenomenology of Religious Life}, trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2004), p. 75-79 and 109-110. Needless to say what Heidegger describes in those lectures about time, the Antichrist and eschatology is not readily apparent in Division II of \textit{Being and Time} that discusses such topics as authentic ecstatic temporality, the everyday, inauthentic registers of time, within-time-ness as the source of the ordinary conception of (infinite, linear) time, world-time and datability, and finally the discussion about the connection between Spirit and Time in Hegel’s \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}. Furthermore, Heidegger discusses Paul’s Thessalonians and not sayings by Jesus about His time, hour, day and death in the Gospels, particularly the Gospel of John. The latter is my aim in reconstructing the mission Division III without repeating the statements in either the \textit{Phenomenology of Religious Life} lectures or Divisions I and II of \textit{Being and Time}. Therefore I do not feel need to establish a connection between the early lectures on religion and \textit{Being and Time} to advance my hypothesis about the missing Division III. Having said that, I will have to return to the early lectures on religion to make the separation clear. For more on the connection between the early religious life of Heidegger, his appropriation of the phenomenological method for religious study and its consequences for the development that led to the conceptualisation of \textit{Being and Time}, see Alfred Denker, “\textit{Being and Time: A Carefully Planned Accident?}” in \textit{The Cambridge Companion}, p. 54-83. Also see Matheson Russell, “Phenomenology and Theology: Situating Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion,” \textit{Sophia} 50:4 (2011): 641-655. Russell argues that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is not merely a secularisation of primitive Christian faith (the claim of Macquarie, Caputo, and Dreyfus), and avowedly, on the surface, one cannot simply find the possibility of Christian faith (whether medieval Scholasticism or Luther’s reformed/destruction of the metaphysical tradition) in \textit{Being and Time}. See Russell, p. 647. With regard to the relation of the early religious lectures and \textit{Being and Time} he states, “To the extent that his phenomenology of religious life \textit{does} prepare the way for the account of human Dasein in \textit{Being and Time}, nothing essentially ‘religious’ remains in it.” Ibid., p. 651. This corroborates what Sean McGrath says- “\textit{In Being and Time...the theological has so many qualifiers around it that we are discouraged from asking questions about it.” See Heidegger: a (very) critical introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008), p. ix. McGrath will go on to question the tenability of the separation of ontology from theology. For an interesting analysis of Heidegger, St. Paul and the idea of eschatology, see Denis McManus, “Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and St. Paul on the Last Judgment: On the Roots and the Significance of the ‘Theoretical Attitude,’ \textit{British Journal of the History of Philosophy} (2012): 1-22.
I am not concerned with whether Heidegger’s philosophy is a ‘secularisation’ of primitive Christianity buried beneath the excrescence of a dead medieval Scholasticism and the ‘onto-theological constitution of its metaphysics.’ Nor I am concerned with seeking out the theological roots of Heidegger’s philosophy even though he and others may claim that his philosophy is rabidly a-theistic. To repeat, this paper is not interested in intellectual history and or a genealogical reconstruction of Heidegger’s true intentions and the contradictions that are displayed in his published works and what that could mean for the relation between theology and the philosophy of religion. We have to tread a path, making it new, as opposed to discovering a new path that has yet to be taken. Creation is harder than discovery; the former is active and intentional, albeit obscure, and the latter is passive, even accidental, albeit something that can be more readily followed.


24 If one is interested in that line of investigation, see Matheson Russell’s article which provides a good summary of the history of works on the topic while adding his own nuanced claim: Heidegger’s theological roots (the break from medieval Scholasticism and the movement to Protestant thinkers such as Luther and Kierkegaard) make problematic Heidegger’s own claims about the incompatibility of two poles—namely fundamental ontology (Being and Time as a new type of philosophical inquiry or questioning that destroys the ossified history of metaphysics) and the non-philosophical/non-systematic theological attempts to understand in existential terms the mysteries of Christian faith in terms of vital/living impulse and not as a system of concepts.

25 We are inspired by the concluding moments to the preface of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: “But from this we must often distinguish the more gradual effect which corrects, too, contemptuous censure, and gives some writers an audience only after a time, while others after a time have no audience left.” See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 45.