

The Being of God's Time: The Problem of Time in Barth's *Church Dogmatics* and Heidegger's *Being and Time*

Rajesh Sampath
Brandeis University, United States of America

Abstract

This paper aims to compare and contrast Barth and Heidegger on the question of time. Although Barth speaks from the theological standpoint and Heidegger considers theology as a form of an 'ontic science' distinct from his fundamental ontology in *Being and Time*, I pose the following question: To what extent can an appropriation of Barth, ironically, transcend the limits of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, which could not offer its missing division III? We hypothesize that this step beyond *Being and Time* can help frame a research agenda to frame – ontologically – the problem of the very of Being of God's time. And this agenda would go beyond the limits of Barthian theology on the one hand and Heidegger's first two divisions of *Being and Time* on the other.

Keywords: being, God, time, theology, fundamental ontology, Barth, Heidegger

Introduction

I want to compare Barth and Heidegger on the question of time. Specifically, I want to look at section 14 – “The Time of Revelation” – of Chapter II in Part II of *Church Dogmatics*, Vol. 1.2: The Doctrine of the Word of God and section 47 – “Man in His Time” – of Chapter X of *Church Dogmatics*, Vol. 3.2: The Doctrine of Creation. My objective is to compare and contrast what Barth has to say about time in light of his dogmatic theology with Heidegger's attempt to separate fundamental ontology from any kind of theology (which he considers an 'ontic science') while treating the problem of time in *Being and Time*, particularly Division II.¹ But the story does not end there. Heidegger never completed the missing Division III of *Being and Time*, and several historical witnesses have speculated that the missing Division III involved a bizarre reckoning with theology, particularly on matters of eschatology.² As a philosopher (and suspended theologian in the making) my intuition is that a critical reading of Barth (utilizing the resources of modern continental philosophy) can help advance a fundamental critique of Heidegger's one-sided secularism in *Being and Time* while re-opening the question of the missing Division III. Heidegger once confessed that he was a ‘Christian theologian’ in disguise.³ My aim is to reveal (or ‘un-conceal’ to use Heidegger’s iconoclastic appropriation of the Greek word *aletheia* for truth) something quite startling: I postulate the existence of a cryptic theology in *Being and Time*, albeit heterodox and totally unrecognizable from the standpoint of mainline Christian theology and despite Heidegger’s stated intentions on the ontological difference between ontology and theology in the introduction to *Being and Time*.⁴ I do not speak of matters of Trinity or Christology for example; nor do I attempt to understand anything like salvation and redemption through reconciliation. I am concerned solely with the problem of time and death and how to treat them from the perspective of a non-subjective and hence non-human way. To write the missing Division III out of a burning engagement with the traces in Barth’s *Church Dogmatics* and Heidegger’s *Being and Time* is to generate a new content that is irreducible to both magisterial works.⁵

One way to transcend the human embeddedness within time is to recognize the recurring illusion that all human beings entertain about their very being, life and impending death: as a being that flows in time while intuiting *both* external, physical-cosmological time and the

¹ According to Heidegger, although theology thinks it is going for a foundational explanation of man’s primordial relation to a higher Being, i.e. God, as transcendent, it treats its object, namely the relation of man to God through faith, like a thing; and hence it is ontic just like every other science that tries to pin something down and conceptualize it. Fundamental ontology, however, raises the question of the very meaning of Being without ever assuming that Being is a being or thing that is present to the senses or can be conceptualized in a principle, i.e. theological, metaphysical or scientific. See Heidegger (1962, p. 30). Furthermore, the “central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained...” (Ibid., p. 40).

² Max Mueller was a student of Heidegger and was among the first to speculate about the architectonic that was planned for the missing Division III. Taminaux and Sheehan have tried to trace the legacy of this missing division.

³ See his famous letter to Löwith. Quoted in “Letter to Karl Lowith on His Philosophical Identity,” in Kisiel & Sheehan (2007, p. 100). For more on the exchange, see Hans-Georg Gadamer’s *Heidegger’s Ways*, trans. John W. Stanley (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994).

⁴ I am not a follower of anything Heidegger says in *Being and Time* regarding the incommensurable difference between his allegedly unique and singular project and the entire history of Western metaphysics, theology and science.

⁵ Some argue that Barth is the greatest theologian of the twentieth century and his *Church Dogmatics* is one of the greatest systematic theological efforts in the history of Christian thought. Similarly, some argue that Heidegger is the greatest continental philosopher of the twentieth century (without comparing him to the great figures of the Anglo-American analytic philosophical tradition), and *Being and Time* is one of the greatest works in the history of philosophy. But appropriating theology to surpass the desiccated limits of philosophy and to think creatively like a philosopher beyond the confining limits of doctrinal faith is something that rarely occurs in the history of (Western) thought. Hegel’s writings would be an example of such an event.

internal timeliness in terms of the ambiguous anxiety one feels about getting older but not exactly according to the relentless march of chronological time, namely seconds, minutes, hours, days, months and even years. The schism between the two types of time is real but the illusion of bridging them persists. One knows that a time has been allotted to them and despite every attempt to live a long life, it can be cut short at any moment for causes and reasons beyond one's control, say an unforeseeable accident. But one does not lead life with such paralyzing anxiety as to cut their own life short due to the general fear or dread that they know they can't live forever; they merely continue on, hoping that that day of termination will not arrive unexpected. Living in time and flowing along with, but fighting it at every instance to grasp the sequence of moments as if one can grasp the whole but always confusing a moment with the whole in relishing the notion of being present, and that past and future can be present with the present; all of this points to the futility of the human reckoning with time. But it is precisely this very strange relation between being (life and death) and time that embeds the human being 'in' time; and this 'within-time-ness' (to use the Heideggerean phrase of *Innerzeitigkeit*) either forces human beings to postpone inauthentically the question of the meaning of their being (after a whole life has been lived) or plunges the human into despair so that a single moment cannot continue as if the illusion of an endless series of moments cannot continue to be maintained. In different ways the sections on time in Barth's *Church Dogmatics*, namely section 14 of Volume 1 called "The Time of Revelation" and section 47 of Volume 3 called "Man in His Time," and all of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, particularly Division II: "Dasein and Temporality," call into question this dominant assumption about human anxiety over linear time. (And linear time is the dominant presupposition, which derives the inauthentic and hence false idea of being 'within-time.')

Heidegger questions the sense of an infinite flowing linear time and beings 'within time' as inauthentic, and to Barth's credit he does not speak of 'man in time' but 'man in *his* time.' These fine distinctions are crucial. Both are concerned with timeliness and the possibility of searching for a deeper ground that derives the commonsense astro-physical-biological notion of linear time as an endless flow. Heidegger searches for an answer to the question of the universal meaning of Being in terms of the phenomenon of time without calling that a theology of God. And Barth turns to his faith's tradition, namely Christianity, to offer a solution to how human beings should be oriented to the mystery of time (and impending death) when all other human forms of knowledge (including science) fail to provide an answer.

By comparing and contrasting how Barth treats the problem of time within the standpoint of a unique vision about the role, content and function of theology with Heidegger's fundamental ontology we can gain some new insights into time.⁶ Physical time is not timeliness, and timeliness has been under-philosophized, including the biblical and systematic theological

⁶ This will be complicated from the outset because Barth opens his section 14 on the "Time of Revelation" with a very brief critique of Heidegger's *Being and Time*. See Bromiley & Torrance (2010, p. 46). I will read his critique very closely as I reconstruct my own problem, but essentially Barth says that Heidegger's philosophical linking of time with human existence misses the entire problem of ascertaining how God 'had time for us' by revealing Himself in the event of Jesus Christ (Ibid., p. 45). Barth makes a fairly clear separation of his theological task and Heidegger's philosophy, which he couples with Augustine. Neither Heidegger nor Augustine can help Barth understand the Time of God's Revelation. However, defending or questioning the validity of Barth's critique and his project for that matter is not the aim of this investigation. If anything, I will need to critique and overcome Barth's critique of Heidegger and return to *Church Dogmatics* to write in the spaces that were actually forbidden by Barth's presuppositions against Heidegger's philosophy. In other words, Barth's critique and dismissal of Heidegger is too simple for the philosopher's demands. For more on Barth's notion of time in *Church Dogmatics* see Adrian E.V. Langdon, *God the Eternal Contemporary: Trinity, Eternity and Time in Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2012) and the PhD dissertation thesis by Mark James Edwards, *The divine moment: Eternity, time, and temporality in Karl Barth's "Church Dogmatics"* (Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 2013).

tradition leading through the Church fathers up to modern theologians like Bultmann and Barth and philosophers such as Hegel and Heidegger. This is a massive claim that requires a fair amount of justification.⁷ And no doubt the reader will come to realize that the entire intention driving my ambition is the attempt to achieve this justification about an original undertaking and win the reader's approval.

But I will say briefly in passing that with the exception of sparse moments where Jesus speaks of his time or the Gospel writers and Paul speak about the fulfillment of time (kairos), like the Prologue to John's Gospel or Galatians 4:4, for the most part the text of the New Testament does not dwell philosophically on the nature of kairos. That is not its purpose. It aims to save by baptism and faith through the revelation that is the 'Word of God' manifest as Jesus Christ who is God (which includes Jesus the man as the 2nd Person of the Triune God). For Christianity, Jesus conquered death and sin by dying for us and was raised; and by believing and confessing that basic fact we can achieve eternal life. That is the mystery of faith: time was fulfilled in the Incarnation, life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. In the waning moments of 'absolute knowing,' or the last section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel finally penetrates the mystery of 'time as the concept, which is there' but 'as long as Spirit appears in time its Notion cannot appear' and even the 'Notion has its time.'⁸ Section 65 of Heidegger's *Being and Time* tries to develop the core root of Dasein's Being (Care) as time construed as 'primordial, finite, ecstatic, unified and authentic' in contrast to the inauthentic linear sequence of 'nows' simply 'coming to be and passing way,' whereby the past is a 'no longer now' and the future is a 'yet to be now' (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 370, 480). It is not my task to compare the Bible, Hegel and Heidegger on time. My claim is that all of these reflections remain thoroughly and completely underdeveloped in the history of theology leading up to Barth's *Church Dogmatics* and the Gesamtausgaben of both Hegel and Heidegger despite claims of over two hundred years of scholarship on the *Phenomenology* and over 80 years of scholarship on *Being and Time*, not to mention nearly 1900 years of reflection on the aforementioned Event of faith and everlasting life described by the New Testament.

There is no sustained treatise focused strictly on the phenomenon of timeliness, which matches the length (word count) of the Bible (Old and New Testaments), Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Heidegger's *Being and Time*.⁹ Pushing the limits of where these texts stop on timeliness is my aim. But that means we need to see how each serves as the blind spot in and

⁷ This is not to say that there are no works on Heidegger's treatment of the time problem, especially in *Being and Time*, in a systematic and focused way. There are immense resources in both the analytic and continental philosophical traditions that can be leveraged in such an undertaking. Blattner's work should be consulted in that regard. See his pioneering *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). On the problem of kairos in Heidegger, one should reference the original work of John Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumors of the Hidden King* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) and Theodore Kisiel's exhaustive and paradigm-shaping genealogical reconstruction of *Being and Time* in *The Genesis of Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). For an analysis of the separation of the idea of eschatological-messianic (New Testament) kairos and phronological kairos (derived from Aristotle's ethics of praxis), see Hakhamenesh Zangeneh, "Phenomenological Problems for the Kairological Reading of Augenblick in *Being and Time*," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 19:4 (2011): 539-561. Also see Joan Stambaugh's translator's introduction to the 1962 lecture *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). Stambaugh provides a nice summary of the evolution of Heidegger's thinking about time from the early works to his last attempt at philosophizing about it in the 1962 lecture.

⁸ See G. W. F. Hegel (1977, pp. 487, 493).

⁹ The same goes for any other major thinker in the Western philosophical tradition prior to Hegel, namely Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Leibniz and Kant and after (Kierkegaard, Nietzsche). As for theology's deficit, this includes great modern figures such as Barth, Tillich, Rahner, von Balthasar, Pannenberg and Moltmann.

of the other: in each other's texts are holes, and each text serves as the hole of the other.¹⁰ These holes have to be filled tracing a certain event of movement and movement of the event. The event of their interrelations disclosed in a new way is a new revelation and the revelation of the new. The movement is not linear or circular. The event is irreducible to a single dimension of time, say the present. Unlike the texts of the history of philosophy and theology, we finally have time for timeliness to reveal it for what it is. This way we do not relapse into the same-old notion of time as an unstoppable flux that human beings cannot control, i.e. the linear sequence of nows 'coming to be and passing away.' But each thinker does not accomplish in their own system of thought what the other criticizes as the limits of the other's field. In other words, for Heidegger, Barthian theology presupposes a linear sense of time even as it tries to overcome it and has to polarize in traditional metaphysical terms a distinction between beings in time (man) and eternity (God). This is totally untenable for Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology beginning with the existential analytic of Dasein. For Barth, theology, in its interrelated biblical-exegetical, dogmatic-systematic and practical forms¹¹, can help us understand truth as revelation by bringing into unison the time of God's revelation – as Jesus Christ – and how man tries to grasp his time or the meaning of his life on the basis of that revelation. In this sense, Heidegger's obscurantism and lapse of faith is both unwarranted and unfortunate. Neither the theologian Barth nor the philosopher of Heidegger can or would turn to the other to deepen their own projects, but this is precisely what I will set out to do.

Tracing *Being and Time* in *Church Dogmatics* and vice-versa indicates a twofold, reciprocal, intertwining movement: suspending traditional assumptions about what we think theology accomplishes through Barth by appropriating philosophy *and* what philosophy dismisses in theology by deracinating the latter's assumptions, namely in Heidegger's fundamental ontology and its avowed repudiation of theology. The unthinkable possibility being staked out here is an uncanny synthesis of Barth and Heidegger in a third project that tries to penetrate the very mystery of God's time without recourse to the linear sense of being-in-time that both Heidegger and Barth find problematic but in different ways. This does not mean I merely repeat what Barth has to say about the time of God's revelation in and as Jesus Christ. Nor do I simply fall short like Heidegger does in Division II of *Being and Time* in not being able to crossover to the missing Division III in his aborted reckoning of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. My origin and goal is the missing Division III period, and this is nowhere to be found in the Bible, Heidegger's pre- and post-*Being and Time* corpus and all of Hegel.¹²

With Heidegger's *Being and Time* we have access to the resources of the entire history of Western philosophy from the Pre-Socratics up to his time, including the Neo-Kantians and Husserlian phenomenology of his day, and several prominent Christian thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas and Kierkegaard.¹³ With Barth we have access to biblical theology, namely

¹⁰ Our focus is on Barth's *Church Dogmatics* and Heidegger's *Being and Time* but we will never lose sight of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* that lingers like a ghost throughout this investigation.

¹¹ In Volume 1.1 of *Church Dogmatics*, Barth states in his introduction that the three forms are related in how theology is the self-questioning or self-examination of the Church when it 'talks about God': "theology as biblical theology is the question of the basis, as practical theology the question of the goal and as dogmatic theology the question of the content of the distinctive utterance of the Church." See *Church Dogmatics, Vol. 1.1*, pp. 4–5. In other words, biblical theology questions the basis of the Church's talk about God, practical theology examines the goal or action proposed by such talk, and dogmatic theology questions the content of the talk about God.

¹² Recall footnote 5.

¹³ I will not get into whether these figures are philosophers or theologians. The modern canon of both fields can characterize them as both or only one. Some could argue that the terms 'philosophy' and 'theology' have complex genealogies that intertwine at different moments in time, converging and diverging for different reasons. Aquinas says 'philosophy is the handmaiden of theology,' but few would doubt that his contributions to philosophy and

New Testament and Biblical exegesis, the Church fathers from the Orthodox and Roman Catholic traditions, and modern philosophical theology in Protestantism and Catholicism, most notably from the Protestant side in Schleiermacher to the time of Barth's composing of the 13 volumes of the *Church Dogmatics*. The resources for both thinkers is no doubt immense. However, this project cannot offer a vast, exhaustive historical account of how Barth the theologian or Heidegger the philosopher relate to the histories of theology and philosophy, let alone their relations. Rather tracing structural germs of the New Testament within *Being and Time* so that they come to fruition means challenging the conception of time and its assumptions in Barth's *Church Dogmatics*. Inversely, utilizing the philosophical insights in *Being and Time* to write in the margins and spaces that were not articulated in *Church Dogmatics* is an endeavor that would seem foreign to mainstream Christian theology today. I am not setting out to attack or defend the doctrines of the Christian faith as they have descended from the earliest Church Fathers (dating back to the first century CE), the crystallization of the New Testament canon by the fourth century CE and the first Councils (Ephesus, Nicea and Chalcedon) that would lay down the doctrinal foundations of much of Christian faith, i.e. Trinity, Christology, etc. To the reader familiar with biblical, dogmatic and practical Christian theology this project may appear a bit suspicious as to its real intentions to inhabit texts, such as the Bible and Christian theology, typically reserved for matters of authentic faith. To the philosopher interested in pushing the limits of *Being and Time* into areas of philosophical investigation that Heidegger himself could not traverse, the appropriation of the dogmatic contents of biblical and systematic theology via Barth may seem 'heretical' in an opposite sense as it broaches the secular-atheistic divide that many commentators view Heidegger's legacy as having established.¹⁴ But negotiating these issues is not the purpose and aim of this investigation.

My goal is to begin a critical reading of *Church Dogmatics* and *Being and Time* while staying focused strictly on the problem of time in terms of the phenomenon of timeliness. Over the course of the argument the reader can draw their own conclusions as to whether the work defends or attacks either theology or (present-day) philosophy or both or neither. Towards the conclusion I can offer my reflections on what I think an ecumenical relation between philosophy and theology can look like going forward, but only having first traversed the attempt to produce a new vision about time as timeliness in the double appropriation of Barth to critique Heidegger and the use of philosophy to write in the margins that Barth did not conceptualize in his theological works. Again this is not a defense of Christian faith by creating a theology that lays claim to Christian truth as revealed in the history of biblical, systematic or practical theology. The work also does not make any claim to understanding why *Being and Time* failed, which then moves on to the later works (i.e. 'The History of Being') that are not purely based on philosophical ontology. The effort underway here is to write the missing

metaphysics would exclude him from the history of the Western philosophical canon irrespective of his achievements for Christian theology. By the time we get to Kierkegaard, we see self-reflections in which he sees himself neither as a professional theologian nor an academic philosopher. He views himself as merely as a writer critical of the public representations of both theology and philosophy in his day. My point is that in Barth, theology relies on philosophy in complex ways, and in Heidegger's fundamental theology he is by no means not rooted in religious discourses and theological works. The literature on this is quite vast. See Benjamin Crowe's *Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006) and Bruce McCormack's *Karl Barth's Critical Realistic Dialectical Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

¹⁴ If not atheism, then at least an undecidability with regard to matters of religion and faith is what many would defend in Heidegger's project. Again the literature on this vast. See the works of Caputo, Richardson, Van Buren, Kisiel, Thomson and Sheehan. Discussing Heidegger's philosophy of religion and what that means for theism, atheism or agnosticism is not my project.

Division III without recourse to any missing texts (non-published works of Heidegger). Only what is available in the public domain will be considered.

I will begin by announcing a basic presupposition before engaging in a critical deconstruction of Barth's *Church Dogmatics*. I am going to bracket for a moment the general problem of the resurrection and just focus on the living Jesus and the events that led up to His death. This does not mean I will ignore how Barth thinks about time in terms of the proclamation of the risen Lord. For Barth, the recollection of the resurrected Lord in the New Testament is linked with the futural expectation of the messiah announced by the Old Testament (Bromiley & Torrance, 2010, p. 54). But before I get to the total conception of the 'Time of Revelation' in "the event of the presence of Jesus Christ is God's time for us" (Ibid., p. 45). I must work out philosophically several distinctions between various ways time is talked about in the opening moments of section 14. 'Fulfilled time' is the event of God's revelation as Jesus Christ, and the unity of past –futural expectation of the messiah in the Old Testament and the recollection that returns from the future to the New Testament proclamation of the risen Lord is the "time of witness" (Ibid.). But even before I get to these wondrous distinctions I must raise a whole series of philosophical questions as I probe the opening pages of section 14 in *Church Dogmatics*.

In my endeavor, I will actually use key insights from Heidegger's *Being and Time* and its attempt to destroy the history of ontology and metaphysics. Destruction is that attempt to rethink the very mystery of how time constitutes the meaning of the core Being of that entity, namely Dasein's concern or care for its greatest possibility to be (which will turn out to be its 'possibility of impossibility' called death). And this is how that entity which reveals the universal and necessary answer to the question of the meaning of Being, or fundamental ontology, requires a primordial explication of time as the horizon for understanding Being.¹⁵ Time is the horizon for understanding Being. In other words, nothing can be won by way of any understanding of Being without working things out within the 'horizon' called 'time.' This does not mean any 'thing' is occurring 'in' time. That is not what is meant by horizon. And 'primordial, ecstatic, unified, finite, authentic temporalizing of time' founds the Being of Dasein, namely Care, regarding Dasein's greatest possibility to 'be,' which will be death. For as long as never-present Dasein 'is' in the world and running ahead towards all its myriad possibilities while re-grasping itself and bringing itself along towards itself, it is incomplete.¹⁶ So far, what is revealed in the introduction to *Being and Time* is that the meaning of that Being (or Dasein's concernfulness) that will answer the meaning of Being in general is time; but the transcendence of this Being of absolute concern that will offer the answer is radically unique and singular, and thus irreducible to anything else. It is the Other to everything that is other to it. One can understand this radical uniqueness as non-relationality and incomparable alterity to revelation itself in which Truth is disclosed. But Truth is given and as such transcends the

¹⁵ This is all taken from the introduction to *Being and Time*. In summary fashion in the beginning of section II of the introduction, Heidegger states: "we shall point to temporality (Zeitlichkeit) as the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call "Dasein." (1962, p. 38). Furthermore, "the transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and necessity of the most radical *individuation*." (Ibid., p. 62). As for the definition of death in Division II, Heidegger states, "Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein." (Ibid., p. 294).

¹⁶ I hope the reader excuses this technical jargon from the English translation of Heidegger's original German text. In section 65 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1962, p. 380) offers an original take on time by summing up how time is 'primordial, ecstatic and finite.' It is my responsibility to try and explain all these phrases in clear terms while appropriating them for a creative distillation of buried possibilities in Barth's *Church Dogmatics*. I am not concerned with understanding Dasein within the framework of *Being and Time*'s two Divisions. I am interested in writing the missing Division III, which requires passing through Barth's *Church Dogmatics*. That is my intuition, which would be inadmissible to most mainstream, secular Heideggereans.

human imagination's ability to create it for itself. Since human beings cannot understand time while transcending death on their own, they certainly cannot fashion the truth of the totality of their existence because they have no idea what predates the birth of existence and what comes after it. Hence *if* there is an answer to the mystery of life, existence and death, it must come from elsewhere, but this elsewhere does not derive from the dogmatic principles of religion that tries to enforce belief. And this hermeneutic of suspicion is exactly what will be required to re-inhabit Barth's treatise to rethink from the ground up the mystery of God's time, but this *time* beyond the confines of faith.¹⁷

All I can say at this point is that there is this outstanding possibility of a double movement: *Being and Time* can be appropriated to be written into the margins and hidden spaces in *Church Dogmatics* to blow wide open the notion of the revelation of God's *Time* and the time of God's *Revelation*; and inversely, the data and material from *Church Dogmatics* can be transmogrified in an alchemic concoction that will constitute the bridge to the missing Division III of *Being and Time*. Once the bridge is crossed, then a new picture of God's Time will emerge. This picture builds upon what *Church Dogmatics* explicates given the heritage of the New Testament and Old Testament, or the Bible as a whole, and the history of Christian theology. But what appears far exceeds what the foundation can support and hence is wholly Other to Christian doctrine, which is centered primarily upon the historical person of Jesus as the Christ in relation to the Father and Holy Spirit as the Triune God.

¹⁷ This obviously means going against the grain of what Barth himself says about the invalid and irrelevant nature of Heidegger's understanding of time for Barth's theological task of explicating 'the Time of Revelation' or the 'fulfilled time of God's revelation as Jesus Christ when God has time for us.' If appropriating and transforming Barth's text against Barth's presuppositions and intentions serves as a bridge beyond Heidegger, then it should be clear by now that my intention has nothing to do with defending Barth against Heidegger or vice-versa. The double movement of appropriation requires a twofold commitment to transcendence beyond Barth's Christian theology and Heidegger's fundamental ontology.

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Author contact email: rsampath@brandeis.edu