Table of Contents

Introduction
James Rowlins
George Radics

Articles

Interview with Anshul Tiwari
James Rowlins

On What Was, and What Remains: Palestinian Cinema and the Film Archive
Hend Alawadhi

What’s Goin’ on in the Back Streets? Patriarchal and Authoritarian Mentality in Contemporary Turkish Cinema
Murat İri

Interrupted Social Peace: Hate Speech in Turkish Media
H. Esra Arcan

Looking Back at Malaysia’s GE2008: An Internet Election and Its Democratic Aftermath
Sara Chinnasamy and Mary Griffiths

Social Media Empowerment: How Social Media Helps to Boost Women Entrepreneurship in Indonesian Urban Areas
Ezmieralda Melissa, Anis Hamidati, Muninggar Sri Saraswati
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Hend Alawadhi is a Visual and Cultural Studies Ph.D. student at the University of Rochester, New York. Her research interests include images of war and trauma, archival studies, memory, Orientalism and gender theory. She graduated from Kuwait University (2008) with a Bachelor of Fine Arts in Graphic Design (summa cum laude), and was granted a M.F.A. and Ph.D. scholarship. She received her M.F.A. in Computer Graphics Design from the Rochester Institute of Technology, NY in 2010.

Dr. H. Esra Arcan holds a Ph.D. in Journalism and M.A. degrees in Journalism and Human Rights and Democratization. She has published articles and book chapters on media issues related to human rights, gender issues and media discourse. Her latest research revolves around the role of the media in peace building. She teaches at Istanbul University in the Communication Faculty’s Department of Journalism and is also a member of the UNICEF Children Rights and Journalism Syllabus Study Group.

Sara Chinnasamy is a final year Ph.D. student in Media at the University of Adelaide. Her thesis deals with media discourse and political participation in Malaysia. During 1999-2005, she was a broadcast journalist for the public broadcaster, Radio Television Malaysia, where her role focused on parliamentary reporting, political assignments and related analyses. In 2006, she began lecturing on broadcast journalism in the Faculty of Media and Communication Studies at the University of Technology Mara, Malaysia, before coming to Australia in 2009 on a Malaysian government international scholarship.

Ezmieralda Melissa is currently a Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Public Relations at the Swiss German University, Indonesia. She is a grant recipient of the Strengthening Information Society Research Capacity Alliance (SIRCA II) programme funded by the International Development Research Centre of Canada for the period 2012-2013. Her research interests include new media technology, the representation of minorities in the media, and nationalism and democracy. In addition to her work with SIRCA II, she is involved in numerous research projects, including studies of Chinese representation in Indonesian media and studies of the effects of Nokia Life’s Business Application on women entrepreneurs in Indonesia.

Dr. Mary Griffiths is Associate Professor in the Discipline of Media at the University of Adelaide. She had formally held academic positions in the Departments of Communications and Writing (Monash University, Australia) and Screen and Media (University of Waikato, New Zealand). She publishes in the interdisciplinary fields of e-participation, digital citizens, online and offline governance, digital humanities, media reform and participatory media.

Dr. Murat İri is an Associate Professor of Communication Studies at Istanbul University. His doctoral thesis explored national identity in early Turkish cinema. His research interests include the sociology of communication, the social history of art, media and nationalism and fatherhood and masculinity in cinema. His books, Bir Film İzlemek: Pop Kültürü Sökmek (Watching Films: Deconstructing Pop Culture) and Sinema Araştırmaları: Kuramlar, Kavramlar, Yaklaşmalar (Film studies: Concepts, Theories, Approaches), were published by Derin Publications in 2010 and 2012 respectively.
Dr. George Radics is Associate Editor of the IAFOR Journal of Media, Communication and Film. He is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Southeast Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. He received his B.A. *(summa cum laude)* in Sociology and Asian American Studies from the University of California, Los Angeles and subsequently earned his PhD from the Department of Sociology at the National University of Singapore. Dr. Radics also has a law degree, with a concentration in Asian law, from University of Washington. His interests are law and development, media policy, sociology of emotions, postcolonial studies and Southeast Asia.

Dr. James Rowlins is Editor of the IAFOR Journal of Media, Communication and Film, as well as a Lecturer in Arts and Humanities at the Singapore University of Technology and Design, established in collaboration with MIT. He holds a doctorate from the University of Southern California, earned in conjunction with the department of French and the USC School of Cinematic Arts. His research interests include cinematic realism, politics and aesthetics, the legacy of the French New Wave, the emergence of ‘new waves’ and digital technology’s impact on contemporary filmmaking practice. He has dabbles in filmmaking and has directed several short films that have been screened at international film festivals and on university campuses.

Anshul Tiwari is a Singapore-based independent filmmaker. He has made films across South East Asia and India for non-profit organisations. Many of these films have been selected for screening in international film festivals such as the prestigious EIGHT festival organised by the United Nations. His film *Rosario* was awarded first prize in the IAFOR FilmAsia Open Film Competition 2012 in the under twenty minutes documentary category. In 2012, he collaborated on a feature film, *A Gran Plan*, which has been screened at the Harlem Film Festival and Rome International Film Festival. Details of his latest films projects can be found on his website www.forachangefilms.com.
Introduction

James Rowlins
George Radics

Welcome to the first issue of the IAFOR Journal of Media, Communication and Film (JMCF)!

JMCF is committed to promoting scholarship that explores the relationship between society, film and media – including new and digital media, as well as to giving a voice to scholars whose work explores hitherto unexamined aspects of contemporary media and visual culture. The journal additionally has a focus on Asia and Asian cultures’ interaction with the wider world, with the aim of providing new perspectives and keeping abreast of the socio-political changes taking place on the world’s fastest-developing continent.

JMCF is associated with MediAsia, IAFOR’s Annual Asian Conference on Media and Mass Communication, and FilmAsia, IAFOR’s Annual Asian Conference on Film and Documentary. A small number of papers from the associated IAFOR conference proceedings have been selected by the journal editors for publication, and all have been subjected to rigorous peer review. As the conference proceedings selected for publication by JMCF come from disciplines associated with both the Humanities and Social Sciences, articles’ methodology and content will inevitably vary to some degree. It goes without saying that any exploration of society through the lens of media and film raises theoretical and conceptual questions, and some of the articles published in JMCF will have this focus. However, many of the articles featured in this journal will primarily be concerned with practice: with tangible problems – of a societal, political, gender, religious or ethical order – and the ways in which they are represented and problematized in film and media.

In our first issue, we have selected five papers – two concerned with film studies and three that relate broadly to media, social and political science. Each article in this issue pertains to Asian nations whose primary religion is Islam. All but one of the article authors are women in this issue, and it is fair to say that our interaction with the topic of Islam is influenced to some extent by gender. The articles also touch on themes such as patriarchy and authoritarianism, as well democracy, free speech, economic development and modernisation. It might be said that the issue of censorship, loosely defined as the repression of the expression of ideas which may be considered offensive, objectionable or dangerous, is an overarching theme linking the articles in this issue. Indeed, each writer asks, in the context of his or her subject matter, what can and cannot be said, while also giving consideration to the far more contentious question of what should and should not be said through film, media or scholarship.

This theme is tackled in the first feature – an interview with a Singapore-based filmmaker Anshul Tiwari whose film, Rosario (2012), was awarded first prize in the IAFOR 2012 Documentary Short Film Competition in the under twenty minutes category. The eponymous protagonist, Rosario, is represented as a happy-go-lucky busker with a perennially sunny outlook on life. However, during a discussion about the documentary filmmaker’s ability to truthfully show life ‘as it is,’ it emerges that Rosario is far from being a Panglossian optimist, and has something of an axe to grind against ‘the system.’ Tiwari intimates that this message did not make it into the final cut for reasons of censorship, and this provides impetus for broad-based discussion about censorship in the context of the Singapore
filmmaking community. Incidentally, the interview piece – in which filmmakers are invited to reflect theoretically on the medium of film – will be a regular piece in JMCF.

The repression, or censorship, of ideas and memories is the subject of Hend Alawadhi’s article, ‘On What Was, and What Remains: Palestinian Cinema and the Film Archive.’ Alawadhi relates the highly disturbing account of the destruction of the Palestine film archive, which housed unique reels of Palestinian films made between the 1920s and 1980s, including over one hundred films dating from before 1948, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Polemically, Alawadhi’s article asserts that the disappearance (assumed destruction) of the archive was the result of one nation state’s attempts to ‘silence’ another by purposefully obliterating its memories, narratives and ultimately, its cultural identity. Parenthetically, Alawadhi’s article raises the question of how far, as scholars, we can allow political conviction to infiltrate our research. On a more positive note, Alawadhi explains that the lost films have been the subject of experimental and documentary film works that provide commentary and reflection on the lost archive. These works, which she characterises as being part of ‘an archival fever,’ afford the Palestinian people the chance to ‘rediscover its voice.’

Political strife in the Middle East indirectly connects the next two articles, which are about Turkey. The Anatolian peninsula is often said to be at the crossroads between East and West and Turkey has historically served as a diverse and multicultural home to people from throughout the region. After the political upheaval referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2012, world media attention was focussed on Turkey in the months of May and June of this year, when thousands of protestors took to the streets to take a stand against the incumbent government. The protests began after the brutal eviction of environmentalists who were conducting a sit-in demonstration against plans to turn Istanbul’s historic Taksim Gezi Park into a shopping mall, condominiums and army barracks. By all accounts, the strength and momentum of the demonstrations was fuelled by massive discontent with the ruling AK party, which in recent years has placed restrictions on freedom of speech, the press and internet, taken numerous anti-libertarian stances and is seen as increasingly Islamist and authoritarian.

In ‘What’s Goin’ on in the Back Streets? Patriarchal and Authoritarian Mentality in Contemporary Turkish Cinema,’ Murat İri shows that the process of modernisation in Turkey has not coincided with any ‘softening’ of the religious ideal of patriarchy and secular notion of authoritarianism. Indeed, while the relationship between city and cinema is a modernizing paradigm, İri argues that ‘traces of the authoritarian and patriarchal structure inherent in Turkish modernization persist in the modern day.’ Nowhere is this more evident than in cinema. Despite there being evidence of something of a ‘Turkish New Wave’ – a slew of popular films made by ‘young Turk’ directors with a strong emphasis on showing life as lived by youth on the city streets – İri categorically demonstrates that Turkish cinema, in particular the backstreets which are the site of violence, confrontation and punishment, is an unhappy place for those with a progressive mentality.

Ezra Arcan’s article, ‘Interrupted Social Peace: Hate Speech in Turkish Media,’ tackles, directly and indirectly, many of the issues raised by the recent protest movement. The article provides a careful and conscientious review of the rise of hate speech and its potential effect on deteriorating peace. Indeed, while media can serve as a mechanism to encourage one’s affinity towards home, it can conversely marginalise and inflame tension with minority groups. Arcan reminds us of the precarious balance between freedom of speech and the regulation of hate speech, exploring the contentious issues raised by the censorship of intolerant discourse. In aiming to construct and preserve an idealised identity through hate speech, Arcan concludes that Turkish media is killing off alternative voices and
histories. She advocates for further study to safeguard against the rise of hate crimes, and also for significant changes in the manner in which journalism is practiced in Turkey.

The manner in which journalism is practiced is also an important topic of discussion in Malaysia, a country that projects itself to the world as a modern Muslim country. As discussed in Sara Chinnasamy and Mary Griffiths’ article ‘Looking Back at Malaysia’s GE2008: An Internet Election and Its Democratic Aftermath,’ the rise of alternative media sources can profoundly affect the practice of politics. In the particular context of Malaysia, the Internet has provided the opportunity for opponents of Barisan Nasional, the Malaysian ruling party, to erode its powerbase and, arguably, for the opposition to achieve significant electoral gains. Critics of Barisan Nasional, who accuse the party of pervasive chauvinism, are optimistic that its failure to comprehend the power of media and the Internet may signal its epic downfall, and potentially usher in a new epoch in Malaysia’s political structure—one in which the patriarchy and authoritarianism that arguably characterises the state will be subverted by a more inclusive and heterogeneous democracy.

Finally, Melissa Ezmieralda et al. in ‘Social Media Empowerment: How Social Media Help to Boost Women Entrepreneurship in Indonesian Urban Areas’ remind us that media no longer affects societies on just the meta-political level, but directly in the home and in the family. As Indonesia, the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, grapples with developmental problems such as unemployment, the introduction of new technology and media is helping to not only transform the nature of employment but also challenge existing notions of gender. There is evidence, however, that traditional gender roles in Indonesia are changing, thanks in part to social media sites such as Facebook that are giving women the opportunity to overcome their lack of social capital and finance, to maintain businesses that connect these women to economic markets within and outside their locale. Ezmieralda et al. further note that such an enterprise additionally provides women with the ability to achieve self-actualisation and to become more confident and satisfied in their daily lives.

We would like to extend our sincere and heartfelt thanks to all those who have contributed to this issue, in particular the members of the Editorial Advisory Board, the peer reviewers, the publications team at IAFOR and the authors. We are excited to survey our readership’s opinions on this first issue and very much look forward to publishing our second issue in winter 2013-14.

Dr. James Rowlins
Editor

Dr. George Radics
Associate Editor
Interview with Anshul Tiwari

James Rowlins

Anshul Tiwari’s film Rosario was awarded first prize in the IAFOR FilmAsia Open Film Competition 2012 in the under twenty minutes documentary category. The following interview was recorded in Singapore on 15 February 2013.

Keywords: Independent filmmaking, documentary aesthetics, Singapore film industry, censorship.
1.) Tell me about your background and training in filmmaking? Who are your biggest influences?

I come from a small town in India, where watching movies is the main source of recreation for us. I used to watch a movie every week in the theatre, so that’s how I started loving films. From the age of eleven or twelve, I harboured dreams of maybe one day being a filmmaker, or maybe being in the movies. But you know, in India you have to ensure you make a living and I am an engineering graduate. I finished my engineering degree in 2004 and moved into a job, but immediately started looking for options for getting into filmmaking. I did several short courses all over India – I made short movies on a Handicam, and I think from there I realized I had to give a bit more formal shape to my filmmaking, so I took a year-long course on documentary filmmaking. Afterwards, I was determined to keep making movies and I produced short films – hiring the crew, the cinematographer, the lighting and everything. I had my first taste of professional filmmaking in 2008.

I have admired different filmmakers at different stages of my life – each of them have influenced me and given me inspiration and direction. My love of film started with Indian filmmakers like Kundan Shah, Ramesh Sippy and Chetan Anand – these are men of extraordinary persona and vision. Then I discovered French filmmakers like Maurice Pialat, and later, American filmmakers like Jim Jarmusch. I love a great many filmmakers. I especially love new wave filmmakers from Latin America, India and South East Asia. I admire the films of Kim Ki-duk and Mike Leigh. Some of Leigh’s films end a bit too simplistically – his problems are deep but his solutions are too simple. But I think that is how we want our lives to be, or at least, that is how we hope things were. I also look up to the Iranian filmmaker Majid Majidi. *Children of Heaven* and *The Song of Sparrows* are very interesting films. I am drawn towards Iranian films because you still feel there is honesty in the storytelling – they avoid certain negative aspects of Hollywood and they are not overly dictated by the technical side of things – the best cameras, lenses, lights, etc. As regards Indian cinema, I have always admired the work of Shyam Benegal.

2.) How would you define the art of filmmaking? With which art, or arts, does filmmaking have kinship?

I don’t think there can be a general answer at all to this question. For me, films are closest to music. There is certain mystery behind why a certain kind of music is appreciated by some people, while rejected by others. That said, it is the vision of the individual that gives filmmaking kinship to one art form or another. Recently, I saw *Children of God* by Kareem Mortimer. If you pay attention to the cinematography, you will find yourself entering into the skin of the characters and becoming very intimate with the places represented. And yet it is a very poetic rendition of reality. Another example is M.F. Husain’s films, such as *Gaja Gamini*, which can be said to be ‘painterly’.

3.) Please tell me about the conception of Rosario. How did Dennis Rosario come to be the subject of your short documentary?

I met Rosario inside the tunnel. I’d stop there to listen to his voice, his music. Those songs weren’t familiar, but I liked his voice. He wasn’t just repeating the same beat – he was actually trying to entertain people. I would see people stop by and chat up with him, lending him their newspaper. And he knew names, he knew their families. I was drawn to his personality, his outgoing nature and wanted to explore more. We began chatting. He asked me what I did so I told him about myself. And
he just said very bluntly, ‘Are you looking for a subject to make a film on? I have a friend who is a guide in Singapore night safari.’ I didn’t know what to say to him. Maybe then he sensed something inside me and said, ‘Do you want to make a film on my life?’ I said, ‘Do you want to see yourself in a film?’ And he said, ‘Well, I don’t mind. But I don’t know what you expect from me.’ I left the conversation at that. I had bought this camera a few months ago and I was looking for more subjects to shoot and I thought, why not give it a try? It turned out to be a different experience from what I had imagined.

4.) Is Rosario’s philosophy on life (‘don’t worry, be happy!’ etc.) akin to your own way of seeing the world?

My own life is about juggling the personal and professional, life and career. I get tense. I lose my appetite. I lose my peace of mind. Filmmaking, as a process, can actually be nothing short of harrowing. Yet there is only satisfaction at the end. Yes, I feel that my filmmaking is very similar to how I see my life; which is, full of struggle and a quest for peace and satisfaction that is only granted to you once you have gone through the pain of doing the hard work. Nothing that is worth doing comes easy. And nothing that is easy is worth doing anymore. I see my life as a constant learning curve, going upwards, never reaching a plateau. And when you are learning, you are always dealing with the pain of doubting yourself, of second-guessing, or being in the unknown. It is the feeling of overcoming the unknown that gives you satisfaction at the end.

5.) Please tell me about the technical process. How did you render the colours (greens, yellows, reds) so vividly? Was the music recorded in-camera or post-synched? What are your favourite kinds of shots? Did editing pose any problems?

I shot this on a Canon EOS 7D DSLR at 24 FPS (frames per second), going as wide as I could go with my aperture. Some shots were taken at 50 FPS and slowed down in post-production. I wanted to see the background during the interviews, so I shot at a narrow aperture. The music was recorded using a Zoom sound recorder and synched later. The night shots were planned separately as B-roll footage. I had scouted a lot of places in Singapore, and I wanted to shoot late at night, once the lights are switched out. My favourite shots are the close-ups and moving shots, in which I tried to create a dolly or track movement without actually using one. In total I had ten to twelve hours of footage, which I had to reduce to seven minutes.

I have learned some of the most important lessons in life as an editor. If you can help it, don’t edit your project. My original story was much different. I had a feeling that I had shot much, much less than I should have. I originally planned to cut a short two-minute piece and create a reel to show it to investors, raise more funds and make a feature length documentary film. Even now, I don’t think it’s a bad idea. But because I thought it was going to be a two minute film, I wanted to stylize it much more, doing a lot more work in post-production, and that is a reason the post-production didn’t take off immediately. I moved to a feature film (A Gran Plan), and only came back to Rosario after a gap of ten months. When I got to edit it, I felt as if I was looking at fresh material. This helped the project, since I began to see the potential in the work. Editing, after all, is less cerebral than emotional – it is alchemy.
6.) I noticed you employ deep focus and quite emotive music during Dennis Rosario’s interview segment. Can you comment on these choices?

The choice of music emerged later when I began to hear Rosario’s voice on different pieces of music. My idea about storytelling is that the viewer should actively participate in the process of storytelling. These days, audiences have gotten used to being spoon-fed, generally by means of the music; i.e. the audience is supposed to laugh in this scene, or cry in that scene, because the music says so. Filmmakers know that even if they don’t have anything good on celluloid, they can manipulate their audience through music, and it works. Conventions and standards have been set standard for what people will and won’t like, and it’s not good as a culture.

7.) How ‘rehearsed’ was Dennis’ performance? Is it at all improvised?

He was interviewed by my creative producer Smita. I purposely asked her to interview Rosario, since she comes across as a much more humane person on such occasions. Moreover, her interview skills are much more refined as I get so caught up with capturing the visuals and audio that I am unable to make the eye contact needed to elicit correct emotions.

At times, I made him perform for the camera. The music was the reason I was drawn to him – its rawness, and as I wanted to give that feeling that you are listening to it on the street, I didn’t want it too polished. So I kept something of the ‘hiss’ picked up in the sound recording. Although the conversation began slowly, he became relaxed so we just let him talk. When you share your feelings with someone who gives you their full attention, it is easier to remain honest.

I believe, moreover, that there is such a thing as an honest and dishonest filmmaker. I know, for instance, of this documentary filmmaker in America who wanted to make a statement on the fast-food generation – his idea is that there is a fat, dumb generation of children who can’t follow instructions. He had to get permission from parents, of course. Later, however, the kind of music he used and the editing made it look much worse than they were. The parents didn’t know that they had signed up for that. So this is where honesty comes in. Couldn’t he say the same thing in a different way? To me, this was making a mockery of someone to make a point – it felt dishonest and I was repulsed by watching it.

8.) Can documentary film show the world ‘as it is’?

It is hard for a documentary to depict the world as it is. The camera is a powerful and frightening device. It alters reality. Then there is the whole element of selection and rejection during the editing process. You can’t finish editing a film if you are caught up in the confusion of reality. Ultimately, film has to manipulate.

As a filmmaker, however, you want to tell reality as it is. But as soon as you bring a camera in there, you have to accept that it is going to play some part. People stare at the camera and start to change their behaviour. When I filmed special needs children, for instance, I thought that they would not be affected by the camera, but as soon as I put the camera there, they started asking if they could do this and that on camera. So, the camera alters reality. Even if you tried to capture reality as it is, well, eventually you have to accept that when you are telling a story on film, you are compressing reality. You have to choose some parts over others – otherwise films would be never-ending! Most filmmakers aim to depict a stylised version of reality. Personally, I am most drawn to the space
between documentary and fiction. It is not docu-drama – it is not about recreating or re-enacting, but rather, creating a version of reality. Your narrative choices are inspired by the real depiction of events.

9.) With regard to Rosario, what do you think of the alternative aesthetic, namely that documentary should show the world ‘warts and all’, and actively probe and challenge the status quo, even if this means being negative or polemical?

In the case of Rosario, he’s had a good life. He isn’t a drifter – he chose to live and perform on the street. He receives government help. I don’t know if he has enough savings, but I realized he was making enough to get by. I realised that the man is lonely and that he hasn’t had an audience in a long time, but he’s not going through a really tough time.

That said, I had to trust my judgement in a few instances. I saw him quoting the Bible; but as I didn’t want to give a religious hue to the film, I stayed away from those bits. Rosario also said a few things about the system. You see, he’s been in Singapore for the past forty years and he said that when he was young, there were promises made that weren’t kept. He had a few complaints – that the government should not do this and that, and that they never change. He said that he had been thrown out of places because he hadn’t applied for a licence, and that if he was living in a different country, he would have more opportunities to play. So he had these complaints, but I chose not include that in the film – he wasn’t comfortable having them in the film either. There are a few things you can’t say.

10.) Let’s talk about censorship. Does the government impede independent filmmaking in any way?

My take on this is that if there is censorship, filmmakers should find a way to get around it. The government has allowed a lot of ideas that are mild – films like Rosario won’t be censored. The issue of censorship is linked to funding. The government is very strict about the subjects it will give support. I have heard instances on MDA (Media Development Authority) banning the screening of films that may harm the sentiments of a certain communities on the grounds that they are racist or prejudiced. There was a film – Sex, Violence and Family Values – which was banned last year, despite it actually being a self-funded project. As Singapore is a mixed society, you can’t say certain things about certain communities – even in jest. Their approach is not one of tolerance. Sometimes people want to make a point using sarcasm or satire, but they are not allowed to, and I think that is something that should change. But independent filmmakers always find ways to make films – this is part of their education. That said, I am against filmmakers getting extra publicity for their works because of run-ins with the Board of Film Censors.

11.) Your films, signed ‘for a change’, are in the service of many good causes: health and hygiene, development in S.E. Asia, safe sex and family planning, community initiatives for disadvantaged children, etc. As a filmmaker, do you feel that you have a ‘duty’ to support these causes?

I don’t feel duty bound to my causes. I feel empathy and love, but I have never felt duty-bound. I’m not an activist. I find interesting stories – my goal is to tell that story honestly. I don’t start out on a film thinking I have to give something for the cause - I start out hoping to tell a good story and then see what comes out of that. Sometimes you can hope for many things – that it will change people – but then nothing happens. Sometimes you create a work and the unexpected happens.
12.) What is it like to be a filmmaker in Singapore? Is there a vibrant filmmaking community here?

Singapore has a young and vibrant filmmaking community. There is a lot of energy in the filmmaking community. Lots of people are making short films who are all still in their prime, in their 30s or early 40s, and so have lots of potential. In the recent past, filmmakers such as Eric Khoo have enjoyed international success.

The government supports indie filmmakers by providing grants through the Singapore Film Commission and Media Development Authority. However, as mentioned, in order to get funding in Singapore a film project has to relate to local issues, communities or culture. For a feature film, the crew has to be predominantly Singaporean, and again, you are bound to subjects about your local environment. Some of these ideas are quite good, but some are quite frustrating.

While there is no shortage of filmmakers making good short films, this is not the case for feature filmmaking. A short film can be made over a few weekends, whereas a feature film needs a dedicated, month-long shoot and proper funding. People arguably pay too much attention to the industry side of things – screenwriting, directing, camera, sound, etc., rather than to the art of storytelling. They want to be gaffers, cinematographers, sound men, etc. This means there are very good technical people available. But a very well-made, technically competent film may not necessarily be an effective film – because film is more than that. They are so busy out looking for a ‘job’ that they tend to forget that filmmaking about finding and telling experiences and storytelling. On the other hand, you see in more mature industries like in the USA, UK, India and China, people trying to come through as artists, not just as technicians. While people are not currently doing enough, I hope that in due time we will see better stories and better storytellers.

13.) What are your future projects and ambitions?

My target is to make a feature-length documentary. I am fleshing out a couple of ideas, writing documentary scripts and applying to the US and Germany for funding. I know people who have started a television documentary channel in India and who are building a network of filmmakers. This is something I hope to be involved in. In this part of the world, I participate in film festivals to get exposure and funding. I am drawn to an initiative called the ‘Indian Memory Project.’ A lady in Mumbai has collected scrap books and albums from people’s personal lives, going back fifty years or so. She has created sets of stories based on these artefacts.

Most recently I have been working on a docu-drama which recreates events from last year. A group of school students aged between ten and twelve noticed that their school cleaners were not respected enough – that nobody pays attention to them, to the point where they are almost invisible. The kids thought this was kind of disrespectful and made this campaign to raise awareness. I thought there’s a good story there, so I lined up a couple of meetings with the children and began filming.

I hope to have funding for a film about the food situation in Singapore. There are a number of people who depend on being given food by charities. There are food banks for this purpose, but big supermarkets like Cold Storage continue to throw food away within their expiry date, refusing to allow impoverished people access to it.
On What Was, and What Remains:  
Palestinian Cinema and the Film Archive  

Hend Alawadhi

Abstract

Palestinian cinema is intricately tied to the memory of a pre-1948 Palestine and the desire of return; one that must be understood in the context of sixty years of exile and dispersion. It is also concerned with making what has been forcibly made invisible, visible. The individuality of the Palestinian people and their cultural identity, which is frequently marginalised in today’s media, is given a chance to rediscover its voice in films that are fuelled by an archival fever (Derrida & Prenowitz 1995). Items like keys, title deeds, family photographs, newspaper clippings, school certificates, and marriage licenses are the foundation of Palestinian memory, and hence are a decisive part of Palestinian cinema, alongside landscape and trauma. Although the Palestinians are a dispersed people, and their films originate from different places: the West Bank, Gaza, the Arab world, Europe and the United States, they represent a collective identity, an identity that is primarily based on ancestral memory and one which is facing continual crises that threaten its existence. This paper is about Palestinian cinema and the themes of disaster, displacement and memory. It also focuses on the Palestinian Film Archive that went missing during the Israeli siege of Beirut in 1982. The archive is perhaps the ultimate representation of the silenced Palestinian with no permission to narrate (Edward Said, 1984). I take a close look at two short documentaries made about the archive, as well as interviews and personal accounts, deeply rooted in nostalgia, twice removed from the memories of a utopian Palestine.

Keywords: Palestine, cinema, archive, memory, displacement, film, politics, representation, narrative.
The first motion picture frames that were taken in Palestine can be credited to Auguste and Louis Lumière’s cameramen, who travelled to many countries after introducing film to the world. The date is not well documented, although most sources list 1896 as the year of the first film shot in Palestine. The scenes that were filmed featured quotidian details; trains entering the station, people waiting on platforms, the landscape around Jerusalem, and so on (Tryster 1995). These early silent movies were frequently played in the movie houses scattered around major Palestinian cities. Edison cameras also toured the Middle East region as early as 1903, releasing films such as Arabian Jewish Dances and Jerusalem’s Busiest Street. In 1908 Pathé released a film entitled Jerusalem, which was part of a world tour (Travel Film Archive at www.travelfilmarchive.com). A simple internet search for ‘Palestine’ and ‘early film’ yields numerous results. The Travel Film Archive website has twenty-three films taken in Palestine from the early 1920s silent era to the mid-1940s. The themes of the films are quite diverse, including religious tours, folk dances, architectural exploration and travelogues. Following the Lumière brothers, other foreign film crews documented the country while others filmed dramatic adaptations of New Testament stories. The documentaries of this period were Orientalist in nature, did not grant Palestinians agency and generally presented them as primitive (Gertz & Khleifi 2008).

It is unclear whether any non-war related films were made during the First World War, and even if any were, none of them survive. However, there were British and Australian cameramen stationed in Palestine between 1914 and 1917 who did take some footage of the war. Although most Palestinian films that are known internationally were made during the 1970s, for reasons I shall discuss later, it is a misconception to believe that only European men carried out filmmaking during the first half of the twentieth century.

In 1935, Ibrahim Hassan Sirhan filmed a twenty-minute long silent movie that documents King Saud of Saudi Arabia’s visit to Palestine. Sirhan followed the king from Lod to Jaffa, and from Jaffa to Tel Aviv. The film was screened at the Nabi Rubin festivals, and Sirhan played an accompanying soundtrack so that, it is said, spectators did not realise that it was silent. This event is deemed to mark the starting point of Palestinian cinema, whose history is divided into four periods that correlate to the major stages of the national Palestinian struggle (Gertz & Khleifi 2008).

Sirhan bought his manual camera for 50 liras in Tel Aviv. He was self-taught, and relied on books and instructional manuals to learn filming, developing and editing techniques, reportedly assembling his editing table himself. Sirhan collaborated with Jamal al-Asphar, the cinematographer who filmed
King Saud’s visit, and together, the two men are considered to be the founders of Palestinian cinema. They went on to produce a forty-five minute film called *Realized Dreams* (1940) about Palestinian orphans. The film also self-consciously aimed to prove that Palestinians, and not just Europeans, were capable of producing movies about Palestine. Their next documentary was about a member of the Arab Supreme Council, for which they received three hundred Palestinian liras (Gertz & Khleifi 2008).

Sirhan, together with Ahmad al-Kilani – a Palestinian who studied film in Cairo – founded a production studio called ‘Studio Palestine’ in 1945. The studio produced several feature-length films that were screened in Palestine and neighbouring Arab countries. There were a number of other prominent figures that played an important role in shaping Palestinian cinema during this same period, such as Mohammad Kayali and Abde-er-Razak Alja’uni, who also produced several films in Palestine, all of which are now lost (Gertz & Khleifi 2008).

In order to explain how this happened, it is first necessary to provide some historical context. In 1917, when Palestine was under the British Mandate, the Balfour Declaration was drafted: a paragraph-long letter from the United Kingdom’s foreign secretary Arthur Balfour to the leader of the British Jewish community Baron Rothschild, which stated that Palestine was to be the national home for the Jewish people. This declaration was put into effect in 1948 and as a result, more than 700,000 Palestinians were forced into exile. Palestinians were driven out of their homes and many had to go to refugee camps. Palestinians refer to the events of 1948 as the *Nakba*, which literally means ‘catastrophe’ in Arabic. Of course, the historical context to al-Nakba is more complicated that this paragraph-length introduction can convey. The Balfour Declaration was only one part of a sequence of events, yet ultimately it had important, life-changing consequences for all Palestinians.

The events of the *Nakba* and its aftermath are not well documented in tangible form other than oral histories and personal testimonies. There are several explanations as to why this may be. First of all, the majority of Palestinians back then were farmers and peasants, and had been connected to their land in an organic and intimate manner for generations. Heavily dependent on oral traditions, as opposed to the written word, they did not see a need or a reason to document their history in writing; they simply belonged to the land and it belonged to them. Secondly, most of the Palestinians suffered from posttraumatic stress after the *Nakba*, experiencing a collective sense of, but not limited to, denial, guilt, shame and a general difficulty in coming to terms with the facts of their situation and the loss of their homeland. Practically no Palestinian films were made between 1948 and 1967. It is therefore dubbed the epoch of silence, and historians view this as the second era of Palestinian cinema (Gertz & Khleifi 2008: 11).

The era of silence ended in 1968, when the third period of Palestinian cinema began. This happened on the heels of yet another significant and devastating event for the Palestinians: the 1967 Arab–Israeli war, the *Naksa*, during which Israel defeated the Arab forces and occupied the Gaza Strip and took the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria (Gertz & Khleifi 2008). Several Palestinian institutions, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that had been formed during the years preceding the 1967 war, were greatly strengthened as a direct result of the conflict. Most Palestinian cinema of this era was made
by exiled filmmakers who resided in Amman and Beirut. As the PLO was also based in Jordan from 1969 to 1971, it provided a makeshift sanctuary for these filmmakers. In view of the involvement of the PLO and other Palestinian organizations, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), the film production body of this period is referred to as the ‘Cinema of the Palestinian Revolution,’ or the ‘Cinema of the Palestinian Organizations’ (Gertz & Khleifi 2008: 12).

In 1967, Sulafa Mirsal a young Palestinian who studied photography in Cairo set up a small photography unit in her kitchen. Her equipment was primitive and her techniques were basic, and she mostly worked with images of Palestinian casualties, the *shahids* (Abu Gh’nima 1981 cited in Gertz & Khleifi 2008). Her work was transferred to Amman, Jordan, where the PLO offices were located and the Department of Photography was established. Mustafa Abu-Ali and Hani Johariya, both Palestinian filmmakers who were living in Amman, joined Mirsal. The two of them worked for Jordanian television, and regularly borrowed cameras and film from the station to document protests, public gatherings and cultural events related to the Palestinians. The first movie produced in the third period; *Say No to the Peaceful Solution* (1968), was a collaboration between Abu-Ali, Johariya and Salah Abu Hannoud. The film documented the demonstrations of the civilians who objected to the ‘peace solution’ suggested by US Secretary of State William Rogers, as they believed it neglected the interests of the Palestinian people (Gertz & Khleifi 2008: 21).

When the PLO was forced to leave Amman, Jordan, for Beirut, Lebanon, due to conflict with the Jordanian monarchy that resulted in the events of Black September in 1970, the film group, led by Abu-Ali, went with them. During this period, more than sixty documentary films about the Palestinian struggle were made, under the harshest of conditions. It was during this period that ‘the Palestinian organizations reiterated their belief in cinema as a significant tool for the advancement of their cause’ (Gertz & Khleifi 2008: 12), and in accordance with the era's Marxist-Leninist outlook, cinema was regarded as a means of promoting revolutionary ideals, as it was in anti-colonial and resistance movements worldwide.

The situation in Lebanon wasn’t easy for the filmmakers. Equipment constantly had to be borrowed, and as funding from the PLO was scarce, and there was a constant shortage of crews. Footage from their archive was used to complete films, and once recorded, the material was sent outside of Lebanon for development, as laboratories no longer functioned after the Lebanese civil war. After the editing process, the films had to be sent back again for printing. The process took months, and resulted in fifteen or twenty-minute long films at best. The filmmakers nevertheless continually pressed Palestinian organizations for any kind of support they could afford (Dabashi 2006).

During this time, Abu-Ali, along with several other Palestinian filmmakers, decided to set up a Palestinian Film Unit/Archive (private interview with Ghaleb Sha’ath, Jerusalem, 1995 cited in Gertz & Khleifi 2008). Their main intention in doing this was to create a history of Palestinian identity, especially since many pro-Israel politicians had renewed the ‘Palestinians don’t exist’ campaign. In setting up an official archive, they also wanted to unite the efforts of Palestinian filmmakers worldwide and hoped to give Palestinian cinema better recognition and status (private interview with Khadijah Abu-Ali, Ramallah, 2003 cited in Gertz & Khleifi 2008). The archive included over one hundred films, dating from pre-1948 and up until the early 1980s, as well as all the
films directed by the group. Since materials from past films were constantly being used as footage in newer films, a systematic and easily accessible method for storing the films was needed. Khadija Abu-Ali, the first Palestinian woman filmmaker and the wife of Mustafa Abu-Ali (Hillauer 2005: 209), was in charge of screening and received archival training to respond to the growing need to access the films. The budget – not surprisingly - was minimal and the films they had were stored in boxes marked with the film type and date of filming. No computers were available and thousands of meters of celluloid were categorised manually.

The archive was initially housed in the Film Institute in West Beirut (Gertz & Khleifi 2008: 28). It contained a vast amount of documentation of battles, bombings, sieges – footage which had miraculously survived considering the circumstances it was taken in – as well as political and social events and interviews with political leaders, intellectuals and academics, most of whom have passed away now. The archive also contained films and documentaries about life in refugee camps and the lives of Palestinians in the diaspora. Additionally, newly made films were constantly being added to the archive. However, when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, life for Palestinians in Beirut came to an abrupt halt. The Israeli siege signalled, not only the devastation of Palestinian life in Lebanon, but also the obliteration of the Palestinian cultural presence there, and marked the end of the third period of Palestinian cinema. Alongside the thousands of casualties and the complete destruction of civilian infrastructure in Lebanon, the destruction of the archive can be considered to be one of the biggest losses of the war.

Literature concerning the lost archive is sparse. Aside from the occasional article, two books concerning Palestinian cinema; Hamid Dabashi’s Dreams of A Nation: On Palestinian Cinema (2006) and Nurith Gertz and George Khleifi’s Palestinian Cinema: Landscape, Trauma and Memory (2008) touch upon it briefly. It was therefore quite a revelation to come across two recent films that have been made about the lost archive. The first and most recent is a short eight-minute experimental film essay by Sarah Wood entitled For Cultural Purposes Only (2009). The film starts with a flickering image of what looks like a film certificate. It states the name of her film, but we see several shots each with a different price marked on them, the last one marked being fifty pounds. Black and white film footage from what appears to be 1930s Palestine is displayed on the screen next, with the word ‘cinema,’ first in French then in English, juxtaposed over the moving image. Next we see a great number of people walking about, and several camels as well, in what appears to be archival footage. A black blank screen then appears, and we begin to see a sentence slowly being typed in white, ‘What would it feel like to never see an image of the place that you came from?’ More black and white footage follows, but this time of a small child sliding playfully on top of a tent, and the word ‘cinema’ in Arabic on top of him.

Wood then takes us through a series of ‘remembered’ Palestinian films that were mostly made in the 1970s, and lost with the archive. The details of each film, such as title, name of director, year made and the person whose memory retained that lost film, are displayed on the image of a folder. Wood narrates the memory, while the hand of an illustrator reconstructing the film with pen and paper appears on the screen. Sometimes the directors themselves are the ones providing the memory of the film, and sometimes parts of the film footage is still available, and Wood uses it with the illustrations. Towards the end of Wood’s film essay, the illustrator starts erasing, very slowly, a
drawn image of an archive, wiping out the cabinets, the reels, and the room, until we are left with a white image. Wood also makes use of quotes throughout her film, as well as one-word title cards such as ‘memory’ and ‘lost.’ She also uses an animation that shows the loss of Palestinian land to the emerging state of Israel, from pre-1948 to the present day, interjected with film footage of Palestinians children in refugee camps.

While For Cultural Purposes is incredibly nostalgic, all of the narrated memories are, poignantly, about films that don’t exist anymore. Wood wonderfully explores the concept of how cinema fuels memory, and what the effect of cinema is on culture and heritage. More importantly, the film strongly conveys the dependence of the Palestinian narrative on memory, and its strong urge to return to a Palestine that once was. The film also presents an alternative medium through which these historical accounts can re-emerge. The interviewees relate to Wood through their recollection of the films that are now lost key events in Palestinian life such the Nakba, as well as the Sabra and Shatila refugee massacre in which hundreds of children and women were mercilessly slaughtered. Watching this reconstruction, composed of quick drawings, makes the viewer acutely aware that in a world that depends on moving images to give the facts, spoken memories count for very little.

The second film concerning the lost film archive is a lengthier documentary entitled Kings and Extras: Digging for a Palestinian Image (2004). Directed by the Palestinian Azza El-Hassan, the film chronicles El-Hassan’s journey from Jordan to Palestinian territories, Syria and Lebanon on a quest to try and find clues about the whereabouts of the missing archive. El-Hassan begins her search in a Jaramana refugee camp, located in Damascus, Syria, where Iranian filmmakers shot a film about the Palestinian war using Palestinian refugees as actors. All that remains of the filming location is a few burnt car tires and an-ash coated car. As with the archive, all evidence of their involvement in the film has vanished, except for the memories of a few elderly people who remember seeing the film set.

El Hassan is continually confronted with new clues, yet meets dead ends. She interviews numerous people and receives all sorts of accounts as to what might have happened to the archive. She and her film crew even locate the apartment in which the archive was said to have been stored in during the Israeli siege, waiting for the owners to show up. However, when she eventually meets them, they tell her that they were totally unaware of this. Towards the end she is led to the graveyard that is believed to have been yet another assumed ‘resting’ place for the archive, but no one is prepared to start digging.

Hiba Joharia, who is El-Hassan’s childhood friend, provides the most intriguing insight into the importance of the film archive. Joharia is the daughter of Hani Joharia, a member of the PLO film unit who was also one of those responsible for creating the archive. He was killed in Lebanon while filming the Palestinian resistance in combat. The feeling of compounded loss of both the Palestinian people and Hani Joharia’s legacy is palpable when narrated from the perspective of his daughter, especially when Hiba Joharia and El-Hassan examine the very camera that her father was using when he was killed from the shrapnel of a bomb that landed half a meter away from him. Naturally, the camera is barely recognizable. She urges El-Hassan to look for the archive, saying:
Even if you don’t find them [the archives], it’s good to look and to make your own film telling the world we’ve lost something we once had and we’d love to find it again. Then maybe someone you don’t meet during your search will see the film and tell us something about the archive.

Throughout her search, El-Hassan indirectly communicates the everyday life of Palestinian people – mostly refugees – through their personal narratives. Their sense of dislocation is exemplified in one man’s frustration about his inability as a refugee to work or buy land. ‘We’re not only ghosts, it’s as if we’re living in another century. We’re on the margins of society. We’re not living,’ he says. El-Hassan’s attempt to find the lost archive is understandably perceived by some as a futile attempt, especially since the Palestinians are still living under what many call an apartheid rule. Questions of cinema are naturally considered to be less important than the day-to-day struggle of people’s lives. One Palestinian woman bluntly tells El-Hassan: ‘If you want drama go to the checkpoint. Go and watch men being tied up.’

There are a number of theories surrounding the disappearance of the archive and its possible whereabouts today. The most common one is that Israel’s military or spies intentionally destroyed the archive during the siege (Dabashi 2006). Khadija Abu-Ali claims that she personally approached Yasser Arafat – then chairman of the PLO – and his top aide, Khalil el-Wazir, to ask them to protect the archive. They promised they would, but a few days before leaving Beirut, they informed her that they couldn’t transport the archive out of Beirut under the current circumstances. However el-Wazir told Khadija Abu-Ali that they had contacted the French embassy, whose officials had agreed to help secure the archive. Khadija Abu-Ali and the group were nevertheless eventually left to their own devices. They rented a basement and paid two years’ rent in advance. In an interview with Mustafa Abu-Ali in *Kings and Extras*, he stresses that one of their main concerns was finding a safe and cool place to avoid the degradation of film. Beirut is extremely hot and humid during the summertime, so there was a risk that the films would rapidly degrade. The basement that they eventually found was in a relatively safe street but wasn’t equipped with an air conditioner, so they had to buy an air conditioning unit and install it.

These details are important, as they show the lengths that a few people went to in order to protect the heritage of a nation. It goes without saying that they did so during a time of great danger, with bombs literally exploding around them every day. Transporting the archive to somewhere outside of Beirut proved too difficult, and thus they had to settle for what they believed would be the safest option – leaving the archive in Beirut, before leaving the city themselves, as most people did for their own personal safety. Abandoning the archive was not an option. Omar a-Rashidi – a cinematographer who worked in the institute – and two clerks from the institute’s staff, were asked to guard the archive, but due to escalating violence in the area, a-Rashidi was compelled to leave Beirut. The two remaining clerks were extremely worried about its safety and eventually turned to the Palestinian Red Crescent for help. The Red Crescent stored the archive in their hospital at Akka for a short time, undoubtedly in unfit conditions, before having to relocate it, fearing that it would make the hospital a target. Some believe that the hospital staff buried the archive in a nearby Palestinian graveyard under unidentified gravestones. Others have speculated that Hizballah managed to seize the archive and transport it to Iran, and there are also rumours that a pro-Syrian group stole the archive and sold it to Israel. Whatever the truth, Khadija Abu-Ali is not optimistic about its fate, and fearing that the memories of several generations have disappeared forever (Gertz & Khleifi 2008: 30).
The 1980s and 1990s were particularly tumultuous decades in Palestinian history. The economic crisis, increased Jewish settlements and even the Intifada (Arabic for ‘shaking off’) left the Palestinians in a vulnerable state. Poverty, unemployment, and crumbling infrastructure were, and still are, the priority of the Palestinian Authority. Cinema was once again relegated to the margins of the Palestinians’ concern. However, it did not come to a complete halt. Michel Khleifi effectively began the fourth period of Palestinian cinema – one that is presently on-going – when he returned from Belgium to his birth town of Nazareth in Galilee in 1980. He produced his first documentary - presented in a fiction-like narrative – about two Palestinian women, one of whom (Khleifi’s maternal aunt) was forced to work in an Israeli textile factory after her land was expropriated.

Although Khleifi’s name was the most prominent during the 1980s, many others began making films during that period as well, many of whom are considered to be major Palestinian directors today such as Elia Suleiman, Rashid Masharawi and Nizar Hassan (Gertz & Khleifi 2008: 32). However, the difficulties faced by the filmmakers are essentially the same as those encountered around the time of the Nakba. Edward Said called attention to this fact in his essay ‘Permission to Narrate’ (1984). Most media outlets were inaccessible to them, especially in Israel, as cultural and artistic events were banned because they were deemed to be acts of incitement. Even displaying the colours of the Palestinian flag was considered an offence worthy of arrest and indefinite detention. Painters, singers, actors and especially filmmakers were constantly arrested, expelled from the country and even assassinated (Gertz & Khleifi 2008).

During the Israeli siege of Beirut, Israeli soldiers targeted symbols of Palestinian culture, such as flags and statements of resistance that were graffitied on walls, and they continue to do so in occupied Palestinian territories. Starting with the 1970s and onwards, there is evidence that Israeli agents have targeted and assassinated prominent Palestinian artists and intellectuals, not only in Palestine but also around the world (Dabashi 2006: 26). The novelist Ghassan Kanafani was murdered with his 16-year-old niece in Beirut, the writer Wael Zuaiter in Rome, the intellectual Mahmoud al Hemshari in Paris, the feminist leader Nada Yashruti in Beirut, and cartoonist Naji Al-Ali in London, to name only a few (Dabashi 2006: 26). Palestinian cultural centres are also common targets for Israel. The Khalil Sakikini Cultural Centre in Ramallah, that often hosts literary events and film screenings, was destroyed in 2002, causing irreparable damage to the artwork in the building. Moreover, the offices were ransacked and equipment destroyed, and most alarmingly, the hard drives of all the computers were stolen. Similar incidents have also occurred at the Land Registry Office, the Central Bureau of Statistics, various human rights organizations, as well as at numerous radio and television stations and film theatres such as the Kasaba Theatre Cinematheque.

Annemarie Jacir, a Palestinian filmmaker who curated the Dreams of Nation film festival in 2002 in New York City speaks of the difficulty and duress of acquiring material for the festival:

Curating the film festival from New York hinged on having someone in Palestine who could physically gather the tapes – since Palestinians in various parts of the West Bank and Gaza are under different levels of military curfew and are often not allowed to leave their homes, let alone venture to a post office to mail videotapes. This made even the mundane details of receiving copies of films for the festival a major difficulty, often requiring sophisticated planning and execution by parties both inside and outside of Palestine (Dabashi 2006: 27).
On several occasions the films never showed up, and upon investigation Jacir was informed that the films were held under Israeli authority for security purposes. Thankfully, these were usually copies and not originals. Despite the delays and the frustrations, the festival was deemed a success, which can be attributed both to the importance of cinema to the Palestinian people and their attitude towards their struggle, characterised by *sumood*, which is Arabic for ‘perseverance.’ However, the considerable effort required to make the festival a success demonstrates the extreme challenges involved in making and preserving films in Palestine, as well as in achieving visibility with the appropriate audience and benefiting from this visibility.

Palestinian cinema is intricately tied to the Palestinians’ displacement and the desire to return to a pre–1948 Palestine. It must therefore be understood specifically in this context; not as a luxury or leisure-time pursuit or a medium for addressing complex philosophical questions, but as a means of survival and a fundamental part of the demand to be recognised, both individually and collectively. It stands against invisibility, and making visible what has been forcibly made invisible. It also stands against the western stereotype of Palestinians in the media; the masked, *kufiya*-wearing, stone-throwing violent entity, by providing a counter narrative and a counter identity for Palestinians. Although the Palestinians are now a dispersed people whose films originate from many different places (the West Bank, Gaza, the Arab world, Europe and the United States), most of the cinematic works created in the diaspora still address questions of Palestinian national identity. The Palestinian people and their identity, frequently marginalised in today’s media, are therefore given a chance to rediscover their voices in film. Items such as keys, title deeds, family photographs, newspaper clippings, school certificates and marriage licenses are the foundation of Palestinian memory, and hence are a decisive part of Palestinian cinema, alongside depictions of landscape and trauma.

The lost archive is perhaps the ultimate representation of the Palestinian struggle, and Palestinian cinema itself; made under the harshest of circumstances, aspiring to attain recognition in mainstream narrative, but ultimately silenced. The documentaries *Kings and Extras: Digging for a Palestinian Image* and *For Cultural Purposes Only* show that Palestinian cinema is also deeply rooted in nostalgia, albeit one that is twice removed from the memories of a utopian Palestine. In a direct correlation to the Palestinian crisis, many Palestinians similarly cling to what was in the archive and what it contained, as they cling to notions of what Palestine was before the creation of Israel. Jacques Derrida names the compulsion to collect and store in the wake of an ever-receding memory as the ‘archive fever’ (Derrida & Prenowitz 1995). He also contends that there would be no ‘archive fever’ without the imminent death of the ‘archive drive,’ which is precisely why the Palestinian’s obsession with memory and past events is a case in point. The compulsion, he argues, does not stem from a need merely to accumulate the past, but rather to provide grounds for a future based upon it. The most important thing to note, perhaps, is that these films *existed*, not the fact they were destroyed or lost. Made by Palestinians about the Palestinians themselves, they document the on-going struggle of identity and displacement that is experienced by every Palestinian. To focus solely on their loss is, in a way, to deny their existence, akin to how the Palestinian’s existence is denied.

In a world where images hold such importance and, more importantly, permanence, it is crucial for the Palestinian cause to have an uncontested history rooted in film and image. That is not to say that the Palestinians will cease to exist because certain parties have denied the legitimacy of Palestine,
but it is easier to make such claims when there isn’t a solid library of documentation that proves their existence for centuries before. Recently, President Obama was accused of not being a true American citizen because the White House refused to publish an image of his birth certificate online. Images have become equivalent to evidence since their inception; and it is likely they will continue to be regarded in the same manner for many centuries to come. The plight of the Jewish people in the Second World War reached millions across the globe largely due to their diligence in taking photographs during the Holocaust, and making these photographs widely accessible after the war. The need for preserving and disseminating the Palestinian image is not only for the sake of history and memory, but also for the sake of the Palestinian cause, as the two are intricately bound together.

Works Cited


Filmography


What’s Goin’ on in the Back Streets?
Patriarchal and Authoritarian Mentality in Contemporary Turkish Cinema

Murat İri

Abstract

This article analyses the popular contemporary Turkish films Çakal, Ejder Kapanı, Kara Köpekler Havlarken and Bornova Bornova. These works build representations that reconstruct the patriarchal and authoritarian mentality – arguably deeply embedded in Turkish history, culture and society – in an unmitigated way. In each film, the streets are noticeably prominent and men are firmly at the centre of the plot. All of the main characters, victims and perpetrators alike, are representative of a certain kind of Turkish male – policemen, taxi drivers, the unemployed, carpenters, private security guards, car park attendants, pigeon breeders and imams. They are all heterosexual, Sunni Muslims and Turkish from the lower or middle classes. In spite of the fact that the back streets of Turkish cities are the site of violence, confrontation and punishment, and that the male protagonists are themselves victims of other men’s brutality, it is still good to be a male in Turkey. The films analysed can thus be shown to simultaneously celebrate and condemn the patriarchal and authoritarian mentality.

Keywords: Patriarchy, authoritarian mentality, contemporary Turkish cinema, gender.
Film as social practice is a medium in which patriarchal and authoritarian mentality is often reconstructed. In order to understand precisely how this is achieved in contemporary Turkish cinema, I have chosen several crime films where the streets give a meaning to the story and where men are at the central protagonists. As Sualp (2004) and Gutting (2005) argue, the city space is intrinsically an area of power struggle, a ‘battle field,’ so-to-speak. This is particularly true of streets, which belong first and foremost to men. Moreover, the relationship between men and streets is analogous to the relationship between men and the family, and to men and the state (Connel 1987: 183).

In some contemporary Turkish films, ships, brothels, headquarters, caves, hotel rooms, casinos, and streets are ‘new spaces’ (Ulusay 2004: 160) – the site of conflict where the patriarchal and authoritarian mentality is shaped and mapped. In my analyses, I will first define patriarchal and authoritarian mentality in the particular context of Turkish culture. I will briefly emphasise the significance of streets in the cinematic cities of Turkish film. I will then proceed to my analyses of the films I have selected: Çakal (Erhan Kozan 2010), Ejder Kapam (Ugur Yucel 2010), Kara Köpeker Havlarken (Mehmet Bahadır Er & Maryna Gorbach 2009) and Bornova Bornova (Inan Temelkuran 2009).

**Patriarchal and Authoritarian Mentality**

The relative domination of the authoritarian mentality in the West and the patriarchal mentality in the East can be observed in an area extending from Western Europe to India. Each Eurasian society integrates these two mentalities in its own way and differentiates them by creating ideological structures that maintain and perpetuate themselves (Lloyd 1993).

When we look at Anatolian geography at around the time period in which cinema came into being – in the Ottoman Empire and then in the Republic of Turkey – the most evident characteristic of patriarchal discourse is its dependence on its conceptualisation of an eternal, everlasting and perfect system. In this system, change is only legitimate if it happens from within, and any kind of change brought about from outside is seen as a form of corruption and degeneration. Indeed, any kind of change is only approved of if it reinforces patriarchy; otherwise it is categorically false and harmful.

The system is a heterogeneous and homogenous structure in which every element occupies the place it ‘deserves.’ This structure implies a balanced unity composed of elements which are adjusted to each other around a vertical axis. It is believed that the ‘balances’ that exist among elements of the system must be preserved and defended at all costs, and that every act devoted to the violation of the balance is a ‘sinful’ aberration. The maintenance of harmony and balance also requires the existence of an authority; conversely, the legitimacy of the authority depends on the maintenance of this order. The authority also maintains a harmonious unity by ensuring that individuals and social groups are integrated with each other and with the state (Bruzzi 2005; Ryan & Kellner 1988).

The most distinctive aspect of the authoritarian mentality is the predication of the relation between action and the legitimacy that is based on the success of the action. While one of the areas of
domination is the establishment of the rule, the other is the nature of the relationship between state and society. In other words, in such a system, an absolute obedience to the state is required. Action is given ontological priority, meaning that questions regarding which attitudes and behaviours are morally ‘right’ are subsumed and considered after the action. While the purpose of coming to power is determined within the relations of interest, everyone around the power lives in a state of doubt; contrivance thus becomes the most natural means of politics. Given that allocating power among different individuals and groups is seen as a sign of impotence, power is centralised. Moreover, in the ideal state-society relationship, the rulers are separated from the ruled. In order to govern, a communication system exists for the purpose of maintaining the flow of information from the periphery to the centre. The state is the arbiter among individuals and groups, and it also audits them. In this system, even though the ruler and the ruled are separated from each other with a definite hierarchy, the two categories nevertheless have homogenous structures to the extent possible.

While patriarchy implies a heterogeneous social structure based on a multiple hierarchy, authoritativeness implies a homogenous structure based on a single hierarchy (Mahcupyan 1998). Within the state-society duality, these two mentalities ultimately merge, becoming a single harmonious unity. The authoritarian mentality furnishes state and society with homogenous characteristics with respect to each other; hence society surrenders to the illusion of considering itself within the state by being accepted by the state agencies (Sennett 1993). The patriarchal mentality legitimises the inner differentiation of the ruler-ruled groups, rationalises the existence of communities and paves the way for every kind of differentiation, unless the state-society division is violated.

While the authoritarian statist mentality is associated with the Turkish secular tradition, it is the Sunni and Hanafi Islamic traditions that have advocated a form of patriarchy that is most inclined to sanctify the state. The patriarchal and authoritarian mentalities have, therefore, been integrated in this way too. Historically, this situation brought stability and peace for a while, although it ultimately delayed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and thus prevented Turkey from undergoing a real ‘modern’ transformation. Modernity came to be defined, not as a modernising process, but as the implementation of conservative reforms, and politics came to be defined as the means for making society embrace them. As the patriarchal mentality is based on religion – its practitioners claiming to have access to unknowable and ‘un-measurable’ divine wisdom – it remains somewhat abstract. However, its impact on the administration of justice is tangible. Justice in Turkey does not imply the resolution of conflict among individuals and groups, but first and foremost the protection of Turkish Islamism and its property.¹

The popular films analysed in this paper – ‘texts’ born of Turkish society – also read patriarchy from within the Turkish and Sunni version of Islam. They also reinforce the authoritarian mentality in their representations of masculinity. Before proceeding to a consideration of these films, I will first provide a brief account of Turkish cinema from the 1950s to the present.

¹ Turkish society considers that ‘property is the basis of justice’ and that this is the basis upon which the Republic ‘will live for all eternity’ (Mahcupyan 1998: 45).
How Patriarchal and Authoritarian Mentalities Are Reconstructed in the Back Streets of Turkish Cinema

The relationship between cities and cinema, and in particular between the city streets and cinema, is a rich field of inquiry. Cinematic images of the city lie at the intersection between film as ‘culture’ and film as a sociological tool, and representations of the city street in particular can be seen to be at the forefront of cinema’s relationship with modernity. Furthermore, representations of city streets have contributed to a reevaluation in the way that we see the city. Large cities that have turned into metropolises, in particular, offer a rich backdrop for films whose fictions are shaped on the basis of the new, urban landscapes depicted on film (Ozturk 2008a). The city streets capture the essence of the continuum of life and the constant comings and goings that play out within a relentless and unyielding ‘competition’ (Ozturk 2008b).

In the 1950s and 1960s, films often opened with gorgeous cityscapes of Istanbul. Generally the viewer was invited to walk through the ‘cinematographic’ streets of Yeşilçam. The film then showed idyllic images of the Galata Bridge, Süleymaniye and Tarabya, depicting a sweet dream without ever showing the true colours of Istanbul. However, towards the late 1960s, against the backdrop of the relatively liberal atmosphere of the Constitution of 1961, films such as Üç Arkadaş (Three Friends, Memduh Ün) and Umut (Hope, Yılmaz Güney) turned their attention to social problems, thus coming closer to representing the true colours of the city. In the early 1970s, there was an increased sense of social consciousness. The films Gelin (The Bride), Düğün (The Wedding) and Diyet (Blood Money) by Lütfi Akad display the city streets transformed by migration from rural to urban areas. In the 1980s, the problems of the individual, and especially the female, are tackled in films such as Dağıntı Yatak (The Messy Bed, Atıf Yılmaz) and Kadının Adı Yok (Woman Has No Name, Atıf Yılmaz). One particularity of films in the 1980s is to depict the city back streets as strange, surreal and cruel. This is seen in films such as Beyoğlu’nun Arka Yakası (Back Streets of Beyoğlu, Şerif Gören) and At (The Horse, Ali Özgentürk 1982). The 1980s also saw a period of arabesque films: a genre that became widespread in conjunction with the rapid rise in slums. In the works of Küçük Emrah, Küçük Ceylan and Gökhan Güney, the debauched suburbs of the city are a frequent presence.

In 1990s, the agenda shifts to questions of identity and provincialism, as can be seen in Eşkıya (The Bandit, Yavuz Turgul) and Güneşe Yolculuk (Journey to the Sun, Yeşim Ustaoğlulu). Ethnic and sexual minority groups now join the struggle on the streets, as seen in such as Dönersen Ishik Çal (Whistle If You Come Back, Orhan Öğuz 1992). In the 2000s, with the advent of globalization, the paradigm shift from ‘representation to performance,’ as defined by Brunsdon (2012: 219) becomes increasingly apparent. Despite being a modern city, Istanbul is still full of people who are disenfranchised and underprivileged. The life experienced by the lower classes living in the urban slums and that of the upper classes living in luxurious houses bears no comparison, and makes it
difficult for different groups to live together. Being a ‘global city’ does not mean that the whole city is modernised, and this is reflected in the cinematic experience.²

In the 2000s, Istanbul is no longer represented as a saintly city, but an ugly and charmless metropolis. Although it has a historical and authentic appearance, its spirituality has been commercialised. In its new appearance in contemporary Turkish cinema, Istanbul is not what is represented but what is analysed and performed. Contemporary films explore, therefore, the problems and questions of a city that is falling apart. However, while the films are imbued with a sense of anxiety as a result of this on-going process (Aymaz 2008: 351-363), they nevertheless uphold the authoritarian and patriarchal ideal. Indeed, while the relationship between city and cinema is a modernizing paradigm, traces of the authoritarian and patriarchal structure inherent in Turkish modernization persist in the modern day.

The aim of my analyses is to expose how patriarchal and authoritarian mentalities are reconstructed in contemporary Turkish cinema. For each film, I will first present a summary of the plot and provide descriptions of the back street setting, followed by a consideration of how this mentality is construed.

Çakal (The Jackal, Erhan Kozan 2010)

Akın’s (Ismail Hacıoğlu) life changes upon the death of his mother, who lived in the suburbs of Istanbul. He plans to make a new life for himself with the money he steals from Master Nuran (Cüneyt Türel), his employer in a carpentry shop, but his girlfriend, Deniz (Damla Sönmez), finds this plan ridiculous and leaves him. Akın therefore accepts his friend, İdris’ (Çetin Altay) offer to become the errand boy for a mafia group operated by Fahrettin (Ügur Polat) and Celayir (Erkan Can). While Akın wins his bosses’ favour, he quickly makes enemies, in particular a certain Mecit (Naci Tasdögen). Akın starts to work in the mafia bosses’ billiard hall, where he asks if can buy and install a large aquarium. In time, Akın is ordered to murder a rival gangster, who turns out to be Mecit. Akın undertakes this duty as he has done previously, although the task is more meaningful to him given that he has a personal account to settle with Mecit. This marks the beginning of the end for Akın.

The street first occurs when Akın meets with his ‘dirty’ street friends and smokes marijuana after the death of his mother. He questions his existence through an inner voice on his way back home. The next day, we see a perspective view of the street. It is a hazy morning in Istanbul – the building’s balcony is full of antennas and the street is jammed with parked cars on the left and right sides of the road. In the opposite direction, a Turkish flag is flying. After stealing his employer’s money, Akın strolls around the streets. It is cold and hazy and the streets are crowded and suffocating. He tries to settle accounts with his inner voice – he is not a thief; he has been swallowing sawdust since his earliest childhood. He goes to a café and buys something to drink.

² Even the cinema halls in Turkey separate the upper and lower classes. Although the Turkish model of modernization is thought to be more comprehensive and democratic than elsewhere, film festivals, for instance, are organised with the sponsorship of global financial circles and reach only the elite.
In the fourth street scene, Akın meets his girlfriend Deniz at the seaside. He asks her to leave Istanbul with him, but she does not accept his offer. Akın gets furious and screams at her. When Deniz gets scared and walks away, he makes fun of her saying, ‘Bitch, you have slim jeans on your ass and a headscarf on your head.’ Leaving the crowd and the human traffic behind, Akın meets a drug dealer on the corner of the street. With an inner voice, he questions his life, friends and family.

Accompanied by one of his street friends, Akın goes to see İdris in the mafia bosses’ billiard hall, where he is given a job. In the next street scene, we see him walking ostentatiously in his new black suit and white shirt together with İdris. The camera then follows Akın’s friends from a bird’s-eye perspective. At a junction, each of the three friends takes a different street. The night will be full of surprises, and we sense that something dangerous is about to happen. Akın is in the beer house, drunk, and plagued by his usual inner self-criticisms. However, he is granted his wish to build an aquarium in the billiard hall, so he goes to the aquarium shop. Afterwards, he encounters his father, who has a long beard and wears a cap, on the street. We observe their war of words from a close perspective. Akın says, ‘You seem to have wrapped up well. Will you be in your tomb soon?’ His father replies, ‘I am not a thief like you.’ Akın says he will pay back Master Nuran’s money, but his father retorts that he will never be his father, no matter what he does. Akın brushes past him and disappears into the night.

Later that night, Akın kills Mecit on the street in the car park. Before dying, however, Mecit shoots Akın. İdris is now under orders by Fahrettin to kill his wounded friend in a forest. However, he does not do so, but instead returns to the billiard hall and shoots the mafia bosses, Fahrettin and Celahir. Akın waits in the car, dying. He looks behind at his wounded friend, Akın. The camera moves in the direction of İdris’s gaze. Akın’s last words are, ‘Where are we going? We need to take the aquarium with us.’ In his delirium, Akın recalls the first time they walked down the street together in their black suits. The streets he is walking through are as imposing as his beloved aquarium. Like the aquarium, the streets also have tightly defined borders controlled by an outside authority. If an act breaches the rules, its perpetrator will be thrown out and will ‘die,’ like a fish thrown out of water.

**Ejder Kapanı (Dragon Trap, Ugur Yücel 2010)**

This film questions the concept of justice in contemporary Turkey. It is the story of two experienced detectives, ‘Çerkez’ Abbas (Ugur Yücel) and ‘Akrep’ Celal (Kenan İmirzalıoğlu), a Kurd, as well as a trainee female police officer named Ezo (Berrak Tüzünataç), who are pursuing a serial killer that is targeting paedophiles who have been released early in an amnesty. The clues point to Ensar (Nejat İşler), a killing machine who discovers on return from the army that his twelve-year old sister has been raped and has hanged herself. Abbas, who has worked the night shift for many years, is on his last case before retiring to spend more time with his beloved girlfriend, Cavidan (Ceyda Duvenci).

The first street scene occurs when Abbas is waiting in his car in the cobbled back streets of Istanbul for his girlfriend, a cabaret singer. The back streets are unsafe – full of danger and filth. A drug dealer crosses their path and three men start bothering Cavidan. She manages to climb into Abbas’s car, but Abbas, furious, gets out of the car and starts a fight with the men. The scene is stylised in the
manner of a Tarantino or Guy Richie movie – when Abbas throws a punch at one of the men, the image is frozen and the blood hangs in the air. One of the other men is capitulated into the air with a single blow of Abbas’ fist, and remains frozen there before falling onto a trolley. The camera is extremely mobile and active in this sequence, drawing the viewer into the action.

In the second street scene, Abbas and Celal go to the latter’s house on a rainy night. The camera films the men from above, following them as they walk in a parallel line to the rooftops down the narrow and wet street. Then Abbas is seen leaving Celal’s house to go to his hotel room with his umbrella. The streets appear once again during a chase sequence of a suspect named Selçuk Demirci. It is dark and the rain strikes the ground like a whip. The camera follows the suspect through the back streets and closed markets, with Abbas in pursuit. However, the sequence ends when Selçuk is suddenly and mysteriously killed. The streets are foregrounded yet again when a special team invades the main suspect’s house and a chase ensues. At night, the suburban streets are narrower, dirtier and more dangerous than those of the old town.

In a news bulletin, Abbas watches interviews with people conducted on the streets about the paedophile-murderer. The streets are therefore present on a meta-level. People thank the murderer, who dares to do what everyone else merely says they would do. Just then, Abbas gets a call and the detectives dive into the back streets once again. The murderer has struck again. They see the murderer in the house of the murdered man and chase after him in another, Tarantino-style chase down gloomy streets. Abbas captures the murderer in the yard of a mosque and informs his team via a transmitter. However, he is exhausted by the chase and has a heart attack, and so has to be rushed to hospital by ambulance.

Abbas eventually realises that the murderer is none other than his colleague, Celal. We observe the streets for a sixth time when Abbas is driving his car recklessly en route to Celal’s house. A series of frenzied camera shots show how the traffic is disrupted. Although Ezo is with Celal, the latter manages to escape and Abbas must begin a chase. However, he has an accident and his car is turned over. Fearlessly, he stands up, gets in a taxi and continues his pursuit. Abbas is as determined to catch the murderer as Celal is to kill paedophiles. They travel through the streets, bridges and subways of Istanbul. Eventually, he tracks down Celal in an abandoned factory: a site that, incidentally, is symbolic of Turkey’s fractured modernity and by extension, the castrated authoritarian and patriarchal mentality.

Celal believes he is administering justice in a fair and legitimate way, especially given that his own sister was raped when she was a child. He leaves behind some clues so that Abbas would discover his secret and arrest him. Abbas sees this as a story in which a father must apprehend his own son. The only possible outcome for the ‘son,’ Celal, is to commit suicide. At the end of the film, the lonely father, Abbas, dives into the streets of Istanbul for the last time. The Islamic call to prayer is being recited. The camera whirls around Abbas as he makes his way to the mosque. The streets are multi-cultural places of performance where Kurds and Circassians mingle and clash with one another. The fact that the streets and Abbas’ journey end in the mosque can be seen as an allusion to the unitary nature of Islam. In this respect, the film is extremely patriarchal.
**Kara Köpekler Havlarken** (*Black Dogs Barking*, Mehmet Bahadir Er & Maryna Gorbach 2009)

Guvercinci Selim (Cemal Toktaş) and Çaca Celal (Volga Sorgu) are two ambitious youngsters in a working-class neighbourhood. A naive young man without much education, Selim likes to feed and breed pigeons on the rooftop of the building where he lives. They operate a car park belonging to a local mafia boss known as Master (Erkan Can) who lives in the upper-middle class neighbourhood just on the other side of the road. Selim is planning to marry his beloved fiancée Ayşe (Ayfer Dönmêz). Selim and Çaça’s biggest dream is to run their own car park. In a pigeon club that Selim frequents, he meets Mehmet (Murat Daltaban), who offers the youths the chance to go behind Master’s back and to enter into a bidding war for a small car park contract belonging to a shopping mall, against a hard-nosed security contractor named Sait.

We first encounter the streets when Selim goes back into his house after feeding the pigeons. Dealers, poor kids riding bikes and playing football, women wearing headscarves, dilapidated buildings and brick houses underscore that this is a lower-class neighbourhood. The roads are neglected and the electricity pylons are dangerous. A funeral coach goes past a child who is trying to fly a kite. The coffin is covered with a Turkish flag, indicating that it is the casket of a local citizen of a certain standing, such as an official or a war veteran, etc. The camera observes the streets as seen from the hearse leading to the graveyard. Celal comes to the graveyard by his car, late to the burial. Selim brings his fiancée, Ayşe, and then they return to the impoverished streets.

Images of the poor back streets are seen against the backdrop of modern skyscrapers, giving the impression of a somewhat chaotic cityscape. Selim drops Ayşe at the kindergarten school where she works. Before she says goodbye, Ayşe reminds Selim that it is the last day to pay the mortgage. Selim, who is positioned in front of the garden door on the street, tells her not to worry and that the payment is ready. He leaves and Ayşe returns to the school. The camera then follows Selim as he dives into the streets, where he meets Celal. They share jokes with friends, and Celal gives advice regarding Selim’s upcoming interview. Selim then leaves his friend on the street, gets into a car and goes to the shopping mall.

In the next street scene, Selim and Celal go to the pigeon club to see Mehmet. Just as they enter the club, which is on a narrow street, they get stuck in the middle of a farewell convoy for soldiers. The drivers whose cars are covered with Turkish flags scream, ‘Ours is the biggest soldier,’ and toot their horns loudly. In the third street scene, Selim waits for Ayşe in the back street behind the kindergarten. Selim gives her the money he had promised, and also presents her with a solitaire ring. Afterwards, he goes to meet Celal and they go to see the mafia boss for whom they work. The summer sun connotes a feeling of hope, although images of a garden suggests that more complicated times are ahead. When they arrive, Master is punishing a worker who had taken drugs by squeezing his hand between car doors. They talk about work and a fight that happened at the pigeon club. Master tells them to be careful and not to argue with anyone. The camera is mobile and held at eye level during this sequence, and focusses on some of the men working on the nearby street: men who are undoubtedly nasty heterosexual, Turkish bullies. Master then gets into his car, accompanied by a
bodyguard and a driver. The camera focuses on the sticker of the Turkish flag on the car. Finally, Selim leaves Celal on the street and drives away.

While preparing their bid to operate the shopping mall car park, Selim and Celal are threatened by Sait. The streets, and their attendant danger, threat and masculinity, are omnipresent throughout all these proceedings. The friends argue with each other, buy bird food and get back into their car parked beside the feed shop on the street. The car – an orange Doğan with ‘my orange angel’ written on the side – is a sort of ‘room’ in the ‘street house’ where they live. The sequence features Selim’s voice singing an arabesque song about the boys playing on the street.³ ‘Think, life resembles a dream just for once. I know those hard times, I know them very well. Realities cannot be hidden. On the last day of my life, I will still love life.’ The sound emanates from the rooftops where there are pigeons, reinforcing the idea that the streets and the city roofs are the only places for Selim.

Selim and Celal return to the streets once again as their friend, Taylan, is about to join the army. The men see off the future soldier by wrapping him in a Turkish flag, throwing him up and down and dancing to the tune of trumpets. The camera strolls among them and joins in with the festivities. While this is going on, Celal examines a luxury car – another sign of masculinity. The convoy begins the farewell procession and the cars are covered with Turkish flags. The frenzy and noise of ‘Ours is the biggest soldier’ dominate the streets of Istanbul. In this film, the streets thus become a place where patriotic Turkish men are sent off to do their military service.

Next, the men play street-ball, but the game gets a little out of hand and the police are called. While Celal tries to get rid of the gun in his back, it gets fired, but he escapes from the police through the narrow streets lined with tall walls segregating the rich villas from the slums. In the meantime, however, the police arrest Master and Ayşe disappears. Later than night, Selim and Celal locate Master on the roof of a squatter building to ask if he can help them locate Ayşe. It turns out Ayşe has been abducted by the security mafia boss, Sait, and that they have been lured into a trap. They are savagely set upon by Sait’s doberman dogs and die from their injuries.

The film, which starts with a burial scene, ends with the protagonists’ funeral. Their coffins lie in the mosque and a prayer is recited in the courtyard. Two pigeons are released, but in the very final image of the film, a pigeon is shown being eaten by a seagull. The bidding war is won by Mehmet who collaborates with Sait. In this film, the dark, blind back streets are paradoxically ruled by a secular patriarchy, and in spite of the religious funerals, the authoritarian mentality is largely fictionalised from a secular perspective.

**Bornova Bornova** (Inan Temelkuran 2009)

The film depicts a day in the lives of young men from the same neighbourhood in İzmir’s Bornova district. Salih (Kadir Çermic) and Hakan (Öner Erkan) are like brothers, and spend their days in front

³ ‘Arabesque’ is an Arabic style of Turkish music genre that was very popular in Turkey in the 1960s through the 1990s. The common theme is an embellished and agonizing depiction of love and yearning. This theme has undertones of class difference. It is also called ‘slum music’.
of a local grocery store waiting for a chance to do something with their lives. Hakan has recently returned from the army and his career plans to become a footballer have come to nothing, so he is unemployed and idle. He hopes to become a taxi driver. Salih is from a good, well-educated family, but has got involved in a number of illegal activities and is considered to be a hoodlum. Everybody in the neighborhood is scared of him, including highschool student Özlem (Damla Sönmez), with whom Hakan is madly in love. The third protagonist is Murat (Erkan Bektas), Salih’s childhood friend and a doctoral student in philosophy who makes a living by writing erotic fantasies.

The film opens with two boys riding a bicycle fast down a street. The camera captures the excited amusement of the children in close-up. We see a mature man, smoking and pushing his motorbike and staring at the street as the boys go by. Salih drops Hakan at the corner of the road next to a graveyard. In the following street scene, we see Salih and Hakan as young men, repairing a motorbike in front of the local store at the corner of the street. Hakan catches sight of Özlem among the parked minibuses, private cars and taxies, and talks to Salih excitedly. Salih chases and shouts after Özlem, which makes Hakan agitated. His only hope of wooing Özlem is to start earning money as a taxi driver, although this is a doubtful prospect. The camera monitors them from far away and surveys what goes on the street. It is a hot summer day and customers go in and out of the local store as cars pass down the street. The camera approaches Hakan and Salih, who are sitting on a wall talking about a football match. We learn that Hakan has not been selected to play for the Altay football club because of a reoccurring injury, even though he played in the team for five years.

Hakan is a good-hearted man, which is essentially why he faces so many ordeals. He recounts what happened to him the previous day. He was buying a sunflower, but got into a fight when the vendor refused to serve him. As he is very animated in his descriptions, a policeman comes to ask what is going on, but Salih reassures him that they are just having a friendly conversation. They start to talk again about Özlem. Salih tries to ride his broken motorbike, but they end up pushing it. Then Hakan gets off the wall to go into the store. In the store, two friends of Hakan start refer to Salih as a ‘stupid’ neighbourhood thug, and while they are talking, the viewer is shown a series of images of Salih swinging a knife on his motorbike.

In another street scene, Hakan is seen on the wall beside the store reading a newspaper. Murat comes over and they chat. Salih and Murat have fallen out, but Hakan doesn’t get involved in the quarrel. Murat is happy that Hakan plans to become a taxi driver and they talk about this and his plans to marry Özlem. Murat adds that he should not listen to Salih about matters of the heart. Hakan defends Salih, but Murat tells Hakan about an incident that occurred between Salih and Özlem in her house which inspired one of his erotic fantasies. Hakan gets extremely angry and upset on hearing this, and then leaves to wonder through parks, streets and bazaars.

In the sixth street scene, we see Özlem walking furiously with a boy just behind her. The boy teases her, but she is too angry to listen. The subjective camera follows them both, underlining the tension between them. In a later scene, Salih bullies this boy in a billiard hall, which provokes a fight between him and Özlem. Özlem complains that the boys that are her age only talk to the girls in Bornova to amuse themselves. She kicks the boy in his private parts and walks away. In the next
street scene, Hakan is pictured strolling around the streets. He has tracked down Özlem, who has told him what really happened between her and Salih. Salih tried to rape her, but could not manage to do so because he is sexually impotent. Now, Özlem asks Hakan to kill Salih. Hakan is then once again pictured on the streets – in abandoned houses, fields and parks, struggling with his internal dilemma.

In the final street scene, Murat and Salih are sitting on the wall, chatting and drinking beer. The camera films them from waist level. Salih comes up with a fantasy for one of Murat’s stories. He then begins talking about how he lives off his parents’ money and how he has been in jail for as many years as he has lived. He talks at length about his ambition to get to Holland or Germany, where his friends tell him that life is much better. Everybody wears leather jacket there and if you are a Turk, you are ‘different’ as opposed to being a ‘nobody.’

Meanwhile, Hakan approaches them from behind. It is twilight and getting dark. Salih makes fun of Hakan’s ambition to become a taxi driver, but Murat argues that having an honest job is a good thing. Salih then gives Hakan a knife, saying that driving a taxi is dangerous. He tells them about an event that took place two years ago – while driving a taxi, he was assaulted by two drunken Kurdish men who refused to pay the correct fare. Salih stabbed one of the drunkards in the back of his neck and chased after him, possibly killing him. The knife he used that night is the one he gives Hakan, in case he finds himself in a similar situation.

Just as Murat is about to leave, Hakan says that he has a fantasy he wants to recount to them. Murat refuses, but Salih insists that they stay and listen to Hakan’s tale. His fantasy is about a forty-five year old woman who seduces him under the guise of asking for help at the market. The woman tells him that she has a sexual relationship with her son, although he can no longer stand it and has run away. Murat notes that this is very Oedipal. Hakan then reveals that the woman is Salih’s mother, provoking Salih into attacking him. Hakan kills Salih with his knife and disappears into the night. In the final image, he runs, limping, towards the camera and smiles.

In Bornova, even though women only play a minor role in the film, the streets are profoundly shaken by events set in motion by the sexual desire for women. In this sense, female dominance can arguably be construed as a performance that takes place within male authority. Conversely, one could state that the ‘non-Muslim’ and ‘feminine’ streets of Izmir are a place of conflict for secular and authoritarian men.

**Conclusion**

The films analysed in this study – Çakal, Ejder Kapani, Kara Köpeklер Havlarken and Bornova – build representations that reconstruct the patriarchal and authoritarian mentality in an unmitigated way. The authoritarian mentality is seen in those who judge others, those who impart fear and those who discipline and punish others, while the patriarchal mentality is seen in those who enforce traditional gender roles. Muslim Turks, in particular, are bound to each other through blood ties, and this manifests itself through patriarchal social structures. Each of the main characters, victims and perpetrators alike, are representative of a certain kind of Turkish male – policemen, taxi
drivers, the unemployed, carpenters, private security guards, car park attendants, pigeon breeders and imams. They are all heterosexual, Sunni Muslims and Turkish from the lower or middle classes. In spite of the fact that the back streets of Turkish cities are the site of violence, confrontation and punishment, and that the male protagonists are themselves victims of other men’s brutality, it is still good to be a male in Turkey. The films analysed can thus be shown to simultaneously celebrate and condemn the patriarchal and authoritarian mentality in modern-day Turkey.

In each work, the one having authority attempts to convert patriarchal hegemony into a display of power. In Ejder Kapanı, the Kurdish police officer Celal tries to settle his account with the government, which he perceives to be powerless. Ultimately, however, this turns out to be a childish endeavour and his superior, Abbas, assumes the role of the father. It is highly symbolic that at the end of the film, after Celal commits suicide, Abbas goes to the mosque. In Kara Köpekler Havlarken, the protagonists’ passion for cars and farewell ceremonies for soldiers are coded images of patriarchal power. In Çakal, Akin unceasingly questions himself while walking through the streets filled with Turkish flags. Moreover, he has a problematic relation with paternal dominance, manifested by the conflict with his religiously conservative father. In Bornova Bornova, the power afforded to the Turkish male abroad is also discussed.

In conclusion, the patriarchal and authoritarian mentality in Turkey, as seen in contemporary film drama, unfolds on the narrow, dangerous back streets of Istanbul and in the filthy, cramped suburban streets, full of abandoned buildings and wasteland. It is manifested and ‘performed’ by dealers, prostitutes, imams, boys playing with balls and girls playing hopscotch, soldiers leaving for tours of duty, by men who commit murder and men who question their existence.
Works Cited


Filmography

Bahadıır Er, Mehmet & Maryna Gorbach (motion picture) (2009), Kara Köpekler Havlarken (Black Dogs Barking), Karakirmızı Film, Turkey, 88 min.
Kozan, Erhan (motion picture) (2010), Çakal (The Jackal), Cinemîl, Turkey, 90 min.
Temelkuran, İnan (motion picture) (2009), Bornova Bornova, TurkishFilmChannel, 92 min.
Yücel, Uğur (motion picture) (2010), Ejder Kapanı (Dragon Trap), United International Pictures, 105 min.
Interrupted Social Peace:
Hate Speech in Turkish Media

H. Esra Arcan

Abstract

Hate speech can play a key role in interrupting social peace. Recent studies have shown that the number of headlines and news stories that vilify specific groups on the basis of ethnicity, religion, gender or sexual orientation have increased in Turkish media. Since media narratives and news reports affect the construction and representation of social groups, this study attempts to uncover hate speech strategies that specifically target ethnic and religious minority groups in Turkey. Reviewing hate speech in mainstream Turkish media, the article poses two important questions: (1) How, and to what extent, is hate speech employed? (2) What types of discourse strategies are constructed in the news? Answering these questions, the article will then discuss related issues and use critical discourse analysis methodology. Also, the relationship between hate crimes and hate speech will be investigated, revealing the primordial importance of combating hate speech.

Keywords: Hate speech, discourse strategies, Turkish media, non-Muslim minorities, Kurds.
Introduction

In 2007, Hrant Dink, a Turkish Armenian journalist and human rights activist, after being threatened by extreme nationalists, wrote in the Turkish Armenian newspaper Agos, ‘I may see myself as frightened as a pigeon, but I know that in this country people do not harm pigeons’. (10 Jan. 2007, www.agos.com.tr). In an unfortunate twist of fate, a few weeks later, Hrant Dink was shot dead by a sixteen year old boy who in a letter to court stated, ‘I am not guilty. Guilty are the headlines that showed Dink to be a traitor’ (BİA News Center, 6 Apr. 2011, bianet.org).

Studies have shown that in Turkey, media, school textbooks and politicians commonly engage in hate speech or hate discourse concerning ethnic, religious and gender groups and that this is accepted as ‘normal.’ (TTV & TİHV Report 2007; TTV 2009; Yeğen 2011). As a result of these studies, hate speech in the media has only recently become recognised as an important issue. After the death of Hrant Dink, hate speech and hate crime have attracted more attention and have become part of public discussions. Originally, these public discussions were, for the most part, organised by liberals and left-leaning groups.¹ More recently, however, the infamous trailer for the fictitious movie Innocence of Muslims, which engaged in anti-Islamic rhetoric, also drew conservative and right-wing religious groups’ attention to the issue. (Hacıismailoğlu 2012). Today, hate speech in Turkey is considered a serious problem, and receives attention from politicians, journalists, and academics from all over the country.

Furthermore, current research and monitoring organisations report that hate speech and hate crimes are rising in Turkey. The Hrant Dink Foundation’s Hate Speech Media Monitoring Report announced that the employment of hate speech in news stories increased both in quality and quantity in 2012 compared to 2011. Furthermore, the report found an increase in the number of groups that were targeted by hateful reporting, a trend that has also been on the rise since late 2011 (Hrant Dink Foundation’s Monitoring Report of Hate Discourse in the Media 2012 http://www.nefretsoylemi.org/rapor/rapor_Ocak-Nisan_2012.PDF). Since the media has become an effective tool in propagating hatred as well ethnic and religious divisions, and undoubtedly has a hand in provoking conflicts, examining hate speech and hate discourse in media, and combating against it, becomes more all the more crucial (Cohen-Almagor 2011; Vollhardt et al. 2006). According to Hernández, ‘[i]t is especially critical to broaden the hate speech debate now that we are seeing an apparent rise in the occurrence of hate speech worldwide’ (2011: 806).

Hate Speech

Despite its frequent usage, there is no consensus on a definition of hate speech. Boeckman and Turpin-Petrosino (2002: 23) stress the wounding and denigrating character of hate speech, stating that ‘any form of expression directed at objects of prejudice that perpetrators use to wound and denigrate its recipient is hate speech.’ According to Vollhardt et al. (2006), members of targeted groups are delegitimised, demonised, or depicted as inferior in hate speech. Tsesis (2002) also draws attentions to the irrational, disapproving, hypercritical, unjustified expressional characteristics of hate speech.

¹IHD (Human Rights Association), the Hrant Dink Vakfı (Hrant Dink Foundation), Nefretme (Do not Hate), IHOP (Human Rights Joint Platform), BİA (Independent Communication Network) are some of the organisations that combat hate speech.
In the Appendix to the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation no. R (97) 20, hate speech is defined as:

The term ‘hate speech’ shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin.

The definition above stresses the racist, nationalist and xenophobic origins of hate speech. Matsuda (cited in Schwartzman 2002) points out that racist hate speech must be defined according to its three characteristic features. (1) Hate speech contains a massage of racial inferiority; (2) hate speech is directed against a historically oppressed group; (3) hate speech is persecutory, hateful, and degrading. ‘According to these criteria, racist speech is harmful not because of the words all by themselves cause harm and pain, but because of the social, historical, and political context in which they are uttered’ (427).

Parekh (2006: 214) states, ‘Hate speech expresses, advocates, encourages, promotes, or incites hatred of a group of individuals distinguished by a particular feature or set of features’ and ‘when hate speech is permitted to be propagated, it encourages a social climate in which particular groups are denigrated and their discriminatory treatment is accepted as normal.’ In summary, hate speech can basically be defined as racist, nationalist or sexist speech that hurts, wounds or causes psychological and physical harm. In other words, ‘Hate speech is the rhetoric of hate crimes and perpetuates racism, heterosexism, and sexism’ (Cowan & Khatchadourian 2003: 300).

Hate speech has consequences because ‘[s]peech always matters, is always doing work; because everything we say impinges on the world in ways indistinguishable from the effects of physical action, we must take responsibility for our verbal performances – all of them’ (Fish cited in Hernández 2011: 841). If speech kills and harms, we must take responsibility for our words and speech. This raises crucial questions such as: where we should draw line in order to protect historically repressed groups? Is the answer censorship? Is a ban on hate speech a violation of the freedom of expression? These questions are given consideration in most scholarly treatments of hate speech, with the fundamental aim of finding the most ethical and responsible way to deal with hate speech.

**Speech That Kills: Hate Crimes**

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) defines a hate crime as:

[...] any criminal offense, including offences against persons or property, where the victim’s premises or target of the offence are selected because of their real or perceived connection, attachment, affiliation, support or membership with a group. A group may be based upon their real or perceived race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual disorientation or other similar factors (www.osce.org).

The connection between hate speech and hate crime can be detected within a rhetorical stratagem of hate speech that is described by Whillock as having the following four characteristics: ‘(1) to inflame the emotions of followers, (2) to denigrate the designated out-class, (3) to inflict permanent and irreparable harm to the opposition and ultimately (4) conquer’ (1995: 32). In this way, hate crime can be seen to follow hate speech. However, the question of how exactly this is achieved requires further analysis.
Rwanda and Yugoslavia serve as the most dramatic and well-known examples of hate speech communicated through the media. Davison suggests that the ability to successfully convey the politics of hate relates to a number of factors, including the media’s role in instigating mass mobilisations. Nazi and fascist parties, for instance, took advantage of press laws, urbanization and mass communication to agitate and attract followers. Likewise, Milošević in Serbia and the Hutu extremists in Rwanda established ‘ultranationalist networks and controlled important media outlets’ (Davison, 2006: 50). Serbian media broadcast propaganda messages just as Hutu Radio des Mille Collines propagated hate strategies, as described by Whillock (1995).

The Hate Speech Dilemma: Prohibition or Freedom

Discussions regarding hate speech can be controversial in nature, and often involve the conflict between hate speech restriction and free speech. One of the major concerns coming from the North American perspective is whether or not hate speech laws violate a person’s right to freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the E.U. Human Rights Charter and other conventions, declarations and charters. The notion of free speech is a core value in Western societies. The roots of the libertarian concept of free speech go back to the seventeenth century and the writings of John Milton, John Stuart Mill and others. Today’s liberals acknowledge the harm of hate speech, yet generally argue that the proper response is to grant even more freedom of expression. Free speech supporters derive their theoretical arguments from marketplace theories, peacekeeping, deontological theories, and civic republicanism (Heinze 2006), and therefore reject bans or restrictions on hate speech.

Lillian suggests that ‘most discussions of free speech revolve around the interpretation of the U.S. First Amendment’ and points out that ‘[f]or American readers, this might seem a self-evident preoccupation, but from a non-U.S. perspective, the framing of a large and complex human problem in peculiarly U.S. terms suggests a form of hegemony’ (2007: 738). The hegemonic, individualistic and libertarian nature of the pro-free speech argument is challenged by critical race theorists and feminists. Feminist perspectives stress that ‘free speech is not an ahistorical, objective, universal concept’ (Phillips cited in Cornwell & Orbe 1999: 78). They also criticise the role of power, privilege, culture, and social-political inequalities embedded in the liberal structure of society. However the liberal ideology of free speech assumes that hate speech and hate crime victims have equal power with hate speech and hate crime perpetrators.

Critical race theorists, on the other hand, oppose the unregulated usage of freedom of speech, arguing that hate speech has become embedded in social structures and hierarchies. Slagle comments that ‘the traditional western notion of freedom of expression has been criticised in recent years by critical race theorists who argue that this ethos ignores the gross power imbalance between the users of hate speech and their victims’ (2009: 238). Critical race theorists draw attention to the rights of historically oppressed minority groups, rather than individuals, and have a communitarian approach to law and ethics, instead of taking a strictly libertarian approach. As Matsuda puts it, ‘tolerance of hate speech is not tolerance born by the community at large [...] rather it is a psychic tax imposed on those least able to pay’ (Matsuda 1993: 18). Another concern expressed by these scholars is there is an artificial distinction between speech and conduct. Hate speech causes violence, and as such should be outlawed (Boeckman & Turpin-Petrosino 2002: 3). Under the U.S. Constitutional principle of equal protection, hate speech may be subject to state regulation if the state has an interest in preventing violence and in protecting the esteem and dignity of its citizens (see Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952, 343 US 250).
There is a long history of international organisation and governments trying to regulate harmful hate speech. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1965. CERD not only explicitly opposes the manifestation of racist hate speech, but also requires that states condemn the dissemination of hate speech and punish such offences under states’ laws (Art. 4). Similarly, Article 20 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCRP) provides that ‘any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law’ (www.ohchr.org).

After the Holocaust, hate speech and hate crimes became a sensitive issue for European countries. As a result, most European nations have since restricted or outlawed racist hate speech and crimes (Bleich 2011). Different countries and regions have dealt with hate speech in various ways. In 1994, the U.S. federal government passed the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act, 28 U.S.C 994. (Bleich 2011: 924). In 2003, the Council of Europe issued a protocol that encouraged signatories to criminalise racist and xenophobic acts committed in cyberspace (CETS No. 189; Bleich 2011: 927). In Latin American countries, hate speech is also prohibited (Hernández 2011: 805). Post-apartheid South Africa has also enacted hate speech legislation (Hernández 2011: 810).

In contrast to the CERD and the ICCRP, the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) does not prohibit sexist or gender discriminatory speech. Indeed, there are no explicit provisions with regard to the prohibition of hate speech against women. Lillian writes with reference to Samuel Walker, author of *Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy* (1994):

> [He] makes reference to hate laws in the UK, Brazil, Turkey, Germany, and Canada, all of which refer to various combination of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, and class, but none of which specifically refers to sex, gender, or sexual orientation. He also points out, however, that in the 1980s, definitions of hate speech began to expand to include other historically victimised groups such as women, lesbians, and gays (2007: 731).

Despite these legislative improvements, many sociologists argue that the criminal law approach is a poor vehicle for regulating hate speech, adding that ‘what is needed is a framework of civil remedies that is better formulated to address the harms of hate speech and its hindrance to racial equality’ (Hernández 2011: 807). In essence, the relation between hate speech and crime, as well as between hate speech and racism, nationalism and sexism should be addressed and questioned through discursive means rather than through legalisation. The relationship between hate speech and the media must also be explored.

**Hate Speech and the Media**

According to van Dijk, discourse ‘is the main interface between the social and cognitive dimensions of racism’ (van Dijk 2012: 16). This is important because ‘one of the main roles of discourse is the reproduction of social representations, such as knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, norms, and values’ (van Dijk 2012: 16). Discourse can thus be said to play a fundamental role in provoking conflict as much as in establishing social peace. Furthermore, the way in which social problems are defined by news media strongly influences how the public and policy-makers understand and act on an issue (Thompson & Ungerleider 2004). According to van Dijk, ‘the mass media are currently the most
influential source of racist bias, prejudice, and racism [...] news, editorials, and opinion articles in the press are crucially involved in the formation of ethnic attitudes and ideologies’ (van Dijk, 2012: 17). Moreover, ‘across many countries, the main source of racist beliefs stems not from an individual’s daily experiences but rather from the racist speech prevalent in public discourse and racially biased media sources’ (van Dijk cited in Hernández 2011: 813). Thus, the media is often the primary vehicle by which the public learns, in essence, about who is valued and who is not (Dasgupta cited in Hernández 2011: 814).

**Methodology and Scope**

The scope of this study includes seven Turkish newspapers and articles published from between 2011 to 2012. The newspapers were chosen according to their different political ideologies. *Vatan* and *Sözcü* newspapers are known as being secularist and republican. *Yeniçağ, Yeni Mesaj* and *Ortadoğu* are known as being pro status quo, or nationalist papers that propagate the supremacy of the Turkish nation. They are also secular and republican but with Islamist and ‘neo-Ottomanist’ leanings. *Milli Gazete* and *Yeni Akit* newspapers are Islamist, conservative and ‘neo-Ottomanist,’ although they are sometimes considered to be anti-republican. Left-leaning and liberal newspapers are not included in this study because of their heightened sensitivity to the issue of hate speech and oppositional attitude towards the status quo.

Articles published in these newspapers in 2011 and 2012 were surveyed with the aim of detecting hate speech employed against religious or ethnic groups. Although the data is taken from the Hrant Dink Foundation Hate Discourse Media Monitoring Project, which monitors twenty-four national newspapers and two sports newspapers, I have only included in the dataset findings related to the seven above-named newspapers for the purposes of this study.

The content of the newspaper articles are categorised according to how hate language is used. After categorising the ethnic or religious group that was targeted, the journalistic methods used to convey the hate speech are determined and categorised as either creating a perception of a potential or existing threat, or degrading and humiliating a group based on the act of an individual (www.nefretsoylemi.org/metodoloji.asp). News and columns are analysed to reveal the dominant discourse patterns and discourse strategies employed in the headlines as well as in the main body of text.

In assessing the data, I employ two approaches belonging to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA): the socio-cognitive approach model of Teun van Dijk and the discourse-historical approach model developed by Ruth Wodak. Using these models, the dominant discourse patterns and strategies in the news headlines and texts are revealed. CDA, as defined by Fairclough, is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse that sees languages as a form of social practice and that focuses on the regeneration of social and political dominance through text and speech (Wodak 2009: 27). Wodak defines CDA as an interdisciplinary field that approaches the use of language from a critical perspective and argues that it should be methodologically placed in the hermeneutic tradition instead of the analytic-deductive tradition (Wodak 2009: 28). Generally, CDA is problem-focused, and that is why it is defined as having eclectic and interdisciplinary characteristics both in theory and practice (Wodak 2009: 3).

Another characteristic feature of CDA is its interest in revealing the ideology behind certain discourses. Based on these reasons, Critical Discourse Analysis approaches discourse with a critical
focus on concepts such as power-dominance, ideology and hegemony. Contrary to other discourse analysis methods, it also attaches a special interest to the examination of news discourse. According to van Dijk, proof of the method’s success can be clearly seen in its effective usage in studies on class struggle, anti-colonialist movements, the civil rights movement and the women’s rights movement (1992: 252). For these reasons, the CDA method is appropriate for the scope and content of the study.

Findings: The Construction of Polarised Identities

‘Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference’ (Benhabib 1996: 3). Benhabib, who was born in Istanbul and has become one of most important political scientists of our age, believes that ‘othering’ is an obligatory step in the process of identity construction. While the ‘self’ is constructed by emphasizing the qualities that differ from the ‘other,’ both identities are constructed. Wodak and van Dijk, who both focus on decoding racist discourse, argue that while the ‘self’ or the concept of ‘us’ is constructed as an in-group identity, the ‘other’ or the concept of ‘them’ is constructed as an out-group identity (van Dijk 1992, 2012; Wodak 2009).

Therefore, polarisation and opposition are created by emphasizing the differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’. By creating a discriminative differentiation in the identity hierarchy, the desired and undesired identity is clarified. Positive self-representation and negative representation of the ‘other’ mark the ‘other’ as an out-group that is undesirable. By stressing the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ members of the out-group are denigrated, demonised, delegitimised, or depicted as inferior. Through an examination of the referential, nomination, and prediction discursive strategies, negative names, adjectives, references and definitions are used in the construction of out-groups in media discourse (Wodak 2009).

According to the Hrant Dink Foundation Hate Speech Media Monitoring Project Report (Jan.- Apr. 2011: 6, table 1), the first four out-groups that are targeted and represented in a negative light in Turkish media are respectively the Armenians, Christians, Jews (who are targeted as much as Christians) and Rums (Greek Orthodox Turkish citizens). Later that year, however, according to the Hrant Dink foundation Hate Speech Media Monitoring Project (Sep.-Dec. 2011: 4, table 1), the main group targeted by hate speech is Jews (24%), followed by Armenians (15%), Rums (9%) and Christians (9%). Christians and Jews are the main targets of hate speech for reasons related to religious identity. The Armenians, Rums, Jews and Kurds are, respectively, the main targets of hate speech for reasons related to ethnic identity. It should be noted that Turkey has citizens from all these ethnic and religious groups. The Turkish identity, on the other hand, is uniformly depicted in a positive light.2

Ethnic minorities are described using a variety of words that have negative connotations and attributes. Furthermore, ethic communities are frequently depicted as having undesirable characteristics. This situation is widely seen in news stories published by right-conservative-nationalist-Islamist newspapers. Some examples include:

2 This is exemplified in the usage of a quotation from M. Emin Yurdakul’s famous poem as the title of a column by Ahmet Sevgi: ‘I am a Turk, my religion, my kind is divine’ (Yeniçağ 14 Jan. 2011, www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr).
Despite being Ottoman citizens, Armenians, who dreamed ‘of forming Armenia on Turkish land,’ collaborated with enemy forces and stabbed Turkey in the back [...] (Ruhat Mengi, Vatan 25 May 2011, haber.gazetevatan.com);

The Greeks [...] no race in the world has such lying, untrustworthy, unreliable people (H. Macit Yusuf, Yeniçağ 12 Sep. 2012, www.yenieagazetes.com.tr);

The most ferocious enemy of Muslims are the Jews [...] Let me remind you that all gambling games were invented by Jews. Are you aware of how the Jews took you away from your [Muslim] faith and make you slaves? (Adnan Öksüz, Milli Gazete 3 Sep. 2012, www.milligazete.com.tr)

Tsesis argues that violence against ethnic minorities and other outsider groups never occurs in isolation, but is legitimated and made more likely through a combination of social beliefs, customs, imagery, metaphors and stereotypes that degrade and dehumanise the ethnic minority. Indeed, ‘[c]hopeful response elicited by the repeated expression of disrespectful images about ethical, political, sexual, religious, or familial qualities of targeted groups’ (Tsesis 2002: 81) produce all these social beliefs, customs, imagery, metaphors and stereotypes which are expanded and reinforced by the media. It is for this reason that we must imperatively study the relationship between hate speech and hate discourse in media, as well as its influence on hate crimes.

There is a growing, disturbing trend of hate discourse entering the political arena. A new tendency in Turkish politics, for instance, is to represent Kurds as non-Islamic. This is especially blatant in recent speeches and public addresses by Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdoğan. The reality is that the vast majority of Turkey’s 15 million Kurds are Muslim. However, Kurdish members of the Turkish parliament, who sit with the opposition, are sometimes accused of being Zoroastrian or Yezidi. The Prime Minister is reported as saying:

They are Zoroastrian. [...] they are mentioning Yezidi. They are practising this kind [Yezidi] of worship. [However,] even if they are Yezidi, so long as they do not get involve with terror, we value human beings as human beings (transmitted by Pınar Öğünç, Radical Newspaper 22 Oct. 2012).

By characterizing these opposition party members as Zoroastrian, Prime Minister Erdoğan aligns these Kurds, who are belong to a dissident political party, with non-Muslim religion and tradition, thereby engendering hostility towards them, given that non-Muslims are the historic enemy. He therefore practises a ‘politics of difference’; a practice that ‘cannot easily be abstracted from particular histories of social conflict and ideological contestation’ (Kaplan 2008: 40).

**The Construction of non-Muslim Identity as Evil and the Historic Enemy**

The commonplace phrase – ‘ninety-nine per cent of the population of Turkey is Muslim’ – depicts Turkey as a monolithic Muslim country with a population of 70 million. However, research has shown that in modern-day Turkey there are 50,000 Armenians, 27,000 Jews, and around 3,000–5,000 Rums, all of whom are Turkish citizens. Historically, since the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has been a multi-religious country. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire developed a system for protecting minority rights called the Millet system:

Ottomans had evolved a system of dealing with religious and ethnic minorities because of the policies of progressive sultans, anxious to maintain their hold on territories populated by non-Muslims [...] non-Muslims were allowed their own religious laws and institutions [...] such as
education, religion, justice, and social security including separate schools, hospitals and hotels, along with hospices for the poor and aged. Millet system was established in the fifteenth century, during the height of Ottoman power by Sultan Mehmet II and lasted until the twentieth century, an impressive example of group rights based on religion (Sigler 1983: 70).

In the Ottoman era, Jewish people lived peacefully with the Turks. However, in the Republican era, they suffered from anti-Semitic and anti-Christian state oppression. Rather than being non-Muslim, the problem was being non-Turk because the new state was, and currently is, a secular republic dominated by Turks.

In summary, hostility towards non-Muslims can be seen to be embedded in the social fabric of Turkish society. It is detectable in news broadcasts, which has the effect of normalising the representation of non-Muslims as the enemy and as evil. Nationalist, Islamist newspapers play a crucial role in constructing such a discourse, but liberal, secularist, pro-republic newspapers like Vatan also show how hate speech is internalised in the rhetoric and language of newspapers regardless their ideological, political attachment. For example:

[...] If we look at our district, we can see that Zionist powers and the Christian world are behind every type of cabal and chaos [...] Zionists and the Christian world constitute an evil axis against Islam [...] If they were able to, they would wipe Islam and Muslims from the face of earth (Abdülkadir Özkan, Milli Gazete, 9 Aug. 2012);

Do Evangelists have any interest in peace? Are not Evangelists a Christian sect whose members believe in ruining the Al-Aqsa mosque and killing all Muslims in the war of Armageddon? What happened to this geography’s [Turkey] tradition of resisting the invading Crusaders? (Mustafa Hilmi Yıldırım, Yeni Mesaj, 17 Sep. 2012);

[Muslim] believers do not make Jewish or Christian friends. They are friends with their own kind. If one of you keeps [Jews or Christians] as friends s/he is one of them. There is no doubt that Allah does not guide them (Selim Çoraklı, Vatan, 20 Mar. 2012);

The Vatican says, ‘We made Europe Christian in the first millennium and America in the second millennium. In the third millennium we will make Asia Christian’ (Seyfi Şahin, Ortadoğu, 18 Jan. 2011).

It is not uncommon to encounter severely hostile language against non-Muslims in the press. While the first example cited above is derived from Milli Gazete (‘National Newspaper’), a paper known for its Islamist and nationalist conservative ideology, the third example is taken from Vatan Gazetesi (‘Homeland Newspaper’), known as a liberal, mainstream newspaper. These examples show how hostile language, regardless of a newspaper’s ideological or political attachment, is common in Turkish media.

Historical conflicts between Muslims and Christians, like the Crusades that handed possession of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem to the Jews, are still vivid in the collective memory. Furthermore, historic images of medieval Christianity and hostile anti-Semitic clichés are still found in contemporary Turkish social imagery. Christians and Jews are routinely defined as enemies, unreliable, and dishonest individuals that threaten Turkey’s existence. By using hostile language in the

news, therefore, we can see how identities are constructed based on historical animosity. This creates an opposition between Islam and the Christian-Jewish faiths, enhancing polarization. Generalizations and denotations that emphasise the evil character of Jews and Christians are indicators of how hate speech, hate discourse and racism are being employed against non-Muslim citizens of Turkey. Now Kurds are being positioned into this historical context by depicting them as non-Muslims that adhere to pagan beliefs – one of the greatest sins according Islamic teachings. The following column piece demonstrates this:

The mission of PKK [Kurdish Worker’s Party] is to break [Turkey] to pieces, to separate [Turkey]. Do they want to form a Kurdistan? No! They want to form a big Armenia, a big Israel, and Christianised Asia Minor (M. Şevket Eygi, Milli Gazete, 5 Sep. 2012).

This column from Milli Gazete was also published in Yeni Akit (‘New Commitment’) on September 6, 2012 and was written by Ş. Eygi under the title of ‘Separating Turkey.’ Incidentally, in addition to being a renowned Islamist who writes on religious and political subjects, Eygi tackles lifestyle issues for the more ‘sophisticated,’ giving guidance on topics such as headscarf fashion and home decoration.

The Construction of Minorities as Disloyal Citizens and Traitors

Stigmatizing, blaming, stereotyping and scapegoating are the main characteristics of hate speech and hate discourse, and most of the time serve to inflame the emotions of followers, thereby increasing support for speakers. Destructive ideologies and dehumanizing messages become ‘normal’ for followers and listeners exposed to hate speech on a regular basis through mass media (Vollhardt et al. 2006: 25). The following examples indicate common forms of hate speech and hate discourse in the media that emphasise the supposed disloyalty and treachery of minority groups:

They [Kurds] are burning [Turkish] flags, ruining neighbourhoods, [but] then expect to be served by state (Sözcü, 14 Jul. 2011);

Ishak Alaton hugged pro PKK, former parliamentarian Leyla Zana, who was sent to prison for being a separatist. He also talked with the language of a separatist […] as if he meant to say, ‘Do not care about Atatürk! Erase the Turkish nation’s identity’ […] While the Turkish nation’s money has made him rich, he says ‘it is time to set Öcalan, head of the terrorists, head of the enemies of the [Turkish] state, free’ (Sözcü, 12 Apr. 2011);

Mayday belongs to labourers, workers and all working people who toil with sweat and honesty, who are loyal to the country and the nation and who are respectful to Ata[türk]. [Mayday] does not belong to the savage, blood-stained separatist Kurdists (Ufuk Söylemez, Sözcü, 3 Apr. 2011);

There is no other country that has such big number of traitors […] The Turks are suffering under the Armenians’ cruelty (Altemur Kılıç, Yeniçağ, 26 Apr. 2010);

Patriarch Bartholomew [Ecumenical Patriarch of the Eastern Orthodox Church, a Turkish citizen] is out of his mind… [He] complained about Turkey to the world. [He] will start a war [if he] continues to attack Turkey (SalimYavaşoğlu, Yeniçağ, 19 Dec. 2009);

‘Lovers of Armenia’ pushed the button [Headline of an article reporting how the SOROS- TESEV think-tank and ‘collaborator’ writers participated in an ‘Armenianist’ conspiracy by criticising Turkey for its role in the Armenian diaspora] (Yeni Akit, 3 Sep. 2012).
As it is argued by Vollhardt et al. that ‘[s]tatements alleging the disloyalty of the ‘other’ can create mistrust against the stigmatised individual or group, and even incite irrational fear of the ostensibly subversive group within one’s society’ (2006: 24). As the quotations above show, non-Muslim (the Armenians, Jews and Rums) and Muslim minorities (such as the Kurds) alike are accused of disloyalty, treachery and of showing allegiance to other countries.

Often accusations of disloyalty are related to the on-going armed struggle between the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party) and the Turkish Army. When a minority member like Ishak Alaton, who is a respected business person, gives his opinion about the Kurdish question and calls for peace, a hate stratagem is employed and he is labelled and represented as a friend of the Turkish state’s enemy, as seen in the above quotation from Sözcü (12 Apr. 2011). It should also be noted that many of the columnists and journalists that are quoted above are not Islamists, but on the contrary, secular and pro-republic. Nevertheless, their discourses are similarly hostile.

The hate stratagem concept that is introduced by Whillock (1995) essentially provides a typology of the main features of hateful discourse. Hate speech: (a) inflames the emotions of speakers’ followers; (b) denigrates an out-group by associating them with undesirable qualities; (c) inflicts harm on the out-group by attacking features that the out-group values; (d) rhetorically conquers the out-group (e.g. by glorifying the killing or destruction of the group). The news stories or columns that are cited in this study illustrate Whillock’s hate stratagem. Having identified hate speech, the next step is to highlight its hazardous effects and to formulate a riposte. Vollhardt et al. write that ‘[o]nce hate speech has been detected, sensitised and motivated listeners can engage in activities that counteract its destructive effects’ (Vollhardt et al. 2006: 31).

Conclusion

In this article I have demonstrated that explicit hate speech is common in Turkish media, regardless of ideological or political position, and that it disrupts social peace. Print media use discourse strategies that represent minorities as disloyal citizens and traitors, with non-Muslim identities in particular constructed as the evil and historic enemy. Through this discourse, and with the help of the media, social polarisation is justified and normalised. Conducting research on the issue can provide data that helps to change the status quo. Such research can also provide support to citizens who are targeted by hate speech. Moreover, showing the destructive effects of hate speech on social peace can help raise awareness of the issue and gain the support required to confront and fight against it on a societal level.

The Hrant Dink Foundation Hate Speech Media Monitoring Report of January-April 2012 found that hate speech in Turkish media increased by more than 100% in the first quarter of 2012. According to the report, 80% of news reports employing hate speech or hate discourse were published in national media outlets, with the remaining 20% in local media outlets (4). Therefore, hate speech is undeniably on the rise. Raising awareness and encouraging lawmakers to pass new legislation is essential to combatting hate speech and discourse at a societal level. It is also noticeable that NGO reports on hate speech are not covered by mainstream media, and that there is a serious lack of academic studies on the issue in Turkey. This only reiterates the need for conducting further academic research on hate speech in increasingly polarised societies like Turkey. The findings of this study suggest that hate speech is particularly prevalent in Turkish print media. Future studies might focus on broadcast media outlets, such as network news and entertainment shows on television, in order to determine whether hate speech is present.
In conclusion, the mass media’s propagation of hate speech is not only an ethical problem but also a violation of minority rights. In order to reduce hate speech in the media, we must educate journalists and reinforce ethical codes. Thus, subjects like hate speech, human rights-based journalism and peace journalism should be a core part of university journalism curricula. When hate speech becomes the dominant discourse and ideology of governments, states and societies, it diminishes the capacity for peace. When racism, nationalism and sexism become deeply embedded in the fabric of society, it becomes imperative that the state acts to uproot the hate politics and hate paradigms that threaten social peace and stability.
Works Cited


Looking Back at Malaysia’s GE2008:  
An Internet Election and Its Democratic Aftermath  
Sara Chinnasamy and Mary Griffiths

Abstract

Prior to 2008, alternative news sources were already established and exerted influence on the political process. They broadened the variety of topics reported, increased informed participation in political culture and presented political alternatives. However, after Malaysia’s 12th general election in 2008, the Internet emerged as a major new player in the socio-political landscape. The impact of the Internet, in particular the influence of the Independent News Portal (INP), Malaysiakini.com, was seen as being partly responsible for changes in Malaysia’s political landscape. Thereafter, the Internet’s role as ‘an agent of political change’ became the subject of much debate and controversy in Malaysia. The question of the Internet’s influence is especially relevant given that alternative media sources were predicted to exert an even greater impact on the 2013 general election (GE2013). This article explores the influence of alternative news sources and examines the concept of the ‘Internet election’ with reference to two international examples. It contextualises public debate about the issues and controversies of the 2008 election coverage, and its aftermath, through the perspective of local media practitioners and election observers. The findings are revealing of the distinctive impact of Malaysia’s independent online news sources. The article argues that the democratisation of information has the potential to encourage new forms of democratic participation and to have a significant impact on political culture.

Keywords: Internet election, Independent Internet Portal (INP), general election, political participation.
Introduction

The Internet’s role in Malaysia is widely recognised as sparking, in earnest, the development of the democratisation of information, as seen in its significant impact on the 12th General Election (Kensaku 2008; The Straits Times 2008; Ooi 2008; Stodden 2008; Steele 2009). Since 2008, independent news portals, blogs and social media platforms such as Facebook, have been seen as having the potential to increase broader and more diverse participation in political culture. The 12th General Election was described as a ‘political tsunami’ for the Barisan Nasional (BN), which turned in what was thought to be its worst performance in electoral history (Asli 2009; Star 2008). Since 2008, the BN’s downward trend has continued. The idea of a ‘tsunami,’ an unstoppable force that overwhelms and destroys, has proven to be an accurate characterisation of political participation in Malaysia. Increased information flows have created stronger democratic and oppositional forces. As a result, in 2008, the ruling regime lost almost two-thirds of its majority in Parliament along with control over five of eleven states. Moreover, the 13th general election, held on May 5, 2013, saw an increased voter participation of over 80% (Hsu 2013), with the BN again losing more of its share of the overall national vote. At the time of writing, a few days after the 13th general election, it appears that the ruling party is confronting a possible challenge to the election result from the opposition. Allegations of corruption in electoral processes arose before GE2013 and protest rallies about this issue were held the week after the election results were announced.

The BN government, in common with its predecessors – multiparty coalitions that have been in power since Malaysia’s independence in 1957, rules within a democratic system that is loosely adapted from the Westminster parliamentary system and that is inherited from Malaysia’s colonial history. The Constitution guarantees certain rights to the Malay population and establishes Islam as the official religion. Furthermore, the government prioritises the interests of its majority Malay population and upholds Islamic judicial traditions. While freedom of religion is guaranteed under the Constitution, freedom of expression, on the other hand, is tightly controlled. This is particularly the case with the government-owned mainstream print such as Utusan Malaysia and broadcast media such as Radio Television Malaysia. Legislation controlling all media content, such as the controversial Internal Security Act (ISA), which is about to be replaced, and the Printing Presses and Publication Act (PPPA), restrict information and the free circulation of opinions; rights that are characteristic of democracies. Consequently, Malaysia is not seen as a full democracy but rather a ‘quasi-democracy,’ ‘flawed democracy’ or ‘semi-democracy.’

Despite a lengthy, authoritarian period in power, the BN is not without strong and vocal opponents. When Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy Prime Minister was sacked in 1998 and sent to prison on charges widely regarded as spurious, he became the focus of political attention on emerging Internet blogs and in the foreign press. Although the Internet’s political uses were at an early stage of development, their existence was a factor in the formation of the reformasi, a broad issues-based movement advocating change in many aspects of Malaysian life, led by Anwar. Despite agitation for change and better conditions in the country, Abbott’s conclusions (2004) suggest that the reformasi had not yet gained sufficient momentum to bring about the desired changes from the government.

General elections, one of the essential components of democracy, are held every five years in Malaysia. After GE2004, there were signs that the voting public had a desire for change. It is no
coincidence that in 2007 – a year that saw mass rallies by the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf), demanding Indian ethnic rights, and the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (Bersih 1.0), demanding electoral reforms – Internet penetration had significantly increased, especially in urban areas.¹ For the first time in the nation’s electoral history, therefore, the Internet impacted on election results, and it came to be seen as a new agent in the country’s political landscape; one that gave a communicative power to reformasi and minority groups. Malaysiakini.com, in particular, was able to provide a platform for those seeking alternative information. Malaysiakini.com is a popular Internet portal for news media formed by an independent group of individuals, including former mainstream journalists, frustrated with the restrictions on mainstream reporting. The site exerted an even stronger influence by the time of the 2008 election. The role of the INP Malaysiakini.com was recognised at the time due to significant differences in its coverage of national political issues. Conversely, mainstream and government-owned media were seen as less successful (The Straits Times 2008) due to the restrictions imposed on them by government ownership that resulted in a pro-BN agenda.

Research on GE2008 has raised a number of questions about the nature of relations between the press, the government, and movements for social change in recent years. This article looks back at GE2008, building on previous research on the subject such as Abbott’s work on democratisation (2004), Steele (2009), who emphasised Malaysiakini.com’s promotion of democratic discourse and challenge to the ruling BN party, and Rajaratnam (2009), who compared the news coverage of Malaysiakini.com with The Star on election issues during GE2008. This article’s primary focus is the Internet’s political potential for strengthening democracy and increasing political participation in Malaysia. It aims to define the term ‘Internet election,’ as it refers to the Malaysian experience, and to consider its impact. The study is partly based on statements of media practitioners – both INP and mainstream journalists – who participated in the 2008 election coverage, gathering the post-election reflections of election journalists on their understanding of the Internet’s impact.

The Democratising Potential of the Internet

Since the mid-1990s, scholarly observers have predicted that the Internet would play a unique role as a tool that promotes democratisation and political transformation, particularly in the context of regimes that control oppositional or divergent voices by imposing restrictions on free speech (Grossman 1995; Perrit 1998; Barber 1998-99; Abbott 2001). In countries where freedom of speech is fiercely guarded, the Internet has provided citizens, civil society movements, and opposition political parties with more influence and access to the public sphere, thus demonstrating convincingly that democratic diversity of opinion can exist and that the governments can change hands peacefully through fair electoral processes. As a commentator (Perrit 1998) argued while the Internet was still in its infancy, the Internet not only performs as a communication channel but also as a medium for political changes and regime transformation.

Dutton and Lin (2001) argue that the widespread diffusion of the Internet and highly publicised Internet events, such as the 1999 web-orchestrated protests at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, and Howard Dean’s unsuccessful web-centred campaign for the Democratic

¹ Bersih was organised by an NGO coalition demanding electoral reform; Hindraf emerged out of Indian ethnic groups’ dissatisfaction with racially based policy. The rallies added to public anger when media coverage detailed incidents of demolished temples and the detention of Hindraf protesters under the Internal Security Act (ISA).
Party’s United States primary elections in 2003, demonstrate that Internet technologies have transformed into instruments that can be used to increase political participation. The so-called ‘Arab Spring,’ a series of protests and demonstrations across the Middle East and North African countries in 2012, shows that the Internet, particularly its social media platforms, were capable of raising awareness about the state of repression, corruption and censorship in diverse regimes (Howard 2011). More confrontational phenomena, which are enabled by Internet platforms, include mobilised civil resistances, strikes, demonstrations, marches and rallies. Mobilised conflict elsewhere arose with citizens’ demands and lack of government reforms on human rights issues, corruption, declining economic, poverty, and youth unemployment. An increasing number of Internet-savvy youth in these countries are credited with being responsible for forcing change through the so-called ‘youth quake,’ which sees autocrats and monarchies as ‘anachronisms’ (Reverchon & de Tricornot 2011).

The extent to which the Internet is used for political discourse and expression varies between countries and depends in large measure on the limits and controls set by the state. Existing surveys show that the Internet has enhanced political discourse in the U.K. and U.S. (Hansard Society 2010; Rainie & Smith 2008), by increasing online political participation. The Internet can, for instance, be used for mobilising party supporters, gathering volunteers, as a tool of political marketing strategies during campaigning periods and for e-voting. Significant changes among citizens and political candidates using the Internet for political campaigning have led some to refer to the sum of these experiences as ‘Internet elections.’ The concept of ‘Internet elections’ is found in multiple sources such as Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project (2004 & 2008) and Hansard Society’s Audit of Political Engagement (2010). The Internet can displace traditional forms of campaigning style, communication, fund-raising and other electoral activities, as is demonstrated later in this article with regard to the U.S. and U.K. First, however, it is important to describe the specific conditions of the media landscape in Malaysia, with a focus on alternative online news portals.

Prior to the development of online news media, mainstream media consisted of print and broadcast media owned or influenced by the BN government and its inner circle. For many years, the credibility of Malaysia’s mainstream media has been in doubt due its perceived failure to cover news items that are critical or hostile towards the BN government; issues pertaining, for instance, to alleged nepotism, cronyism, corruption and the political elite’s business activities (Ho, Kluver & Yang 2003). In Malaysia, mainstream media consistently report ‘good news about government leaders and cooperation between ethnicities while promoting a single national identity,’ to summarise scholarly comment (Lent 1979; Sani 2005). Furthermore, media is considered a tool for national unity (Khattab 2008). In contrast, malaysiakini.com became a distribution platform for alternative interpretations and commentary on government actions in 2008, and for criticism of government failures and weaknesses.

Malaysia’s Media Landscape

Part of the reason for the popularity of alternative news can be illustrated by the following anecdote, which highlights key operating differences between the independent journalists and those of the mainstream media. When key states were lost to the opposition and the BN’s majority collapsed in 2008, the mainstream media representatives had to wait for the official election
results to be announced by the government spokesman. Meanwhile, their colleagues at malaysiakini.com were already reporting the results to their subscribers. Live news updates were posted by university students, citizen journalists and volunteers trained by the portal. Consequently, world news sources such as Channel News Asia, Al-Jazeera and the BBC relayed the 2008 electoral results according to early malaysiakini.com reports. Thus, malaysiakini.com played a prominent early role as a recognised and authoritative news provider and authentic interpreter of election results, while mainstream news personnel were hampered by traditional time-bound news reporting schedules and the old-established way of operating alongside, rather than independently, of the government.

It is significant that during the 2008 poll campaign, malaysiakini.com had the highest numbers of paid online subscribers. Moreover, its daily page hits nearly tripled in July 2008 and it became the most visited INP in Malaysia (Alexa.com 2008). Malaysiakini.com also received attention and international recognition and acclaim for its independent reporting (Wong 2001; Nain 2002; Plate 2001). By contrast, mainstream media outlets appeared to be losing their credibility because of their perceived pro-government stance (Chin 2003), and mainstream news websites, such as thestar.com, did not see any significant increase in traffic.

Another factor that accounts for the success of malaysiakini.com is the relative urban-to-rural distribution of Internet penetration rates. The Malaysia Communication Multimedia Commission (MCMC) figures reveal that Internet penetration in the country’s urban areas was relatively high at 85.3% in 2008. In the same report, Internet penetration was only 14.7% in rural areas. High urban Internet penetration in 2008 may be a significant factor in explaining the substantial growth in readership for alternative news, as coverage of political issues not reported elsewhere is most likely to appeal to the interests of city-dwellers. Parenthetically, big cities, such as Shah Alam in the Selangor state, had the highest subscribers for malaysiakini.com at the time (Alexa.com 2008).

However, rural areas have also been exposed to the influence of alternative media. This is mostly thanks to Section 3 of the Internet Law – ‘No Censorship of the Internet’ – in the MSC Communication and Multimedia Act of 1998 that commits to the liberal governance of the Internet. This allowed opinion leaders critical of the government and the opposition to disseminate content from malaysiakini.com to rural areas. They did this by circulating political pamphlets and reproducing malaysiakini.tv’s videos on important events. Notable examples came in the form of the video compact discs such as A Cry for Royal Help and Hard Questions, No Answers, which were widely distributed to areas where Internet access was poor or non-existent.

Malaysiakini.com has long since had the reputation for promoting ‘greater transparency and public accountability in Malaysia via new communication technology’ (Tong 2004). It has since become recognised as an agent of democratic change through its upholding of a more independent journalistic ideology that contrasts with the country’s dominant ‘development journalism’ approach. Researchers have recognised the online newspaper as an exemplar of its form (Chin 2003) and as a blueprint for encouraging democratic civic discourse (Steele 2009). Malaysiakini.com is also known for investigative reporting or ‘contentious journalism’ (George 2006).
After 2008, *malaysiakini.com* remains the main alternative news medium and continues to grow its networking potential among civil society movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), university students, the middle classes and opposition group leaders. Even government journalists turn to it for breaking news. Subscription statistics reveal nearly 5000 visitors daily (Alexa.com 2012). The portal’s varied opinion and editorial content has been designed to encourage engagement in online political participation, through channels such as Video Testimonies by Citizen Journalists (cj.my) and malaysiakini.tv, as well as the ‘Letters,’ ‘Column’ and ‘YourSay/Vox Populi’ features. These allow people to post information and to exchange ideas, and they improve website popularity, thus increasing return visits.

### The Question of ‘Internet Elections’

Scholars have defined an ‘Internet election’ as the strategies employed by political candidates and parties to achieve more favourable electoral outcomes through use of the Internet. This definition includes online campaigning, web-based applications, as well as other ways in which the Internet drives electoral results, or has an impact on the media’s political agenda. Parsons considers that an ‘Internet election depends on the numbers influenced by the Internet’ (2010: 1). This criterion seems to privilege the practices in western democracies with organised political parties and good-to-excellent connectivity.

Sen (2010) argues that the ‘Internet election’ is a ‘hyper-partisan’ activity that occurs among the Internet community during a campaigning period. Sen also notes the importance of blogs, online news, and the ability to observe those who are actively engaged online during the period, have the potential to speed up political discourse, and create faster news cycles, broadening diversity in political opinion. Williams and Tedesco (2006) define the Internet election based on perspectives of the United States Presidential elections. They argue that the notion of the ‘Internet election’ can be tracked through the growth of online news consumption and other Internet uses by political parties, candidates and the public during the campaign period. An ‘Internet election’ can also be defined by its revolutionary features and by the ability of committed users to interact and mobilise in chat rooms, through email, forums, meet-ups and blogs during a campaign. Two examples, the U.S. in 2008 and the U.K. in 2010 are provided to illustrate particular definitions of the ‘Internet election.’ The Malaysian elections will then be discussed in relation to these two examples. It should be noted that the U.S. 2004 Presidential election, despite its failure to deliver results for Howard Dean, sparked a truly global debate on Internet elections.

### United States (2008)

The 2008 United States Presidential election was the first example of a modern political campaign to use social media and to develop innovative ways of reaching new targets in the voting population. Barack Obama used a low cost and efficient method of campaigning with his website, *my.BarackObama.com* (Lyons 2008) to mobilise voters, increase Democrat participation and engagement, raise campaign funds and recruit campaign volunteers. His campaign was heavily reliant on social media strategies to connect and persuade younger voters and to encourage democratic participation. This election became known as a ‘social media election’ (Hesseldahl, MacMillan & Kharif 2008), where platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Flickr provided voters opportunities to share their experiences with photos and videos. The grassroots approach and social media engagement also helped voters get a wider range of information about
candidates and political parties’ position on certain issues. In 2008, voters monitored online videos and followed social media movements, which broadcast their own thoughts on political candidates and electoral processes. Pew Internet & American Life Project (2008) indicated that 46% out of 309,842,000 of U.S. population used the Internet for getting information about campaigns, used email to discuss campaign related matters, and social networking for getting political news and sharing their views. Thus, the Internet was utilised in various ways to mobilise support from voters and to increase Americans’ participation in democracy.

**United Kingdom (2010)**

The U.K. experienced an ‘Internet election’ on 6 May 2010 (White 2010; Dale 2010; Tall 2010). It was so named because of the increased use of social networking websites in the campaign period, as well as the use of Twitter and Facebook by political parties. The party websites proved capable of generating increased political participation. For instance, Nick Clegg’s Facebook page reached nearly 70,000 fans before the television debates and other independent Facebook groups formed with great success (Tall 2010). Moreover, membership of the Liberal Democratic Party increased to 160,000 within a few weeks. New campaign techniques were also employed using Facebook, with pages providing links to political parties’ websites and the Electoral Commission for voter registration. Twitter became a popular way to broadcast supporters’ comments (Jones 2010), and younger voters (those between 18 and 24 years of age) used Twitter to engage in the campaign forums (YouGov.co.uk). In another notable example, more than 42,000 people followed Nick Clegg’s Twitter feed. These examples indicate that U.K. political parties’ were quick to adopt the communicative potential of the web, particularly in their political marketing strategies.

In the U.S. and U.K.’s ‘Internet elections,’ political parties actively, and opportunistically, used the Internet to communicate directly with the electorate, rather than going through the traditional channels and established mass media.

**Malaysia (2008)**

In contrast to the U.S. and U.K., Malaysian’s 2008 ‘Internet election’ was characterised by civil society leadership’s unrestricted and critical usage of independent news portals. Scholarly analyses and media reports of the 2008 election show that one of the most powerful factors in the unprecedented swing to the opposition was the provision of alternative Internet news platforms and discussion forums. The Internet thus provided Malaysians with a diversity of political coverage and a robust critique of the government. Distrust of the government and government-owned mainstream media was a powerful factor underpinning citizens’ enthusiasm for alternative perspectives. Influential events such as the Hindraf and Bersih rallies (the latter demanding electoral reforms) in 2007, had not been reported accurately, and had been downplayed or ignored by mainstream media. Furthermore, government mishandling of these rallies – the police deployed tear gas and water cannons against demonstrators – aggravated the electorate and prepared the ground for popular resistance. The inadequate reporting of these events, due to the restrictions placed on broadcast and print media’s coverage of events critical to the government, generated strong feelings among Malaysian protestors as well as those who were unhappy with the government for other reasons.
Discontent led to what has been called *kebangkitan rakyat* (‘the rise of people’) against the ruling party. A number of political factors, such as the government’s lack of transparency, allegations of corruption, the heavy-handed crushing of oppositional movements and perceived media bias against the proponents of change, explain the surge in the anti-BN movement. However, the government’s missteps were undoubtedly compounded by the increasing popularity of independent Internet news as a grass-roots medium. As online news is not subject to the same regulation as mainstream media, it can operate more speedily than time-bound print or broadcast media, as shown in the anecdote related earlier, and thus came to be regarded as a more first-hand, experience-based, accurate and current source of news.

Internet news portals benefit directly from a favourable regulatory environment. This is thanks to the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) initiative, which promotes Malaysia as a high-tech cyber-hub with only minimal regulation of the Internet. Citizen journalists and independent online news sites are the unexpected beneficiaries of this provision. Internet news sites do not require the annual permit applications that print news require and are therefore not so deferential to the BN. The growth of these portals is therefore due in large measure to the government’s promise not to regulate the Internet. The former Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi commented on the political upset in the 2008 general election, attributing it to the Internet factor: ‘We certainly lost the Internet war, the cyber-war. It was a serious misjudgement. We made the biggest mistake in thinking that it was not important’ (Agence France-Presse, 24 March 2008).

In 2013, the increased number of INPs and blogs provide a sharp counterpoint to the state-influenced media. The government has largely kept its promise regarding direct censorship of the Internet, although INPs claim that media regulators have blocked and even closed down several websites during important events. The government’s closing of controversial web portals is viewed as an attempt to curtail further online criticism. Many fear that closures could be expanded to other websites. This would be seen as a serious breach of the original contract but, as yet, has not been ruled out.

**Journalists Look Back**

The research aim in the case study is to better understand the GE2008 period and its aftermath, through the opinions, perspectives and practical experiences of media practitioners and journalists from both the INP and mainstream media. In 2011, extensive interviews were conducted in 2011 with ten of Malaysia’s media practitioners and journalists. Three years after the event, and after much public debate, the interviewees were able to provide in-depth and insightful individual reflections. The interviewees are leading figures in the country’s media industry and all participated in the 2008 general election reporting process in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Respondents from the prominent INP and mainstream media discuss the practicalities of reporting and their experiences during the 2008 election campaign. The respondents are categorised according to numeric identifiers numbers to ensure anonymity. INP respondents are referred to as R1 to R5, and mainstream media journalists are categorised as R6 to R10.

**Providing Further Context for the Interviews**

The surge in the popularity of Internet news in the Malaysian political landscape has been attributed to a widespread distrust of the mainstream media’s coverage of political issues and
events. Mainstream media were seen to have reported issues related to ethnic privileges and
government weaknesses (asiasentinel.com 2008; Gatsiounis 2008), among others, inaccurately
and unsatisfactorily. One can even ask to what point the mainstream media’s approach to covering
politics contributed to the BN’s poor electoral performance. After the 2008 general election, most
of the mainstream media had headlines stating that the ‘(BN) government had won a simple
majority in the 12th Malaysia’s general election.’ However, the also widely quoted the former
prime minister’s statement to a journalist, ‘Why ask more questions? We have lost, we have lost.’
This was posted in red as a headline, and used to impart the impression that the BN had lost its
political authority, despite the overall results.

Thanks to the policy forbidding Internet censorship in Malaysia, citizens were able to watch all
the ensuing street demonstrations on INPs. They could also observe first-hand how the BN ill-
treated certain groups. For example, the public witnessed how authorities mishandled
demonstrators that participated in the big rallies. Hundreds of images flooded malaysiakini.com
and blogs, showing protesters with reddened eyes from chemicals, coughing, screaming, and
running for safety. Mainstream media reports, on the other hand, tended to highlight how the
demonstrations damaged the public infrastructure in the city of Kuala Lumpur and disrupted local
businesses and trading. These facts can easily be substantiated, but the news agenda was clearly
biased and determined from a political perspective.

Starting from 2007, minority ethnic groups began to manifest their dissatisfaction after the
government was perceived to have mishandled significant cases related to religious matters.
Among the country’s population of 28,334,135 (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2010), the
largest ethnic group is the Bumiputera/Malays/Indigenous (67.4%), followed by Chinese (24.6%),
Indians (7.3%) and others (0.7%). Ethnicity and religious beliefs are highly correlated in Malaysia
(Population and Housing Census, 2010). Race is a significant and divisive force in politics:
political parties are ethnically based, and this also divides the population socio-politically. Since
Malaysia is a multi-ethnic and multilingual society, tolerance and the need for unity keep the
country in a tenuous equilibrium. However, Malaysian citizens are highly sensitive to matters
concerning race and ethnicity.

**Opposition on the Net**

The Internet was skilfully utilised by opposition parties to their advantage (Smeltzer & Lepawsky
2009), since the government respected its ‘open Internet’ promise. The fact that a number of
bloggers became opposition Members of Parliament proved that the Internet could be successfully
utilised to gain political advantage. Jeff Ooi, a political blogger and candidate from the opposition
party, Democratic Action (DAP), won his parliamentary seat in the 2008 election along with other
members of parliament, who are prominent bloggers. Political manifestos and tracts by activists
and opposition parties were distributed on the Internet. Furthermore, their efforts to release them
in the form of CDs for circulation in remote areas helped increase voter participation. Some of the
political campaign events were instantly reported on the INPs and political blogs. For instance,
malaysiatoday.com covered the Bersih rally, which demanded clean and fair elections. Malaysiatoday.com described the rally in a detailed account under the heading, ‘Walkers are
Gathering in Hundreds near Jalan Melayu – Malaya Road Gate’ (2008). It should be stated that the
site was blocked at 3.30 p.m. on 10 November 2007 (the day of the rally) by the government,
although reports were available later that day.
Civil society movements have been subject to tighter control after the opposition increased its share in the 2008 vote. At present, the Internet is seen as a medium for free speech and a challenge or threat to the BN. On the other hand, INP readership outstrips mainstream media readership (Voice of America 2008). Kaufman (2008) states that in 2008, blogs, text messages and streamed videos became the most influential information for Malaysians, with 70% of voters influenced by blogs (bernama.com 2008). Ultimately, it can be argued that the ruling regime underestimated the Internet’s potential, and that if it had been more technology savvy, the outcome of the election could have been different. For instance, the BN’s only launched its own website, bn2008.org.my, two weeks prior to the election.

GE2008 was the first election where the Malaysians witnessed political campaigning via websites. Opposition leaders’ personal websites such as limkitsiang.com, from the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and anwaribrahim.com, from the Pakatan Rakyat Party-PKR are closely followed by voters. In contrast, the BN government was seen as having taken a ‘sledgehammer’ approach (Moten 2009), employing traditional methods such as billboards and posters focused on BN’s achievements, with the slogan ‘Security, Peace and Prosperity.’ Moten states the BN bought 1,100 full pages of colour ads in mainstream print media in order to attract voters. Overall, Malaysia’s political parties and candidates used a mixture of traditional and contemporary campaigning methods in the 2008 election, with posters, political rallies, small group discussions (ceramah) and door-to-door efforts. In remote areas, Internet campaigning and text messages via mobile phones were used. By contrast, with 93% of Internet subscribers concentrated in urban areas by 2005 (Zaitun & Crump 2005), the Internet was undoubtedly the most persuasive communication tool among urban dwellers, younger voters and internet-literate voters (Mohamad 2008).

Interview Data
Respondents on GE2008 as an ‘Internet Election’

Most respondents from both INPs and mainstream media agreed that the 2008 general election was an ‘Internet election’ because of the increased flow of online information. Key figures were involved with INPs and the dissemination of relevant and influential political information and views online. For instance, respondent R1 confirms that the ‘Internet is the main factor. People get to know all the information through the Internet. They knew the information openly without any purpose of hiding. It has the potential to transform people’s minds and hearts before the election.’ Another INP respondent agreed that INPs can lead to changes in the country, stating, ‘We need a strong and united opposition, a vibrant independent media, and in 2008, this quality was present to a certain measure with the presence of malaysiakini.com and bloggers. The third ingredient is to have vibrancy in society.’ Another INP journalist believed that the news on the Internet is able to influence public perceptions more easily than the mainstream media.

The five mainstream media respondents recognised that the Internet had a unique potential for circulating information more widely but were more critical about its potential. One stated that people expressed and exchanged their views and ideas through the Internet. ‘People get more access to opinions on the Internet, both good and bad’. There is a general view that print and broadcast media have lost their credibility because certain public events were not reported in the detail expected by readers. As another respondent argued:
INPs gave exposure to oppositions’ talk (ceramahs) and activities. They reported how many people turned up to the talks, what issues were discussed and the public sees that, because they do not have alternative sources (in mainstream media). Even myself, after I leave my office, I will check malaysiakini.com. If the RTM and TV3 were doing their job, why would the public want to go to the Internet?

A sense of professional frustration is evident in the journalist’s admission that s/he reads the online portal after work, and there is an acknowledgement of the general popularity of malaysiakini.com.

There is also a perception among the mainstream media group that INPs are oppositional media, and therefore that all their reporting is anti-government. Respondent R8 stated:

Before the 2008 election, people thought that whatever was said by the opposition was right, and furthermore [that] the Internet focused on the opposition’s issues and also Hindraf issues. Thus, people thought the opposition was right and the government was wrong.

This comment identifies the popular view that commentary by the opposition is somehow more authoritative.

**Question of Mainstream Media Credibility**

There were mixed reactions among the respondents when questioned further on whether the country’s mainstream media had really lost their credibility. Mainstream media’s lack of coverage on certain issues that had been prioritised by INPs was thought to be an issue worthy of further exploration. For instance, R2 affirmed that ‘issues like government spending were not reported properly [and] civil society issues, ethnicity issues don’t appear in mainstream media, right?’ Other INP respondents stated that the mainstream media had no claim to objective truth telling. However, while most mainstream media journalists admitted that mainstream media appeared to have lost credibility, one disagreed. R6 raised the question of whether credibility is a matter of political viewpoint: ‘Mainstream media or any other media may have lost their credibility among those who [don’t want to] believe them. There are still lots of people who believe them.’ The respondent thus expresses the view that the media landscape is inhabited by equally biased and partisan news sources. The question of why certain events are not fully reported by the mainstream media was not discussed.

**INP Efficiency**

The perception of the mainstream media’s lack credibility is partly due to the greater efficiency in news coverage by the INPs. R4 insisted that INPs are the first to be contacted for any issue related to minority groups. ‘When the church was torn down, we were the few people who went there to report about it. When temples demolitions occurred, we were first to provide them coverage.’ These remarks highlight the idea that reporting all events as they happen by following witness reports and other sources has the effect of building public trust and credibility. It also corresponds with a free press model of journalism. The lack of a need to check for the government’s
interpretive framework or to practise self-censorship not only increases the speed of reporting, but also facilitates news gathering from non-traditional sources.

The ‘efficiency’ of the INPs is also clearly seen by their equal coverage of the diversity of opinion within the opposition, as mainstream media provide insufficient coverage of this kind. The INP respondents argue that INPs, by their provision of coverage to the opposition, bring more balance to the media landscape. However, government officials and the mainstream media still consider the INP to be a medium that belongs to the opposition. In the words of one INP respondent, ‘[INPs] are important when it comes to Anwar’s issues, as [there is] no medium to highlight them’ (R5). Another respondent said, ‘I disagree that we are an opposition website because at the end of the day, it doesn’t stop us from criticizing PAS about certain of their policies regarding women [and] it does not stop us from criticizing PKR about what is happening on direct collection’ (R3). Mainstream news reporters again did not comment directly on the news gathering practices that restrict them.

**General Discussion**

From the interviews, it can be concluded that the Internet election has impacted the government-owned media landscape. After the 2008 general election, more INPs have been established with various outlets and different agendas, such as *The Malaysian Insider* and *Free Malaysia Today*. The growth of INPs and the volume of news circulated by them, has affected print media sales, just as online news has impacted print news globally. In Malaysia, there are regulatory and political reasons to reduce the competition between online and print in the news sector.

The mainstream media news editors and journalists are now trying to understand the ‘political circuits’ used by INPs to get their news sources, and are ready to confront the opposition in their reportage with a promise of ‘better’ explanations to the public. In addition, the mainstream media has now adopted some changes in the news gathering processes, as journalists from the mainstream media are encouraged to observe and refer to INP news before leaving for their news assignments. This indicates a change comparable to the regular checking of competitors in free press societies, for market reasons as well as newsroom efficiencies. As for the government, efforts have been taken to review the existing media laws that constrain mainstream media reporting. The ISA was replaced by legislation that has yet to come into force, the Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act. Changes are being proposed to the Printing Presses and Publication Act (PPPA) (1984) that would curb mainstream practice with annual printing permits and give the Minister of Home Affairs power to suspend and revoke the newspaper.

**Conclusion**

After 2008, there was a degree of optimism that the popularity of INPs in national political discourse would strengthen the opposition coalition and ultimately result in Malaysia becoming less of a ‘flawed’ democratic system. The results of GE2013 indicate that the troubled and unequal relationship between mainstream media and independent media and the undemocratic nature of the government’s dealings with media are not improving. At present, the different types of media in the country set the agenda for their respective readers. The rally to support Anwar Ibrahim’s challenge of the GE2013 results – seen around the world courtesy of foreign news agencies, relays from *malaysiakini.com* and social media – and the inflammatory headline from *UtU.S.A.n*
Malaysia reporting on BN’s perception of Chinese Malaysians on 7 May 2013, ‘Apa lagi Cina mahu?’ (‘What Else do the Chinese Want?’), indicate that the newly re-elected Prime Minister may need to work quickly to restore stability in race-relations and regain party support from the disaffected.

Since 2008, Malaysia’s media landscape has nonetheless seen a number of significant changes. More INPs now exist and Malaysians have an increased access to online news – both free and subscription-based. During GE2013, malaysia.kini.com reached 4.3 million readers on election night, receiving an additional 1.3 million hits on its mobile version. Furthermore, the website increased its free access time in 2013. This demonstrates a degree of sophistication on the part of malaysia.kini.com (2013) and underscores that it understands the importance of its contribution to civil society. As this article has argued, INP growth and development is helping to forge additional democratic spaces in Malaysia, and may serve to mobilise the next stage of more inclusive democratic participation in the country.

INPs in Malaysia have proven to be successful because of their capacity to use the ‘experiential’ aspect of the Internet, as well as their ability to make public debate more informed, diverse and vibrant – challenging the ruling government with critical oversight. This combination of factors develops a more democratically diverse public sphere. Thus, INPs can be recognised as a diversifying model for mobilization and resistance against authoritarianism. This plurality of opinion plays an important role in sustaining the reform movements in Malaysia for the future. As for the ‘Internet election,’ which in 2008 facilitated the first real losses to a once firmly entrenched ruling party, there has been less mention of the Internet in GE2013 coverage. This is probably because, as elsewhere in the world, Internet uses are normalising. Indeed, although the ‘Internet election’ in Malaysia had its own distinctive characteristics, using the Internet for democratising a political culture is becoming more common. Malaysian politics have been opened up to global scrutiny through YouTube clips of Malaysian citizens participating in vox populi, blogging, rallying in the streets, and bringing controversial issues to the attention of the polity. The Internet, therefore, serves as one of the ways in which citizens may be able, in time, to challenge Malaysia’s status as a ‘semi-democracy.’

---

2 In 2008, free access had been given for a week; in 2013, access was free from 17 April 2013 onwards, with the General Elections taking place on 5 May 2013.
Works Cited


Institute for Politics, Democracy & the Internet (2004), Under the Radar and over the Top: Online Political Videos in the 2004 Election, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.


Abstract

In Indonesia, there is a growing trend to open businesses through social media, especially by women. There are many reasons that account for this trend, the main reason being the flexibility that it affords businesses, allowing transactions to be done from anywhere, including one’s own home. This paper argues that online business has great potential in empowering women by assisting them to become entrepreneurs. Online businesses can also be seen as a solution to the dilemma faced by women who must manage and balance their career and family life. Ultimately, social media entrepreneurship works well for women in Indonesia due to its unique characteristics that include: mobility and flexibility, social capital gained through social media interactions, the unequal distribution of products in Indonesian cities, the lack of time on the part of customers to visit physical shops and the confidence and satisfaction experienced by women as a result of this enterprise.

Keywords: Indonesia, social media, Internet, entrepreneurship, gender, development.
Background

As with many other developing countries, Indonesia faces important issues in sustaining the well-being of its 242 million inhabitants. One issue that the Indonesian government has paid particular attention to is unemployment. At the current time, Indonesia has a problem providing jobs for its population. Current statistics report that the number of unemployed in Indonesia is 7.61 million people or approximately 6.3% of the potential working population (BPS 2012). Although this number may seem small, it does not reflect the fact that only a minority of workers are employed full-time. Additionally, of the 116.53 million people who can be categorized as employed, only 67.72% have permanent employment. As a result, it can be argued that Indonesia’s economy is still in the pre-condition stage, which means that a large proportion of its citizens do not contribute actively to the country’s domestic income. Hence, Indonesia needs to provide real solutions if it wants to address its unemployment problem.

There are many reasons behind the unemployment problem in Indonesia, which include unequal development between areas in Indonesia, low education standards, a lack of skilled workers, a general unwillingness on the part of people to find jobs in the less developed parts of the country, and so forth. However, the most common reason is the disparity between the number of job seekers and available job openings (Sholahuddin 2008).

In view of this obstacle, there is an urgent need for Indonesia to increase employment opportunities. One way to do this is by encouraging citizens to become job creators instead of job seekers. To this end, the Indonesian government – through the Coordinator Minister of Economy – aims to increase the number of entrepreneurs to 4.76 million, or 2% of the country’s population, which is considered the ideal proportion for a developing country like Indonesia (Antara News 2012). Moreover, the government has developed several new programs to facilitate this agenda, such as loans for new entrepreneurs to open or expand their businesses, providing training to enhance entrepreneurs’ business skills, and organizing exhibitions that showcase these entrepreneurs’ products (Ardieansyah et al. 2011).

One of the main target audiences for these government programs is women. Women are seen to be a strategic target audience since they have great potential to boost the country’s economy. Gender roles in Indonesia are changing, and nowadays, women play a much larger role in improving the economy of the family and society. The State Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprise reported in 2006 that 60% of micro, small and medium enterprises were owned by women. This phenomenon is not restricted to Indonesia. Other parts of Asia also report a growing number of women as owners of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Chiam 2001).

Despite having great potential as entrepreneurs, however, women also face many obstacles when starting their own business. As in many other parts of the world, most Indonesians still see men as the primary breadwinners and women as the primary homemakers. Therefore, women are often required to quit their jobs and to dedicate their lives to taking care of the family after marriage (Wood cited in Griffin  2003: 482). Furthermore, when women decide to work outside the house, some have the extra burden of managing their duties in the home and at work – not only do they feel guilty about leaving their children under someone else’s supervision, but they still have to take care of chores once they arrive home. Hence,
it is common for women to take on multiple roles in the family that consist of being a wife, a mother and a worker. The extra responsibilities result in increased stress for these women.

Female entrepreneurs face other problems related to economic and social capital. As women tend to stay at home as housewives, or take on lower-paid jobs, it becomes difficult for them to fund their own business. When they seek external sources of funding, such as loans from banks or other financial institutions, they can only be granted funding if their husbands agree. Hence, if their husbands do not allow them to work or apply for the loan, then they cannot get approval from these institutions. In addition, due to their limited social circles, women potentially face difficulties in expanding their businesses, as social networks are very important to support the growth of a new business. Furthermore, many women tend to have lower education than men as a result of Indonesia’s cultural practice of favouring boys over girls due to their expected future role as the family’s primary source of income. Thus, women might not have sufficient managerial and technological skills to start their business (Coleman 2000; Cromie & Birley 1992).

Gates (2000) argues that the Internet and its features create new possibilities for many people because it allows for a more efficient way to communicate. Not only is communication faster, it is also easier and relatively cheaper. A new kind of service made available by the Internet, which has gained tremendous popularity, is social media. Following its introduction, social media such as MySpace, Facebook, and Twitter have attracted millions of female users, many of whom have integrated these sites into their daily lives. With social media, personal and direct interactions increase because the account owner can communicate directly with those on her friend list. These social media platforms also contain useful and easy-to-use features, such as photo uploading, video uploading, instant messaging and photo tagging.

Women often take advantage of social media for reasons that go beyond merely finding friends. They can now use social media in order to achieve a measure of financial independence. There is a growing trend among women to open businesses through social media. For instance, in Indonesia, among the 549,740 users registered on Facebook as the owners of small and medium enterprises, 176,300 of them are women. As reported by most of our research participants, social media businesses have numerous benefits. Research participants have stated that they can use readily available technology, such as smartphones, while taking care of their children. Additionally, they do not require physical stores, which can be costly. Social media applications are also easy to use since business owners can tag pictures and provide information to potential customers in a single click. The growing interest of women in developing online businesses may also be supported by the more social nature of some women and the tendency of many of today’s customers to prefer online shopping for its convenience.

This kind of entrepreneurship is seen to be an ideal option for women for several reasons: society’s perception that women should stay at home and take care of the children, the flexibility offered by this kind of business and the relatively low costs involved in opening the business. However, one specific factor that attracted the attention of some researchers studying online women entrepreneurship is the need for flexibility in balancing family and work (see, for example, Lombard 2001: 216). This factor is most prominent in developing countries (van der Merwe & Lebakeng 2010; Nguyen 2005). In Vietnam, Nguyen (2005) found that most women did not hesitate to leave their corporate jobs if they could become entrepreneurs so as to manage their traditional role as wife and primary role as caregiver to their children.
These factors also apply to Indonesian women. Cukier et al. (1996) found in their research on Balinese women working in the tourism industry that women tend to have jobs in the peripheral, lower-paid sectors of the tourism industry because ‘these occupations harmonise women’s traditional roles in Bali,’ which include managing household routines.

Based on the above-mentioned facts, this article argues that social media can help to boost entrepreneurship, especially amongst women in Indonesian urban areas. Furthermore, it proposes that certain unique factors contribute to the success of social media entrepreneurship in Indonesia. This article is a product of research conducted in five major cities in Indonesia, namely Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Medan, and Makassar, with the aid of a SIRCA II grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada, and administrative support from the Singapore Internet Research Centre (SiRC), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

**Entrepreneurship to Reduce Unemployment**

Entrepreneurship is seen as an alternative to paid work in formal institutions. Many people prefer being self-employed because it provides a certain level of freedom; these people are sometimes described as ‘opportunity driven entrepreneurs.’ Moreover, in many cases where people lack formal qualifications, informal employment and entrepreneurship may be the only way to make ends meet. In cases where getting paid work is not an available option, self-employment serves as the only means to generate income; this group of self-employed is described as ‘necessity driven entrepreneurs.’ The latter situation more often than not applies to those in the bottom stratum of society (OECD 2003). In his book *New Firms and Free Enterprise* (1949), Oxenfeldt pointed out that individuals facing unemployment and low prospects of salaried employment turn to self-employment as an alternative (cited in Audretsch, Carree & Thurik 2002). However, the quality of this type of venture is questionable since people who are unemployed for long periods of time tend not to have the entrepreneurial talent required to set up and maintain a business (Jovanovic 1982). In addition, the various motivations for entrepreneurship ventures lead to differences in growth aspiration. A study of twenty-nine countries in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor in 2001 found that 14% of opportunity driven entrepreneurs expected their firms to produce over twenty jobs in a five-year period, while 99% of necessity driven entrepreneurs expect their ventures to produce less than five jobs within the same time period (OECD 2003).

Entrepreneurship is arguably an aspiration for a large portion of the working population. Many surveys conducted show that a large proportion of employees aspire to be entrepreneurs with the aim of achieving greater self-reliance and self-realization (OECD 2003). Moreover, entrepreneurs often have higher levels of job satisfaction compared to salaried employees (Blanchflower, Levine & Zimmerman 2002). Although it is evident that jobs generated by entrepreneurship lead to a reduction in a country’s unemployment, the size of the impact on the labour market is questionable and depends on both regional considerations. Some findings suggest that in the short term, the promotion of entrepreneurship is found to have limited impact on employment growth. A 1992 evaluation of Australia’s NEIS program, an incentive scheme given by the government of Australia for its citizens to open new enterprises, revealed that only 20% of the scheme’s successful entrepreneurs had recruited an employee (Chapman, Gregory & Klugman 1998). In the case of the UK, researchers found that only about 3% of self-employed businesses created additional jobs during a five-year period (Cowling & Hayward 2000).
More positive statistics can be found in developing countries where self-employment in non-agricultural activities is encouraged (International Labour Organization 2002). In Nigeria, a study conducted between 1999-2005 found that government support in promoting entrepreneurship led to an increase in new enterprises, benefitting a total of 5% of the population (Ekpe 2010). In 2002, the International Labour Organization published statistics for the period 1990-2000 showing that while in developed regions self-employment in non-agricultural sectors only reached 12%, in Africa it reached 48%, followed by Latin America with 44% and Asia with 32%.

When entrepreneurs recruit, unemployment is further reduced. Most entrepreneurs tend to recruit locally as this has a number of benefits for both employer and employee. A survey conducted in the United States found that over a five-year period, one in every five jobs in the metropolitan area is typically given to a local resident (Bartik 1994). This is not universally the case, especially if the locale of the business is considered to be a bad neighbourhood. However, as found in research conducted in the US concerning employment of the urban poor, despite the negative perceptions by employers of hiring potential employees from the same area, local workers are not excluded from jobs located in their own neighbourhood. One of the reasons suggested for this are the obvious benefits of hiring employees who live in close proximity to the workplace (Ramsden et al. 2001).

As Indonesia is a developing country, the government is encouraging the growth of entrepreneurs. However, Indonesia’s entrepreneurship ratio is still relatively low. Current statistics shows that the number of self-employed people in Indonesia only represents 0.18% of the total population (Antara News 2012), meaning that an additional 4.76 million entrepreneurs are required if the country is to meet the ideal target of 2%, cited previously. Efforts are underway to prioritise entrepreneurship support programs with the aim of reducing unemployment, ameliorating poverty, and improving the general welfare of the population.

The low number of entrepreneurs in Indonesia can be attributed to the fact that salaried employment is preferred over self-employment (Purwanto D. 2012). Public sector and civil service jobs in particular are seen as much more attractive options than becoming an entrepreneur. Generally, upon completing degrees, graduates prefer to be job seekers rather than job creators. Some argue that this stems from an education system that aims to create skilled workplace-ready graduates rather than job-creating graduates (Halim in Purwanto D. 2012). Unemployed graduates accounted for almost half of the 4.1 million unemployed in 2011 (Pikiran Rakyat 2012). The Ministry of Education addressed this issue by promoting entrepreneurship prior to graduation through scholarships and other efforts. Educational institutions are also increasing the promotion of entrepreneurship by integrating it into their curricula and even inscribing entrepreneurial education models into their vision and mission statements (Fitriati 2012).

Regulations favouring small-scale entrepreneurship have been implemented to boost the growth of this sector at the national level. Law no. 9/2003 on State Owned Enterprises, for instance, obliges SOE’s to allocate 5% of their net profit to support the development of small and medium enterprises and cooperatives. This support is administered in the form of soft-loans to non-bankable SMEs through a partnership program, in addition to the provision of SME capacity building activities (OECD 2010). Despite the small percentage of entrepreneurs among the workforce, Indonesia actually imposes relatively
few barriers to starting up new businesses. A recent study by the OECD demonstrates this, indicating that Indonesia has lower administrative burdens, regulatory and administrative opacity and fewer restrictions on competition compared to other countries in the OECD (see Figure 1.1 in OECD 2010: 119). This suggests the large potential that Indonesia has for entrepreneurial activities.

The Potential of Women Entrepreneurs

Women entrepreneurs make up a large proportion of the working population and their numbers are growing. During the period 1990-2000, the percentage of the global female workforce that was self-employed, excluding those in agricultural work, amounted to 34%, compared to 28% during the period 1980-1990 (ILO 2002). Moreover, this number could be higher since quite often businesses are not officially registered due to their casual nature. In Indonesia, the number of women entrepreneurs is high for the informal sector, where it is estimated that for the period 1994-2000, self-employed women amounted to 70%. This figure is more than double the salaried employment for the informal sector, which was 30% in the same period (ILO 2002). The number of self-employed women is higher than men, particularly in the informal sector, indicating that self-employment is a more important source of employment for women workers than for men (ILO 2002).

Despite the high number of female entrepreneurs, gender-based discrimination still occurs. Women are sometimes deprioritised as a group when it comes to receiving support for entrepreneurial endeavours from the government. A flagrant example of this is seen in Nigeria, where between 2004 and 2005, women were not given as much support as their male counterparts in both urban and rural poverty alleviation programs conducted by the government (Ekpe 2010). In the labour force, women are generally paid less than their male counterparts, and in the case of Indonesia, it can be as much as 50% less, according to the country’s Statistic Bureau of 2009 (Sahabat Wanita 2012). Gender based discrimination is also found in the informal sector where in many cases women also have lower incomes than men (Williams 1998).

Today, regardless of their employment or marital status, women are still expected to do household chores after returning from their day of work. In Indonesia, it is estimated that the women still do over 90% of household tasks (Macionis 2010). There is the general expectation that women should prioritise working at home and child-rearing before deciding to seek employment. Despite some recent improvement in the share of family responsibilities and domestic chores between men and women, one cannot talk about equality, and women are undoubtedly put under pressure to leave work to raise a family (Tribun Jogja 2012). Entrepreneurial schemes, which grant more flexibility, are therefore seen as a viable alternative, allowing women to simultaneously accommodate work and child-rearing duties (Orhan 2005) and to juggle their professional and domestic roles. A survey of the members of the Indonesian Women Entrepreneurs Association (IWAPI), where the majority of the members are married women or over childbearing age, demonstrates the high appeal of entrepreneurship for this women group (Purwanto P. 2012).

The challenge of maintaining a business may be more difficult for some women. At the early stages of a new business, the entrepreneur may incur a significant reduction in earnings, causing her to return to salaried employment. The desire to return to salaried employment further increases for women who
initially start up a business as a means of generating income while they raise a family. Once the children start school, there is less necessity to be stay-at-home mother and therefore many women wish to end their self-employment and to return to salaried employment.

Last, the family is not the sole factor determining a woman’s decision to start up a business. The ‘push and pull’ motivations for women entrepreneurs vary. In general, the push factors may include dissatisfaction with salaried work, the difficulty in finding a job, insufficient family income, and the desire to balance professional and family life. The pull factors may include the potential of the business concept and the prospective value of the enterprise. Values here include achieving independence and self-fulfilment (or self-achievement), and satisfying entrepreneurial drive, desire for wealth, social status and power, or social mission. Duchéneaut suggests an additional pull factor: the perception of participating in a social mission to create employment and to promote economic development (cited in Orhan 2005). These push and pull factors reflect the contribution of women entrepreneurs to the self, family and society.

ICT Supports Women Entrepreneurship

As previously discussed, the development of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) has given a new impetus to women entrepreneurship (Ndubisi & Kahraman 2006; Duncombe et al. 2005). While the first generation ICT was limited to one-way communication, the updated versions offer more opportunities to boost interactivity among users. The invention of Web 2.0, for example, enables users to connect and interact with each other, thus forming and expanding their networks (O’Reilly 2009). In the business sector, entrepreneurs make use of Web 2.0 to support mainly marketing-related activities (Jones 2010).

Although the Internet has enormous potential for business-related activities, Internet penetration levels in Indonesia remain relatively low. It was reported in 2010 that only 9.1% of the population had access to the Internet. Meanwhile the neighbouring countries have achieved higher rates; for instance 55% in Malaysia and 27.6% in Vietnam (ITU 2011). Access to the Internet is also mostly centralised in urban areas of the country. Despite this poor performance, the International Telecommunication Union (2011) reported that there were 220 million mobile phone users in Indonesia and many of them subscribed to mobile Internet services. Hence, this new service increases Internet penetration in the country.

Revealingly, the majority of Indonesia users access the Internet for social networking purposes. Reports show that the country is home to around 43 million Facebook users and 19 million Twitter users (Abud 2012). Indonesian users have recently started to use the Internet, and specifically the online social networks, for more substantial and productive enterprises (Lim 2003; Nugroho 2011). For example, Asosiasi Ibu Menyusui Indonesia (AIMI), an association of Indonesian women, have made use of Indonesian social media to set up a support system for breastfeeding mothers from across the archipelago (Nugroho 2011). In addition, Indonesian social media users were very effective in utilising online networks to support victims of the Mount Merapi eruption (Nugroho 2011).

As discussed in the introduction, ICT, and social media in particular, has facilitated women’s efforts in starting their businesses from home. This service provides women with the flexibility to manage their
businesses as well as to carry out their duties as wives and mothers. Nonetheless, it should be noted that this kind of entrepreneurship is not due to ICT per se. ICT facilitates and boosts entrepreneurship, but it is the women themselves who appropriate social media and use it as the main engine to drive their business.

**Characteristics of Women Social Media Entrepreneurship in Indonesia**

The previous section has shown that social media entrepreneurship has the potential to provide a solution to the dilemma faced by women who aspire to balance their career and family lives. This section will further explore the contributing factors that have contributed to the success of social media entrepreneurship in Indonesia.

**Mobility/Flexibility Promoted by Social Media**

The first contributing factor is related to the mobility and flexibility promoted by social media. As technology advances, with the advent of tablet computers and smart phones, social media business can now be conducted from practically anywhere and at any time, including from home. This results in a flexibility that allows women to take care of the family and children while simultaneously managing their business. Furthermore, these technologies also reduce the costs involved in opening a business, as social media businesses do not require the capital that is usually required in traditional businesses – to establish a physical store, for instance. Instead, most respondents report that they keep their supplies at home, take pictures of the products, and promote them through their social media accounts, which can be accessed using their tablets or smart phones. These technologies are also easy-to-use. As mentioned, social media provides simple ways to upload photos, write updates and to contact people.

An example of this flexibility can be seen in the following quotation from a research participant from Bandung. This respondent is a mother whose husband travels often as a result of his work responsibilities. She quit her former job after experiencing ‘baby blues syndrome’ following the birth of her son, who is now ten years old. At first she had difficulties in accepting the fact that she had to stay at home to take care of the baby. Fortunately, her friend encouraged her to work from home. She explains, ‘I started this business because I was inspired by a friend. She has two kids but she still can sell food through the Internet. She is online 24 hours.’

Some of the participants are able to do exceedingly well thanks to the flexible nature of the business. Not only can they maintain their role as mothers, but they can also communicate, make sales and generate reasonably large profits through social media. One respondent from Jakarta says:

> With this kind of business, it feels as if I am stealing time. I often update my [Facebook] page after midnight. It is easier to upload photos from my Blackberry to Facebook. Then I can communicate with my customers through Blackberry Messenger.

This young mother of three infants sells cupcakes through social media. She has never worked outside of the home as she always wanted to be fully involved in the development of her children. She never actually expected the business to generate a regular income and she started it simply as a hobby. At the present time, she reports that her income surpasses that of her husband.
Initial research demonstrates, therefore, that the main advantages of using modern technology and social media to start a business are increased mobility and flexibility. Social media entrepreneurship can be practised by women who desire to contribute to the household economy while continuing to fulfil their responsibilities in the home.

**Social Capital Gained through Social Media Interactions**

Social media interactions address the lack of social capital commonly experienced by Indonesian women; this is the second contributing factor. By engaging in business through social media, the women are able to reach larger target audiences located outside of their locale. Many respondents report that with social media, they can attract customers from other areas in Indonesia and indeed internationally. Moreover, the people that they meet through social media not only function as their customers, but can also serve as potential mentors, business partners and friends, thus enhancing their support network. As mentioned, Indonesia is also known as a social media hub, with approximately 61 million people subscribing to at least one social media account. Consequently, Indonesia is a large target market for the business of social media.

According to one of the respondents from Jakarta who has been selling Indonesian traditional food online for almost ten years, many of her customers come from Australia or European countries. These customers do not actually order for themselves, but instead order the food to be delivered to their relatives in Jakarta. At the current time, she reports that she regularly caters for government functions while also serving individual customers. She states:

> My customers come from many countries, not only from Jakarta or other parts of Indonesia. I think it is because they are actually interested in tasting traditional Indonesian foods after looking at the photos on my page, but unfortunately they cannot do that [in their country]. So, they order for their relatives who live in Indonesia.

Another respondent from Surabaya, the capital city of the Eastern Java province and the second largest city in Indonesia, said that the reason she stopped working was to take care of her only son. Despite receiving much criticism from family members, she felt that it was a right decision. She currently sells home-baked cakes and cookies to customers in Surabaya and its surrounding area, which has a population of approximately 3 million people.

> I decided to leave my job, and my parents were really angry. Even more so when they found out that I was selling cakes. Then I shared this with my friends and I joined an online community. They were the ones that motivated and encouraged me to pick myself up and to show everyone that, even though this career is not based on what we learnt at school, we can still ‘make it.’ My husband also supported me all the way, and thank God, everything was provided for us.

Although there is still scepticism, and even resistance, to the idea of social media entrepreneurship, the advantages undoubtedly provide some women with opportunities that would not exist without the Internet. Social media entrepreneurship allows these women to reach out to larger audiences even if they have limited social capital.
Unequal Distribution of Products and Customers’ Lack of Time

Economic development in Indonesia is not equally distributed throughout the country. As a result, it is difficult to find some products in less urban areas of Indonesia, such as Kalimantan, Aceh and Papua. For that reason, there is a high demand for products sold by social media entrepreneurs in these parts of Indonesia. Moreover, many customers who live in urban areas have a working schedule that does not allow them to the time to shop. Consequently, they prefer to shop online, which can be done outside of standard working hours or indeed at any time that is convenient.

Aceh is one province that is particularly affected by unequal development. A respondent from Medan states:

My husband works in Aceh. There are very few stores in Aceh that sell popular products such as Happy Call [a frying pan brand from Korea that is very popular in Indonesia] and the price is usually very high. So, when I sell this product at a similar price to what you pay in Jakarta, many customers are interested in buying.

This respondent from Medan cleverly saw an opportunity to sell popular products in Aceh. She reported that apart from household appliances, she often sells makeup and women’s fashion items. As Aceh is located in the Northern part of Sumatra Island, it is often difficult for consumers there to find products that are readily available in Jakarta. Moreover, if they are on sale, the price is usually substantially higher.

However, sales are not limited to provinces that are economically isolated. Buyers also come from the larger cities, such as Jakarta, where the convenience of making purchases online fuels many social media businesses. Another respondent in Jakarta says:

Actually, many people sell similar products in ITC [a large shopping mall in Jakarta]. However, our price is more competitive and our products are more varied. Moreover, the traffic jam is getting worse. Many people are too lazy to go out of their houses. Hence, they prefer to shop online.

This quotation reflects the challenges faced by today’s customers. As traffic in big cities such as Jakarta means that residents are often stuck for hours on a daily basis, particularly in the city centre, many customers have switched to online shopping. The situation is therefore one of the supporting factors that accounts for the popularity of online shopping in Indonesian big cities.

Confidence and Satisfaction

The last factor that characterises social media entrepreneurship in Indonesia is related to self-actualization. Social media businesses allow women to gain a degree of financial independence by having their own money. This has the effect of raising their self-esteem, giving them the self-confidence to deal with future financial transactions as well as the financial freedom to effectively carry out other duties. Most respondents reported that they can now use this money to spend on whatever they like, such as on children toys and recreational activities as well as to buy things for themselves. One respondent from
Surabaya states, ‘Of course I am proud, because I am a housewife but earn my own money and I don’t depend on my husband.’

Lastly, these women also reported that they did not consider their business activities to be a burden, as they receive support from family members (mainly their husband and children) and they feel fully able to work and take care of their families at the same time. Consequently, this business option gives them satisfaction and makes them more motivated to contribute to their family’s financial capacity. A respondent from Makassar says:

At first, my in-laws were unhappy with me when I decided to quit my job. But I love my children so much. Then I proved that my business could generate income. Afterwards, other family members started to open online business after seeing my success.

As discussed throughout this article, many women in Indonesia tend to quit their jobs after they get married and have children. This decision can be made by themselves or by other family members, such as their husband and parents. This tendency is growing due to lifestyle changes occurring in many Indonesian big cities. Previously, most working mothers trusted their family members (parents and in-laws) or nannies to take care of their young children. However, many young families now live further away from their parents. Moreover, it is also becoming more difficult to find trustworthy nannies. As a result, staying at home is considered to be the best solution.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, the research findings demonstrate that online business has great potential to empower women by assisting them to become entrepreneurs. In addition, social media entrepreneurship can be seen as a solution to the dilemma faced by women in managing and balancing their careers and family lives. Ultimately, social media entrepreneurship is a beneficial provision for women in Indonesia due to its unique characteristics that include mobility and flexibility, social capital gained through social media interactions, the unequal distribution of products in Indonesian cities, the lack of time on the part of customers to visit physical shops and the confidence and satisfaction experienced by women as a result of this enterprise.
Works Cited


Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) (7 May 2012), Labor Force Situation in Indonesia: February 2012, Official Report No. 33/05/Th. XV, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta.


Macionis, J.J. (2010), Sociology, Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.


