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Introduction

It is a pleasure to present the second volume of the IAFOR Journal of Politics, Economics & Law, following the successful publication of the inaugural issue last year.

The commitment of IAFOR to publish the most outstanding papers presented at its conferences therefore continues, with selections for this issue coming from the European Conference of Politics, Economics and Law 2014, and the North American Conference on Social Sciences 2014. The papers in this issue thus reflect the international approach of IAFOR, with the authors and the subjects they address stemming out of Europe and Asia, from academics based in both the UK and Australia.

Demonstrating IAFOR’s objectives of presenting original peer-reviewed academic research that is interdisciplinary and reflective of a wide range of themes, this issue showcases papers that address interrelated topics in the often overlapping fields of politics, economics, and law. Each paper tackles an aspect of either domestic or foreign policy, which necessarily will have legislative, socio-economic, and political implications. The selection of papers for this issue also reflects IAFOR’s commitment to nurturing future academic talent, with three out of the four articles being authored by academics in the early stage of their research careers.

Martin E Purcell analyses research of policy affecting public participation in local government in the UK, providing a timely critique of policies under the Labour and Conservative-Liberal Democrat governments.

Thipsarin Phaktanakul considers the difficulty of achieving contemporary education reform in Thailand, comparing the policy obstacles experienced under various governments.

Adam Clark delivers a provocative critique on how debate over the construction of development theory has been based on an idea of a ‘Threatening Other’, perpetuating the field of development studies.
Thosaphon Chieocharnpraphan utilises the case study of the East Timor crisis of 1999 to assess the extent of strategic partnership between Australia and Thailand during the Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor.

As well as acknowledging the effort and patience of the authors for their contribution, I would like to thank the Advisory Board for their assistance, with particular appreciation for the hard work of Assistant Editor Dr Shazia Lateef. Acknowledgement also goes to Jasper Tran of the University of Minnesota, and Arash Salehi of the University of Tehran, for additional reviewing assistance. Grateful thanks are expressed as always for the talent and professionalism of the IAFOR publications team, and to the IAFOR International Advisory Board for their ongoing support and guidance. I hope you find stimulating and informative reading in this issue.

Craig Mark
Editor
Public Participation in new Local Governance Spaces: the Case for Community Development in Local Strategic Partnerships

Martin E Purcell

Abstract

Research into public participation in local decision-making has increased over the past forty years, reflecting increased interest in the subject from academic, policy and practitioner perspectives. The same applies to community development, a values-based profession promoting a transformational agenda.

During the New Labour government’s period in office (1997-2010), public participation featured centrally in several policies, reflecting their adherence to communitarian theory and Third Way politics. Additionally, the language of community development (promoting community empowerment and social justice) featured in these policies. Guidance for Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) – central to New Labour’s local government reforms – required them to facilitate public participation in decision-making, and used the language and values of community development.

This paper reports on research into LSPs’ public participation practice. Applying a constructivist methodology, the research applied an evaluative framework reflecting the community development values in all 22 LSPs in the Yorkshire & Humber region. Data was collected through documentary review and interviews with LSP officials in each participating LSP. Case study research was conducted in one LSP, concentrating on two communities, generating deeper understanding of the process of facilitating public participation in different circumstances.

Notions of power feature centrally in the analysis, and the research concludes that local authorities struggle to relinquish power to communities in any meaningful way, even within the context of government guidance requiring this process to be implemented. These findings are extrapolated to present a brief critique of the present UK government’s stated commitment to de-centralising power to communities in various policy areas.
Introduction

Public participation in local decision-making has featured increasingly as a central tenet of public policy over the past forty years, particularly in relation to planning (Damer & Hague, 1971; Innes & Booher, 2004), health (Mitton et al, 2009) and environmental issues (Webler & Tuler, 2007). Theories have evolved over this time to help better understand the impact and evaluate the effectiveness of various public participation initiatives, and to shape future policy (e.g. Arnstein, 1969; Wilcox, 1994; OECD, 2001; IAAP, 2007). Over the same period, the community development profession has evolved, such that it is recognised a values-based profession promoting a transformational agenda (Banks, et al, 2013).

This paper aims to explore the extent to which these professional values provide a useful framework with which to evaluate public participation policy and programmes. It draws on the findings of research conducted into the public participation practice of new local governance ‘structures’ in Yorkshire & the Humber region, and aims to contribute to the wider debate on the translation of policy into practice using these cases as exemplars. The paper aims to: review public participation theory, addressing its relationship with community development; review the public participation policy of the New Labour governments of 1997-2010, specifically relating to Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs); assess the extent to which these policies were translated in practice by LSPs, using a community development-based model; and reflect on the (2010-15) Coalition government’s approach to public participation.

Community Development Values

This paper uses as the basis of its analysis the set of professional values that underpins community development practice, as laid out in the National Occupational Standards (NOSs) for Community Development (LLUK, 2009). Banks et al (2013: 144) suggest that practitioners need to exhibit these in an open and explicit manner in order to enhance the likelihood of successful outcomes in work with communities. The NOSs expand on these values to promote a wider understanding of their application and to ensure they are reflected in any activity described as community development practice (LLUK, 2009: 7-9):

- **Equality & Anti-Discrimination** - challenging structural inequalities and discriminatory practices, recognising that people are not the same, but are all of equal worth and therefore entitled to the same degree of respect and acknowledgement.
- **Social Justice** - involves identifying and seeking to alleviate structural disadvantage and advocating strategies for overcoming exclusion, discrimination and inequality.
- **Collective Action** - supporting groups of people, increasing their knowledge, skills and confidence so they can develop an analysis of and identify and act on issues.
- **Community Empowerment** - supporting people to become critical, liberated and active participants, taking control over their lives, communities and environment.
- **Working & Learning Together** - enabling participants to learn from reflecting on their collective experiences, based on participatory and experiential processes.

Notions of power feature centrally in the community development values, especially equality and anti-discrimination, social justice and community empowerment, and effectively underpin and hold them all together (Ledwith, 2011). When assessing LSPs’ policies, it should be possible to identify how closely they align with these values, which align closely with definitions of public participation.

Public Participation

Public participation is the process by which individuals and groups affected by any proposed intervention are involved in the decision-making process relating to that intervention (IAPP,
Political participation – “taking part in the processes of formulation, passage and implementation of public policies” (Parry, Moyser & Day, 1992: 16) – differs from developmental participation: “collective efforts to increase and exercise control over resources and institutions on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from control” (Stiefel & Wolfe, 1994: 5). Citizen participation is “about power and its exercise by different social actors in the spaces created for the interaction between citizens and local authorities” (Gaventa & Valderama, 1999: 7). It is a “categorical term for citizen power … the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programmes are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parcelled out” (Arnstein, 1969: 216).

Public participation is perceived increasingly as a ‘right’ of citizenship, both locally and at national / international levels (Cornwall, 2002: 2), with communities of interest effectively demanding the right to be included in the decision-making process (Gilchrist, 2004: 17). Three key drivers of the recent focus on public participation in decision-making have been identified. Firstly, the ‘democratic deficit’ is evidenced by a decline in public participation in traditional decision-making processes (Electoral Commission, 2005), and other activities associated with political participation, (Power Inquiry, 2006; Pattie, Seyd & Whiteley, 2004). As well as a decline in voter turnout at elections, it includes a lack of trust in political institutions and a fall in membership of political parties and trades unions (Prendergast, 2008; Bender, 2003; Barber, 1984). Furthermore, considerable challenges face civil society. While the scale of voluntary and community sector (VCS) remains substantial (870,000 formal civil society associations with £210 billion assets), Carnegie Trust (2010) identifies a blurring of values in pursuit of financial security, increased inequality between VCS organisations and weakened influence in key policy areas. Citizen action is less clear-cut, as recent mass demonstrations demonstrate citizens’ commitment to challenge governments; whose resulting action has demonstrated intransigence on the part of the political classes, unwilling to respond to the concerns expressed by their citizenry. For example, the UK government invaded Iraq despite the largest demonstration in British history; the Egyptian military overthrew the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government; and Russia annexed Crimea, after demonstrations in Ukraine resulted in a change in government.

Politicians appear to believe that the seeming downward spiral of participation – which undermines the effectiveness of representative institutions in managing public affairs – reflects disengagement, disinterest and apathy on the part of the populace. This results in a fragmented and isolated social life, a culture of distrust and hierarchical political structures. Several writers (e.g. Bang, 2009; Li & Marsh, 2008; Norris, 2007) challenge this perspective, citing the emergence of new forms of public participation – such as single-issue citizen activism and web-based organizing – as contradictory evidence. They emphasise the importance of power relations, citing alienation as a more likely cause of the decline in public participation (Marsh, O’Toole & Jones, 2006). They also suggest that the increased complexity of governance in a globalised and individualised system has resulted in some of the weakest and most vulnerable groups and individuals being excluded from the decision-making process by powerful politicians, bureaucrats and corporatist interests (e.g. Bang, 2004: 4). Consequently, new forms of public participation outside the conventional arenas have emerged, reflecting participants’ identities and project politics, and state institutions accept that the complexity of the policy arena requires a broader range of stakeholders to engage more directly in the policy process (Keeley & Scoones, 1999: 29). These include ‘virtual’ or electronic forums for campaigning (e.g. 38 Degrees; Avaaz; change.org).

More fluid boundaries have emerged between loose networks, coalitions and de-centralised organisational structures, and there is an increasing focus on achieving social change through direct action and community-building (Norris, 2007: 638-9). People engage in issues that
affect them directly, seeing action as a more effective form of participation than voting (Kane et al, 2009: 123). This ‘micro-political’ participation allows individuals to influence people with responsibility for implementing specific policies that impact on their own lives, as opposed to engaging in policy-making processes at a more remote level (Pattie, Seyd & Whiteley, 2004: 113). A significant proportion of the population is engaged in some form of civic activism (Pattie, Seyd & Whiteley, 2003: 465), with an increased emphasis on self-actualisation identified as a motivation for participation in these less formal processes, with young people in particular motivated more by individual purpose than obligations to government (Brooks, 2009: 2.3).

Values of Public Participation

Cornwall (2000: 77) distinguishes between ‘induced’ and ‘invited’ participation and a form of citizen participation through which “people come to create their own spaces and enact their own strategies for change”. Oakley (1995) views participation as either a developmental process (undertaken as an end in itself), or an instrumental process (aiming to affect the outcome and quality of decisions made). This distinction represents a choice between utilitarian and empowerment models (Morgan, 2001: 221; Nelson & Wright, 1995: 1). As summarised in Figure 1: in the utilitarian model, an agency may promote public participation to achieve its stated aims more efficiently, effectively or cheaply; in the empowerment model, communities promote public participation as an end in itself, using it as a tool to diagnose their needs and control their own development.

Figure 1: Public Participation as a Means or an End

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Participation as:</th>
<th>A means</th>
<th>An end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alternative moniker</td>
<td>Instrumental Participation</td>
<td>Transformational Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>Normative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of interaction between community and agency</td>
<td>Consultative, Collaborative</td>
<td>Collegial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characterisation of interactions</td>
<td>Community participates in agency’s agenda</td>
<td>Agency addresses community’s priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Nelson & Wright, 1995)

These distinctions reveal how decisions about the intended focus of participation are likely to be informed by values. For example, relating public participation in decision-making to notions of justice, Sen argues that it should be understood as a “constitutive part of the ends of development” (1999: 291). The International Association for Public Participation identifies seven core values for use in implementation of public participation processes (Figure 2). Aiming to ensure decisions better reflect the interests and concerns of potentially affected people, these correspond closely with the community development values.
Figure 2: Core Values of Public Participation

1. Public participation is based on the belief that those who are affected by a decision have a right to be involved in the decision-making process.
2. Public participation includes the promise that the public's contribution will influence the decision.
3. Public participation promotes sustainable decisions by recognizing and communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision makers.
4. Public participation seeks out and facilitates the involvement of those potentially affected by or interested in a decision.
5. Public participation seeks input from participants in designing how they participate.
6. Public participation provides participants with the information they need to participate in a meaningful way.
7. Public participation communicates to participants how their input affected the decision.

(IAPP, 2007b)

Public Participation & New Labour Policy

New Labour’s public participation policy sought to reconfigure the roles and relationships of citizens, communities and government (Prior, 2005: 357), and embraced community as the locus of many reforms (Imrie & Raco, 2003: 5), seeing it as “a natural and desirable social formation, based on the diminution of difference and conflict and the inculcation of shared values” (Imrie & Raco, 2003: 8). The New Labour government sought to challenge the failings of the prevailing neo-liberal political hegemony, introducing policies that rejected the view that societies can flourish simply by promoting ‘competitive individualism’ and unfettered private enterprise (Driver & Martell, 1997). They highlighted roles in shaping society both for government and individuals based on values of co-operation and collaboration to contain the excesses of the market system, believing that a society of individuals recognising the extent to which they are inter-dependent is likely to be more effective than one in which they simply seek to assert their individual rights and preferences. This perspective incorporates implied ethical and explicit moral imperatives, inasmuch as community must be accepted as a ‘good thing’, in which people should subscribe to a clearly defined set of shared values (Driver & Martell, 1997: 35). However, while making repeated reference to ‘values’, New Labour failed to encourage people to subscribe fully to them, due to the vagueness of their exposition of these values, and because they were imposed, rather than emerging from a dialogue with the citizenry (Hall, 1998: 11). This reflects the fact that New Labour governments saw it as their role to lead the process of fostering community in society, through exhortation, symbolic action and legislation (Driver & Martell, 2000: 159).

‘Community’ remained the cornerstone of New Labour policies throughout their tenure, Tony Blair asserting that community is “the governing idea of modern social democracy” (2001: 5). Community was conceived as being a fundamental component in addressing social problems, promoted as a “practical means of furthering the social and material refurbishment of neighbourhoods, towns and larger local areas” (Giddens, 1998: 79). Reflecting the view that people have the “moral power of personal responsibility for ourselves and each other” (Blair, 1996: 3), New Labour policy promoted a view of the citizen as an individual with rights and responsibilities, one of which is to contribute to the welfare and governance of their community (Pratchett, 1999: 7). Citizens were viewed as having a responsibility to exercise individual
choice and participate in collective decisions (Jordan, 1999: 119); meanwhile, communities were characterised as instruments of policy delivery, particularly in disadvantaged areas, encompassing latent values that government programmes could revive or re-define (Fremeaux, 2005: 271).

New Labour conceived public participation as part of a fundamental re-modelling of the public sector, requiring a re-negotiation of the relationship between the state and its citizenry, and a shift in emphasis from the individual to communities (DETR, 1998). While aiming to re-engage people isolated by an increasingly individuated society, generating enhanced accountability and re-kindling the urge to participate in democratic institutions, policy also sought to draw on the knowledge, ideas and experience of the public to inform change in the nature and quality of services (Martin, 2009; Pratchett, 1999). Policy also acknowledged that different initiatives would be undermined if public participation focussed only on one of these stated purposes while overlooking others (ODPM, 2002a: 3).

Local Strategic Partnerships

The Local Government Act 2000 (DETR, 2000a) required local authorities and local agencies to prepare Community Strategies, to promote the economic, social and environmental wellbeing of their areas. Proposals for the establishment of formal partnerships to oversee this work and neighbourhood renewal recommended that LSPs adopt a collaborative approach to addressing inequalities between areas within each locality, bringing together the public, private, voluntary and community sectors to do this (DETR, 2000b).

Government guidance (DETR, 2000c) urged local authorities to ground the Community Strategy in the views and expectations of individuals, groups and communities, putting local people at the heart of partnership working. Further guidance (DETR, 2001) emphasised the opportunities LSPs provided to focus on issues that matter to local people, and promote equity and inclusion. Involving local people was identified as a “vital” force for change, and LSPs were urged to adopt imaginative and flexible approaches to secure public participation, to improve service delivery and strengthen social inclusion, developing empowered communities. Additional guidance highlighted the need for LSPs to engage groups traditionally excluded and alienated from local decision-making processes (ODPM, 2002b: 10-11). The implicit commitment to community development values in these was made explicit in subsequent policy (DCLG, 2006a).

Other independently produced guidance (LGA, 2002, 2001; CDF/Urban Forum, 2001; CDF, 2000) suggested that LSPs should create a culture and dialogue in which the contribution of the community is valued, that they support local community groups in raising their capacity, and that local people challenge LSPs about their participative structures. Subsequent policy included a clear expectation that the third sector would be actively involved in shaping the local area (DCLG, 2006b), and introduced a duty to involve the local community (i.e. inform, consult or involve representatives of local people) in the exercise of LSPs’ functions (DCLG, 2007a). Proposals to strengthen LSPs’ role included the statement of a set of principles of representation of the VCS, which aimed specifically to ensure greater accountability, equality and openness in their work (DCLG, 2007b).

LSP evaluations identified a lack of clarity about LSPs’ different communities, proposing the following as guiding principles for public participation: participants’ ownership, inclusivity, a commitment to change and support, training and development for community members (ODPM, 2004a; 2004b). They highlighted the continued existence of barriers to community engagement, particularly to young people and BME communities, including overly complex structures, the imposition of externally determined priorities and excessive time lags between decisions and action.
Researching LSPs in Yorkshire & the Humber

Research was conducted in all 22 LSPs in the Yorkshire & Humber region, to explore the translation of New Labour’s public participation policies into practice. This research explored the extent to which LSP practice reflected theoretical perspectives and the community development values. This sample of LSPs included: rural and urban areas; locales served by District and County or Unitary / Metropolitan Councils; the full range of economic conditions, from among the poorest neighbourhoods to some of the wealthiest in the country; boroughs and constituencies represented / controlled by all major political parties. This sampling sought to allow for extrapolation of the findings to LSPs throughout the country displaying similar characteristics. One LSP was selected as a case study, allowing for themes emerging from the wider sample to be explored in more detail and to generate greater depth of understanding of processes. An analytical framework (Figure 3) was devised to allow for comparison between the LSPs, and to help in generating conclusions about general patterns and trends. This built on previous typologies characterising community development practice (Toomey, 2011; Popple, 1995; Glen, 1993), allowing for distinctions to be drawn between radical, consensual, reformist and service management approaches to public participation. Practice in each LSP was assessed against this framework, and each was ascribed to one of these four elements of the typology.

Figure 3: Outline Analytical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Element of Model</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LSP:</td>
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<td>Radical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Community Models,</td>
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<td>Relationships &amp;</td>
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<td>Strategies</td>
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<td>Governance</td>
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<td>Approach</td>
<td>Community Empowerment</td>
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<td>Community Capacity</td>
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<td>Focus</td>
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<td>Participation</td>
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<td>Roles</td>
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<td>Professional</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Community Development</td>
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</table>

Overall Category:
A key part of this analysis considered the extent to which the community development values were implemented, and how these had helped to shape each LSP’s approach to public participation. While all five of the values were likely to be in evidence to some extent in the practice of all LSPs, it was felt likely that greater weight would be given to one or more of the values depending on which element of the typology prevails (Figure 4).

Where the radical model is dominant, practice may be informed by belief in the need for disadvantaged groups and communities to overcome institutional barriers to individuals and communities fulfilling their potential. The aim of public participation would be community empowerment, ultimately enabling them to overcome injustices and oppression, and LSPs would recognise the need to support and respond to collective action within communities. If the consensual model were dominant, LSPs practice might focus on seeking out common priorities, with agencies and communities working with and learning from one another to pursue the common good, characterised here as social justice. While LSPs operating with the reformist model in the ascendancy use the language of social justice, their practice is more likely to focus on equality of opportunity than of outcome. Given the focus on service-specific issues and the involvement of individuals more often than groups to identify ways to improve service delivery, LSPs where the service management model dominates would only specifically promote the working and learning together value.

**Figure 4: Community Development Values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radical</th>
<th>Consensual</th>
<th>Reformist</th>
<th>Service Management</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Empowerment</td>
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<td>Social Justice</td>
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<td>effectiveness</td>
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**Key Findings**

The following selected findings are presented as a representation of how effective LSPs were in implementing policy and guidance on public participation, and the extent to which this work was informed by political and professional values, and – specifically – those of the community development approach.

Overall, there was significant evidence of local communities participating in consultations on the development of Community Strategies and other high level strategies. Most LSPs had also established complex structures to facilitate the participation in decision-making of representatives of the community sector. In many cases, too, local authorities and other partners in the LSP employed staff to support communities’ participation in local service planning processes, or / and in overseeing implementation of projects at a local scale. However, in all cases, local people expressed concern that their input had little or no impact on the key decisions affecting their communities, feeling that much of their effort was wasted. In several cases, community representatives on LSP structures complained that their presence was merely tolerated, and that they felt their participation was tokenistic at best and – in many cases – an opportunity for them to be manipulated by partners.

A fundamental weakness in the approach of all LSPs to promoting and facilitating public participation was their unwillingness to cede any power – over decisions or resources – to local
communities. In particular, local authority personnel (both officers and elected members) demonstrated a strong reluctance to facilitate genuine community empowerment. Many officers claimed they had a duty to act objectively and draw on their professional expertise to plan and manage services on behalf of their citizens (who they asserted prefer bureaucrats to make these decisions on their behalf). Likewise, Councillors decried the process of promoting public participation as anti-democratic, asserting that they knew their community better than anyone, particularly self-selecting individuals with vested interests or ‘axes to grind’.

A third of Community Strategies focused on neighbourhood renewal, aiming explicitly to ‘narrow the gap’ between the most deprived communities and their more affluent neighbours. Hence, public participation here – as in most other LSPs – was based on a deficit model, focusing on engaging people from more disadvantaged areas.

Only one LSP had a ‘public participation strategy’, although five LSPs were developing one. A further six LSPs use their local authority’s policy to guide work in this area, with two more planning to do so once the authority completed work on their policy. In one case, devising additional stand-alone strategies was said to be contrary to their stated intention of minimising bureaucracy and limiting the LSP’s area of responsibility to producing a Community Strategy.

LSP Managers and Co-ordinators highlighted the fact that consideration of values influences LSPs’ approach to identifying and approaching their community. In particular, there appears to have been considerable difficulty in balancing the ‘rights versus responsibilities’ dichotomy. Half of LSP’s stated aims reflected more closely the former, while the policy agenda they were required to implement pushed the latter. They also ranked the community development values in order of importance ascribed to them by their LSP. Although the results indicate that LSPs place most emphasis on community empowerment, it is clear from other responses that their practice is not designed to bring about this result. One explanation for this might be that reference to community empowerment features to such an extent in policy and guidance that – when presented with this choice in the survey – respondents recognised the term, without necessarily fully appreciating the meaning (even though a definition was provided). It is possible that a similar phenomenon explains the priority given by five respondents to social justice in this survey, when there is little evidence to corroborate these claims elsewhere. Equality and anti-discrimination were identified as important by all those who responded to this question, which corresponds with the stated goals in many of the Community Strategies. While it is perhaps unsurprising that eight respondents feel that collective action is neither important nor unimportant to their LSP, the same rating for working and learning together is perhaps more unexpected. With the majority of Community Strategies committing their LSP to working with communities to identify common priorities, one might have expected for this value to be rated as more important. Although they were not all ranked by all respondents, it is interesting to note that nobody felt that any of the community development values are unimportant or contrary to their LSP’s approach.

**Public Participation under the Con-Dem Coalition**

After the 2010 general election, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government stated its commitment to disperse power more widely (Cabinet Office, 2010: 7). The coalition sought to reform the relationship between citizens and the state, creating a ‘Big Society’ to engender greater personal, professional and civic responsibility so that social issues are addressed by the communities they affect, and problems resolved by social action instead of state intervention. In this vision, the role of the state is to stimulate social action, helping every adult citizen participate in an active neighbourhood group (Conservative Party, 2010a), thereby fostering and supporting a new culture of voluntarism, philanthropy and social action (Cameron, 2010a). The Big Society is to be brought about by giving more power to
communities (e.g. in reform of the planning system, or in ‘saving’ threatened local services), and promoting / supporting more active involvement in local volunteering. As with New Labour, the objectives of reforms have been grouped under three themes (Cabinet Office, 2010; Conservative Party, 2010b): enhanced social action (or ‘mass engagement’), reformed public services, and community empowerment. The rationale is to shift power, emphasising the government’s belief that “when people are given the freedom to take responsibility, they start achieving things on their own and they’re possessed with new dynamism” (Cameron, 2010b).

The Big Society is presented as a rethinking of the nature of society from first principles, an approach to policy making that emphasises “the three-way relation of enabling state, active individual and linking institution” (Norman, 2010: 6-7). Also akin to New Labour’s approach, these ambitions include an implicit commitment to partnership approaches and delivery models, with relationships between government and the community subject to radical change (Cameron, 2010c). A voluntary and community sector strategy (OCS, 2010) details government plans to give local communities the right to buy or bid to run community assets, and requires public service commissioning to allow charities to bid for public contracts. The Localism Act and associated guidance outlines six ‘essential actions’ to transfer power from the state to local communities (DCLG, 2011): reduce bureaucracy, empower communities, increase local control of public finance, diversify the supply of public services, increase public scrutiny, and strengthen accountability to local people.

The Big Society agenda could be perceived as a continuation of New Labour’s public participation policies. McCabe (2010: 5) reports a shift in tone, however, in the implementation of these policies, from voluntarism under New Labour to ‘aspirational compulsion’ under the coalition government’s proposals. Similarly, Scott (2011: 20) notes the irony that the Big Society agenda is being implemented in a top-down manner by the government, when the stated intention is to facilitate bottom-up, community-led action. At the same time, the language accompanying announcements on the Big Society reflects a shift in values, and disguises a deliberate attempt to co-opt “the language of transformational development” (McCabe, 2010: 6-7). For example, the vague notion of ‘fairness’ is used in place of social justice, while ‘social action’ has replaced ‘community engagement’. Social justice features in ongoing critique of the Big Society agenda (e.g. Coote, 2010; NEF, 2010), with concerns expressed that the policy is most likely to further disadvantage people already excluded from society, as it remains unclear about how power will be transferred between different groups.

The Big Society vision appears consistent with community development practice, recognising that everyone has assets (not just problems), and encouraging citizens’ involvement / action, to strengthen social networks and to use local knowledge to get better results (NEF, 2010). However, not everyone will be able to benefit from the Big Society, as participation relies on individuals and communities having sufficient capacity, meaning that benefits will not be distributed equally, thereby having a negative impact on social justice, equality and cohesion. Partnership features at the heart of recommendations about how the Big Society agenda should be implemented. Coote (2010) asserts that – in contributing towards the Big Society’s goals – partnerships should moderate the relationship between citizens and government, requiring power and responsibility to be shared on an open and equal basis between professionals and intended beneficiaries, to promote social justice and to narrow inequalities.

Conclusions

There appears to be a close relationship between public participation theory and the stated aims of / the values subscribed to by community development practitioners. Indeed, the relevance of the community development approach in helping to achieve New Labour’s policy goals was articulated explicitly by them, and their public participation guidance for LSPs drew heavily on community development theory and practice. However, their policy guidance and practice
promoted an instrumental form of participation, failing to grasp the opportunity to support public participation as a developmental process.

The research has demonstrated that the practice of exercising and sharing power by key stakeholders – specifically local authorities – is central to considerations of public participation. The extent to which individuals believe they can exert power and influence over decision-making has affected the way in which they participate in the public realm, and goes some way to explaining the increase in direct citizen action. The prevalence of these forms of citizen participation in specific types of activity seems to prevail over traditional political participation; while the work of LSPs seems to have been located in the realm of developmental participation.

LSPs have faltered in their translation of government public participation policy, failing to translate their stated commitment to transferring power from the state to its citizenry, and potentially further alienating communities from the democratic process this policy was intended to revitalize. In particular, their reluctance to cede power to communities demonstrates state agencies’ inability to accommodate the changes needed if local people are to be afforded a genuine opportunity to shape their own destinies. Even where the VCS demonstrated its ability to engage in meaningful dialogue with local stakeholder agencies, and with structures established to facilitate their input, it appears that they were able to make very little impact on the development of local policies and services. Resources to support the development of community capacity to participate were not matched by changes in decision-making processes, leading to frustration on their part as the results of their inclusive processes were often ignored when decisions were taken by LSPs or individual agencies.

Despite having access to ample evidence (based on New Labour’s experience) to help shape their own public participation policy, it appears that the coalition government has achieved even less than their predecessors in this area of policy. The stated aims of their Big Society agenda have yet to be achieved, as public service reforms seems to have created more opportunities for the private sector to deliver the kinds of services it was suggested could be provided by VCS organisations. The impact of cuts in resources to support public participation in local partnerships and the downgrading of LSPs and other local governance structures means that communities are even more disadvantaged in this regard than they were under New Labour.

Community development, and the values it espouses, would appear to offer a legitimate means of achieving the stated goals of public participation, and could be said to be as important now as it was in 1997, as the symptoms their policies (and those of the coalition government) sought to address continue to prevail. The process of disaffection and alienation from the political system have been shown to be likely to continue as long as people feel disempowered, and the divide between the “haves” and “have-nots” (as Arnstein described them) persists and widens.
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The Roles of Governments in the Education Reform Policy in Thailand and Their Impacts From 1999-2009

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Abstract

The most recent education reform policy in Thailand officially began in 1999, when the National Education Act came into force. It was considered the most comprehensive reform in Thailand’s history. From 1999 to 2009, many governments and ministers of education assumed power. Their roles in implementing the education reform policy as stipulated in the National Education Act were significant. This paper begins by providing a brief historical background of the education reform in Thailand; then explains the theoretical framework; and finally analyses the obstacles to implementing the education reform policy by focusing on the roles of governments based on a top-down approach to policy implementation analysis.

Based on a top-down approach, there are five major factors which obstructed the implementation of the education reform policy from 1999-2009, namely: (1) the size of target groups involved and affected and the extent of change required by the policy; (2) the ambiguity of the National Education Act as the main framework for the policy; (3) the lack of one main agency responsible for implementation and the lack of agreement on the education reform policy; (4) different levels of commitment and leadership of the governments; and (5) political instability in Thailand, especially from 2006-2009. The situation after 2009 was not different, and the education reform policy did not proceed as expected.
Introduction

In 1997, Thailand encountered a severe economic crisis. This crisis caused unprecedentedly traumatic effects on people’s daily lives. Education was considered a solution to revive the country’s economy. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E.2540 (1997) was the first constitution to have most tangible provisions on education. Two years later, on 20 August 1999, the National Education Act, Thailand’s first national education law came into force. It has become the master plan and framework for the education reform policy of Thailand in later years.

Every step to implement the education reform policy as stipulated in the National Education Act seemed to be smooth, when the Democrat Party and the Chart Thai Party were responsible for the education reform policy after the Act came into force. However, a major obstacle begun to emerge when Thaksin Shinawatra became Prime Minister of Thailand, after he led his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party to win the 2001 election. The implementation of the education reform policy was not one of the government’s urgent policies. Furthermore, during five years of the Thaksin administration from 2001-2006, the cabinet was reshuffled several times, with the rotation of six Education Ministers including Thaksin himself. Every time the new Education Minister assumed power, education reform came to a standstill.

From the end of 2005, the Thaksin government encountered strong resistance from the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or the ‘yellow-shirt’ protestors. Thaksin was toppled in the coup d’état of 19 September 2006. Until 2009, the political situation in Thailand was dominated by the conflicts between the pro- and anti- Thaksin movements, so the agenda of the education reform almost entirely disappeared from the public interest.

At the end of 2008, the Democrat Party came to power, and Jurin Laksanawisit, its deputy leader, was appointed the Minister of Education. The situation seemed to be slightly better when he undertook some tangible measures to implement education reform policy; for example, 15-year quality and free education for all children in the academic year 2009, and the Tutor Channel Project.

This paper begins by providing a brief historical background of education reform in Thailand; then it explains a theoretical framework; and finally it analyses the roles of governments in the implementation of education reform policy in Thailand, based on a top-down approach to policy implementation analysis.

History of Education Reform in Thailand

According to Fry (2002, p. 21), education reform in Thailand can be divided into four phases. The first phase happened during the reign of King Chulalongkorn or King Rama V. Kullada Kesboonchoo-Mead (1868-1910) (2004, p. 68), who argued that the main rationale for the education reform in this period was to supply the modern bureaucratic system with sufficient literate officials. In order to expand education to ordinary people, King Chulalongkorn encouraged the monasteries to be integrated into the new education system. Mead (2004, p. 74) argued that “the government involved itself by supporting the production of new textbooks and paying salaries to both monk and lay teachers.” Moreover, King Chulalongkorn also established the Training School of the
Civil Service, which later was upgraded to become Chulalongkorn University, the Law School, and the Military Officers’ Academy, to train future bureaucrats with specialised skills (Mead, 2004, p. 77).

The second phase began after the uprising of university students to topple the authoritarian regime in 1973. The key feature was the unification of basic education including primary and secondary education under the Ministry of Education. Moreover, it was the period in which there was a demand for a more open curriculum, and many Marxist writings were allowed to be published (Fry, 2002, p. 12-13). The third phase occurred between 1990-1995, in response to globalisation and internationalisation of the Thai economy. Co-operation and integration between numerous actors in society was needed, in order to improve the quality of Thailand’s education (Commission on Thailand’s Education in the Era of Globalization: Towards National Progress and Security in the Next Century, 1996, p. 36).

The most recent phase of reform, which is the focus of this article, began in 1997, when Thailand encountered a severe economic crisis, which became a fundamental motive of the education reform policy. In 1999, the National Education Act came into effect. It is the most comprehensive education reform in the history of Thailand, including eight main components, namely: (1) ensuring basic education for all; (2) reform of the education system, curriculum and learning process; (3) encouraging participation and partnership in education; (4) restructuring the of educational administrative structure; (5) enhancing standards and quality; (6) Reform of teachers and personnel; (7) Mobilization of Resources and Investment for Education; and (8) Utilization of Technologies for Education (Ripley, 1999, p. 116-122).

Theoretical Framework: Top-down Approach to Policy Implementation Analysis

Policy implementation can be considered as a separate stage from policy formation (Hill & Hupe, 2002, p. 6-7). Ripley and Franklin (1986, p. 4) separated policy implementation from the stage of policy formulation, and implementation can be both actions and nonactions of actors involved, as they defined policy implementation as: “what happens after laws are passed authorizing a program, a policy, a benefit, or some kind of tangible output. … Implementation encompasses actions (and nonactions) by a variety of actors, especially bureaucrats, designed to put programs into effect, ostensibly in such a way as to achieve goals.”

According to Hill (2009, p. 194-204), there are two main approaches for the study of policy implementation. The first approach is the top-down approach. This model separates the stage of policy implementation from policy formulation. People involved in the implementation process are directed by the objectives set in policy decisions (Meter & Horn, 1975, p. 447). The other model is the bottom-up approach, which emphasises the roles of what Lipsky calls ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Hill & Hupe, 2009, p. 51). Street-level bureaucrats, in dealing with their daily workloads, have to make choices on their own on how to make use of their scarce resources. Control and direction from the top will lead to worse service delivery (Hill & Hupe, 2009, p. 52-53).

With regard to the top-down approach, Van Meter and Van Horn (Meter & Horn, 1975, p. 458) identified two features affecting policy implementation: the level of change required; and the level of goal consensus among actors involved in implementation.
They concluded that in principle “implementation will be most successful where only marginal change is required and goal consensus is high” (Meter & Horn, 1975, p. 461). They went on to identify six variables which affect the implementation phase of public policy, as follows: (1) policy standards and objectives providing concrete and more specific standards; (2) resources must be available; (3) interorganisational communication and relationships, especially if there is one superior organisation which can direct and influence others; (4) the characteristics of the implementation agencies, for example, the competence and size of the agency, the degree of hierarchical control, the political resources of the agency, the agency’s links with the policy-making body etc.; (5) economic, social and political conditions; and (6) disposition and attitudes of implementers towards the goals and standards of a policy (Meter & Horn, 1975, p. 464).

Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989, p. 21) divided a large number of factors affecting implementation into three categories: “(1) the tractability of the problem(s) being addressed; (2) the ability of the statue to structure favourably the implementation process; and (3) the net effect of a variety of political variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives.” In the first category, there are four issues to be considered: (1) technical difficulties; (2) diversity of proscribed behaviour; (3) the size of a target group (the smaller the target group is, the more likely the implementation to be successful; (4) extent of behavioural change required (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989, p. 21-25). The issues in the second category include: (1) clear and consistent objectives; (2) valid causal theory; (3) initial allocation of financial resources; (4) hierarchical integration within and among implementing institutions; (5) decision rules of implementing agencies; (6) officials’ commitment to objectives; and (7) formal access by outsiders (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989, p. 25-30). Finally, nonstatutory variables are the followings: (1) socioeconomic conditions and technology; (2) public support; (3) attitudes and resources of constituency groups; (4) support from sovereigns; and (5) commitment and leadership skill of implementing officials (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989, p. 30-35).

Hogwood and Gunn (1984, p. 199-206) provided ten recommendations for policy makers to ensure successful policy implementation, which could be summarised as follows: (1) external circumstances should not be constraints on policy implementation; (2) adequate time and resources must be provided; (3) required resources must be available for each stage in the implementation process; (4) a policy needs to be based on a valid theory of cause and effect; (5) the cause and effect relationship is direct; (6) there is one implementing agency without the need to be dependent on others; (7) complete understanding of, and agreement on objectives to be achieved; (8) the tasks to be performed by each participant is specified in detail; (9) perfect communication and communication between agencies involved; and (10) the authorities of those in command.

Matland (1995, p. 147) conceptualised that there are some general points which top-down theorists share, which are to: “(1) make policy goals clear and consistent; (2) minimise the number of actors; (3) limit the extent of change necessary; and (4) place implementation responsibility in an agency sympathetic with the policy’s goals. Based on the arguments presented by the top-down approach theorists, this paper conceptualises and utilises five major factors to analysis the role of governments in the implementation of the education reform policy in Thailand from 1999-2009, namely: (1) the size of target groups involved and affected and the extent of change required by
the policy; (2) the ambiguity of the National Education Act as the main framework for the policy; (3) the lack of one main agency responsible for implementation and the lack of agreement on the education reform policy; (4) different levels of commitment and leadership of the governments; and (5) political instability in Thailand from 2006-2009.

Five Factors Shaping the Implementation of the Education Reform Policy in Thailand from 1999-2009

There are five distinct factors that have shaped how education reform policy has been implemented in Thailand:

1. The size of target groups involved and affected and the extent of change required by the policy

   Based on the propositions of top-down theorists such as Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 458) and Hogwood and Gunn (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984, p. 199-206), the size of target groups involved and affected, as well as the extent of change required determined the level of success of the implementation of public policy. It should be noted from the beginning that the education reform policy in 1999 was the most comprehensive reform in Thailand’s history, which attempted to cover a wide range of issues: from learning and teaching processes, to restructuring educational personnel, management and numerous government agencies. This policy therefore needed to involve numerous groups of stakeholders. Moreover, the education reform required significant change of behaviours of numerous target groups, for example: teachers need to change the teaching process to embrace a child-centred approach, and many government agencies needed to be amalgamated, to set up new agencies under the portfolio of the Ministry of Education, Religious and Culture with only four main agencies: (1) the National Council for Education, Religion and Culture; (2) Basic Education Commission; (3) the Higher Education Commission; and (4) the Religion and Culture Commission (The Royal Thai Government, 1999, p. 10). Each government from 1999-2009 was required to implement many controversial measures stipulated in the National Education Act within a limited time.

   For example, the government was required to restructure the whole Ministry of Education and other related agencies within three years, since the National Education Act came into force (The Royal Thai Government, 1999, p. 20). Finally, the Thaksin government did not restructure the Ministry of Education within the timeframe set by the National Education Act. On the contrary, the Thaksin government, especially Minister of Education Suwit Khunkitti (2012), believed that the amalgamation of the government agencies responsible for primary, secondary and vocational education as required by the National Education Act went too far, and would not work. The government decided not to comply with the restructure set by National Education Act. On the contrary, the government and Suwit decided to amend the National Education Act, to separate the vocational education mission to set up the new agency, which delayed the implementation of the education reform policy in general.

2. The ambiguity of the National Education Act as the main framework of the education reform policy
As top-down theorists argue, one of the necessary conditions of successful implementation is a clear policy with clear objectives. However, from the outset, the provisions with regard to education in the 1997 Constitution was rather abstract and ambiguous, so it is open for different interpretations by different groups of elites who became the governments of Thailand. The first paragraph of Section 43 of the 1997 Constitution states that “Persons have the equal right to receive not less than twelve years of basic, quality of education which must be provided free of charge by the government on generally available basis” (The Royal Thai Government, 1997, p. 10). However, the Constitution did not define the “twelve years of basic, quality of education”. In general, it has always been expected that twelve years of basic education ranges from the primary to the secondary levels of education (Year 1 to Year 12), but it can also be interpreted to cover the pre-school levels (3 years) to the junior secondary level (Year 9).

The same problems arose when the National Education Act came into effect. Its provisions are again abstract, ambiguous and require interpretations or further reviews by committees to be established later. For example, the first paragraph of Section 10 of the National Education Act provides almost exactly the same as Section 43 of the 1997 Constitution that “In the provisions of education, all individuals shall have equal rights and opportunities to receive basic education provided by the State for the duration of at least 12 years” (The Royal Thai Government, 1999, p. 4). Even though the Act defines basic education as “education provided before the level of higher education” (The Royal Thai Government, 1999, p. 2), the Act did not specify the levels of education which the free education scheme would encompass. The government led by Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of the Democrat Party had sought to clarify the definition of basic education before the National Education Act came into force by excluding the 3-year early childhood education from the definition of basic education (The Secretariat of the Cabinet, 1999).

However, when Thaksin himself became the Minister of Education, Thaksin rejected the interpretation of the Chuan Leekpai government which intended to provide free education from the primary (Year 1) to senior secondary levels (Year 12). Instead, Thaksin’s free education scheme would encompass the three-year early childhood education to junior secondary (Year 9) education. Concerning the senior secondary level (Year 10-12), the government decided to provide financial assistance to only underprivileged students (“Thaksin plik rien free 12 pee mor. 4-6 jai aeng”, 2001). Thaksin’s proposal of change was highly controversial, as stakeholders had different views on it. It was opposed on the ground that it was not appropriate for the government to remove financial support from senior secondary education to provide funding for early childhood education. The government should not support one level of education at the expense of the other. Even though his attempt was not successful, it triggered another controversy in the implementation of this policy due to the ambiguity of the provisions of the National Education Act.

Another example of the ambiguity is Section 22, which stated: “Education shall be based on the principle that all learners are capable of learning and self-development, and are regarded as being most important. The teaching-learning process shall aim at enabling the learners to develop themselves at their own pace and to the best of their potentiality” (The Royal Thai Government, 1999, p. 7). The phrase “All learners….as being most important” is confusing, and key stakeholders interpreted this phrase
differently. When the government tried to implement this section, it caused confusion and anxiety among executives of schools, teachers and students, because it was not clear what it really meant and encompassed. Some students at the time complained that teachers tended to only assign homework to students, without teaching in class.

The issue of the ‘area base administration’ also emerged. The National Education Act did not outline the criteria on how to determine the number of the educational service areas. Wichit Srisa-an, former Chairperson of the Executive Committee of the Office of Education Reform, did not want to use the administrative areas such as provinces as the basis for the establishment of the educational service areas, but he encouraged the consideration of various criteria, for example, similar and appropriate workloads and the appropriate sizes which should not be too big (Office of Education Reform, 2001, p. 49-50). However, there were some people who wished to base the education service areas on the number of provinces (Srisa-an, 2012). This became one of the most controversial issues, which resulted in the dispute between Minister of Education Kasem Watanachai and Deputy Prime Minister Suwit Khunkitti, which finally led to Kasem’s resignation in 2001.

3. The lack of one main agency responsible for implementation and the lack of agreement

Top-down theorists such as Hogwood and Gunn (1984, p. 199-206) suggested that there should be one main agency responsible for policy implementation, without the need to be dependent on other agencies to be successful. This is not the case for the National Education Act. Instead of elaborating in detail how to restructure the agencies responsible for education, how to mobilise resources for education, and how to restructure the personnel system, the Act required the government to set up an ad hoc public organisation called the “Office of Education Reform” (The Royal Thai Government, 1999, p. 20-21). The main duties of this organization, according to the National Education Act, were to finalise details of the three issues mentioned, to draft related legislations and to propose the legislations to the government for consideration. Even though the Office of Education Reform became a significant agency, because its proposals and drafted legislations would be a basis for restructuring the government agencies in later years, the Office of Education Reform did not have the authority to force the government to accept its proposals. It meant the government did not necessarily accept the proposals, or could even reject them.

Suwit Khunkitti (2012), one of the Ministers of Education of the Thaksin governments, strongly criticised some members of the Office of Education Reform and other scholars who had played important roles in formulating the education reform policy, on the ground that those scholars had been involved in the education reform policy in the past, and they did not succeed in implementing the reform, so their ideas, and approaches did not have any credibility to be accepted and followed. Suwit believed that the members of the executive committee were mostly university lecturers, and did not understand basic education. He therefore could not approve all proposals of the Office of Education Reform straight away, and it was necessary for him to consider all proposals in detail (Khunkitti, 2012). This sceptical attitude of Suwit was reiterated by one of Suwit’s successors as the Minister of Education, Adisai Bodharamik. When he faced a motion of no confidence proposed by the Opposition on 21 May 2004, he responded that many ministers in the
Thaksin government, including himself, did not agree with many issues proposed by the Office Education Reform; for example, they did not agree with the amalgamation of 14 government agencies of the Ministry of Education and other agencies under the portfolios of other ministries, into 3-4 main agencies with their own committees, which was believed as an effort to exclude politicians from education policy (The Secretariat of the House of Representatives of Thailand, 2004, p. 220-223).

Ratchanee Yampracha (2001, p. 52) observed that one of the reasons the Thaksin government was skepticism about the National Education Act, and the proposal of the Office of Education Reform was that education reform policy in Thailand was initiated by the Democrat Party government in 1999. It is usual in Thai politics that the new government would not want to attach great significance to the policy which they had not initiated. In 2001 alone, the Thaksin government never proposed the bills to the Cabinet or the Parliament for consideration (Yampracha, 2001, p. 65). Another tactic which the Thaksin government used to oppose the proposal of the Office of Education Reform was to align with senior bureaucrats of the Ministry of Education, as they were afraid that their positions and interests would be shaken (Yampracha, 2001, p. 72).

As the Office of Education Reform did not have any authority to enforce what they considered as necessary regulations for the implementation of the education reform policy, they needed the support from the government. This provided an opportunity for the government to reject or reconsider the proposals of the Office of National Education Reform, which inevitably affected the implementation of the education reform policy.

4. Different levels of commitment and leadership of the governments responsible for policy implementation

As Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989, p. 34) pointed out, commitment and leadership of implementing officials is a requirement for effective implementation. In this case, the commitment and leadership of Thai governments to implement the education reform policy is necessary. However, the levels of commitment and leadership of each government and each minister responsible for this policy from 1999-2009 differed significantly, which caused problems to the implementation. In general, there were three major groups of elites who assumed power from 199-2009. The first group was the Democrat Party and its associated scholars. The second group was Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his supporters, who assumed power after the election victories in 2001, 2005 and 2007. The last group were the elites who assumed power after the bloodless coup d’état on September 19 2006, which toppled the Thaksin government. The leader of this group of elites is former Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont.

Each group of elites had their own style and different levels of commitment to implementing education reform policy. The Democrat Party tended to focus on rules and regulations, in order to reform the education of Thailand. The first step was complete as the Democrat Party was successful in enacting the National Education Act (Pipatrojanakamol, 2004). After that, the government immediately established the Office of Education Reform (OER) (The Royal Thai Government, 2000, p. 7-8). This reflected the determination of the Democrat Party to implement education reform policy based on the provisions of the National Education Act. When the Democrat Party returned to government at the end of 2008, Jurin Laksanawisit, as the Minister of Education, tried to implement what was required by the National Education Act,
especially providing 15-year free education from early childhood to senior secondary levels to all Thai students (Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education, 2009, p. 1-10).

The situation changed when the second group of elites assumed power in Thailand after the 2001 election. This group of elites did not share the same approach as their predecessor. The education ministers of the Thaksin governments, including Thaksin himself, tended to initiate their own policies, rather than complete what was required by the National Education Act. After Thaksin’s resignation as the Minister of Education, Suwit Khunkitti was appointed Minister of Education. Not only did Suwit decline to adhere to the timeframe set by the National Education Act to restructure the government agencies responsible for education, he also doubted the validity of the National Education Act and its advocates (“Reformers can’t be trusted,” 2001). Suwit himself believed that education reform policy should be implemented gradually, and with caution, as there were still differences between groups of stakeholders. He claimed that he did not want to see the failure of the education reform policy in Thailand again (“Saroop wisaitas ‘patiroop Karnsuksa’ 3 rattamontree Suwit Chamlong Sirikorn,” 2001).

The situation after the National Education Act was amended was not different. Even though Thaksin appointed many more ministers responsible for the education reform policy, the Thaksin government still had sceptical attitudes towards the National Education Act, and the government was reluctant to implement what they were required to by the National Education Act. The third group of elites assumed power after the bloodless coup d’état against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra on 19 September 2006, and Professor Wichit Srisa-an, former chairperson of the Executive Committee of the Office of Education Reform, was appointed Minister of Education (The Royal Thai Government, 2006, p. 3). However, as the major task of this government was to eliminate Thaksin’s influence from Thai politics, the implementation of education reform policy was not its priority. The government only undertook some non-controversial measures with regard to education reform policy, for example, the promotion of morality within education, and the expansion of basic education opportunities to Thai students (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 41; Ministry of Education, 2008, p. 4).

More specifically, apart from three different groups of elites, with different approaches to implementing the education reform policy as already elaborated, in ten years from 1999-2009, there were 11 ministers altogether. On average, a minister was changed every year during that period. Each minister had different levels of commitment and leadership skills in implementing education reform policy, according to the provisions and the spirits of the National Education Act.

5. Political instability in Thailand

Based on the top-down theorist’s propositions, political instability could be considered as a major obstacle to the implementation of public policy, especially from 2006 onwards. Thaksin’s political party won the 2001 and 2005 elections. However, the second Thaksin government from 2005 was accused of abuses of power, and manipulation of independent organisations set up by the 1997 Constitution. Mutebi
(2006, p. 303) referred to the second Thaksin government as “semi-authoritarian”, “soft-authoritarian” or “diminished democracy”. The political crisis began when Thaksin decided to remove Sondhi Limthongkul’s weekly current affairs programme, called Muang Thai Raisapda or Thailand Weekly from a state-owned Channel 9 television station on 16 September 2005, because the programme had tended to criticise the Thaksin government more frequently and more severely in 2005 (Montesano, 2006, p. 2). Later, Sondhi’s movement expanded to form the anti-Thaksin movement called the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), commonly known as the ‘Yellow Shirt’ protesters at the beginning of 2006. According to Thitinan Pongsudhirak (2006, p. 297), Sondhi’s movement was composed of “Bangkok-based social activists, NGOs, the intelligentsia, the disaffected middle class, and disgruntled businessmen”. They mobilised mass rallies against the Thaksin government frequently in 2006. This led to political brinkmanship. Finally, on 19 September, Thailand’s military, led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the Army Commander, launched a coup d’état, which toppled the Thaksin government and chose General (retired) Surayud Chulanont to be Prime Minister.

After the coup, the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), or the ‘Red Shirt’ protesters, the pro-Thaksin movement, was established. Thailand has been deeply divided from that moment. In 2008, the PAD mobilised a series of mass protests against the coalition government led by Thaksin’s supporters. The protests lasted 193 days in total (Nelson, 2010, p. 119). At the end of 2008, even though the Democrat Party was able to form the government with the support from a faction of the People’s Power Party, the Red Shirt protesters did not accept its legitimacy (Askew, 2010, p. 47-49). They began protesting against the government, and in April 2009 stormed the venue of the ASEAN Summit and other related meetings in Pattaya, a major tourist attraction in the eastern part of Thailand. As a result, Abhisit needed to cancel all meetings, declared the state of emergency in Pattaya and evacuated the leaders attending the meetings (“Thai protests cancel Asian summit” 2009). When Abhisit returned to Bangkok, the Red Shirt protesters surrounded his car and pelted it with rocks, flags, chairs and sticks (“Two dead as violent clashes rock Thai capital,” 2009). The army then encircled the protesters, and the leaders decided to end the protest. The incidents demonstrated that the legitimacy and stability of the government was seriously challenged, and Thai politics from 2006 to 2009 was dominated by the conflict between the pro- and the anti-Thaksin movements.

After 2009

After 2009, the implementation of education reform policy in Thailand was not given high priority, as Thai politics was still polarised between the pro- and the anti-Thaksin movements or commonly known as the Yellow Shirt and the Red Shirt protesters (Askew, 2010, p. 31-82). Moreover, the cabinets were reshuffled many times, and the Minister of Education was always a target for change. The same problem of different levels of commitment and leadership to the implementation of the education reform policy due to frequent change of ministers emerged.

At the beginning of 2010, the Minister of Education, Jurin Laksanawisit of the Democrat Party-led government, was moved to become Minister of Public Health, and he was replaced by Shinaworn Boonyakiat (The Royal Thai Government, 2010, p. 1-2). His most outstanding proposed measure was his unsuccessful attempt to recognise
English as the second language of Thailand (Ministry of Education, 2010). After the 2011 general election, the Pheu Thai Party, which supported ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, formed the coalition government. During the tenure of this government from August 2011 to May 2014, there were four Ministers of Education (The Royal Thai Government, 2011, p. 3; The Royal Thai Government, 2012a, p. 1-4; The Royal Thai Government 2012b, p. 1-4; The Royal Thai Government 2013, p. 1-3). At the end of 2013, the Thai government was paralysed because of the protests against the controversial amnesty bill led by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) (“Timeline: Events in the lead-up to Thailand’s political unrest,” 2014). The crisis ended when the government was toppled by the coup d’état led by the Army Commander on May 22 2014 (Daniel, 2014). The implementation of education reform policy has disappeared from public view ever since.

Conclusion

In conclusion, based on a top-down approach to policy implementation analysis, the implementation of the education reform policy in Thailand from 1999-2009 was affected by five major factors. The problems were initially rooted in the idea to implement comprehensive education reform, which required substantial change in the behaviours of the large target groups. The provisions of the National Education Act were also ambiguous, and did not authorise one main agency to implement this policy. Moreover, there were many governments and ministers responsible for this policy; each of them had different levels of commitment and leadership. Finally, political instability in Thailand from 2006 to 2009 forced the governments to pay more attention to political issues, particularly how to deal with the pro- and anti-Thaksin protesters. The situation after 2009 was not different, as Thailand still faced political instability which substantially affected the implementation of education reform policy.
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Development Theory and its Threatening Other

Adam Clark

Introduction

The 'other' of development is usually taken to be the developing world. Underdeveloped societies are portrayed as somehow deficient compared to the West, and the need to remedy these deficiencies legitimises Western intervention in the world of the underdeveloped Other. Be that as it may, it does not explain the existence of a field called development studies. To do so, the present paper deals with another aspect of the identity of 'development,' namely, how the existence of development studies as a discipline is justified. Development theory must be able to differentiate itself from other possible fields which could name and describe the Third World. This is no idle question: in the 1980s the academic position of development theory was severely undermined during the so-called 'impasse' (Schuurman, 1993). The field's reclaiming of lost ground since the 1990s is, this paper argues, closely linked to the 'othering' critique aimed at neoliberal development. That 'othering' – by which an alternative is turned into an opposite – has proceeded on the basis of same rhetoric utilised by post-war modernisation theorists to differentiate their fledgling field from alternative conceptualisations of social change. In this paper it shall be argued that as a consequence our image of 'neoliberal' development has ceased to represent anything that has ever been a consensus at the World Bank or IMF, its supposed bastions. Rather, it has been given the pre-existing characteristics of development theory's 'threatening Other.' The first section of the paper will provide an overview of these characteristics through the work of J.M. Keynes and some post-war modernisation theorists. It then looks at how the critique of neoliberalism has constructed that approach in this manner, focussing on the Washington Consensus. Thus while many have analysed neoliberalism as a hegemonic discourse that excludes alternative, this paper looks at it from the opposite perspective; that is, how neoliberalism itself, as a particular form of development, has been pushed out of the development discourse.

The Threatening Other

In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Michel Foucault was concerned with how concepts we regard as natural – such as economics or politics – come into being; that is, how they become differentiated from other concepts. For Foucault, concepts such as 'development' are not based on something objectively definable. The discourse on madness, for example, is not based on the existence of an object called 'madness'. Rather, the concept is defined by the collection of statements that are accepted
as being about madness and those that are not. The question for Foucault is how and why certain statements emerge and are associated with the subject of madness, and others either do not emerge or are not accepted as part of the discourse. The conditions of existence, coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance Foucault calls the “rules of formation” of a discourse (1972: 38). There are three aspects of the rules of formation of which the most relevant to the present paper is the “field of initial differentiation” where the discourse “finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object – and therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable.” (1972: 41)

Many radical critiques of development (Said, 1978; Escobar, 1996) have been based on the idea that the object of development theory is the Third World. Through development theory the West creates and defines the underdeveloped world as an object upon which it can act. However, although it may be a useful rhetorical device, it is clear to all development theorists that there are no developed countries. Developed and underdeveloped are ideal types with no counterparts in reality: everyone is in a process of development (Deutsch et al, 1981). Consequently, development theory is not merely concerned with recreating Western society in the non-Western world. As Lerner put it: “[t]here is no uniform Tomorrow just as there was no single Yesterday.” (1958[1966]: 74). Even Rostow's famous “stages of growth theory” does not end with his book's 'final' stage. It was not capitalist mass consumption that was the ultimate aim. Development would find its fulfilment only in a later stage; for even in the West, “[t]he problem of choice and allocation – the problem of scarcity – has not yet been lifted...” (Rostow, 1960[1977]:81). The object of development theory – what it is talking about – is social change itself. 'Development' is a particular form of social change, and development theory is the body of knowledge that conceptualises and describes it. The telos of social-change-as-development consists not in replicating Western capitalist society but in overcoming the problem of scarcity, of freeing mankind from the burdens of the struggle for mere existence. In Rostow's ‘Anti-Communist Manifesto,’ Marx was conceded to be correct on one point: “the end of all this [development] is not compound interest forever; it is in the adventure of seeing what man can and will do when the pressure of scarcity is substantially lifted from him.” (1960[1977]: 166) Development theory sees itself as the guide and guardian of a cooperative endeavour of striving toward a developed world for all – a striving that both the popularly-called developed and underdeveloped countries are part of (Rostow, 1971: 360). Thus when development theorists define their field they must therefore do so by differentiating it from alternative ways of conceptualising social change, and for the 'guardian' identity to be meaningful one requires a threat. That threat is a world where social change is unguided and unlimited by development policies. This world is given four primary characteristics: it is selfish/materialistic, Darwinian, Eurocentric, and
conservative/cynical. This 'threatening Other' recurs frequently in the history of development theory, from the field's initial differentiation from the idea of progress to the revitalisation of economic growth theory by J.M. Keynes and the post-war emergence of development studies as we know it, and the post-impasse period. The remainder of this section looks at these characteristics through the work of J.M. Keynes and post-war modernisation theorists.

1. Selfish and materialistic

The primary and overriding characteristic of the conceptualisation of social change from which development is attempting to distinguish itself is its selfish and materialistic impulses. In all periods in which this process of ‘othering’ was dominant, the then existing form of social change was presented by development theorists as being solely motivated by selfishness and materialism. Keynes saw selfishness and materialism at the heart of social change as it existed. He argued that the ruling passion in the individualistic, capitalist society in which he lived was the 'money motive', which he described as a 'somewhat disgusting morbidity' and a 'semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensity' which should be handed over to 'the specialists in mental disease.' He believed that the 'game' of capitalism ought to be played for lower stakes than at present – that true social progress would require society to overcome all that condoned and encouraged self-seeking activity (1936[1960]: 374). Keynes described the moral problems of present society as: love of money; the dominance of the money motive; individual economic security as the highest good; the 'hoarding instinct' as the means of providing for one's family. He saw in Soviet Russia the “first confused stirrings” of a non-supernatural social religion which would finally condemn these immoralities, a social experiment which “tries to construct a framework of society in which pecuniary motives as influencing action shall have a changed relative importance, in which social approbations shall be differently distributed, and where behaviour which was previously normal and respectable ceases to be either one or the other.” (1925b: 305, 302).

In the post-war era, too, one finds that the argument for 'development' rests in part on a portrayal of social change as otherwise being based on selfishness and materialism. David Apter, for example, warned that an unplanned social change by private entrepreneurs would result in mounting “social dysfunctionalities”. This is because people would be concerned with their own interests rather than the wider social consequences of their activities. It would be “at best a gambler's environment in which planning for the game takes second place to the overall consideration of winning.” (1971: 197) Arthur Lewis, one the few modernisation theorists to write an explicitly normative justification of economic growth, counted increased 'economism' and 'individualism' among its costs, arguing that
both would have to be limited if the desired benefits were to materialise (1955: Appendix). More recently, a UNESCO report on citizenship education argued that a deliberate inculcation of civic virtues was necessary because existing society is characterised by “a lack of cohesive spiritual and social values, and unrestricted acquisitiveness …; this ruling social passion is tied to a peculiar conception of 'freedom,' one shaped by highly individualist perceptions and impulses around crass indifference and materialism.” (Howe and Marshall, 1999)

2. Darwinian

The second characteristic of the threatening Other is a societal-level consequence of the selfish individual-level motivations guiding social change: it is Darwinian, in the sense that the weak are left to the mercy of the strong who are set free to act on these selfish and materialistic impulses. This “old-fashioned individualism and laissez-faire” was characterised as a system of “economic anarchy” (Keynes, 1925a: 329). Keynes identified the uncertainty and lack of direction inherent in the present system as the source of the problem, and proposed instead the economic activity ought to be guided by considerations of social justice rather than individual whim, which would only perpetuate the present inequalities. For this the world needed a “new wisdom for a new age.” (1925a: 337; 1926) The new wisdom was necessary because the old way had served to benefit the rich without providing them with an incentive to help the poor out of their vicious circle of poverty.

Clearly it would not do for those who saw themselves as helping the poorer nations out of their present economic misery. Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), in what is often considered the founding text of modernisation theory, noted that the “social conscience” could no longer accept the miseries that accompanied social change in the “Darwinist nineteenth century.” Post-war development theorists were particularly suspicious of the operation of the international economic system, where the economic anarchy that was being overcome within Western societies still reigned. Some had argued in the post-war era that the task of US foreign policy ought to be to recreate the world of nineteenth century Europe, but most modernisation theorists set themselves explicitly against the free trade liberalism of that era. It was believed that “the working of capitalism would maintain the same unequal world division of labour as has previously been enforced by imperial might” (Toye, 2006). Although some scholars, such as P.T. Bauer, were conceded to genuinely believe that liberal economic policies would benefit Third World development, this argument was more often seen as hiding a lack of empathy regarding developing nations (Rostow, 1984). According to Balogh (1966[1974]) such an approach “decried the motives of deliberately helping the poor” and would leave them to their fate as the plaything of powerful market forces. David Apter (1971: 204n, 46) saw
it as a “hit and miss, private and public pattern of manipulative and exploitative aid” which, despite the best efforts of multilateral agencies, rendered the international system “essentially hostile” He described it as “the repugnant purveyor of anti-humanism.” It was not ‘development’. True development policies would have to protect the poor from the selfish and materialistic impulses that still existed.

3. Eurocentric

A third characteristic of the threatening Other is that it is Eurocentric. It is presented as being derived from the Western experience and imposed as a template for the non-Western world to follow. Post-war development theorists argued that people like P.T. Bauer were promoting “a projection for the whole world of a conception of change that was believed, erroneously, to be true of the societies of Western Europe.” (Black, 1966:7) Today, we are quite used to hearing that the old approaches to and theories of development – from colonialism to post-war modernisation to neoliberalism – were Eurocentric. Yet the unquestioned acceptance of this account obscures the fact that those development theorists saw themselves as providing a bulwark against Eurocentrism. Thus Daniel Lerner wrote his *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958[1966]), which marked the beginning of the ‘golden decade’ of the political modernisation school, in opposition to existing methods of development which he believed sought to impose Western models on non-Western societies. Despite the title of his book, Lerner did not believe that development was a process of the traditional gradually coming to accept the ideals and institutions of the modern, Westernised elites. He takes issue with those who suggest it might be so, asserting that “[t]here is no uniform Tomorrow just as there was no single Yesterday.” (1958[1966]: 74). Rather, developing societies must “have the wisdom to distinguish between the generally applicable functions of modernity and the institutional forms derived from alien traditions...” (Black, 1966:97)

Modernisation theorists were in far greater agreement about which aspects of the West ought to be rejected than which ought to be adapted or adopted by the developing nations. The latter were largely at the discretion of the particular developing nation; the former were threatening to social-change-as-development wherever it occurred. To be rejected were the values and practices associated with non-developmental social change – represented again by selfishness and materialism – which are presented as constant dangers to the development process. Modernisation theorists argued that this threatening Other would, if it wasn't for the protection afforded by the development industry, sweep away all locally valued patterns of life that were not conducive to growth (e.g. Apter, 1971). Development theorists have always seen it as part of their task to protect indigenous peoples and
cultures from destruction by the pernicious influence of Western ways of life, which led young people to abandon their fragile traditional villages and cultures to seek white-collar jobs in the cities (Thompson, 1981). This educated urban minority was regarded as self-seeking and materialistic, and disruptive of attempts to promote community and national development.Disconnected from their traditions, these displaced persons could not hope to be the engine of true development (UNESCO, 1961). If set free, as they would be without proper development policies, a country's 'valued patterns of life' would be threatened from within, by an internal Eurocentrism.

4. Conservative and cynical

Finally, development's Other is conservative of the existing system, with all its inequalities and miseries, and cynical of the possibility of promoting change. According to Keynes, the watchwords of the British government in his day remained “Negation, Restriction, Inactivity. … Under their leadership we have been forced to button up our waistcoats and compress our lungs. Fears and doubts and hypochondriac precautions are keeping us muffled up indoors.” Keynes' new wisdom required a more optimistic outlook: “There is no reason why we should not feel ourselves free to be bold, to be open, to experiment, to take action, to try the possibilities of things.” (1929) Modernisation theorists similarly argued that the old way was too “slow and halting” and “unlikely to be satisfying” (Pearson, 1970; cf. Singer, 1949). Like Keynes they presented themselves as occupying a middle-ground between the unguided social change envisaged by liberals and the revolutionary social change advocated by socialists. The former would maintain the status quo, the latter would not produce lasting, stable change. Thus according to Rostow: “The central task of an effective political leader consists in narrowing the gap between the status quo and the theoretical optimum dynamic political equilibrium position, without destroying the leader's underlying basis of political support or the constitutional system itself…” (1971: 25).

In conclusion, development theory defines itself in opposition to an alternative form of social change to which it ascribes threatening and undesirable characteristics: selfishness, materialism, individualism, Eurocentrism, social Darwinism, cynicism. This form of social change is presented as what would exist without the protection of the development industry. As Rostow (1984: 258) put it: “in an inherently divisive world … institutionalised development aid has been perhaps the strongest tempering force, quietly at work, giving some operational meaning to the notion of a human community with serious elements of common interest.” Development is, of course, the opposite of its Other: a form of social change that is motivated by altruism, not selfishness; community spirit, not individualism; normative values, not crass materialism; concern for the poor, not social Darwinism;
it respects traditional cultures, rather than simply imposing Western ways; and it is optimistic, not cynical. In sum, it helps people rather than leaving them to their fate.

Neoliberalism as a threatening Other

While it is ever-present in development thinking this image of a threatening Other, like any other self-other dichotomy, is explicitly invoked at times when there is a felt need for the Self to be strengthened. It serves to reinforce the necessity of development theory as a distinct area of concern by presenting us with a threatening world that had existed before and would exist again were it not for correct development policies. The 'impasse' in development theory (Schuurman, 1993) was such a time, and this final section argues that 'neoliberal' development was then constructed as the threatening Other. Rather than being interpreted as an alternative approach to development it was given the characteristics described in the previous section and thus portrayed as entirely 'other' to true development.

1. The threatening Other is social change motivated by selfishness and materialism

Neoliberalism, according to Peet and Hartwick (2009: 99), is based on little more than an assumption about people as “rational, freedom-loving, and self-interested” beings who have no moral relationships, nor a sense of trust, fairness, or responsibility. Harrison has said that it sees homo economicus, the selfish utility maximiser of economic theory, as the “ordinary state of the human being”; that it sees people as individualised, utilitarian, and egoistic, and that society is constituted by this “classic image of the self created by European liberal political economy.” (2010: 3, 22) For Rist (1997[2008]: 248), Neoliberalism “places on stage egoistical, atomised individuals devoid of social and moral obligations, who are interested only in the exchange of goods and not at all in their fellow-beings.” Neoliberals rest their hopes for development solely on market exchange; “the only form of exchange that excludes all sociability as a matter of principle.” (Rist, 1997[2008]: 249) It is, say Peet and Hartwick (2009), a vision of unplanned development through the “selfish choices” of these maximising individuals, harmonised by the market. Neoliberalism's glorification of selfishness “now fuel[s] the common sense of the age and shape[s] a certain way of seeing and behaving in the world.” (Rist, 1997[2008]: 246; cf Mintzberg et al, 2002), and has led to a generation of adults that is “all too inclined to focus on their own problems” (UNESCO 1996).

2. The threatening Other is a Darwinist social change in which the strong thrive
Neoliberalism, according to Harrison (2010: 17), is “based on an economistic core belief in the free market and (near) perfect competition” through which global poverty and inequality are perpetuated (Cammack, 2002: 160) When they speak of the ‘free individual,’ neoliberals do not mean the workers, or women, or the poor but “the entrepreneur, the capitalist, the boss. And they mean, by freedom, the opportunity to make money... These theorists are against the state because it may limit the freedom of the rich to make more money, and it might redistribute existing wealth. These theorists disguise their support for rich people to become even richer, using the lofty terms of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’.” (Peet and Hartwick, 2009: 100) The law of competition is, according to Rist (1997[2008]: 251), “invoked only to push down wages.” For Leys (1996: v), neoliberalism is an approach to development that “assigns all initiative to the market,” that sets capital free to seek profit on whatever terms it can impose, and that subordinates everything to global market forces. It elevates the “competitive selfishness” of the few to “a higher order of the common interest.” (Peet and Hartwick, 2009: 99) Moreover, “the 'common interest' defined in this selfish way becomes an alienated social force, controlling individuals rather than being controlled by them, so that they are compelled by ruthless competition to do things they know to be socially and environmentally destructive.” (2009: 99-100) Markets are “irrational and dictatorial” whereas, by way of contrast, “the democratic state can signal a higher order of rationality by deliberately increasing prices by adding sales taxes” (2009: 100).

3. The threatening Other is social change modelled on the Western experience

Neoliberalism is “an attempt to impose Western models of society on the diversity of forms throughout the rest of the world.” It seeks “not to make a model that is more adequate to the real world, but to make the real world more adequate to its model.” (Clarke, 2005: 58) The neoliberal Washington Consensus is a set of policies that the IFIs have “compelled” developing states to adopt, a new imperialism which projects a vision of the political good from the West to the rest of the world. It is social change pursued not by developing states themselves but through “the interventions of Western states and IGOs in African development policy making.” (Harrison, 2010: 47, 18) Neoliberal interventions aim “to destabilise existing habits … and to produce notions of conduct based on efficiency, transparency and utility.” (Harrison, 2010: 75) Ultimately, according to Cammack (2002: 159), neoliberalism “virtually abolishes the idea of development as a specific concern, in favour of a universal set of prescriptions applied to developing and developed countries alike.”

4. The threatening Other is a conservative social change, cynical of attempts to help the poor

Neoliberalism “demobilised” development by dismissing its political and social ideals in favour of
economic ones, “subordinating everything to the arbitration of ‘global market forces.’” It denies that people and societies can have any positive influence on the development process, assigning instead “all initiative to ‘the market’ (i.e. to capital).” (Leys, 1996: vi) It advocates a ‘nightwatchman’ state unconcerned with welfare policies and income redistribution. Consequently, neoliberalism “reinvented [development], not as a form of resistance to the logic of capitalism, but as a programme for surrendering to it.” (Cammack, 2002). As Leys (1996: vi) concludes, a return to a world of development will require a rejection of neoliberal principles: “If development theory is to be useful and interesting again it must focus carefully on these decisions [to set capital free etc.] and consider ways and means to re-create a world in which it is once again possible to pursue social goals through the collective efforts of the societies and communities to which people belong.”

In that final citation from Leys the political function of the ‘othering’ critique of neoliberalism becomes evident. The critique, rather than being the observations of a neutral academic bravely undermining the hegemonies produced by Western capitalist society, is in fact vital to the reproduction of the identity of development theory as altruistic, sympathetic, and pro-poor: in constructing neoliberalism as a threatening Other, as an approach that would set the beast of competition free to run its wayward course, the beleaguered field of development theory once again rediscovered its purpose and reaffirmed its right to existence. However, this view of neoliberal development as ideological and fundamentalist has little if any correspondence with reality. The Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990) and the Berg Report (World Bank, 1981), two key documents of the neoliberal development model, were both concerned with particular areas of the world considered within their particular historical contexts: Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively. In neither is there any claim to the universal applicability or timeless validity of the reforms advocated, nor do they purport to offer anything beyond broad recommendations which must be adapted to the particular conditions in which they are eventually applied (World Bank, 1981: v). Far from a set of policies to impose upon the Third World, the Washington Consensus was not even a list of policy prescriptions (Williamson, 2004b): it was a snapshot of policies that the IFIs and the US government generally regarded as desirable for Latin American countries at the time. It was not an unchanging, rigid ideology to be imposed upon all but a shifting consensus that evolved with changes, successes, crises, and opportunities and with new approaches and concerns. Nor was either in any way seen as an exhaustive development agenda. The Berg Report deferred to the Organisation for African Unity’s Lagos Plan of Action (1978) on the vision for development – it accepted the long-term political-economic objectives set out in the Plan – and on key policy areas such as science and technology (World Bank, 1981: v), and Williamson's Washington Consensus list did not include (as the name ought to imply) policies that did not command a consensus in Washington.
The size of government was one such policy area. Both Africa and Latin America were at this time suffering the effects of decades of state planning, and thus the critique of the state-centric modernisation approach was relevant in both cases. The 'nightwatchman' state, however, is nowhere to be found. Indeed, the proper size of government is not even hinted at: Williamson (2004a) later made clear that there was no consensus whatever on this point. Nor did he think there ever would or should be. Although fiscal discipline was recommended, this was to be achieved by cutting non-merit subsidies and raising tax receipts. This would allow for greater expenditure on pro-growth and pro-poor areas, including education, healthcare, and infrastructure. Similarly in the case of deregulation: there was a consensus on the need to ease barriers to entry and exit, but no mention of abolishing regulations in areas such as safety, the environment, and pricing in non-competitive industries (such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure). Thus while the role of government would recede, it is clear from the Washington Consensus list that fiscal discipline – which is not the same as balanced budgets – was not to be achieved (solely) by cutting expenditures. Government expenditure was to be re-purposed from unproductive and distorting subsidies toward productive investment and pro-poor programmes. On this, IFI policy followed squarely in the footsteps of the Lagos Plan, which acknowledged that excessive subsidisation had significantly distorted African economies to the particular detriment of the agricultural sector.

Nor was government to step out of the development process. The recommendation from neoliberal development was not no planning, but an alternative form of planning which would supplement rather than supplant the market. According to Deepak Lal, a prominent critic of the modernisation approach, “neo-classical economics … has provided the justification for rational dirigisme, by showing that there are methods of ‘planning’ through the price mechanism which may be both feasible and desirable.” (Lal, 1983[1997]: 175; cf. Lal, 1980; World Bank, 1981: ch. 4). This is little different from Peet and Hartwick's call, cited above, for the state to “signal a higher order of rationality by deliberately increasing prices by adding sales taxes” (2009: 100). Nevertheless, perhaps knowing how their approach would be interpreted, both Lal and the World Bank took care to explicitly distance themselves from laissez-faire:

“Nor … am I arguing for laissez-faire. That doctrine … has been under attack by orthodox economics since John Stuart Mill.” (Lal, 1983[1997]: 40)

“The report suggests that African governments should not only examine ways in which the public sector organizations can be operated more efficiently, but should also examine the possibility of placing greater reliance on the private sector. The report emphasises that this is not a recommendation which derives from any preconceived philosophy of ownership. It derives from considerations of
efficiency [in the achievement of government's] social and development goals.” (World Bank, 1981: v)

Clearly their protestations were in vain. Yet it is revealing that in all the anti-neoliberal passages cited above direct quotations from neoliberal texts are sparse. Occasionally a word such as 'self-interest' is taken out of context to back up the analysis, but ultimately critics tend to take a caricature of a set of policies that a particular group of people at a particular point in time thought desirable for a particular part of the world, and speak of it as if it is the 'true' neoliberal development model, universal and eternal. Neoliberal development is market fundamentalism, *homo economicus* unleashed, surrender to the whims of capital. Supposed neo-liberals are interpreted according to this pre-existing notion of what neoliberalism is. For example, when Peet and Hartwick (2009) cover the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises they pick out some choice sentences on egoism and self-interest but did not, in a discussion of his economic thought, feel the need to consult his economic treatise, *Human Action*, where they would have found something quite different to the mainstream positivist economics they associate him with. They already know what he, as a 'neoliberal,' is thinking.

Similarly, changes in IFI policy – such as 'adjustment with a human face', good governance, participation, and the increased emphasis on pro-poor growth in the early 1990s – are interpreted as little more than masks hiding the true nature of neoliberal development. At best they have created an 'augmented' Washington Consensus, but only to make implementation of the original list more palatable and efficient. Writes Cammack (2002: 157): “The World Bank and its allies [have established] a new neoliberal orthodoxy that is faithful to the discipline required for capitalist accumulation on a global scale, and [have created] a legitimising ideology that obscures the presence of those disciplines at its core.” This ideology “disguises [neoliberalism's] logic, and promotes it as a solution for the very conditions – poverty and inequality on a global scale – that it itself produces. … The effect is to present a set of policies infused with the disciplines and class logic of capitalism as if they were of universal benefit.” (Cammack, 160, 178) No attempt is made to demonstrate that this model is or has ever been advocated or pursued by the IFIs, much less that it is or has ever been a consensus position there. This image of neoliberalism is a foundational assumption of the analysis rather than the analysis itself and therefore does not appear to require the same standard of evidence.

The point here is not to defend neoliberalism. Yet at the same time it is important that policy options such as (partial) privatisation, (cautious) deregulation, free(er) trade and so on are not discredited simply by association with the distorted and 'othered' image of that approach. Williamson (2004a) reminds us that “[o]ne does not have to be some sort of market fundamentalist who believes that less
government is better government and that externalities can safely be disregarded in order to recognise the benefits of using market forces to coordinate activity and motivate effort.” It is surely not conducive to healthy debate for one who advocates deregulation or free trade to be portrayed as one who cares only for the well-being of the employer over the employee (Peet and Hartwich, 2009: 100), or as a fundamentalist whose sole aim is to 'set capital free' to seek profits at any cost (Leys, 1996: vi). As it is, calling someone a neoliberal is essentially to accuse them of engaging in a sinister conspiracy against the Third World, the poor, minorities, and so forth. The term has become an academic swearword, almost entirely disconnected from anything advocated by the institutions with which it is associated – the World Bank and the IMF. The 'othering' critique has done its work: neoliberalism is no longer an alternative approach to development: it isn't development at all. It is not something to be engaged with; it is something to be resisted. It has become a threat from which we need protection – and development studies once again casts itself in the role of protector.

**Conclusion**

The present paper has argued that the Self of development has been constructed in opposition to a threatening Other. This self-other distinction is not between developed and underdeveloped but between the altruistic and just society development will lead us to and the self-seeking and Darwinian social change that is presented as its only alternative. The paper went on the argue that the image of the threatening Other has, since the impasse, been transposed onto neoliberal development. Neoliberalism has been portrayed not as an alternative to existing development approaches, but as an ideology that 'abolishes' or 'demobilises' development. As we move into the post-2015 development era, this critique of the neoliberal approach is taken for granted. Writes Nederveen Pieterse (2012): “Now the long drawn out critiques of Western economic, institutional, ideological and cultural hegemonies are gradually becoming superfluous. The major target of criticism of the previous period has become a background issue, still pertinent, but on the backburner. With American capitalism unravelling, who needs critiquing American ideologies?” As this paper has tried to show, however, the critique is not neutral: it forms an important part of the identity of the field of development studies, constructing an 'Other' to its 'Self.' Like all 'othering' critiques, the critique of neoliberalism serves to push it out of acceptable discourse. The judgement that excluding alternatives in this manner is normatively bad should not be suspended simply because one finds the neoliberal approach distasteful. Rather, we must not lose sight of the fact that “[a]ll participants share the same aim of eliminating poverty and raising living standards. None has a monopoly of morality.” (Wassel, in Lal, 1983[1997]: 14)
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Strategic Partnership between Australia and Thailand: A Case Study of East Timor

Thosaphon Chieocharnpraphan

Abstract

This paper uses the concept of strategic partnership to analyse the co-operation between Australia and Thailand in the peacekeeping operations in East Timor from 1999 to 2001. A strategic partnership in this paper does not focus on formal agreements between countries or exchange of visits between officials. Instead, a strategic partnership in this paper focuses on how two countries work together by sharing skills, information, resources and risks to advance their perceived mutual interests. This paper argues that before 1999, Australia and Thailand had shared the same stance on the incorporation of East Timor by Indonesia, as both countries supported Indonesia’s action. After the East Timorese people voted for independence in the referendum conducted by the United Nations in 1999 and violence erupted, Australia and Thailand worked together in East Timor as strategic partners to restore peace and stability in the territory.

Thailand’s contributions helped legitimise Australia’s leading roles in East Timor, because Thailand represented a substantial ASEAN component in the Australia-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), as Thailand provided the second largest number of troops and the Deputy Commander. Operationally, while Australia was mainly responsible for disarming militias in the western part of East Timor along the border with West Timor, Thailand’s military officers demonstrated at least three skills which complemented the roles of Australian troops, namely: (1) the ability to get along with local people; (2) agricultural development; and (3) understanding of the way of life of the East Timorese.
Introduction

Prime Minister John Howard of Australia (2011, p. 336) identified in his autobiography that the liberation of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999 was one of the achievements during his prime ministership of which he was most proud. In 1999, Australia under his government led a multinational force, International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to restore peace and stability in East Timor, and to pave the way for and facilitate the transition to East Timor’s independence. Chalk (2001, p. 1) observed that it was Australia’s most significant military operation in an external territory since the Vietnam War.

The operations in East Timor provided an opportunity for Australia and Thailand to work together as strategic partners, at both political and operational levels. Thailand, led by Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, supported Australian leading roles by providing the second largest number of troops and the deputy commander of the INTERFET, Major General Songkitti Jaggabatara (retired as General and the Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces). After INTERFET, Australia and Thailand worked together in the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Major-General Michael Smith and Major-General Roger Powell of Australia became the deputy commanders of UNTAET, under the command of Lieutenant-General Boonsang Niumpradit of Thailand (retired as General and the Supreme Commander of the Royal Thai Armed Forces).

This paper uses the concept of strategic partnership to analyse the co-operation between Australia and Thailand in the peacekeeping operations in East Timor from 1999 to 2001. This article argues that after the East Timorese people voted for independence in the referendum conducted by the United Nations in 1999, and violence erupted, Australia and Thailand worked together and complemented each other as strategic partners, to restore peace and stability in the territory. Thailand’s contributions legitimised Australia’s leading roles in East Timor. Operationally, while Australia was mainly responsible for fighting against and disarming militias in the western part of East Timor, along the border with West Timor, which is part of Indonesia, Thailand’s military officers demonstrated at least three skills which complemented the roles of Australian troops, namely: (1) the ability to get along with local people; (2) agricultural development; and (3) understanding of the way of life and the mentality of the East Timorese.

Strategic Partnership

‘Strategic partnership’ is one of the vaguest terms in international relations. Some scholars, for example, Grevi (2010, p. 2), in the context of the European Union (EU), contended that “Strategic partnerships are a political category that no EU document or statement clearly defines.” However, Wilkins (2008, p. 359) suggested that the term strategic partnership has been widely proliferated and embraced. Moreover, the document on the website the Council of the European Union (2003, p. 14) entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, suggested that Europe “should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support” (Council of the European Union, 2003, p. 14).
According to Nadkarni (2010, pp. 48-49), there are some common elements of strategic partnerships which can be summarised as follows: (1) formalised written agreements; (2) multi-level institutional links; (3) meetings at various levels - from the level of bureaucratic officials to the summit meetings between leaders; (4) military ties development; (5) attempts at stronger economic relationship; and (6) promotion each other’s cultures through activities. One of the limitations of Nadkarni’s approach is that, as a written agreement is one of the main elements of a strategic partnership, so the relationships between other states are completely excluded from the analysis, no matter how closely they work together and how intense their relationships are.

On the other hand, Wilkins (2008, p. 363; 2011, p. 123) did not refer to a written agreement as one of the features of a strategic partnership, when he recast the business definition of a strategic partnership and defined the term in the context of international relations as:

structured collaboration between states (or other actors) to take joint advantage of economic opportunities, or to respond to security challenges more effectively than could be achieved in isolation. Strategic partnering occurs both in and between the international and domestic sectors (levels). Besides allowing information, skills, and resources to be shared, a strategic partnership also permits the partners to share risk.

However, when Wilkins picked up the cases for analysis, the same problems arise. Most of the case studies selected are not different from Nadkarni’s. The strategic partnerships between Russia and China, Russia and India, Japan and Australia as well as Japan and India (Wilkins, 2008, pp. 363-376; 2011, pp. 127-145) have some forms of written strategic partnership agreements.

While Goldstein’s definition shares some elements of a strategic partnership with Nadkarni’s, a formal written agreement was excluded from the definition. Apart from focusing on how the parties to a strategic partnership work together on matters of shared concerns, Goldstein also highlighted the significance of official visits, meetings and summits between government officials and leaders of the parties, when he defined a strategic partnership as:

The essential elements are a commitment to promoting stable relationship and extensive economic intercourse, muting disagreements about domestic politics in the interest of working together on matters of shared concern in international diplomacy, and routinizing the frequent exchange of official visits, especially those by representatives of each country’s military and regular summit meetings between top government leaders (Goldstein, 2003, p. 75).

This approach pays attention mostly to formal mechanisms, such as summit meetings between leaders, official visits or ministerial meetings of the parties to a strategic partnership. Accordingly, when analysing strategic partnerships between states, this approach tends to present meticulous details of numerous meetings and visits at different levels between those states, as well as the outcome documents. Therefore, this approach can only explain strategic partnerships generally, but it does not highlight any
significant cases in which the two states work closely together as strategic partners and examine them profoundly.

When Jiraporn Jiranantakij defined the term strategic partnership in the context of the relationship between China and the United States under the Clinton administration (1993-2001), her definition is similar to Goldstein’s, as she did not refer to a formal written agreement as a prerequisite for a strategic partnership, but she defined the term in a more flexible way, by also focusing on a co-operative relationship, not official visits and summits. According to Jiraporn Jiranantakij (2003, p. 72), a strategic partnership is “a co-operative relationship which encompasses co-operation on a wide range of issues for long-term mutual benefits of the two countries and the world.”

When defining a strategic partnership, there are at least two different stances on the areas of co-operation in a strategic partnership. The first group of scholars suggest that a strategic partnership should span numerous areas of co-operation. Grevi (2010, p. 8) stressed that a strategic partnership is a comprehensive relationship. Some other scholars propose that a strategic partnership concentrates more on security and economic issues, even though they recognise that there could be some other areas of co-operation. For example, Tolipov (2006, p. 3) highlighted security interests as the most important sphere of co-operation in a strategic partnership. It should be noted that among the two groups of scholars, there is a consensus that security and economic issues are the main two spheres of co-operation of a strategic partnership.

Overall, the definition of a strategic partnership between Australia and Thailand in this research is a co-operative relationship between two states, to work closely together in the spheres of security and economics, in order to advance their perceived self-interests. However, this paper focuses only on the sphere of security with the co-operation between Australia and Thailand in East Timor as the case study.

**Historical Background**

The Timor Island is the easternmost and the biggest island of the Lesser Sunda Islands (Boxer, 1960, p. 349) in the Indonesia Archipelago. East Timor is a small territory in the eastern part of the island, approximately 18,900 square kilometres in area and approximately 265 kilometres long and 92 kilometres wide, including the enclave of Oecussi in West Timor (Smith & Dee, 2003, p. 33). It shares a border with West Timor, which Indonesia inherited from the Netherlands as part of decolonisation after the Second World War. Culturally, it should be noted that East Timor is different from other islands and areas of Indonesia because it has not been influenced by Islam, like other parts of Indonesia. This may to some extent explained the difficulties Indonesia faced when it tried to integrate the territory (Dunn, 2003, p. 3).

The Portuguese colonial administration was set up in Dili, the capital city of East Timor, in 1769. Portuguese control over East Timor was relatively benign, compared with the Dutch rule in the western part of East Timor (Macdougall, 2012, p. 325). East Timor is of great significance to Australia’s security, as any great powers which intend to invade Australia must come through the Indonesian Archipelago, of which East Timor is a part. This is one of the reasons Australian soldiers invaded East Timor in 1941 during the Second World War, to prevent Japanese invasion (Commonwealth
of Australia, 2000, p. 111). Later, Japan invaded East Timor in 1942, with the aim of expelling Australian troops from the territory, resulting in the loss of lives of tens of thousands of East Timorese people (Frei, 1996, p. 281).

After the Second World War, the western part of Timor became a part of the new Republic of Indonesia. After Indonesia became independent in 1949, President Sukarno did not pay attention to the territory of East Timor. Portugal then returned to become the colonial master of East Timor, still considering it as its overseas province (Martin, 2001, p. 15). As James Dunn, Australian Consul in Portuguese Timor in the 1960s noted, the situation in East Timor remained relatively calm, as the relationship between the Portuguese and the East Timorese was harmonious, and the degree of political participation was even greater in East Timor than in Papua New Guinea at the time (Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p. 115).

The situation in East Timor changed because of two major political developments. First, the anti-communist regime led by President Suharto assumed power in Indonesia in the late 1960s, after the coup d’etat against President Sukarno. The regime was supported by the United States and its allies, including Australia. Even though Indonesia tried to retain its image as a country which supported independence of colonial territories, the reality was the polar opposite (Jones, 2012, p. 59). Second, in 1974, there was a coup d’etat in Portugal by the Movement of the Armed Forces, comprising lower-ranked left-wing military officers. The coup d’etat toppled an authoritarian regime, and committed Portugal to decolonisation in Africa and Asia, including East Timor.

Indonesia’s intention to invade East Timor was tacitly supported by Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other member countries of ASEAN. Whitlam notified President Suharto of Indonesia on 6 September 1974 during his visit to Indonesia that “East Timor should become part of Indonesia” (“Record of Meeting between Whitlam and Soeharto 1974,” 2000, p. 95). He also believed that “Portuguese Timor was too small to be independent. It was economically unviable. Independence would be unwelcome to Indonesia, to Australia and to other countries in the region...” (“Record of Meeting between Whitlam and Soeharto 1974,” 2000, pp. 95-96). Indonesia invaded East Timor on 7 December 1975. However, Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor was never recognised by the international community, but Australia and Thailand supported it. In Australia, both Labor and Coalition governments considered Australia’s strong relationship with Indonesia as their priority over the right to self-determination of the East Timorese. Moreover, they were doubtful that their support for the independence of East Timor could make any difference to the situation in East Timor (White, 2008, p. 70).

Thailand’s policy towards East Timor before the intervention in 1999 can be understood within the framework of ASEAN, the international organisation of Southeast Asian states, of which Indonesia and Thailand are both members, and communist expansion in Southeast Asia in the 1970s. Since ASEAN was established by the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, ASEAN member countries, including Thailand, have always adhered to the principle of non-interference (Ramcharan, 2000, p. 60). ASEAN member states including Thailand considered the issue of East Timor as the internal affair of Indonesia, which led to their common stance that East Timor was part of Indonesia. Dupont (2000, p. 163-164) explained the rationale behind ASEAN’s support for
Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor as its 27th province, that no country within ASEAN was willing to risk their cordial relationships with Indonesia in favour of the self-determination of the East Timorese.

Moreover, ASEAN member states, including Thailand in particular, shared the same fear with Indonesia that East Timor would have been fallen under communism if it had not been annexed by Indonesia. In an interview with Jones, Tej Bunnag (Jones, 2012, p. 67) asserted that ASEAN anti-communist elites “shared a general feeling that FRETILIN was a communist front.” Bunnag (Jones, 2012, p. 71) also insisted that Indonesia did the right thing, in order to eliminate the communist threat that it perceived. As the issue of East Timor was off the Security Council’s agenda, due to Western powers’ lack of intention to oppose Indonesia, ASEAN member countries worked together in the United Nations to prevent the discussion of the issue in the Decolonisation Committee (Jones, 2012, p. 71) ASEAN’s efforts succeeded in 1982, when the issue was essentially erased from the international agenda (Jones, 2012, p. 72). Both Australia and Thailand supported Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor, based on their strategic interests during the Cold War. Australia and Thailand tried to prevent the issue from being discussed and debated in international organisations.

The Roles of Australia and Thailand in the Intervention in East Timor

The dynamics of the issue of East Timor changed substantially, when Indonesia was severely affected by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, especially after the depreciation of the Thai currency. The stability of Suharto’s regime was substantially undermined, when university students mobilised protests against Suharto in major cities across the country. He was forced to resign on 21 May 1998, and was replaced by Vice-President Dr Bucharuddin Jusuf Habibie. As Prime Minister Howard (2011, p. 340) observed, President Habibie regarded East Timor as a liability, not an asset for Indonesia. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer saw this change as an opportunity to resolve the East Timor issue, to improve the relationship between Australia and Indonesia by assisting Indonesia to remove what Indonesia Foreign Minister Ali Alatas called “pebble in the shoe” (Kelly, 2010, p. 485).

After the federal election in 1998, Downer became more active in pursuing a new policy towards East Timor. DFAT recommended Prime Minister Howard send a letter to President Habibie, to propose Australia’s proposals on East Timor. In the letter dated 19 December 1998 to Habibie, Howard (1998) insisted that he supported East Timor to remain part of Indonesia. However, the most significant part of the letter was the recommendation to postpone the decision on the status of East Timor, and to incorporate a review mechanism into the autonomy package provided for the East Timorese. On 27 January 1999, Habibie announced that the East Timorese people would be offered a clear choice between limited autonomy within Indonesia, or immediate independence. Before the referendum, violence occurred in East Timor. Militias in East Timor backed by the Indonesian military (TNI) killed and tortured people in order to intimidate them. In Australia, Dupont and Berign (1999) suggested that early deployment of a peacekeeping force was needed, However, Downer rejected the proposal. The three agreements finalised on 5 May 1999 and signed by Ali Alatas, Jaime Gama from Portugal as the du jure administrative power of East Timor, and Kofi
Annan, gave all responsibility for ensuring security for the East Timorese to the Indonesian authorities (Maley, 2000, pp. 70-71).

On 11 June 1999, the UNSC passed Resolution 1246 to establish the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), to “organise and conduct a popular consultation” (United Nations Security Council, 1999a). Against the violence instigated by the pro-Indonesian militias, the referendum finally took place on 30 August 1999. The vast majority of the East Timorese 78.5% rejected the autonomy option (Martin, 2001, p. 11). The pro-Indonesian militias began their violent campaign against the population. Overall, approximately 400,000 people fled their houses; 250,000 people were forced to evacuate to West Timor. Many towns were razed; and infrastructure in Dili and other major cities were largely destroyed (Federer, 2005, p. 64; Greenlees & Garran, 2002, p. 202). The international and the Australian communities were outraged by the violence in East Timor. The United Nations and Australia were under intense pressure to resolve the humanitarian crisis. Howard told Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, that Australia would provide the largest contribution to the peacekeeping force, and expected to lead such a force (Howard, 2011, p. 345). However, it was obvious that Australia could not conduct the operation unilaterally.

Surin Pitsuwan (2013, p. 128), former Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999, observed that Australia did not want to be trapped in East Timor, like the United States’ entrapment in Vietnam. Moreover, according to Surin (Pitsuwan, 2014), Australia understood that Indonesia had a strong anti-Western sentiment, due to its history of colonialism. Worse, Indonesia also believed that Australia had not remained neutral before and during the referendum. Habibie frankly told Surin that he wanted to see a large number of Asian troops in East Timor, and a Nordic or Asian military officer as the commander of the international force (Pitsuwan, 2002). With many factors combined, it was impossible for Australia to intervene without co-operation and support from other countries, including Indonesia’s neighbouring Southeast Asian countries. Howard contacted many global and regional leaders, including the Thai Prime Minister, Chuan Leekpai, the US President, Bill Clinton.

Howard expected the United States to contribute ground troops to a multinational force. He was disappointed, because President Bill Clinton of the United States rejected Australia’s request to provide any troops. Bell (1999, p. 173) suggested that it was a normal phenomenon that the United States would not put ‘boots on the ground’ in the areas which are not of great strategic and economic significance to them. However, the US provided diplomatic and logistic support for Australia and a multinational force. Clinton did put pressure on Indonesia to accept an international force at the APEC Summit held in Auckland, New Zealand, in September 1999, which President Habibie did not attend. At the summit, Clinton told Co-ordinating Minister for Economic and Finance, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Habibie’s representative, frankly that “Mr. Minister, would you please advise your government to accept an international force to restore order?” (Kartasasmita 2013, p. 265). The Indonesian government could not withstand this pressure from the international community, and accepted a peacekeeping force authorised by the United Nations Security Council. On 15 September 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 1264 to establish a multinational force to restore peace and security, support UNAMET missions, and to authorise the participating state to take all necessary means to conduct the operations (United Nations Security Council, 1999b).
White (2008, p. 83) suggested that “strategically, US support would send a message to TNI that any attempt to oppose INTERFET would meet an overwhelming response.” Bell (1999, 174) summarised that the assistance the United States provided for Australia in the operations in East Timor was significant, as Australia needed “US diplomatic and economic muscle to put pressure on Jakarta, which secured a ‘permissive environment’ for our [the Australian] troops.” In the case of Thailand, the Chuan government was the first government in Thailand’s history that embraced democracy promotion and human rights in its foreign policy delivered to the Parliament (The Royal Thai Government, 1997, p. 139). He had his own policy to encourage the Royal Thai Armed Forces to participate in peacekeeping operations, in order to bolster Thailand’s profile as a good international citizen. When he was requested by Howard and Annan, he decided that Thailand would contribute to the international force (Pitsuwan, 2014).

Furthermore, Thailand also utilised its strong relationship with Japan to seek its financial contribution. Surin insisted that, due to the Asian financial crisis, Thailand and other ASEAN countries contributing to the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) did not afford sufficient financial resources to conduct the operation. Surin turned to Japan for assistance. Surin and the Filipino Secretary of State talked to Satoh Yukio, the permanent representative of Japan to the United Nations in September 1999 (Er, 2010, pp. 46-47). Surin and the staff of Ambassador Yukio calculated the cost and found that US$50 million was needed. Ambassador Yukio asked Tokyo for US$100 million for the trust fund, and his request was approved within 24 hours. The fund provided by Japan enabled Thailand and the Philippines to take part in INTERFET. As Er (2010, p. 47) observed, Japan’s financial contribution was “extended not only to East Timor but also to ensure the viability of ASEAN as a regional institution.” Walton (2004, p. 244) suggested that Japan was more comfortable responding to the request by friendly Southeast Asian nations, not to overt pressure by Australia.

Politically and diplomatically, Australia’s leading roles in East Timor were significant, because no ASEAN countries had sufficient experience, capabilities or intention to lead a multinational peacekeeping force in East Timor. When Australia decided to lead the force, other ASEAN countries, including Thailand, were willing to follow. John Blaxland (2002, p. 7), former Australian Defence Attaché to Thailand, observed “without Australia taking the lead, the others [other ASEAN nations] would not have participated.” Simply put, the role of Australia leading inspired ASEAN countries, including Thailand, to participate in the operations. On the other hand, Thailand’s status as an Asian country and Indonesia’s fellow ASEAN member helped legitimise Australia’s leading roles in East Timor. It made the intervention possible and achievable for Australia, as it to some extent complied with Indonesia’s request for the presence of Asian and ASEAN components in INTERFET. According to Blaxland (2014), Thailand’s contribution helped legitimise Australia’s leading roles and satisfy Indonesia. Moreover, Thailand could also make use of its strong relationship with Japan, to secure its financial contribution for the operations which Australia had not been able to do, despite Australia’s continuous pressure on Japan.

At the operational level, on the Australian side, Major-General Peter Cosgrove (since retired, and the current Governor-General of Australia), was appointed Commander of INTERFET. Australian troops arrived in East Timor on 20 September 1999. The
Australians were responsible for the western part of East Timor, including Dili, its capital city. Australia thought it would be strategically beneficial for INTERFET if Australia and New Zealand worked seamlessly in the Western part of East Timor, from Dili and Liquica, to Maliana and Suai (Barrie, 2014). Their main duties were to disarm militias and secure the border with West Timor. Australia assigned Asian countries including Thailand to be responsible for the Eastern part of East Timor. Songkitti negotiated with Australia and expressed Thailand’s intention to be responsible for more relatively benign areas in Bacau and Viqueque, because as Songkitti (Jaggabatara, 2013) explained, Thailand wished to avoid confrontation with Indonesian security forces and militias, and Thailand could make use of its expertise in development to assist local people to get on with their normal lives.

By the end of 1999, after INTERFET could effectively control East Timor, the Australian government urged the United Nations to take over the mission from INTERFET. Australia thought it was time for ASEAN countries to take the lead in the United Nations peacekeeping force, because Australia wished to send a clear message that Australia did not want to colonise East Timor (Blaxland, 2014). On 25 October 1999, the Security Council passed Resolution 1272 to establish the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), to facilitate the transition to independence for East Timor (United Nations Security Council, 1999c).

Australia and Thailand continued to work together in the UNTAET peacekeeping force. The force took over from INTERFET on 23 February 2000; the first commander was Lieutenant General Jaime de los Santos from the Philippines. The term of de los Santos ended in July 2000; he was succeeded by Lieutenant General Boonsrang Niumpradit from Thailand, until 31 August 2001. The two deputy commanders were Australian army officers: Major-General Michael Smith, and Major-General Roger Powell respectively. Smith assisted Boonsrang in negotiations with Indonesia, planning strategic operations against militias and visiting each country’s contingents in various parts of East Timor (Smith, 2014). Powell had experience in military training, so apart from his mission as the deputy of Boonsrang, he was also responsible for training local security forces in East Timor, and how to separate power between the police forces, military forces and the civilian authorities at the district level in East Timor (Powell, 2014). Thai military officers in East Timor in INTERFET and UNTAET complemented Australian officers by sharing at least three qualifications and skills. Firstly, they were able to get along with military officers from other countries and the local population quite well. Colonel Noppadol Charoenporn (retired as General), the commander of Thai troops during INTERFET (2013) claimed that Thai soldiers in Bacau and Viqueque did not have to hold the guns in their hands when patrolling around the villages, because Thai army officers always smiled at and greeted the local people, in order to gain their trust and co-operation. During UNTAET, when Boonsrang was appointed Commander of the UNTAET PKF, he was able to create the environment in which troops from different countries, including Australia and Thailand, could work together better. According to Smith and Dee (Smith & Dee, 2003, p. 72), under Boonsrang’s leadership, “the force became more closely knit”. Powell (2014) praised Boonsrang for his empathy for each individual staff member, and his ability to draw out everybody’s strengths. Coming from a non-English speaking country, Boonsrang realised that there could have been problems in communication between nations, so he asked military officers from every country at
the morning briefing on his first day as the commander, 22 July 2000, to speak with one another slowly and clearly (Niumpradit, 2004, p. 4). This clearly showed Boonsrang’s sensitivity towards encouraging teamwork between troops from different nations. Powell (2014) recalled that one of the strategies of Boonsrang to build stronger relationships between his staff and between the local communities was to invite them to have Thai food with him every Friday night, and taught them how to cook Thai food. Thai food therefore became one of Boonsrang’s effective tools to connect people from different cultures and languages in East Timor.

Secondly, Thai troops followed his Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s footsteps in improving the agricultural skills of the local population. When Thailand faced the communist threat during the Cold War, King Bhumibol led the nation to fight communism by initiating development projects around the country, especially in the North East. He insisted that alleviating poverty and improving people’s livelihoods were the best ways to reduce support for communist insurgent (Grossman & Faulder, 2011, p. 247). Colonel Pichate Wisaijorn (retired as General) (2014), the commander of the second Thai contingent deployed to East Timor under UNTAET, who started agricultural development projects, explained that it was King Bhumibol who assigned this development task to soldiers, to help local people to improve agriculture. Strategically, it was a way to garner support from local people, because they would then feel that soldiers were their friends. This could also help to prevent enemies from mobilising them. Pichate wished to apply King Bhumibol’s security doctrine in East Timor; he thought peace would not be restored if people were still starving. Pichate took thousands of walking catfish from Thailand to East Timor; he also thought the condition of soil and lands of East Timor were not appropriate for agriculture, because during the occupation by Indonesia, chemical fertiliser had been heavily used. He decided to teach the East Timorese to produce high quality organic fertiliser by applying a technique called “Effective Microorganism (EM)”. Pichate also taught the East Timorese how to use buffaloes and ploughs to plough rice fields, which is more effective than the traditional way, in which people whipped horses tied to a pole in the middle of the rice field to make them run and step on the soil.

The last qualification and skill was a profound understanding of the way of life and the mentality of the East Timorese, which is similar to that of people in the countryside of Thailand. This was one of Boonsrang’s outstanding abilities as the UNTAET PKF Commander, because he grew up in a rural area. The first significant step was ensuring the positive attitude of military officers in the field towards local people. Boonsrang argued that:

if the multinational force conducting operations in East Timor did not believe that the East Timorese people were good, they would not commit to working for them wholeheartedly, and it would be difficult to be successful (Malikaew, 2012, p. 61).

Some foreign troops, especially those from Western countries, observed that the East Timorese children were prone to violence, when they saw children playing with toys which looked like guns made of bamboo. They also soaked paper and moulded it into circular shapes to use as fake bullets (Malikaew, 2012, p. 53). Moreover, the East
Timorese children often fought against one another, and loved cockfighting. Boonsrang needed to explain to the western peacekeepers that because of the poverty, the East Timorese children could not afford expensive modern toys, so they needed to create their own toys from natural materials available locally, or sometimes fought against one another. The fact that the qualifications and skills of Australian and Thai troops were complementary led to the success of the peacekeeping operations in East Timor. While Australian troops focused on securing the western part of East Timor and strategic operations against the militia, Thai troops were successful in engaging with the local population, uplifting their quality of life and influencing some foreign troops to adopt more positive attitudes of towards the East Timorese, based on their profound understanding of their lives and mentality.

**Conclusion**

When Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, Australia and Thailand supported Indonesia’s action, and tried to prevent the issue from being discussed in international organisations. However, the new Indonesian president in 1999 announced the referendum on the status of East Timor would be held. After the majority of the East Timorese voted for independence, violence erupted in the territory. Australia and Thailand worked together politically, diplomatically and militarily as strategic partners in INTERFET and later UNTAET. While Australia provided leadership in the operations, Thailand helped legitimise Australia’s leading roles, and to satisfy Indonesia. Thailand’s strong relationship with Japan also helped to convince it to provide substantial financial contribution to the operations. At the operational level, while Australian troops were responsible for fighting against militias along the border with West Timor, Thai troops were responsible for the more relatively benign areas of Bacau and Viqueque in the eastern part of East Timor, so they could utilise their expertise in winning the hearts and minds of the local people, and in integrating development with security. That Thai troops were able to get along with local people well, to develop agricultural skills of the East Timorese, to influence some Western peacekeepers to adopt more positive attitudes towards the East Timorese due to profound understanding of their lifestyles and mentality, led to the success of the peacekeeping operations in East Timor.
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