

Three Utilitarians: Hume, Bentham, and Mill

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1 The Aim of this Paper

Utilitarianism has been one of the biggest streams in ethics since a long time ago. Prior to Mill's activity as its spokesman (Mill 1833, 1838, 1861), it is said that Jeremy Bentham initially set forth the doctrine.

- (1) By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question... (Bentham 1789, ch.i, par.2)¹

Bentham himself, however, attributed his doctrine further to David Hume:

- (2) For my own part, I well remember, no sooner had I read that part of the work [Hume 1739-40, Book III] [...] than I felt as if scales had fallen from my eyes [...]. (Bentham 1776, note52 (2))
- (3) That the foundations of all virtue are laid in utility, is there [Hume 1739-40, Book III] demonstrated, after a few exceptions made, with the strongest force of evidence: but I see not, any more than Helvetius saw, what need there was for the exceptions. (Bentham 1776, note52 (2); see also Shimokawa 2002, p.23)

The aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship of these three thinkers, Hume, Bentham, and Mill in the context of utilitarianism. Through discussion, we shall figure out how and why utilitarianism is trustworthy.

2 Are Utilitarians Trustworthy?

Utilitarianism is characterized by the following statement as well.

- (4) Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. (Bentham 1789, ch.i, par.1)

¹ Only when we refer to *Introduction* (Bentham 1789), chapter numbers (ch.) with Roman numerals and paragraph numbers (par.) with Arabic numerals are used.

² See another part (Bentham 1789, ch.x, par.9) as well. Also, it must be noted that Bentham (1789, ch.vii, par.1) did

Here, Bentham attributed human motives either to the *pursuit of pleasure* or to the *security from pain*². We may call this tenet ‘the hedonistic principle.’ According to it, the agent evaluates his (her)³ action exclusively from the view whether it augments his pleasure or not.

This mindset easily leads us to the principle of utility as well (cf. 1). This is how utilitarian doctrines are lined up. Yet, here arises a question: ‘Are utilitarians trustworthy? They stick only to their own profit. Once they find the present action useless for the profit, they seem to withdraw from the action!’

As an example, let us take up the following scenario:

(5) X is a salesman who is well known for his courteous manner to customers. One day, his colleague asked him why he can behave in such a manner all the time. Then, he answered, ‘Well, merely for our own profit. Don’t you think customers prefer the products of the company that such courteous employees work for?’

Can we trust this salesclerk? He behaves ethically in appearance. But, as we see in his comment, his behavior is sustained only by the expectation of the future profit. Once the action lacks the consequence, he seems to withdraw from the action.

3 Bentham’s Scheme

For clarification, here I suggest adopting a modern framework of *practical syllogism*⁴. Making use of it, we can formalize our object of study, X’s mentality in (5), in the following manner:

(6)	I want to make a profit.	(Major Premise)
	If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will purchase our products.	(Minor Premise)
\therefore I entertain customers in a courteous manner. (Conclusion)		

In the major premise, X’s pursuit of pleasure of wealth is stated. In the minor premise,

² See another part (Bentham 1789, ch.x, par.9) as well. Also, it must be noted that Bentham (1789, ch.vii, par.1) did not make a distinction between the pursuit of pleasure and the security from pain.

³ I omit referring to female characters in the following discussion.

⁴ As is well known, it was Anscombe who introduced practical syllogism—originally, Aristotle’s invention—to the modern controversy of ethics or action theory (Anscombe 1957, §33). Also, it is well known that Davidson developed Anscombe’s framework in his epoch-making article (Davidson 1963); what we call ‘practical syllogism’ here is this developed version of Davidson’s. I have fully dealt with its universality in another paper (Kaneko 2011a). Meanwhile, some contemporary thinkers make use of the framework as well, to clarify traditional arguments (Davidson 1976), to make his argument easy to understand (Singer 1980, p.134, p.200), and so on.

X's belief that entertaining customers will make them want to purchase the products is stated. And for these two reasons, X behaves as the conclusion declares.

We may simplify our object of study in this manner. The noteworthy here is that we may also find Bentham's doctrines⁵ behind the formalization:

(7) *Bentham's Scheme*

Hedonistic Principle (cf. 4)

Principle of Utility (cf. 1)

∴ Action

X's mindset is in accord with this scheme.

4 Utilitarians Are Not Trustworthy

Within this scheme, it may be seen, X's rationalization pertains mainly to his belief in the utility of his action, which is stated in the minor premise of (6):

(8) If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will purchase our products.

This conditional belief is vital to X's decision: as long as his fundamental motive, the pursuit of pleasure or wealth, is active, he would stake its realization on his action—this stake is justifiable by the belief.

However, this means in turn: X might easily withdraw from the action once he finds it useless for the desired consequence. But wait: where people expect the agent to stay with the same action, such withdrawal is not admissible. This is why we cannot but say, 'Utilitarians are not trustworthy.'

5 Mill's Extreme Answer

Is this the case? Could you accept this conclusion? At least John Stuart Mill would

⁵ Indeed, the following comment of Bentham's fully reminds us of the practical syllogism.

'[...] for a man to be governed by any motive, he must in every case look beyond that event which is called his action; he must look to the consequence of it: and it is only in this way that the idea of pleasure, of pain, or of any other event, can give birth to it. We must look, therefore, in every case, to some event posterior to the act in contemplation: an event which as yet exists not, but stands only in prospect.' (Bentham 1789, ch.x, par.6)

Here, Bentham explains how human fundamental motive, pleasure and pain, "give[s] birth to" the action. According to him, in the choice of action, the agent 'look[s] beyond' it and takes its consequence into consideration; this corresponds to the minor premise of our scheme. On the other hand, the fundamental motive, the pursuit of pleasure, is still a decisive factor for the action because the expected consequence is, after all, directed to the realization of the pleasure as stated in the major premise of our scheme.

have rejected it. He was a utilitarian who fought against this kind of prejudice, maintaining that utilitarians are not always preoccupied with *consequences* of the act.

(9) [T]hat all our acts are determined by pains and pleasures *in prospect*, pains and pleasures to which we look forward as the *consequence* of our acts. This, as a universal truth, can in no way be maintained. The pain or pleasure which determines our conduct is as frequently one which *precedes* the moment of action as one which follows it. A man *may*, it is true, be deterred, in circumstances of temptation, from perpetrating a crime, by his dread of the punishment [...], which he fears he may have to endure *after* the guilty act; [...] But the case may be, and is to the full as likely to be, that he recoils from the very thought of committing the act; the idea of placing himself in such a situation is so painful, that he cannot dwell upon it long enough to have seen the physical power of perpetrating the crime. His conduct is determined by pain; but by a pain which precedes the act, not by one which is expected to follow it. Not only *may* this be so, but unless it be so, the man is not really virtuous. (Mill 1833, p.12)

Paraphrasing ‘consequence’ in various ways—‘what happens *after* he performs the action,’ ‘the pleasures *in prospects*,’ or the like, Mill criticizes Bentham here, and rather, comes close to a Kantian view⁶: Pains inherent in the action itself—which, in that sense, *precedes* the action—determine it.

This is how Mill led utilitarianism exclusively in an ethical direction.

(10) I must again repeat [...], that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and *benevolent* spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one’s neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. (Mill 1861, p.218).

Mill enthusiastically believed in the *noble character* of human beings (Mill 1861, p.213). He thought the cultivated persons must surely prefer the employment of their higher faculties (Mill 1861, p.211).

(11) Utilitarianism [...] could attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character [...]

⁶ As is well known, Kant argued that the agent must perform the action *for the sake duty*, not *in accordance with duty* (Kant 1785, IV397). That is, we must find the value of the action in itself, not in its consequence. This is completely an opposite standpoint to that of utilitarians. Supporting this standpoint to some extent, Mill argued that Kant’s formalism must be complemented by the principle of utility, which gives substance to its form (Mill 1861, pp.249-250; see also Mill 1838, p.105).

(Mill 1861, pp.213-214)

(12) It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. (Mill 1861, p.212)

Now it is clear that for Mill, Bentham's too simplified, plain view of human nature was not tolerable⁷. Should we then replace Bentham's picture with Mill's?

6 Unreality of Mill's Thought

I myself do not think so. Why? To say simply, Mill was going too far. Let us have a look at our original theme (=5). Could the salesclerk carry on his business manner merely from the insight like Jesus'? It seems impossible, somewhat strange.

There is certainly a case where the agent determines his action only for the sake of duty or from its attendant painful feeling⁸. But in most cases, our mentality does not reach such a deeper part. That the salesclerk serves customers from benevolent feeling alone is as ridiculous as that a debtor pays back the money from benevolent feeling to the creditor.

In one aspect, Mill's depiction is a good picture of human moral mentality. However, for our present interest, it is a bit unrealistic.

7 A Watershed of Utilitarianism

Where did Mill then go wrong? In my opinion, his *prioritization* among human pleasures became a turning point in his course of thought. Maybe, the fact is the opposite: Our mentality could admit of a *variety of pleasures*. Bentham composedly gazed at this point. His *quantitative utilitarianism*⁹, was not a simple doctrine exclusively associated with the pleasures of sense.

(13) *Catalogue of Pleasures* (Bentham 1789, ch.v)

⁷ Mill's arguments on Bentham are summarizable as follows. First, Mill pointed out that it is not Bentham who, for the first time, set forth utilitarianism in history. Such mentality is already found in Socrates (Mill 1861, p.205), in Epicurus (Mill 1861, p.209), in Helvetius (Mill 1838, p.86), and also in such minor thinkers as John Brown (Mill 1838, p.87) and Samuel Johnson (Mill 1838, p.87). Rather, Mill said, the most important contribution of Bentham's to utilitarianism was the invention of its methodology, which Mill called 'the method of detail' (Mill 1838, pp.83f.), on account of which Mill praised Bentham as equal to Bacon (Mill 1833, pp.9-10), although Bentham's main field was jurisprudence (Mill 1838, pp.100f., pp.103f., 1833, pp.9f.).

Second, Mill complained that Bentham had too great a contempt to learn from his precursors, which disturbed him from investigating deep into human nature (Mill 1838, pp.90f.). Too simplified a view on human nature of Bentham's originated from this fault, according to Mill.

Third, Bentham's specific interest in jurisprudence confined his attention to human action only, so that he could not notice the importance of arguing the character of human beings (Mill 1833, pp.7-8).

⁸ Kant admitted that this kind of feeling accompanies the determination of our will by the moral law (Kant 1788, V73-75). On the other hand, Mill called such feeling *conscience* (Mill 1861, p.228).

⁹ Or *hedonistic calculus* (Bentham 1789, ch.iv).

1. the pleasures of sense, 2. the pleasures of wealth, 3. the pleasures of skill, 4. the pleasures of amity,
 5. the pleasures of a good name, 6. the pleasures of power, 7. the pleasures of piety, 8. the pleasures of
 benevolence, 9. the pleasures of malevolence, 10. the pleasures of memory, 11. the pleasures of imagination,
 12. the pleasures of expectation, 13. the pleasures dependent on association, 14. the pleasures of relief.

Bentham left these pleasures as they were.

On the contrary, Mill would have admitted 4, 5, 7, and 8 at best (cf. Mill 1838, p.95). Again, taking his previous remark (=10) and the essence of moral¹⁰ into account, he would have narrowed them down to 8 only, which is located at the top of his prioritization.

This is why there remains no room for a variety of pleasures in Mill's system. In this respect, two utilitarians completely broke with each other.

8 Pleasures Piled

As such, that is, as two discrepant modes of thought, we can rephrase the salesclerk's mindset—our original object of study—in two different manners.

(14) *Mill's Model for Scenario (5)*

I want to please customers. (Pursuit of Pleasures of Benevolence)

If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will be pleased.

∴ I entertain customers in a courteous manner.

(15) *Bentham's Model for Scenario (5)*

I want to make a profit. (Pursuit of Pleasures of Wealth)

I want to please customers. (Pursuit of Pleasures of Benevolence)

I want to be promoted. (Pursuit of Pleasures of a Good Name)

If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will purchase our products.

If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will be pleased.

If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, the manager may promote me.

∴ I entertain customers in a courteous manner.

Since we have already refused Mill's argument (§6), His model is no longer acceptable; it is unrealistic. We could not carry on the same business manner merely from

¹⁰ As is well known, Kant denied the morality of the action motivated by the inclination toward fame (a good name) (Kant, 1785, IV398). In terms of this, we are to remove all the remainder (4, 5, 7) from the list of *moral* motives except benevolence (the reason is stated in §11 below). Some may say this is too Kantian a view. But as already stated in §5, Mill came fairly close to Kantianism (Mill, 1861, pp.249-250).

benevolent feeling.

However, we do not deny Mill's thought entirely. In part, it must be complemented: the benevolence taken as a motivation in the formula (=14) is too feeble to stabilize the action.

Just for this reason, Bentham's model (=15) supersedes it. Bentham admitted *plural* motives (the pursuit of *plural* pleasures), which finally support the feeble ethical motivation of benevolence.

On the other hand, this model of Bentham's gives an answer to our original question, 'Do utilitarians withdraw from their action once they find it useless for their own profit?' We may answer no. Compare the previous model (=6) with this new version (=15). In the latter, the agents can maintain his motivation even if his action (entertaining customers in a courteous manner) turns out to be useless for *one* consequence (customers' purchasing the products), since even in that case, *other* consequences, e.g. the possibility of promotion, are still expectable. To this extent, the agent can maintain his motivation, so that his ethical behavior also successfully continues.

9 Why Be Moral?

Now we found a decent answer. Based on it, we may also realize how ethical *action* is stabilized in utilitarian frameworks. But, not yet ethical *motivation*.

Bentham's model stabilized ethical *action*. However, it seems not to require ethical *motivation*. All that counts in the model is the *number* of consequences—how many desirable consequences the action has. So it does not matter whether the agent has *ethical* motivation or not.

To compensate this, taking Mill's standpoint is easy, but should be avoided, since we have already turned it down (§6). So, here again, we must ask: Why must we have ethical *motivation* to do ethical *action*?

10 Hume

On trial, let us take up the mentality without any ethical motives.

(16) *Egoistic Model for Scenario (5)*

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| I want to make a profit. | (Pursuit of Pleasures of Wealth) |
| I want to be praised | (Pursuit of Pleasures of Amity) |
| I want to be promoted. | (Pursuit of Pleasures of a Good Name) |
| If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will purchase our products. | |
| If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will praise me. | |

If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, the manager may promote me.

∴ I entertain customers in a courteous manner.

The decisive point distinguishing this model from the former (=15) is that the motives listed here are all directed to 'me.' It is only 'me' who is pleased by the consequences listed here. But presumably, only in this case, the agent feels free to withdraw from his action; for even if he stops his action, nobody gets in trouble since his action is related with nobody else.

Yet, most of our acts are put into social contexts. Therefore, such egoistic mindset is not permissible.

Take another look at the principle of utility (=1). According to it, our approbation of the action is relative to 'the party whose interest is in question.' The question here is how large party we should envisage.

Viewed from this angle, we might describe the mentality of (16) this way: 'That model is an extreme case, in which the interest of the smallest party, "me," is only in question.'

Is this mentality, however, still in accord with the principle of utility? To answer this question, we can take up the third utilitarian, David Hume. He is very much a thinker who expressed that mentality directly.

(17) What is that to me? There are few occasions, when this question is not pertinent.
(Hume 1751, p.217)

We may regard this as the *bottom* of utilitarianism. All utilitarians start from this mentality.

Did Hume stay in the bottom, then? No. His conclusion was the opposite.

(18) But, useful? For what? For somebody's interest, surely. Whose interest then? Not our own only: For our approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest of those, who are served by the character of action approved of; and these we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. By opening up this principle, we shall discover one great source of moral distinctions. (Hume 1751, p.218)

In this way, Hume concluded that we had to go out of the narrow circle of 'me.' We must leave egoism.

But how? Let us consider this point in more detail below

11 As a Member of a Society

To begin with, take a look at ‘one great source’ in the above citation (=18). This source was, to tell the truth, the benevolence mentioned above (Hume 1751, pp.220f., pp.230f.)¹¹. Yet, as we saw earlier¹², benevolence was Mill’s specialty. How does Hume’s argument differ from Mill’s, then?

To say simply, Mill’s emphasis was on the cultivation of character (§5), whereas Hume’s was on a social aspect of human beings.

(19) Of all the animals, with which this globe is peopled, there is none towards whom nature seems, at first sight, to have exercis’d more cruelty than towards man, in the numberless wants and necessities, with which she has loaded him, and in the slender means, which she affords to the relieving these necessities. [...] ’Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority above them. (Hume 1739-40, pp.484-485)

Here Hume revealed how indispensable society is for human beings.

In this context, we may regard a *family* as the smallest circle of ‘society.’ Not only for the reason just mentioned (=19), but also for the ‘natural appetite between two sexes,’ we are forced to form the smallest circle (Hume 1739-40, p.486). Benevolence, according to Hume, comes to grow in this smallest society (cf. Hume 1739-40, p.417). It is natural affection, because of which we naturally go out of egoism.

12 From Natural Virtue to Artificial Virtue

In this way, Hume dealt with the benevolence-concept from a social angle. As a result, he successfully provided the same concept of Mill’s with a firmer ground.

But wait: Hume’s argument seems irrelevant to our original interest, scenario (5). We are originally interested in the mentality of a salesclerk, which is totally different from that of a family member Hume dealt with. How can we bridge the gap between them?

Let us trace Hume’s argument further. While classifying benevolence into natural feeling, Hume regarded it as a representative of *natural virtues* useful to others (Hume 1751, sec.II). ‘Useful’ here means utility. However, what does it mean to be ‘useful to others’?

If we bear benevolent feeling to our own families alone, we are to be judged egoistic. For the circle of a family is, in a sense, another egoistic circle than ‘me.’ Indeed we

¹¹ In *Enquiry*, Hume called benevolence “humanity” as well (Hume 1751, p.219 note1; Shimokawa 2003, p.186).

¹² See the last part of §7 and citation (10).

sometimes disregard another person outside of our own families in cold blood. From the insight into this very fact, in turn, we come to think: the benevolent feeling is not sufficient, and must be enlarged beyond the borderlines of families.

This course of thought reveals the true meaning of utility. See the previous citation of Hume's (=18). According to it, the viewpoint of utility is extended as far as possible. But the question here is: How can we realize it?

The answer is surely be given by the transition from natural virtue to *artificial virtue*. Citation (19) implied the possibility of another society: a society *in its literal sense*. In this kind of society, naïve mentality like benevolence does not make sense. It is precisely here that another factor steps into the picture.

Hume argued that in the case of such a broader society, what we acquire first is *convention*. Convention is a rule tacitly followed by people in the society (Hume 1739-40, p.480etc.). Hume says:

(20) Drivers such as waggoners, coachmen, and postilions cannot pass each other on the road without rules. (cf. Hume 1751, p.210)

Without rules, we could not lead our social life smoothly. Why doesn't a passerby suddenly attack me? Why can we get the goods when we pay the money? These questions are all solvable in terms of convention.

Those actions are a kind of convention. Without them, we have great difficulty in leading our social life. So we adopt them, observing them as a matter of course.

This viewpoint justly enlarges our mentality. Why do we care about other people than our own families? It is because such people are, it is true, strangers but at the same time, also those members of *our* society who follow the same convention. To keep the society, we must care about other people as indispensable *fellows*.

We may call this extended mentality *artificial virtue*, following Hume¹³. And it finally supersedes the preexisting natural virtue, benevolence. Artificial virtue enlarges our mentality, and sublimated it toward the broad horizon of *public interest* (cf. Hume 1739-40, pp.534f.). Hume says, 'In all determinations of morality, [...] public utility is ever principally in view' (Hume 1751, p.180). Here we know the true meaning of utility.

¹³ According to Hume, artificiality is intimately connected with the adoption of convention in a society (Hume 1739-40, pp.477f.).

13 Integrated Model

The insight into the convention-networks lets us know: We are fellows in one society. Artificial virtue emerges in this mentality. We may simply call it *moral sense* (Hume 1739-40, p.458 etc.). After all, this moral sense could be identified with the ethical *motivation* we have sought for.

Moral sense has been planted in our mind since we began to form a society. The larger our society becomes, the more crucial it is to acquire such sense.

Our society is, after all, *open* and *competitive* one¹⁴, in which letting customers shop pleasantly is vital to survive; the companies ignorant of business manners—tacit rules in business—are naturally weeded out. So every salesclerk gets to think it obligatory to keep a courteous manner.

This consciousness of obligation is thought to be moral sense, which becomes the motivation for ethical behavior. We may replace ‘benevolence’ in Mill’s model (=14) with it:

(21) *Moral Sense Model for Scenario (5)*

I want to please customers. (Moral Sense)

If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will be pleased.

∴ I entertain customers in a courteous manner.

However, this model is no more sufficient than Mill’s was. The reason is, in this case, not merely that the moral sense is too feeble, but that it is likely undermined by another strong motivation.

(22) *Malevolence Model for Scenario (5)*

I want to revenge my resentment on the manager. (Pursuit of Pleasure of Malevolence)

If I do not entertain customers in a courteous manner, the reputation of this shop will be hurt.

∴ I do not entertain customers in a courteous manner.

In case this malevolence is so strong, it might overwhelm the moral sense. Hume also did not deny such situations:

(23) It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. (Hume 1739-40, p.416)

¹⁴ Katsuragi (1988, pp.155f.) clarified the relationship between Hume’s ethics and open competition.

To avoid such situations, we must reinforce the sole ethical motivation in (21). That is why an integrated model of Hume's (=21) and Bentham's (=15) steps into the picture.

(24) *Integrated Model for Scenario (5)*

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| I want to make a profit. | (Pursuit of Pleasures of Wealth) |
| I want to please customers. | (Moral Sense) |
| I want to be promoted. | (Pursuit of Pleasures of a Good Name) |
| If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will purchase our products. | |
| If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will be pleased. | |
| If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, the manager may promote me. | |

∴ I entertain customers in a courteous manner.

We adopt this model in conclusion.

14 The Axis of Motivation

In this way, we could realize why and how utilitarian agents have ethical motivation. According to Hume, people acquire moral sense as long as they are members of a society. Nevertheless, they know that such ethical motivation alone is not enough. So they increase their reasons for the ethical action. That is why the integrated model (=24) steps into the picture. As stated above, it is the integrated model of Hume's (=21) and Bentham's (=15).

We may regard it as the conclusion of our inquiry. In addition, for complement, I want to add one more thing here: the function of ethical motivation among plural motives; namely, the *axis*-function of moral sense.

In Bentham's model (=15) as well as its extreme case (=16), the expectations of pleasures are, in not a few cases, frustrated. This is because, as stated in §4, the utility of the action—which ensures the realization of the pleasure under consideration—does not always hold¹⁵. But even so, there is one thing never frustrated: the pleasure¹⁶ based on moral sense.

(25) If I entertain customers in a courteous manner, they will be pleased.

The connection between the action and its consequence here stated is never severed.

¹⁵ This was the central topic treated in my other paper (Kaneko 2011b).

¹⁶ According to the recent study of Karl Hepper's, Hume adopted a hedonistic principle like Bentham (Hepfer 1997, p.27), although Hepfer states it in the content of Hume's representative passions: pride, humility, love and hatred (Hepfer 1997, p.29).

This is because in our society, the courteous business manner is, by definition, directed to customers' pleasure (cf. §13). Compared with other consequences like profit (cf. 8), the tie here stated is so strong and intrinsic that we do not have to confirm it from experience.

This strong tie finally makes the agent sure of the justice of his action. Even if other consequences are gone, the customer's pleasure alone remains all the time. Therefore, he could stay with the action.

This is how the pursuit of the pleasure based on moral sense functions as an axis among plural motives toward ethical action. As long as such motivation remains, ethical behavior also successfully continues. And to this extent, we could trust utilitarians

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