

The Internet and Activists' Digital Media Practices: A case of the Indigenous People of Biafra Movement in Nigeria

Emmanuel S. Nwofe, University of Bradford, UK

Abstract

Previous studies have highlighted some important contributions that participants' digital activism play in the process of protest coordination and mobilisation. The literature suggests that individuals' digital practices contribute to the dynamism of social movements' actions for social and political change. Across Africa, there is limited literature examining how social actors use the internet or the variations in the use of the internet for socio-political activism. While many studies focused on leaderless mass actions across the world, few focused on social movement organisations, much less in Nigeria. Understanding of the variations in activist's digital media practices is thereby limited, with the dynamics in the mobilising potentials of the internet in Nigeria under-explored. Second, most studies only focused on the empowering effects of the internet as the main variable, ignoring the concomitant impacts of activists' media such as radio in the mobilisation efforts of social movements in Africa. This article attempts to fill this gap, by examining variations in IPOB protesters' digital media practices and their levels of involvement in the Biafra independence struggle. The article aims to understand protesters' digital support roles, motivations, constraints and sources of mobilising information. Using survey data (N = 113), the article argues that through protesters' digital media practices in the services of the IPOB protests, complemented with the pervasiveness of Radio Biafra ideological programmes, the idea of Biafra was constituted and made visible in the Nigerian public sphere. Implications of the internet as the only alternative media for African social movements are discussed.

Keywords: digital activism, IPOB movement, Internet, activist media, social movement, Biafra, Nigeria

Introduction

The Role of the Internet in Social Mobilisation

Studies have focused, extensively, on the role of the internet in social mobilisation. The literature suggests that individuals' digital practices contribute to the dynamism of social movements' actions for social and political change. In this sense, activists can utilize the spaces of the internet to contribute to the mobilising efforts of a social movement. Apart from offering alternative self-publication for social movements (Atton, 2004) and reducing the cost of coordination, the internet also facilitates diffusion and exposure to mobilising information (Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, & Zheng, 2014; Shirky, 2011). Hence, the internet expands the action repertoire of social movements (Earl & Kimport, 2011) by allowing for a dynamic synthesis between individual "self-mobilising" efforts and a social movement's mobilisation processes (Lee, 2015). Furthermore, the internet has tended to disrupt the hierarchical relationship associated with traditional "collective action" by taking up the characteristics of "connective action" (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). Bennett and Segerberg (2013) explains that the idea of a "connective action" not only privileges personal expressions over organisational but also explains the multiplicity of entry points to social protest networks afforded by digital technologies. In other words, social protest networks emerge and evolve when people are connected by their overlapping concerns to a social cause via digitally mediated networks.

With the proliferation of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, the utility of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) including smart mobile phones has burgeoned considerably in protests movements. Across different urban occupations of large-scale movements such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street, many studies have argued that digital media have played significant roles in the overall coordination and sharing of ideas in such protests (Howard & Hussain, 2011, 2013; Theocharis, Lowe, Van Deth, & García-Albacete, 2015). Bennett and Segerberg (2013) suggest that "digital media are enabling people to commit to an action and recommend it to others by sharing their personal participation stories, photos, or videos, and connect the largest population across time and space" (p.16). Thus, digital communication technology is offering a model of social mobilisation in which shared practices and action repertoire of large-scale movements transcend time, place, culture and issues (Diaz-Cepeda, Castañeda, & Andrade, 2018; McGarry, Jenzen, Eslon-Ziya, Erhart, & Korkut, 2019). For instance, in Turkey's Gezi protest, social media platforms such as Twitter helped in the emergence of a counter public sphere that mobilized attention to the protest (Göncü, Saka, & Sayan, 2018). Through production and dissemination of "bearing witness" videos, still images, music, and text on digital mediated networks by activists, the everyday manifestations of the protest were constituted and made visible (McGarry et al., 2019). Thus, digital media has become significant in turning social discontent into an organisational structure (Howard & Hussain, 2011).

While many of these studies focused on leaderless mass actions across the world, few focused on social movement organisations in Africa and particularly in Nigeria, thereby limiting the understanding of what ways activists in Africa are using the internet. For example, it is argued that the penetration of digital communication technologies in Nigerian society has provided multiple alternative entry points for Nigerian citizens to express their concerns, and add their voice to burning socio-political issues (Akinfemisoye, 2014; Iwilade, 2013). In particular, social media tools are offering a significant level of digital literacy to Nigerian citizens and activists groups, and the ability to utilize social media platforms to produce alternative media coverage (Akinfemisoye, 2014).

This article serves as an initial effort at examining the role that protesters' digital media practices played in the mobilization efforts of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) movement in Nigeria. It also highlights the complementarity and effectiveness of activist media such as the Radio Biafra service in the overall coordination and mobilization process. Activist's media denotes a special media through which activists deliver their messages to target audiences. As such, understanding the effectiveness of such medium in the IPOB movement's Biafra independence struggle will be interesting. In particular, the article focuses on four main issues: 1) the impacts of the internet in the IPOB movement; 2) the extent to which the internet is used to promote Biafran causes; 3) the levels of involvement of actors in promoting pro-Biafran causes on the internet and their support roles; 4) main motivating factor(s) and sources of movement's information and 5) the constraints of using digital media for pro-Biafran activism. The article asks:

1. What is the impact of the internet in the IPOB movement?
2. To what extent did participants engage in a range of digital media dissemination of protests manifestations?
3. What is the motivation for participating in the protest and through which media source are mobilising information received?
4. What is the constraint (s) of digital activism in the context of the IPOB movement?

Background

The political role of the press in Africa and Nigeria in particular vis-à-vis the contemporary activities of alternative journalism has been that of social political interventionism (Skjerdal, 2012). Journalism in Nigeria has remained in the form of protest – from contesting the authority of colonial order and demanding self-rule, to becoming a political instrument of class struggle, political manoeuvring, and a tool for inter-ethnic competition for power and authority (Bamiduro, 1982; Olayiwola, 1991; Oso, 2012). With its history of agitation and culture of dissent, the Nigerian press, which predate the formation of the Nigerian state, set the tone and tenor of group struggles and campaigns such that seemed to deepen the inter-group/geo-ethnic fault line in the Nigerian public sphere. Although the newspapers – which was largely privately owned – championed the rights of Nigerians to a certain degree, they were a potent political weapon in the hands of their owners (Adesoji & Alimi, 2012).

The return to civil rule in 1999 opened up more avenues for media owners to champion geo-ethnic interest in the contest for, and distribution of, national resources. This opened up the public space and unleashed a host of hitherto suppressed and dominant ethnic forces in the country (one of which is the reverberation of pro-Biafra independence struggles in the eastern part of Nigeria). The expanded “democratic” space saw the emergence of ethno-nationalists and ethnic militia groups, “with each group staking its claims and seeking to re-assert its identity in the struggles against perceived exclusion from access to power and resources” (Onuoha, 2012 p. 29). In all of these crises, the Nigerian media played overlapping roles of escalation and resolution (Adebanwi, 2004); either exaggerating the crises at some point and/or misinforming or undermining important issues about the crises and the people (Chiluwa, 2011). In many cases, they have maintained the position of political bourgeoisies, thereby reducing the faith of the people in the watchdog role that the mass media are supposed to play.

Consequently, the advent of the internet has been one of the most exciting moments in Nigerian democracy. Not only did it redefine the process of information dissemination and consumption,

it became an important platform for civil society mobilisation; ushering in a new dimension of political activism in the Nigerian public sphere. According to InternetWorldStats (2019), Nigeria has 55.5% internet penetration as at December 2018, with over 111.6 million internet users. The Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC) reported that the number has marginally increased to 113.8 million as at January 2019 (Leadership, 2019). According to data from the 2018 edition of the Inclusive Internet Index by The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Nigeria ranks number one for internet affordability in Africa and 17th globally (Awosanya, 2018). On the overall ranking for inclusive internet, the data suggests that Nigeria is 4th, with South Africa, Morocco and Egypt topping the continent's list in that order. Nevertheless, the affordances of the internet among increasingly literate Nigerians has increased political participation and awareness thus revolutionising social-political mobilisation and activism. As the mass media tries to wield its agenda setting powers, the audience have found solace in the interactivity of the internet through social networking sites to not only engender diversified views of national issues, but provide platforms which enable them to set agenda for the mass media practitioners.

The first notable event marking the empowering effect of the internet in Nigeria was the 2012 anti-subsidy protest – tagged #Occupy Nigeria movement (Akinfemisoye, 2013; Hari, 2014). The protest followed the government's announcement of a 100% increase in the price of Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) from 65 naira (eqv. 0.18USD) to 141 naira (eqv. 0.39USD). Nigerian citizens took to the streets of major cities but also occupied social media. The #occupy Nigeria hashtag trended on Twitter and Facebook, as well as among other social networking sites and blogs, stimulating discussion on issues that spread beyond fuel subsidy removal to include broader issues of corruption and accountability in the governance of the country (Hari, 2014). The campaign caused the Nigerian government to review its policy on subsidy for petroleum products, leading to a reduction of the hike in the price of fuel (Endong, 2019). Furthermore, the kidnap of over 250 Chibok school girls by Islamist group Boko Haram in 2014, marked another example of digital activism in Nigeria, with #BringBackOurGirls campaigners using the internet to mobilize international support and awareness. Amongst social groups currently taking advantage of the internet for social activism is the IPOB movement.

The IPOB movement is one of the most prominent pro-Biafran movements in Nigeria seeking to break away from Nigeria and form an independent nation of Biafra. This plan is not new. On May 30, 1967, Igbo leaders declared a Biafran state, which led to a brutal civil war that ended on January 15, 1970 (Onuoha, 2018). Nevertheless, the idea of Biafra separatism has continued to ferment, leading to several secessionist movements in the past. The IPOB is currently the most prominent movement in the line of movements taking up the cause. The movement wants the Nigerian government to organize a referendum in the style of the British Brexit referendum, to determine whether the people of Biafra still want to remain in the union of One-Nigeria (Nwofe, 2017). Between 2015 and 2017, the movement was highly successful in organising protests in Nigeria as well as among the diaspora following the arrest and incarceration of its leader, Mr Nnamdi Kanu (BBC, 2018; Tayo, 2017). Prior to his incarceration, Mr Kanu, through the internet and his Radio Biafra FM transmissions from London, repudiated in strong words the alleged lop-sidedness of Nigeria's socio-political structures, double standards and lawlessness (Freeman, 2017). The arrest of Mr Kanu exacerbated pro-Biafra consciousness among the ethnic Igbos. In 2016, more than 150 peaceful protestors were killed on a Biafra Memorial Day, following a "chilling campaign of extrajudicial executions and violence" by the Nigerian military (Amnesty International, 2016). In September 2017, the Nigerian military launched *Operation Python Dance II* wherein dozens

of activists were arrested, tortured and killed extra-judicially, amidst condemnations (Adigun, 2018; Ilozue, 2018; TheEagleOnline, 2017). The movement's heavy reliance on the internet to bring to light evidence of political marginalisation, military brutality and hatred resonate within its constituency, where prominent politicians and stakeholders began to identify and lend their influence to the movement in order to retain their legitimacy with the people (Nwofe & Goodall, 2019). In this article, I argue that through protesters' digital media activities, complemented by the pervasiveness of Radio Biafra ideological content, the ideologies of Biafra were constituted and made visible; attracting the attention of international rights groups and stakeholders.

Digital Media Activities in Protest Movements

The rapidly changing digital media environment is changing the dynamics of collective actions and social change across many societies. The growth of relatively inexpensive digital communication technologies has enabled actors to occupy positions of influence beyond traditional intermediaries (such as government and mainstream media outlets), resulting in new capabilities for exchanges of information and opinions between collective action organizers and interested publics (Seo, 2019). Bennett, Segerberg, and Walker (2014) argue that digital media allows activists and their supporters to instigate shared grievances, form collective identities, and coordinate protest activities with different degrees of peer-peer production, knowledge, skills, and commitment. In many countries of Africa such as Nigeria, analysis of the role of digital media in social mobilisation are still anecdotal, limiting the knowledge about variations of activists' digital media practices in protest movement. Many studies have reported various dimensions through which digital media is enabling individuals to contribute to social mobilisation in protest movements. Earl (2010) argues that the internet allows protest planners to dramatically amplify their outreach efforts, to mobilize a wider audience more quickly and more cheaply. According to Lee and Chan (2015), this can be achieved when actors are able to take "a participation leadership" role, by making people around them participate in the activity of a movement (p. 880). This concept, the authors argue, does not necessarily mean that people must hold a formal position in a movement to exert their influence; it embodies the contribution of anyone that can influence other people's participation decision. Thus, individuals can contribute to the mobilisation process by way of reinterpreting grievances; re-creating meaning, expressing support roles, involvement, and encouraging other people within their digital media network to join. Others can conduct different types of digital activities including dispelling rumours, contributing mobilisation information and expanding the scale of awareness in the digital public sphere (Lee & Chan, 2016). Similarly, Castells (2015) noted that the ability of social movement actors to invent alternative interest and values, by developing an autonomous network of horizontal communication, helps set a new programme of resistance and social change. By occupying the medium and creating the message, he argues, citizens set out a new programme of their lives with materials of their suffering, fears, dreams and hopes that can strengthen public interest and commitment to collective action. Such unlimited spaces of interaction enabled by the internet have created a new communication system: "mass self-communication" (Castell, 2009, p. 70), which has the potential to make possible unlimited diversity and autonomous production of a communication flow that can construct meaning in the public's mind.

More recent studies have shown that individuals' social media activities can provoke large-scale protests in unprecedented ways (Anduiza, Cristancho, & Sabucedo, 2014; Bohdanova, 2014; Howard & Hussain, 2011; McGarry et al., 2019). In this argument, activists and protest participants can play roles that are more active in mobilisation processes. In their study of Gezi Park protest in Istanbul, McGarry et al. (2019) demonstrate that activists' visual documentation

of protest manifestations communicates the idea of solidarity whereby people who cannot be present have the capacity to share in the struggle through any way possible. Harlow's 2012 study of the Guatemalan Justice Movement, found that "users' protest-related and motivational comments, in addition to their use of links and other interactive elements of Facebook," helped mobilized participation to offline protest (p.225). Similarly, Lim (2013) showed that part of the success of the Tunisian uprising in 2010/11 was the connective structure of "individuals who sought more personalized paths to contribute to the movement through digital media" (p. 921). For example, in Egypt, a Facebook page: "We Are All Khaled Said" started by a local Google Executive, Wael Ghonim, became a logistical tool that mobilized the marginalized voices to urban spaces against Mubarak (Howard & Hussain, 2011, p. 38). According to Olesen (2013), apart from the horrifying cell phone photograph of Said posted on the web by his family, the creative appropriation of Said into existing injustice frames in Egypt by protesters strategically universalized the case. In their survey of 1,200 participants in Egypt's Tahrir Square protests, Tufekci and Wilson (2012) found that half of the participants had produced and disseminated protest images, playing journalistic roles. Bohdanova's analysis of the Ukrainian's Euromaidan Movement (2014) suggests that activists' digital activities were amplified by traditional outlets and helped increase the visibility of the movement and promote its message abroad. Moreover, Penney and Dadas (2014)'s study of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement found that the relay of pre-existing material online enabled activists on Twitter to build and sustain a geographically dispersed, networked counter-public that can articulate a critique of power outside of the parameters of mainstream media. Such a dynamic digital communication practices serve as a "stitching" platform that connects and convert different aspects of peer production into a formidable organisational network that is utilized across the crowd (Bennett et al., 2014).

What is most theoretically relevant about digitally networked activism is the phenomenon of scaling-up of action frames, and collective behaviour itself through networks, with or without the participation of organisations. Accordingly, communication among actors, citizens and interested parties themselves constitutes a central mechanism for mobilisation (Jenkins, 2019). Therefore, activists' digital posting of videos and text tends to create visual or textual spectacles that add emotional and human angle dimensions to the protest, attracting needed attentions and conveying multiple interpretations (Kim, 2019). In this article, I argue that the extent to which IPOB protesters use the internet to promote Biafran struggle relates to their level of involvements and commitments to the pro-Biafra cause. I argue that such digital media activism helped to maintain the momentum and legitimacy of Biafra ideology in Nigerian public sphere.

Protest Motivation and the IPOB Movement

Despite the richness of the literature on digital activism and protest participations, few studies have analysed how activists are motivated to participate in protest movements (Suwana, 2019). People can be motivated by different factors including organisation-prompted behaviour, socially-prompted behaviour or based on self-prompted behaviour (Bimber, 2017). Organisation-prompted behaviour is that in which a decision to participate is prompted by a request of a mobilising organisation. Such an organisation may have cultivated involvement overtime through a relationship with citizens. Socially-prompted motivation is when people decide to participate because they are aware others are doing so. In other words, the organisation has activated the network, such that an individual sees the actions of others but not the request or strategy of the mobilizer (Bimber, 2017). Self-directed prompt may best explain personal motivation based on political efficacy, knowledge or exposure or the idea that participation will change the status quo (Bimber, 2017; Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017).

Overall, organisational prompted participation begs the question of the type of message that motivated citizens. From that perspective, the media used by social movements can be important channels of disseminating tailored messages to prospective supporters. Social movement media are target specific, which means that they espouse content that not only resonates with their target audience but also promote their ideological stance. Such “activist media” as described by Waltz (2005) is used to propagate raw facts that would ordinarily be edited by the mainstream media. Like all forms of communication, Waltz argues that activist media responds to the social situations they are produced in, including overt and covert repression. In Africa, motivation to participate in a protest may simply be powered by people and the socio-political and economic conditions of their lives including marginalisation, injustices, exclusion, inequalities, impunity and corruption (Bohler-Muller & Van der Merwe, 2011; Jost, Becker, Osborne, & Badaan, 2017). For participants in the IPOB movement protest, it is quite likely that a general sense of exclusion and deprivation, reinforced by Radio Biafra programmes may have motivated participants.

The Internet and IPOB’s Alternative Media: The Radio Biafra Service

Studies have argued that radio technology represents a unique alternative form of a movement’s media (Atton, 2015; Leung, 2015). In the digital age, social movements can establish a “pirate radio,” which operate both online and in physical spaces. A pirate radio station is a radio station that operates without a valid licence. In some cases, pirate radio can be legal where the signals are transmitted but illegal where the signals are received, especially where the signals cross national boundaries. Radio Biafra transmits from London and is received across the world including Nigeria. In Nigeria, the federal government considers it illegal and made several attempts to jam its signals (Premium Times, 2015; Usman, 2015). However, as the radio operates with satellite and internet, it is difficult to jam. People had alternative ways of listening to it. With the convergence associated with digital technologies, a pirate radio station can set up an interactive news website, offer programmes on demand through podcasting and live audio streaming as well as downloadable features (Mabweazara, 2015). Such interactive platform serves as a “safe haven” for the amplification of “rebel voice” in the face of tightening political control of mainstream media (Leung, 2015, p. 196).

Radio technology is essentially an “Africa’s medium” due to its ability to transcend the barriers of cost, geographical boundaries, the colonial linguistic heritage and low literacy levels (Mano, 2012). Thus, radio can become a very effective means of mass education and mobilisation, and, with the proliferation of digital technologies such as smart mobile phones, radio can increasingly be associated with “deterritorialized”, a transnational alternative public sphere opening up platforms of audience participation. Significantly, the orality associated with radio programmes is crucial to the audience in the African continent as it replicates and extends the already existing oral culture which forms the base of the society (Mare, 2013; Moyo, 2013).

Unfortunately, social movement scholars have not been able to analyse the connection between the internet and social movement’s media such as radio in terms of their complementarity in mobilising protest movement. As we will see in this article, there is evidence to suggest that a movement’s media can be an effective tool for disseminating ideologically focused messages that mobilize participation and support to its cause. Combining such activist media with the potentials of the internet will favour social movements greatly, especially in its ability to bridge the gap associated with various forms of digital divides but also in sustaining the ideological strengths of its target audience.

Method

Sample

A survey of the IPOB movement's protestors across six main Nigerian states was undertaken over different occasions of their protest marches between January 2016 to July 2017 in the following order: January 18, 2016 (Aba), February 9, 2016 (Enugu), May 30, 2016, (Onitsha), January 20, 2017 (Port Harcourt), July 24, 2017 (Ebonyi), and July 29, 2017 (Owerri).

Initially, the aim was to adopt a systematic sampling procedure wherein interviewers would work in pairs around the marching protesters and invite every fifth person, they walked past to be a respondent. This plan was changed as soon as the interviews began. The crowd that greeted the protest caused interruptions and participant anxiety. It is worth noting that this was a chaotic period of crackdowns and arrest of activists by the Nigerian secret services. Protesters organized themselves in a human shield as they marched down the road, making it difficult for any meaningful interactions to happen. As the organizers have no valid documentation of those in attendance it was difficult to ascertain the number of people in attendance. To overcome this situation, we utilized the services of informants who played a snowballing role by referring us to coordinators and protest organizers amongst the protesters. Selected respondents were issued with consent forms which detailed their rights and privileges and how the data would be used. The form also pointed to the anonymity of respondents, as we are aware of their security concerns.

A total of 20 respondents in each state was sampled, which amounts to 120 respondents for six states. While we do not claim that the resulting samples are representatives of either the larger population or the protest itself, the sampled participants are considered to be deeply involved in the pro-Biafran struggle and would be better motivated to share protest manifestations and promote the pro-Biafran objective more than those who are only online. To enhance safety, referred respondents were taken individually or in groups to semi-controlled public spaces such as parks, cafés and recreation centres near the protest ground where they filled in a copy of the questionnaire. Completed copies of the questionnaire were received on the spot by our team of interviewers. Overall, four participants declined their participation after they had been selected and three questionnaires were found to be empty during transcription. The fieldwork received a total sample of 113 completed questionnaires.

Among the 113 respondents, 79.6% are males, while 20.4% are females; 68.1% had or were pursuing college or university undergraduate course; 73.5% were aged between 26 to 35 years; 45.1% had a monthly income of over 20,000 naira (equivalent of 55 USD or £42).

Results and Data

The Impacts of the Internet in the IPOB Movement

Pertinent to research Q1, the survey included eight items asking the respondents to report, using a five-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 2= Disagree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Agree; 5 = Strongly Agree) their level of agreement to identified impacts of the internet in the IPOB movement. First, we applied the principal component analysis to reduce the number of variables using SPSS version 24. As Table 1 shows, the analysis retained one component solution based on Eigenvalue < 1 rule. With the percentage of variance at 83.96, one component solution will provide the correlation with each individual item. As Table 2 shows, the factor loadings values of individual item suggest how strongly the relationship is between each of the individual items and the factor in isolation. Significantly, item Q13d, which hypothesises that *the internet makes*

it easier to source information that promotes Biafra loads or correlates the highest on the component at .930 than any other items. This is followed by item Q13e, which hypothesises that *the internet makes it easier to circulate military brutality*, loading at .926. Other interesting items are Q13c and Q13b, which points to the fact that the internet helps increase protests attendance, supports and funding; loading at .920 and .909 respectively. Although, all items loaded meaningfully with the component, item Q13f, which suggests *the internet makes it easier to verifying information or evidence against Nigerian government*, has the lowest loading or correlations with the component. However, since the factor loading is quite high it shows a strong relationship to the component. Overall, the result suggests a strong positive role of the internet in the IPOB movement.

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	6.718	83.980	83.980	6.718	83.980	83.980
2	.378	4.727	88.707			
3	.343	4.290	92.997			
4	.201	2.518	95.515			
5	.115	1.432	96.947			
6	.108	1.356	98.303			
7	.073	.913	99.216			
8	.063	.784	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Principal component factor analysis (n = 113)

Table 1: Total variance explained

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.	.912
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity	Approx. 1150.004
Chi-Square	
df	28
Sig.	.000
Component Matrix	
	Component 1
Q13d. The Internet makes it easier to source information that promotes Biafra	.930
Q13e. The Internet makes it easier to circulate military brutality	.926
Q13c. The Internet helps increase protest attendance	.920
Q13b. The Internet helps to increase support and funding for the IPOB Movement	.909
Q13a. The Internet helps to increase the number of registered IPOB members	.904
Q13g. The Internet makes it difficult for the Nigerian government to manipulate evidence against them	.899
Q13h. The Internet makes it easier for the main issues of the movement to circulate	.895
Q13f. The Internet makes it easier to verify information or evidence against the Nigerian government.	.879

Principal Component Analysis – Component matrix (n = 113). Sig level = .000. Measured scales for internet impact items were from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.

Table 2: KMO and Bartlett's Test.

Participants' Engagements in Movement-Related Digital Activities

Pertinent to research question 2, which asked the extent participants engaged in a range of movement-related digital activities, the survey first included questions seeking to understand how often participants used the internet in their normal everyday activities. It is assumed that the extent to which participants engage in a range of digital media activities is relatively dependent on their overall frequency of internet use in their everyday activities. Considering the importance of sustained dissemination of pro-Biafran messages online in the visibility of Biafran independence cause, protesters' overall internet use will suggest the extent they play extra role in contributing to the communicative practices of the IPOB movement. As Table 3 also shows, 54% of respondents used the internet every day, 17% use the internet at least 1–2 times a week, while about 18% do not know. It is worthy of note here that although there is an increasing rate of internet penetration and usage in Nigeria, the cost and accessibility of internet services depends on location and mobile network provider. On a general note, mobile data subscription is expensive at around 1,000 naira (\$3) per GB. While some network operators offer lower rates these are not available everywhere in Nigeria. On average, an individual will spend about 500 naira (\$1.50) to 1000 naira (\$3) per GB on data. According to the Nigerian Communication Commission, out of over 26 million Nigerians connected to Facebook in 2018, 25 million connect with mobile devices (Umeh, 2018), which attest to the level of data demands and consumptions amongst internet users. Significantly, this study suggests that 83.2% of the respondents have actually used the internet to promote Biafra independence (Figure 1), which demonstrates the extent participants sacrifice for Biafra independence causes. Protesters argue that they are able to gauge public opinion about the movement through social media, particularly Facebook. As such, using their social media every day allows them to reflect on their successes and weaknesses as well as direct their next actions, especially challenging, and/or contributing materials that correct misinformation. This article argues that frequencies of internet use for the movement-related activities suggest the level of individual involvement in the pro-Biafra independence struggle.




Figure 1: Percentage of respondents who have ever used the internet or social media to promote Biafra independence.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Everyday	61	54.0	54.0	54.0
	At least 1–2 times a week	19	16.8	16.8	70.8
	At least 2–4 times a week	3	2.7	2.7	73.5
	At least once a month	10	8.8	8.8	82.3
	I don't know	20	17.7	17.7	100.0
	Total	113	100.0	100.0	

Table 3: The frequency of internet use

The survey also included nine items asking the respondents to report their engagement in a range of movement-related digital activities using a three-point scale (1 = No; 2 = Yes but not frequently; 3 = Yes but frequently). As Table 3 shows, 93% of the respondents had published an on-the-spot video of police and/or military brutality, and 61.1% had done so frequently.

Q7. Do you engage in the following movement-related digital activities?	%			N. Analysed
	No	Yes, but not frequently	Yes, but frequently	
Frequency Analysis (n = 113)				
Publishing IPOB activist victims	10 (8.8)	38 (33.6)	65 (57.5)	113
Publishing on-the-spot videos of police/military brutality	8 (7.1)	36 (31.9)	69 (61.1)	113
Publishing pictures or video for/from protest or sit-in	6 (5.3)	35 (31.0)	72 (63.7)	113
Publishing materials that support the IPOB movement	7 (6.2)	40 (35.4)	66 (58.4)	113
Critiquing the current government in ways that offer support to IPOB movement	7 (6.2)	50 (44.2)	56 (49.6)	113
Responding to anti-Biafran views	13 (11.5)	53 (46.9)	47 (41.6)	113
Changing your profile to photos/videos that publicize the movement	21 (18.6)	32 (28.3)	60 (53.1)	113
Refuting rumour or anti-Biafra propaganda	10 (8.8)	47 (41.6)	56 (49.6)	113
Debating or discussing social/political issues affecting Nigerian unity	6 (5.3)	47 (41.6)	60 (53.1)	113

Table 4: Frequency analysis of respondents' digital media activities in the service of the IPOB protest

Nearly 95% of the respondents had published pictures or videos arising from the protest ground, and 63.7% had done so frequently. Nearly 94% had contributed materials that supported the IPOB movement, and about 58% had done so frequently. This is consistent with the idea that “the internet gives social movements the possibility of spreading uncensored messages, and of attempting to influence the mass media” (Della Porta & Mosca, 2005, p. 166),

by enabling raw facts to get into the public sphere before they are filtered (Shirky, 2011). The result suggests an overwhelming culture of sharing protest manifestations including horrific pictures and videos of military brutality and/or protesters participation experience. In this way, in relation to the work of Penney and Dadas (2014), protesters' digital circulation of texts, photos and videos helped the IPOB movement to quickly build organically dispersed, networked counter publics that are able to critique power outside of the parameters of mainstream media.

The result shows that nearly 94% of the respondents had expressed personal criticism of the Nigerian government under President Buhari in ways that exposed the fundamental trigger of the protest. About the same per cent (94.7%) had debated with friends online on the social and political issues affecting Nigerian unity, and 53.1% had done so frequently. About 89% had responded to anti-Biafran views and nearly 42% had done so frequently. Moreover, nearly 82% of the respondents had changed their profile pictures with Biafra insignia to further publicize the IPOB movement, and 53.1% had done so frequently. Another important engagement of protestors was to refute anti-Biafran rumours and propaganda. Nearly 92% had refuted anti-Biafran rumours or propaganda, and almost 50% had done so frequently (see Table 4). This is consistent with Howard and Hussain (2011, 2013) who demonstrated that the activities of protestors on social media were the major means through which the global community came to understand what was going on during the Arab Spring. The authors suggested that protestors who were dissatisfied with the version of the event as told by the traditional media used social media to tell their own stories, proposing a new pattern of political communication. Although the act of "homophilous sorting," by which like-minded individuals mostly find and hear from each other in "filter bubbles," has been analysed as potentially weakening democratic participation, these mechanisms, as Tufekci (2013) contends, not only work to increase public attention to the cause but are also potentially positive in increasing participation (p.851).

Furthermore, we tested the extent to which participants' digital media practice helped them undertake extra leadership role of canvassing support for Biafra independence using a five-point scale (where 1 = Always and 5 = never). Table 5 shows that almost half of the respondents (49%) have *Always* canvassed support for Biafra independence on the internet; about 19% had done that *Very often*, while 23% had done that *Sometimes*. Only about 11.5% either did that *rarely* or never. The data also shows that about 82.3% of respondents were likely to maintain discussion about Biafran independence online ($M = 2.26$, $SD = 1.201$), which suggest the overall confidence of protestors in promoting Biafran independence on the internet.

		N	Marginal Percentage
Q8. What is the extent to which you use the Internet to canvass support for Biafra independence	Always	55	48.7%
	Very Often	19	16.8%
	Sometimes	26	23.0%
	Rarely	8	7.1%
	Never	5	4.4%
Q9. How Likely are you to maintain discussion about Biafra independence online vs in person	Very Likely	42	37.2%
	Somewhat Likely	24	21.2%
	Likely	27	23.9%
	Unlikely	16	14.2%
	Very Unlikely	4	3.5%

Valid	113	100.0%
Missing	0	
Total	113	

Table 5: Case processing summary: Confidence using the internet to promote Biafra independence

While most respondents had no issue discussing Biafra on the internet (rating the attribute between 1 and 3), a smaller, but important segment of respondents, had little confidence in discussing Biafra online and rated the attribute between 4 and 5 (see Figure 2). This is contrary to Hampton et al. (2014) who found that social media did not provide alternative platforms for discussing controversial topics. In a Pew Research survey, which examined people's willingness to talk about the Edward Snowden leak in various in-person and online settings, the authors found that people were less willing to discuss the Snowden-NSA story in social media than they were in person. Indeed, mobile-based communication technology is promoting citizens' political discussion with others about government and politics in a developing country (Pang, 2018).




Figure 2: Likelihood of discussing Biafra online compared to face-to-face.
Source: author's field result.

Meanwhile, the survey included a question that asked respondents to select their main support provision.

		Responses		Per cent of Cases
		N	%	
Support role ^a	I have a personal blog dedicated to IPOB movement	18	9.3	15.9
	I have a news website dedicated to IPOB movement	15	7.7	13.3
	I play key roles in gathering information for IPOB media channels	61	31.4	54.0
	One of IPOB Directors	18	9.3	15.9
	No Specific Role for IPOB	25	12.9	22.1
	Produce or share issue-based information on the Internet in support of IPOB	53	27.3	46.9
	Other	4	2.1	3.5
Total		194	100.0	171.7

Descriptive statistics – multiple response analysis of support provision (n= 113).

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1; b. Note: The first percentage column represents the click on an individual item, while the percentage of cases represents people who have clicked on the items. It is more than 100% because people have selected more than one options.

Table 6: Main support provision selected by respondents

As Table 6 shows, more than half of the respondents (54%) had reported that they played key roles in gathering information for the IPOB media channels, and about 47% had produced or shared issue-based information on the internet, which support the ideology of the IPOB movement. About 30% had either a personal blog dedicated to the propagation of the Biafran independence cause or a website for the same purpose. This finding is consistent with the alternative media literature where scholars argue that social movement privilege amateur or native reporters in order to maintain the momentum of protests and dominate public space with information that the mainstream media would like to ignore (Atton, 2003, 2004). The success and visibility of collective actions have been attributed to people taking the role of a citizen journalist (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Al-Ghazzi, 2014), which centred on two related but not mutually exclusive modes of practice: witnessing (when ordinary people document and distribute reports and images of events they encounter) and activism (the strategic media output and contribution of political activists and dissidents whether videos, images, or social media participation) (Al-Ghazzi, 2014).

As the results shows, more than half of protesters play the role of a citizen journalist by spending several hours on the internet per day, and to effectively delivering on their support roles. About 62% claim to have spent several hours a day on frontline digital activism and support delivery; about 22% had done that between 2-4 hours a day, while about 13% had never spent time online for movement-related information (see Table 7). These figures suggest that a greater number of participants in the sample had a high level of involvement in terms of time spent on the internet for frontline delivery of information and support provision.

Q5. How much time do you spend on internet per-day on frontline digital activism and support delivery		N	%
Valid	Several hours a day	70	61.9
	2–4 hours a day	25	22.1
	4–6 hours a day	1	.9
	More than 6 hours	2	1.8
	None	15	13.3
	Total	113	100.0

Table 7: Time spent per day on frontline digital activism and support delivery.
Source: author's field result.

Motivating Factors and Source of Mobilising Information

Pertinent to research Q3, which asked participants their motivations and how they receive mobilising information, this study compared the internet and the alternative Radio Biafra broadcasts to understand the main source of movement's information, through which protesters received mobilising information. The survey included three items related to how they are mobilized to join the IPOB protests. First, respondents were asked to select two main channels through which they received information motivating them to join the IPOB protests. Second, respondents were asked to select one most important channel for getting movement-related information. Third, respondents were asked to select the most important social media platform on average for delivering pro-Biafran messages. Using descriptive statistics, as Table 8 shows, Radio Biafra broadcasts and social media received the highest click of about 43% and 33% respectively. The results suggest that nearly 80% of respondents had claimed that Radio Biafra was their main source of information. About 61% had selected social media such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and WhatsApp; 30.1% selected IPOB news websites and blogs, and 15% indicated interpersonal communication as their main source of information.

		Responses		Per cent of Cases
		N	%	
Main Source of Information ^a	Radio Biafra broadcast	90	42.9	79.6
	Internet platforms (IPOB News websites, blogs)	34	16.2	30.1
	Social Media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp)	69	32.9	61.1
	Interpersonal communication	17	8.1	15.0
Total		210	100.0	185.8

Descriptive Statistics – Multiple Response Analysis (n = 113). a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1; b. Note: The first percentage column represents the click on an individual item, while the percentage of cases represents people who have clicked on the items. It is more than 100% because people have selected more than one options

Table 8: Main source of protesters' information

The data also suggested that Radio Biafra is the most important channel through which more than half of the protesters received mobilising information. As Table 9 shows, 54% had answered Radio Biafra to the question of most important media channel; about 40% selected

social media, while about 5.3% selected the IPOB news websites. Meanwhile, only about .9% selected the Nigerian media.

<i>Most important media channel</i>	%
Radio Biafra	54.0
Nigerian Media (e.g. Vanguard, Channels TV, etc.)	.9
Social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp)	39.8
Internet (e.g. POB news websites)	5.3
<i>Most important social media channel</i>	
Facebook	58.4
Twitter	13.3
YouTube	5.3
WhatsApp	23.0

Table 9: The main channel for getting movement-related information (N= 113)

On the other hand, Facebook and WhatsApp emerged the most used social media platform by participants in the sample for communicating pro-Biafran issues. Table 9 also shows that about 58.4% of the respondents had indicated Facebook; 23% indicated WhatsApp, while Twitter and YouTube accounted for 13.3% and 5.3% respectively.

These results suggest that while many participants in the IPOB movement's protests were mobilized through Radio Biafra service, mobilising information also cut across the internet. On average, participants received movement-related information through both Radio Biafra and the internet. Given the dynamics of participants, especially in terms of their ideological sympathies, many of them would definitely rely on Radio Biafra programmes to get target information that motivates them to join the protest.

Meanwhile, on the motivating factor item, the results show that genuine feelings of marginalisation and exclusion of the Igbo, killing of pro-Biafran protesters and erosion of cohesive value system in Nigeria, which are basic topics of the Radio Biafra programmes, are strong motivating factors for participants in the sample. Although responses are polarized around different issues, as Table 10 shows, not only that, but about 71% of the respondents claimed to be motivated by that item, but the mean ($M=.81$) and standard deviation ($SD= 1.088$) also shows that *genuine feeling of marginalisation of the Igbo* had a wider representation of participant's motivating factor compared to other items in the question. Interestingly too, killing of the IPOB members by the Nigerian security, and lack of a cohesive value system in Nigeria was a better motivating factor for participants in the sample compared to the failure of leadership in Nigeria. However, there is little difference in their standard deviation. The results reveal that an average pro-Biafran protestor may be dissatisfied with the condition of the Igbo in Nigeria and the seemingly ethnic chicanery that characterize Nigerian bureaucratic politic. The discriminatory tendencies and the inequalities of political structures are a fact; which protesters have lived with.

		Responses		% of		
		N	%	Cases	Mean	St. D
Motivating Issues ^a	The killing of IPOB members by Nigerian security	73	23.9	64.6	.65	.480
	A genuine feeling of marginalisation and exclusion of the Igbo	80	26.2	70.8	.81	1.068
	Feelings of Islamic domination	26	8.5	23.0	.23	.423
	Lack of a cohesive value system in Nigeria	67	21.9	59.3	.59	.493
	Failure of leadership in Nigeria	59	19.3	52.2	.52	.502
Total		306	100.0	269.9	N 113	N113

Descriptive Statistics – Multiple Response Analysis (n = 113). a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1; b. Note: The first percentage column represents the click on an individual item, while the percentage of cases represents people who have clicked on the items. It is more than 100% because people have selected more than one options

Table 10: Issues motivating participants' decision to join IPOB protest.

Source: author's field Result.

Constraints of Digital Media Activism in the Context of the IPOB Movement

Pertinent to research Q4, which sought to understand the constraints of digital media activism in the context of the IPOB movement, the survey included variables that asked respondents to select as many that have been a barrier to the use of digital media. Table 11 shows that about 67% of the respondents had identified affordability of the internet data as a major barrier to the use of the internet for movement-related activities. About 58% had worried about privacy and security, while about the same percentage were concerned about poor network qualities and coverage.

		Responses		% of
		N	%	Cases
The barrier to using the Internet ^a	Privacy and security (e.g. Misrepresentation and surveillance)	132	29.5	57.9
	Affordability of the Internet data	153	34.2	67.1
	Poor Network quality/coverage	131	29.3	57.5
	Electricity for charging the device	31	6.9	13.6
Total		447	100.0	196.1

Descriptive Statistics – Multiple Response Analysis (n = 113). a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Table 11. Barrier to participants' digital media activism

This result suggests that inasmuch as protesters engaged in different forms of digital activities, it was not without concern for affordability of data. This brings to question the economic implication of digital media in developing countries for social activism. Although the argument that resource mobilisation is a key component of social movement is seemingly becoming obsolete in the digital age, limited resources can cause a huge obstacle to digital activism. In the developing countries, the use of digital technologies for social activism may be constrained by the economic, social and political context in which they are utilized. This is true when the

cost of living is very high, making even the procurement of internet device such as smart mobile phones uncommon. As Table 12 shows, nearly 82% of the respondents had relied on sim data subscription to be able to access the internet and 82% had used smart mobile device. This suggests that the financial implications of subscribing for internet data and/or purchasing smart mobile device can limit some people from actively engaging in digital activities much more frequently. This factor may have accounted for about 35% of the respondents reporting to have used the internet *Sometimes, Rarely or Never* to canvass support for Biafra (Table 5) To have internet access that can allow for the kind of digital activities the IPOB activists engage in is to budget at least 5000 naira (eqv to 13.83USD) every month; this is very expensive for an average person in Nigeria.

	Frequency	%
Sim data subscription	92	81.4
Wi-Fi	17	15.0
Cyber café	4	3.5
Total	113	100
	Main Device	
Smart Phone	93	82.3
Laptop	18	15.9
Tablet	2	1.8
Total	113	100

Table 12. Frequency analysis of mode of Internet/Main Device

Effective and consistent internet data is the only means through which activists can post videos, audios and text on social media as well as access same in order to have full information to contribute to the IPOB movement's digital activism. It is somewhat difficult for activists in Nigeria to spend such money monthly for internet access without good income. What is clear is that IPOB protestors have internalized a radical view of freedom that even those who earn less strive to keep up with movement activities online and some with shops can lock them up on protest day to show solidarity.

Discussion and Conclusion

This article has revealed the extent of the IPOB movement participants' digital media activities. Some of the activities were primarily about showing support while some were an important part of the movement dynamics. One significant example is the documentation of protest activities that provide an on-the-spot assessment of human rights crimes. Protestors' digital media practices are therefore significant process of expanding the frontier of participation by linking physical spaces of protests with the cyberspace and in the process creating a space of autonomy (Castells, 2015). Since not all supporters of a social movement can participate in its collective protest actions at the same time due to "biographical availability" (Schussman & Soule, 2005) or other reasons, digital media activities allow supporters all over the world to follow the trend and participate without being physically present in the occupied areas.

The analysis of participants' digital practices focused on a number of dimensions that could be considered as significant indicators of level of involvement in the IPOB movement for Biafran independence in Nigeria. The results show that participants who used the internet more frequently were more confident in canvassing support for Biafra and were involved in the IPOB movement much more deeply. They were more likely to contribute mobilising information,

update government repressions and were more active in both frontline activism and support provision. This finding is consistent with the idea that digital media and connective actions have empowered protest movement (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013; Bennett et al., 2014), by diversifying activists' engagement repertoire (Theocharis, Lowe, Van Deth, & García-Albacete, 2015). In the context of the IPOB movement, digital media and connective actions is not only understood in terms of effective mobilisation of Biafran identity but also maximising "the contagious power of enthusiastic online crowd" (Gerbaudo, 2016) where emotion-laden online posts diffuse in the community in ways that serve as a predictor of protest participation. Gerbaudo's analysis of the 2011 protests in Egypt and Spain affirms this position as he argues for the power of "emotional contagion" by which the emotions of web users can help "establish propitious psychological conditions" for protest participation (p.254). For the first time in the history of protests in Nigeria, protesters' recording of military brutalities provided human rights group such as the Amnesty International with the evidence to indict the Nigerian army on human rights charges. Protestors' engagements in newsgathering efforts were crucial in maintaining the movement's momentum, legitimacy and constituency support. This study shows that by deepening participants' involvement in pro-Biafran campaigns and communications, the empowering effects of the internet and Radio Biafra services can also be realized.

Significantly, the findings reported in this article provides new insights into the dynamics of activists' mobilisation process and contribute to better understanding of the synergy between the internet and activists' media, such as radio, in protest mobilisation. Current social movement literature tends to focus more on the empowering effects of the internet as alternative media for social activism without exploring the concomitant power of activists' media such as radio in contemporary social activism, much less Africa. The results suggest that a combination of the internet and special alternative Radio Biafra service in the context of the IPOB movement was an effective counter-public strategy for diffusing Biafra ideological messages that motivate adherents to collective action. This is true for a multi-ethnic Africa and Nigeria in particular. The results suggest that more than half of participants received mobilising information from Radio Biafra service, which is believed to take their situation seriously. The relevance of radio in social mobilisation has been argued in terms of its ability to knit people together socially, politically and emotionally, making identity negotiation a collective and individual process, strengthened by shared feelings and experiences (Mann, 2019). The results show that Radio Biafra served as a vehicle for diffusing Biafran ideology into the hearts and minds of its listeners and motivated participants to the protests. However, a considerable number of the participants received mobilising information from the internet, which suggest a complementary role between the internet and Radio Biafra in diffusing movement related information that mobilized participants to IPOB protests. Essentially, both the internet and Radio Biafra service played a complementary role; thus served as alternative media channels for communicating pro-Biafran issues.

Beyond digital media practices, one of the key motivating factors for participants in the IPOB protest was genuine feelings of marginalisation of the Igbo ethnic group which seems to characterize the topics being analysed on the Radio Biafra programmes. Meanwhile, the killing of IPOB members and the perception of a lack of cohesive value system motivated participants more than the variable that indicated leadership failure in Nigeria. This result is consistent with Johnson and Olaniyan (2017) who found that the Igbo ethnic group (the majority of the ethnic group seeking Biafra independence) are virtually an isolated group subtly denied access to important political positions. This study shows that the IPOB movement participants have a feeling of collective victimisation and see participation as an opportunity for articulating their

sense of marginalisation and exclusion from Nigerian bureaucratic politics. The results also suggest that participants are convinced there is no cohesion in the entity called Nigeria and by engaging in protest-related digital practices, they can make their feelings known. This is consistent with Bailey, Cammaerts, and Carpentier (2007) who argued that

“societal groups that are represented one-sidedly, disadvantaged, stigmatized, or even repressed can especially benefit from using the channels of communication opened by alternative media to strengthen their internal identity, manifest this identity to the outside world, and thus enable social change and/ or development” (pp. 14–15).

Most participants engaged effectively with digital media and canvassed support for pro-Biafran independence cause. However, there is strongly concerns regarding affordability of internet data. While the internet may appear to offer low-cost participation in protests movement, as studies have suggested, this current result suggests that economic and political resources may affect the extent to which people engage in digital media activities, at least among protest participants in Africa. As most respondents indicated they used smart mobile phones and Sim-data subscriptions to access the internet, the affordances of monthly internet data can pose a barrier to full digital media activism.

What these results mean for Africa and Nigeria in particular is that using only the internet in defining alternative media and communication in Africa in terms of social activism could be limiting, as it “carries the danger of overlooking other small-scale oriented communication” (Mano, 2016) and media used by the marginalized subalterns in the hostile cultural environment of Africa. The IPOB movement is related to Catalanian movement in Spain because of its bottom-up character – what Della Porta and O’Connor (2017) called “referendums from below” – in opposition to the “top-down” equivalent seen, for example, in Scotland (Cramer, 2015). In Catalonia, social movement actors launched a campaign on self-determination and independence. As it unfolded, it brought institutional actors and political elites together with other civil society actors. Thus, all participants broadened the repertoires of action of the campaign and introduced innovative forms of organisation (Della Porta and O’Connor 2017, p. 2). However, unlike the Catalanian movement, the bourgeois within the Biafran constituency, who are benefiting from the corrupt bureaucratic character of Nigeria, make frantic efforts to demobilize the idea of Biafra. Thus radio became an effective tool for keeping the right message in the minds of ordinary Biafrans who feel the reality of exclusion in Nigerian bureaucratic politics. Through effective use of Radio Biafra and the internet, the IPOB actors were able promote the gains of a Biafran Republic, while highlighting fears of those in opposition to it. This strategy helps fill the gap created by various forms of digital divides associated with the use of digital media alone in social mobilisation.

By highlighting various forms of appropriations of digital media, the article contributes to expanding the literature on the social embeddedness of the internet in the struggle for social change in the Nigerian public sphere. Importantly too, it provided deeper insights into the supplementary role of radio (hereafter called activists’ media) in deepening participation and involvements for African social movements.

This study is only an exploratory step towards systematically analysing the implications of digital media activism for pro-Biafran protestors in Nigeria. Both the method and the topology of digital media activities can be further refined and/or developed. For instance, further study can investigate the manifest content of the IPOB social media pages to further highlights

activist communication character and the type of message communicated. Second, a review of Radio Biafra programmes in relation to how they are received within the constituency of Biafra can further reveal the impacts it has had on the movement for Biafra independence.

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Corresponding author: Emmanuel S. Nwofe

Contact email: E.Nwofe@student.bradford.ac.uk