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Introduction

It is once more my privilege to present the latest issue of the IAFOR Journal of Politics, Economics & Law. The articles presented here have been derived after the typically difficult task of selecting some of the more prominent papers presented at the recent IAFOR conferences, The European Conference on Politics, Economics & Law 2015, and the inaugural Asia-Pacific Conference on Security & International Relations 2015.

This volume continues in line with the goals of IAFOR in covering the results of a range of interdisciplinary research, with multinational origins. It is an objective of this IAFOR journal to provide an opportunity for rising scholars to publish their work, with the papers in this current volume devoted to emerging academic talent, written by doctoral candidates. All four papers touch on topics which cross over in areas relevant to politics, economics and law, both domestically and internationally.

The first is from a team at the National Defence University of Malaysia: Amelia Yuliana Abd Wahab, Wan Hashim Wan The, and Abdul Rahman Abdul Razak Shaik, on the role development played in postcolonial Malaysian Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. The second paper, by Abhishek Choudhary from Jawaharlal Nehru University in India, critiques the nature of cosmopolitanism through the poststructural concept of biopower.

The third paper by David Sarkisyan, from Yerevan State University in Armenia, considers the application of game theory modelling to the ongoing territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands. The final paper, by Bjorn Koolen of Ristumeikan University in Japan, examines the role of soft power in conflicting presentations of national identity, regarding the controversial Yasukuni shrine in Japan.

Sincere thanks goes to the contributors, the reviewers, the advisory board members, and the sterling ongoing support of Assistant Editor Dr. Shazia Lateef; to the IAFOR publication staff for their always invaluable assistance, and to the IAFOR International Advisory Board for their continuing confidence. I invite readers to discover the stimulating content which has been produced through this emerging generation of aspiring scholarship.

Craig Mark
Editor

Security For Development: Tun Abdul Razak's National Security Strategy

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Abstract

Tun Abdul Razak's counterinsurgency (COIN) through security and development (KESBAN) strategy, in contending the illegal communist activities led by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), was a successful COIN strategy. In the case of Malaysia, even though the *First Malayan Emergency* (1948-1960) was declared over in 1960, the communist insurgents were still continuously active in expanding their covert agenda. Thus, their subversive movement gave a significant threat to national security during the Malaysian Second Premiership, of Tun Abdul Razak Bin Hussien Al-Haj. The objective of this paper is to highlight the national security strategy crafted during Tun Abdul Razak's premiership in the 1970s, that contributed to the success of countering communist insurgents. This period of low-intensity conflict between the Government of Malaysia and the CPM, also known as the *Second Emergency* (1969-1989), was a tough and challenging phase for Malaysia, to ensure its survival as the sovereign state. KESBAN, taken from the Malay words *KESELAMATAN* and *PEMBANGUNAN*, or security and development, was originated during Tun Abdul Razak's premiership, *albeit* KESBAN was formally much later legislated in 1980 by the National Security Council (NSC). The paper discovers Tun Abdul Razak's national security strategy to counter communist insurgents did not solely rely on the usage of hard power; the concentration of his strategy was on internal development, that led to victory on the side of the Malaysian government, to end the illegal guerrilla activities of Communist insurgents, and unite the multi-ethnic society in Malaysia. KESBAN was an admirable COIN strategy for a small country with a multi-ethnic society.

Keywords: COIN, Strategy, Security, Internal Development, Second Emergency

*High mountains, we'll climb together,
Deep seas, united we'll swim,
Let us with one heart endeavour,
To overcome our difficulties and win.*

Introduction

The *Second Emergency* (1968-1989) was the most critical period for the survival of Malaysia. Even though the state of Malaysia had obtained independence in 1957, the Communist insurgents' illegal guerrilla warfare activities led by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) were still active. Their activities contributed as a major threat to the Malaysian authorities. The undeclared *Second Emergency*, or low-intensity conflict (LIC) between the Government of Malaysia and the CPM was then further continued, and lasted until the CPM surrendered through the *Hatyai Peace Accord* in December 1989. For Malaysia, post-independence was a tough period to maintain its survival. Moreover, in the condition of world politics, the Cold War conflict between the super powers, and their involvement to expand influence and hegemonic power, in this paper focuses on Southeast Asia, precisely Malaysia. The ideological race between the Western bloc, the United States Of America (U.S.A.) and its allies, against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People Republic of China (PRC), coloured world politics in that period, especially on their direct involvement in 'Third World' countries. During that *détente* period, Washington was concerned over 'domino theory' and the collapse of Southeast Asia to Communism, and believed all Communist lines of command eventually ran back to Moscow (Weatherbee, 2010).

On the contrary, Communist parties throughout the world were urged to pursue a militant policy towards imperialism, that is, the Western capitalist bloc. The situation became more acute with the inclusion of Communist ideology in Southeast Asia. Communist uprisings started in Malaya, Burma, the Philippines and Hyderabad in India, right after the Southeast Asian Communist parties held a meeting in Calcutta on March 1948 (Comber, 2009). As asserted by Jackson (2011), Chinese Communist agents quickly infiltrated third world countries, and gained control of emerging labour movements. Their intention was to overthrow governments and establish Communist-controlled republics.

Fred Kaplan (2013) highlighted that the British experiences in the Malayan Emergency in countering the communist insurgents as being the classical military reference. The case of communist guerrilla activities in Malaya (later Malaysia) was mostly in literatures of Counterinsurgency (COIN), portrayed the battles during the First Malayan Emergency (1948-1960). There is a lack of discussion on the national security strategy deployed by the Malaysian government in dealing with the second uprising of communist insurgency in Malaysia after independence. Thus, this left a huge gap in the literature discussing the national security strategy deployed between the First and Second Emergency. For the purposes of this paper, the COIN strategic approaches by the Malaysian government will be discussed, using the KESBAN strategy during Tun Abdul Razak's premiership, as one of the successful COIN paradigms in countering the communist insurgents in the Second Emergency.

Second Emergency: Communist Insurgents & the 1969 Racial Riot

In Malaysia, the Communist movement was still active in spreading their illegal guerrilla warfare activities under the control of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). The CPM was formed in April 1930, after the dissolution of the Nanyang Communist Party in Singapore. The main aim of the CPM was to transform the country into a Communist republic. At that time, the CPM was not legally registered, and their guerrilla warfare activities were done ‘underground’, without recognition by authorities. Mentioned by Ward & Mirafior in the *Memoirs of Chin Peng* (2003), financial support from the PRC amounted to USD \$100, 000, which led to the second Communist armed struggle in the country.

Zakaria Yadi (2004) highlighted that the Second Emergency started in 1969, after the racial riot on May 13th, and ended after the CPM signed a peace accord with the Malaysian Government in Haatyai, Southern Thailand in 1989. The peace treaty was an effort and collaboration by the Malaysian Government and the Thai Government with the CPM, witnessed by two representatives from the PRC.

In the National Operations Council (NOC) report signed by Tun Abdul Razak in the aftermath of the racial clash incident on May 13th, 1969, it indicated the CPM strategy to weaken the nation by manipulating sensitive issues, including economic and racial issues. The CPM subversion strategy was a tactic to obtain support of their guerrilla activities from a segment of the population, especially from the Chinese ethnic group, to fight against Malaysian authority. The majority numbers of membership and leadership of the CPM were from the Chinese ethnic group, and the involvement of minority Malays were perceived as symbolic only (Ruhanas, 2009). The racial conflict of 13th May, instigated by the CPM, hindered national unity and stability, and was a threat to national security (Yadi, 2004 & Sharom, 2001). The National Consultative Council (NCC) highlighted after the racial riot three matters that needed to be addressed urgently; which included the need for reconciliation and restoration of goodwill among various races, and the need to reaffirm the social contract that was embodied in the Federal Constitution, as well as the need to close socio-economic divides between different races (Jawhar, 2011). Thus, in a multi-ethnic society, the racial issue is a sensitive matter, and if not managed properly, it may destroy the harmonious prosperity of a nation.

KESBAN : The Malaysian COIN Paradigm

Security and Development, or KESBAN, was the strategy used by the Malaysian government during the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak to counter Communist insurgents, and unite the population after the racial riot. It is clear that Tun Abdul Razak, through his vast experience as the Minister of Rural Development and Minister of Defence before he became the Prime Minister of Malaysia, realized that internal development is important to ensure the better security posture of Malaysia. His COIN strategy focused on development in Malay Language, *pembangunan*, to ensure a better security posture, in order to stabilise the multi-ethnic society in fraction, and protect the state from external threats. He believed that to ensure better security for the state, development in aspects of the economy and politics were essential. With that belief, development was a shield and protector to the population from easily being the target of enemies.

The core of COIN is ‘*winning hearts and minds*’ of the population. According to David Petraeus, successful COIN must focus on population, in terms of their needs and security,

isolation of insurgents and population, an emphasis on intelligence, and amnesty of insurgents (Kaplan, 2013). Malaysia did not follow the conventional method by using strong armed forces for a better security stance during Tun Razak's administration. His strategy of COIN, quoted in his speech:

'I don't care about Socialism, Communism, Neo-Colonialism or Capitalism. I give you what is the most important-ism not only in Malaysia but in Southeast Asia today. It is Alliance-ism. It is the unity of purpose of every-clear thinking citizen of this country. It is an example to the world of what real progress can be made. Development is our defence, discord is our danger, Give us your support-together we will secure the destiny of Malaysia!' (Tun Abdul Razak, 1960).

The strategy of KESBAN emphasizes two most important facets, internal security and internal development. The divisions of strategy involve security forces, both Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) and police, in safeguarding internal security and civil governmental agencies, taking role of the development aspect. KESBAN strategy was deployed by the Malaysian government as early in 1970, but it was formally legislated later as Directive No 11, in February 1980.

'KESBAN constitutes the sum total of all measures undertaken by the Malaysian Armed Forces and other government agencies to strengthen and protect society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency' (Jawhar, 2011).

There were three objectives of KESBAN, as the COIN paradigm included: closing the linkage between the communist insurgents and population; gaining the trust of the people, not only the Malays, but also the minority ethnic groups; and enhancing the twining agenda of security and development. Tun Razak's concept of security through development was further developed later by the National Security Council (NSC), and enshrined in the national security concept of KESBAN, taken from the combination of two Malay words, *keselamatan dan pembangunan*, or security and development. The basic premise of this concept, security and stability, were crucial preconditions for development as reflected in National Security Directive No. 11:

'KESBAN constitutes the sum total of all measures undertaken by the Malaysian Armed Forces and other government agencies to strengthen and protect society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency..' (Jawhar, 2011).

Although KESBAN was formally legislated by the National Security Council (NSC) as Directive No 11, in 1980, the Malaysian government since 1970 adopted the concept of security through development during Tun Razak's premiership, to combat and counter the CPM's insurgency activities, and maintain harmony among the multi-ethnic society. A revisit of Tun Razak's COIN strategy is a *sine qua non* to understand the present and perhaps, future situation in Malaysia.

Implementation of National Security Strategy

First and foremost, in order to capture the *hearts and minds* of the population, Tun Abdul Razak concentrated on internal development in the aspect of the economy. It is noted that to obtain support of the population, the government needed to find a better way to ensure the strategy and policy could enhance the economic well-being of the population. Poverty would induce the population to support the Communist ideology.

The economic pattern within the multi-ethnic society in Malaysia in the 1960s reflected the wide disparity among the majority ethnic group, the Malays, and minorities. The economic

disparity between ethnicities and races was a major security and political problem in Malaysia. In 1970, the Malays received the lowest income compared to Chinese and Indian households. Monthly income indicated \$179 received by Malay households, Chinese \$387 and Indian \$310, despite their status of the 'sons of the soil' or '*bumiputera*' (Second Malaysian Plan, 1971).

Wan Hashim (1983) highlighted apart from the racial socio-economic imbalance, the unemployment rate rose from 6 percent in 1960 to 8 percent in 1970, and there was a high portion of foreign domination in the Malaysian economy, of approximately 62 percent. During this time, the Malays were poorer, compared to Chinese, as most of them stayed in rural areas, whereby Chinese lived in semi-urban and urban areas. He pointed out, traditional notions portrayed the Chinese held economic power and were much more wealthier than Malays, whereas Malays held more political power, and and this perception created fear, mistrust and antagonism between these two majority ethnic groups.

Thus, National Economic Policy (NEP) was crafted to reduce the economic gap over ethnicity, as well as to correct and improve the socio-economic imbalance. The NEP took twenty years to implement, starting from 1970 until 1990, for Malaysia's economic development and also to enhance national unity and national security (Jawhar, 2011). National unity for Malaysia from 1970 onwards can be defined as:

'Unattainable without greater equity and balance among Malaysia's social and ethnic groups in their participation in the development of the country and in the sharing in the benefits from modernization and economic growth. National unity cannot be fostered if vast sections of the population remain poor' (2MP,1971).

Tun Abdul Razak noticed the '*divide and rule*' pattern of disintegration within the multi-ethnic society, designed and left by the colonial power, which threatened the multi-ethnic society of Malaysia in the long run. Therefore, the NEP was deployed to redesign the pattern of society in aspects of economics, towards fairer distribution of wealth and income. Tun Razak make an effort to strengthen Malaysian internal politics. His administration shouted the slogan of '*less politics, more development*' (Hussain, 1997). This strategy was to ensure full concentration towards leading the state and population to prosper and unite in the multi-ethnic society. In political development, Tun Abdul Razak made an effort to strengthen the *Alliance Party*, that consisted of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), by rebranding the *Alliance* to the *National Front*. This was the greatest political strategy deployed in obtaining the support from the population. Inviting more Opposition Parties to sit under the same umbrella of the *National Front*, portrayed the genius strategy in capturing the hearts and minds of the population to cast their vote towards *National Front* in general elections.

In uniting the multi-ethnic society, *Rukunegara*, or 'Pillars of the Nation' was created to encourage devotion of the population towards the state, and to improve the relationship among different ethnic groups within the society. Wan Hashim in his book *Race Relations in Malaysia* (1981) stated *Rukunegara* could help the government in galvanizing the country, and guide it towards national unity and help in blunting the edges of conflict among different races. The Five Principles of *Rukunegara* are: believe in God, loyalty to King and Country, supremacy of the Constitution, Rules of Laws, Courtesy and Morality. As stressed by the late Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, former Minister of Home Affairs, *Rukunegara* is not just the five principles, it is the totality of beliefs and rule, of commitments and principles (Ghazali Shafie, 1985).

In dealing with international and regional politics, Tun Abdul Razak changed the norm of foreign policy from too pro-Western and anti-Communist into a more neutral foreign policy. This strategy was translated by making an effort to make friendlier and less rigid approaches to the Communist states, and therefore Tun Abdul Razak had an official bilateral visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC). This historical strategy was made in 1974, and the visit gave an opportunity for him to discuss some issues with the Prime Minister of the PRC, Chou En-Lai, and President Mao Tze Tung. In his official visit, Tun Abdul Razak talked over several issues, including: the role of the PRC in supporting the CPM's activities in Malaysia; the dual citizenship of 200,000 Chinese in Malaysia; and the prospect of economic relations between two states. The fruitful discussion successfully resolved several issues. Malaysia was the first state in Southeast Asia that had formal relations with the PRC. Tun Abdul Razak later made official visits to North Korea, North Vietnam, East Germany, and the Republic of Mongolia.

In ensuring the better security posture in the region, Tun Abdul Razak proposed the idea of *neutralization* of Southeast Asia from interference by the superpowers. The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand signed a declaration of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOFPAN) on November 1971. The strategy was to ensure that the Southeast Asia region was free from any manner of interference by outside powers (Weatherbee, 2010). Malaysia also played an active role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration by the Founding Fathers of ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

The CPM's involvement in crimes and subversion activities gave threats to the state and society. Their guerrilla activities included bombing of the National Monument in Kuala Lumpur, and the assassination of the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Tan Sri Abdul Rahman Hashim, in 1974, marking their aggression in Malaysia. In the KESBAN concept, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) and the police played a pivotal role in managing the internal security and defence of the state. For this, General Tan Sri Dato Sri Panglima Zulkifli Zainal Abidin mentioned the importance in ensuring internal security, by collaboration and coordination between various government agencies in accomplishing their task on the development:

'KESBAN operation is like conducting an orchestra. The musical instruments are of diverse types. Yet they all contribute toward creating the same music. Every single musician has to be good at playing his musical instrument. They all read the same note. They also follow the lead from one single conductor who is in charge of the performance' (Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, 2015).

Yadi (2004) concludes that an overall Malaysian government containment policy towards the CPM was a successful effort. Tun Abdul Razak laid the groundwork of security for development, and it is carried forward by his successors. Tun Abdul Razak believed security and development work hand in hand in creating a good posture of security.

Consequences of Tun Abdul Razak's National Security Strategy: Northern States of Perak

At this juncture, it is appropriate to provide a general and historical background of the area of our case study. The Upper Perak district borders Kelantan state on the east, Thailand in the north and Kedah in north-west. In the past, Upper Perak was among the least developed areas

of the Malaysian Peninsula, as well as a sparsely populated region. At the same time, it was also known as a region of ‘safe haven’ for the Communist insurgents or guerrilla fighters. The CPM, with Communist guerrillas as its military wing, had its beginning during the Japanese occupation of then colonial Malaya between January 1942 and September 1945. Its predecessor was The Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), formed by the British to help the latter fight against Japanese invasion during World War II. After the Japanese surrender, the MPAJA as an organization continued to exist in the form of the CPM, but with a different aim; to fight the British colonialists in order to free Malaya from foreign domination. Its covert aim was to convert Malaya into a socialist-Communist republic, aligned with China and the Soviet Union.

As mentioned above, the Upper Perak region or district had been regarded as a safe haven by the Communist insurgents, whereby a corridor was formed in the deep tropical jungle as an escape route into Thailand. In 1970, there were about 1,000 Communist guerrillas operating along the Malaysia-Thailand border; their numbers were increased in year 1975 to 2,054 Communist guerrillas operating in the Thailand border (Sindhu, 2009). In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, ambushes of military vehicles or the burning of buses and derailing trains were quite a common occurrence. For the purpose of this paper, the discussion shall be narrowed down by looking on the consequences of the Razak’s national security strategy on his development programmes namely the *Felda land scheme*, the *East West Highway*, and the *Temenggor Dam* projects, which fell under the KESBAN special projects. All these had long-term effects of curtailing the activities of Communist insurgents, and at the same time had long term benefits to the population at large.

The Federal Land Development Authority Scheme (FELDA)

The Felda land scheme was formulated in the early 1950s with the aim of providing land to the landless rural population, where the government had a direct involvement in the selection of settlers, providing the necessary infrastructure and financial aid as a form of loan to be repaid on a long term basis. The basic aim was to ensure a successful amelioration of the conditions of the rural population from poverty. The programme had been implemented nationwide in all the nine Malay states in the Malay Peninsula. The indirect or latent aim was to win the hearts and minds of the population, so as not to be attracted to Communist activities, and concentrate on improving the standard of living.

At the end of Tun Razak’s premiership as a Prime Minister in 1976, there were already 108 Felda settlement schemes located all over the Malaysian Peninsula, with a total 41,288 households settled in these state farms. Approximately 50 percent of the schemes were planted with rubber trees, the other 50 percent with oil palm (Baharin & Parera, 1977). By 1980, the area cultivated had reached 1,301,382 acres. In the sub-district of upper Perak, there was a Felda settlement located some 10 kilometres from the town of Gerik on the Gerik-Jeli or East-West Highway, which was constructed in the 1970s. This scheme had 320 households, and was one of the earliest Felda schemes in the country, opened in the early 1960s (Wan Hashim, 1976). In fieldwork conducted in 1975, out of a total of 160 households interviewed, 64 percent were formerly engaged in agriculture as landless peasants, 15 percent consisted of ex-servicemen (police and armed forces), and 6 percent were engaged in miscellaneous economic activities (Wan Hashim, 1976).

Without doubt, the Felda settlement scheme was one of the success stories of Malaysian style land reform, with the main aim of improving the living standards of landless peasants and

workers, by transforming them into middle-class peasants-smallholders, each owning some 10 acres of rubber or palm oil plantation. Surely, these rural ‘middle peasants’ would never be attracted to any propaganda or attempts to convert them as followers of Communism. In fact, they became a bastion or protector of democratic forms of government and the liberal-capitalist socio-economic system.

East -West Highway between Gerik and Jeli

Before the completion of a federal highway in the middle of the 1970s that linked Gerik in Upper Perak with Jeli in Kelantan, people from the east-coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu, who wished to travel to the west coast states of the Malaysian Peninsula, like Perak, Kedah, Pahang and Perlis, had to travel via southern Thailand, or through Kuala Lumpur in the south, and proceed north, making a travelling distance of more than 600km. After the completion of the East West highway, the distance had been reduced to only one-third, or approximately 200km.

Facilitating the movement of population between the east coast and west coast states was only a part of a wider programme. More important was to transfer people into this undeveloped jungle area, to become a developed region with a settled population. This would end the remoteness and isolation of this thickly covered jungle area. In other words, it was a direct encroachment of the government and the civilian population into the so-called safe haven of the Communist guerrilla fighters. The aim of the development of this highway was to separate the Communist insurgents and the population. The construction of this highway did not go smoothly, with incidents and harassment by the militant Communist insurgents. Workers travelling daily into and out of the area under construction had to be escorted by military personnel and vehicles. There were several military outposts formed at a certain distance along the highway. Clearly, the CPM realised that the presence of the East-West highway would affect their freedom of movement in the area, and the Upper Perak equatorial forest was no more a safe haven for them.

The Temenggor Dam Project

The third KESBAN program that saw a direct encroachment of a government development project into the safe havens of CPM insurgents was the Temenggor hydro-electric dam project, which started construction in the 1970s. It was also a two-pronged approach, that was to provide electric power supply nation-wide, and at the same time to flood the river valleys in the surrounding areas of Perak river with a huge man-made lake, such that a relatively large land-mass in the area between the states of Perak and Pahang would be covered with water. While the dam was under construction, there was a process of resettlement of Malays and the aboriginal or Orang Asli (original people) villages into areas uphill, not affected by the formation of the man-made lake in the area. Two Malay villages, Kampung Belum and Kampung Kuala Temenggor were re-located in the more developed part of the district, acquiring a new name of Kampung Belum Baru and Kampung Ganda Temenggor. All families were provided with agricultural land for cultivation.

The creation of Temenggor Lake had achieved its intended consequences of encroaching and destroying the safe haven of the Communist guerrillas, and cutting the entire jungle path that connected southern Thailand with north and central Perak. After the completion of the Temenggor Dam in late 1970s, Communist guerrilla activities were greatly reduced. But from the viewpoint of development, the construction of Temenggor Dam had long-term effects, as the area has since become a tourist attraction, not just because of the natural beauty of the

surrounding environment, but also because the area, which has been gazetted as '*The Royal Belum*' appears to be one of the oldest and well preserved rainforests in the country.

Conclusion

For a new nation-state like Malaya, later Malaysia, the struggle to maintain the nation's integrity in facing threats from the Communist insurgents to overthrow the democratically elected government was a hard and bitter one. At its early phase after the declaration of emergency rule in 1948, when Malaya was still under the British, General Sir Gerald Templar, the British High Commissioner, had introduced the concept or principle of "*winning the hearts and minds of the people*". By cutting off contact between the Chinese rural population and the Communist guerrillas, confining them into '*new villages*', which were surrounded by barbed-wire, the guerrillas were denied food supplies and man-power. This had helped to confine their activities in the jungle.

But then, during the *Second Emergency* period, the government of Malaysia had to find a new and more effective strategy to counter Communist insurgents, through a strategy known as security and development. Overall, the security and development strategy, deployed especially during the Tun Abdul Razak premiership helped to ensure the survival of Malaysia from internal and external threats. Thus, defence and security must not solely rely only on the usage of hard power; the combination of other factors such as economic, political, societal, and psychological may contribute to the better security position of a state. In this paper, it was highlighted that security and development was the essence of Tun Razak's leadership. His national security strategy to combat the CPM through non-aggression tactics and population-centric approaches indicated the success of his well-crafted national security strategy.

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Cosmopolitanism as Biopower: Creating and Targeting Cultural Others

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Abstract

This paper analyses cosmopolitanism from the lens of biopower. The central argument is that the actual and prospective actions undertaken in the name of upholding cosmopolitan ideals perpetuates biopower. Cosmopolitan ideals here imply the tendency to transcend territorial boundedness. The smokescreen of justice serves to legitimate the narrow self-interest of a few powerful countries. Borrowing the notion of ‘bare life’ and ‘docile bodies’, the paper presents the argument that the selective exclusion of certain social and cultural communities transcends domestic polity. It is no longer the case that a sovereign authority in a domestic polity controls and regulates populations.

Though there is no sovereign power at the international level, the hegemonic stature achieved by the liberal capitalist model is seen as analogous. The contemporary drives toward fighting with justifications that are rooted in cosmopolitan ideals clearly exemplify such a construction of an enemy by ‘othering’. Such actions do not always proceed towards a spatially defined target, but are often directed towards a culturally specific racial other. The contemporary drive for cosmopolitan wars allude to such a reduction of constructed others and perpetuation of ideational hegemony.

Though organisations like NATO claim to work under the authorisation of Security Council resolutions, the ultimate outcomes clearly demonstrate a hegemonic aspiration. A certain model of governance – US-style liberal democracy in this case – is seen to be more appropriate than the existing model or other alternate models. The paper, through empirical evidence, confirms the hypothesis that cosmopolitanism helps sustain a model based on biopower.

Keywords: cosmopolitanism, biopower, othering, bare life, docile bodies, hegemony, justice

Introduction

Cosmopolitanism is a theoretical tool that is expanding fast, and is gaining prominence in current discourses on justice (Held, 2010). The central argument of the paper is that the practice of cosmopolitanism is an exercise of biopower. The paper argues that the actual and prospective actions undertaken in the name of upholding the cosmopolitan ideals perpetuates biopower. The uncritical acceptance of any model of governance is problematic. The paper argues that alternate narratives and differences are forcibly subsumed in the mainstream narratives, and the ideas posing foundational challenges are further marginalised, sidelined, and silenced. The paper engages with the concept of biopower and the idea of cosmopolitanism, and makes an effort at uncovering the inherent problems. Following a post-structural analysis of the contemporary world, the paper argues against the hegemonic nature of liberal universalism. It posits that the dominant stature achieved by the ‘liberal’ community of states is an expression of the perpetuation of biopower.

Biopower is exercised even when a world state is not in place. The practice of cosmopolitanism, especially those of cosmopolitan wars, allows the narrow, self-interested motives of powerful nations to be camouflaged as just and altruistic. This, in turn, creates ‘others’ by a targeted action against those cultural communities that do not allude to the dominant narrative. These created others are then systematically targeted after being reduced as a form of ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault, 1978), and ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998). The paper proceeds by explaining the notion of cosmopolitanism and biopower. It then engages with the theory and the practice of othering to substantiate the claim.

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism is the theoretical premise for the notion of global justice. Put simply, it implies the tendency to transcend territorial boundedness. Cosmopolitanism could be defined as a moral ideal that emphasises tolerance towards differences, and envisages the possibility of a more ‘just’ world order. The idea is that the duties of a human being towards fellow human beings should not be limited to compatriots. Equal moral worth of individuals, irrespective of their citizenship, remains the central concern. The normative argument is that one’s duty towards fellow human beings does not stop at national boundaries.

Several scholars alluding to different hues of cosmopolitanism have emphasised the idea that territorial boundaries, which used to matter the most in recent history, no longer hold such unquestioned sanctity. These scholars differ in their degree and prescriptions (Miller, 2007). Some focus more on legality, while some focus on moral content. Some advocate cosmopolitanism with a stronger degree (Nussbaum, 2002), while some are content with a weak notion of it (Beitz, 1975; Rawls 1993). However, three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions. First, *individualism*: the ultimate units of concern are human beings or persons. Communities, nations or states may be units of concern only indirectly, through their individual members or citizens. Second, *universality*: the status of ultimate unit of concern is attached to every living human being equally. Third, *generality*: persons are ultimate units of concern for everyone and not only for their compatriots or fellow religionists (Pogge, 1992: 48-49).

With respect to assigning responsibilities, scholars have discussed two variants of cosmopolitanism – ‘interactional’ and ‘institutional’ cosmopolitanism (Cabrera, 2004). Interactional cosmopolitanism assigns direct responsibility for fulfilment of human rights to

other agents, while institutional cosmopolitanism assigns such responsibility to institutional schemes. On the interactional view, human rights impose ‘constraints on conduct’ (Pogge, 2007), while on the institutional view, they impose constraints upon ‘shared practices’ (Cabrera, 2004). The institutional variant of cosmopolitanism is of more interest to the present study, as the study undertakes an analysis of the contemporary world through the lens of biopower.

The exercises of biopower requires an institution mechanism to ‘discipline and regulate’ (Foucault, 2000) the population. The constraints that are imposed on shared practices by virtue of belonging to the so-called international community is not inclusive. Certain practices are more acceptable than others. The exclusion created at the level of norm creation at the institutional level perpetuates hegemony and thereby leads to further marginalisation. The creation of ‘truth regimes’ (Foucault, 1984a) sustain such norms. Certain norms gain place in the dominant discourse, owing to their conformity to the existing truth regime. Others get marginalised and sidelined for non-confirmity.

Biopower

Biopower can be defined as a form of power that has its focus on ‘human life at the level of populations’ (Neal, 2009). Foucault focused on the forms, locations and practices of modern power in its plurality. He was concerned with the ways in which such a modern power organises and shapes human populations. Foucault extended his study of disciplinary power, with its focus on the normalization of the productive individual, to biopower. The shift, for Foucault, occurred from power/knowledge that was concerned with ‘training an individual within the walls of an institution’, to that of power/knowledge that is concerned with ‘promoting human life generally’ (Foucault, 1984b). The mass public programmes of the nineteenth century are expression of such biopower. Such programmes aimed at reshaping the ‘living conditions of populations’ (Reid, 2008) through proper sanitation, creation of transportation and communication networks, and mass immunisation for eradicating several diseases (Neal, 2009).

Biopower, as power over life, takes two main forms. First, it ‘disciplines the body’ (Neal, 2009). This process implies that the human body is treated like a machine, and looked at in terms of productivity and economic efficiency. Examples of the exercise of such biopower were seen by Foucault in the military, education, and workplace, whereby it seeks to create a disciplined population that would be more effective. Second, it ‘regulates the population’. This process implies that the reproductive capacity of the human body is emphasised. This form of bio-power appears in demography, wealth analysis, and ideology, and seeks to control the population on a statistical level (Reid, 2008).

Foucault argued about the move from a singular and centred power that threatens death to such forms of power that are plural and decentred, and that promote life. ‘Sovereignty took life and let live. And now we have the emergence of a power that... consists in making live and letting die’ (Foucault, 2002: 247). Death remains an outcome of modern practices of power. However, once it is considered statistically at the level of populations, selective policy choices about where to allocate funds or withhold them often results in ‘letting die’, rather than directly causing to die. Examples might include the concrete numbers of lives saved by increasing funding for road safety, or not allocating more resources to tackling the AIDS pandemic.

The Theory of Othering: Foucault and Agamben

The poststructuralist critique of liberal governmentality based on modernity in general and that of cosmopolitanism in particular rests on the assumption that modernity leads to the creation of certain conceptions as ‘normal’. This normalisation implies that certain forms of knowledge are considered more worthy than some other forms of knowledge. This sort of divide between what forms part of discourse and what remains excluded is the basis of creating a regime of truth that does not include multiple voices. This in turn leads to the creation of ‘others’, as this paper argues. Some notions are considered unworthy of being part of an idea of the so-called global good, and this allows the formation of cultural others that is at the root of the problem in modern global polity (Choudhary, 2014).

Foucault and Othering

Foucault (1978) argued that the concepts that considered being natural are in fact not based on something ‘objectively definable’. Using this argument, it could be ascertained that the discourse on justice, for instance, is not based on the existence of an object called justice. The concept of justice is rather defined by the collection of statements that are accepted as being about justice, and those that are not. The question that Foucault raised was how and why certain statements emerge and get associated with the certain discourse, while others either do not emerge or are not accepted as part of the discourse. Foucault viewed truth and knowledge as functions of power. Truth is ‘not outside power’. Societies have their own ‘regimes of truth’ that is formed through selectively excluding discourses that are not acceptable (Foucault 1984a).

Foucault called such conditions of existence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance as the ‘rules of formation’ of a discourse (Foucault, 1972: 38). There are three aspects that are essential with respect to the rules of formation: the ‘field of initial differentiation’, wherein the discourse defines its object and differentiates itself from other discourses; the ‘authorities of delimitation’, who are assigned the authority and command legitimacy to make truth statements about the object; and the ‘grids of specification’, according to which the various parts of the discourse are ‘divided, contested, related, regrouped, classified, derived from one another’ (Foucault, 1972: 41-2).

Foucault (1978), presenting the relation of war to the society, addressed as to how the emergence of ‘biopower’ – concerned with exerting control over life – has led to a proliferation and intensification of the problem of war between societies (Foucault 1978). Regimes as perpetrators of violence and undertaking a holocaust on their own population can be seen as a result of the emergence of such a biopower (Foucault, 1978). Foucault (1978) further engaged with the paradox of ‘political modernity’, and argued that the reason for the increased tendency among the modern societies toward ‘barbarous forms of war’ can be attributed to the shift where power is oriented towards the exertion of control over life (Foucault, 1978). Wars, thus, are now seen to be waged on behalf of the existence of entire populations that get mobilised for the purpose of ‘wholesale slaughter’, making massacres a vital phenomenon and normalised for ‘life necessity’ (Foucault, 1978). In the traditional view, war was perceived as a means to resolve disputes that arose between sovereigns – with clear distinction between the sovereigns and the corresponding subjects, with respect to the location of power. In a biopolitical context, however, the exercise of power occurs at the ‘level of the life of populations’, and thereby war ‘occurs in the form of a struggle between populations’ (Dillon, 2008; Reid, 2008).

Agamben and Othering

Agamben (1998) presents the ideas of ‘bare life’ that he deduces from the relation between ‘politics, life and sovereign power’. The basic thrust of the argument is that by selective exclusion of certain forms of lives that are considered to be unworthy of living, the sovereign power reduces them to ‘expendable form of life’, or the ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998). The bare life, further, is banned from political and legal institutions. Furthermore, he presents the idea of ‘inclusive exclusion’ that posits the argument that the biological life is an integral part of the political life, by the virtue of this very exclusion. It is in this ‘zone of indistinction’ between the biological and political life that sovereign power is able to produce bare life (Agamben, 1998: 7). In Agamben’s view, modern life ‘tends toward biopolitics’, and reduces the individual to ‘bare life’ (Agamben, 1998). Human beings completely become the ‘subject to rules and regulations and subject to exclusion’ (Agamben, 1998).

For Agamben, the notion of ‘exception’ (Agamben, 1998) is inherent in democracies. This exception starts to spread, as the executive is given more space by the legislature, as ‘sovereignty occurs when a decision must be made’ (Hegarty, 2010), and it is the sovereign who has the final say in deciding on the exception, and as to when the rules could be suspended (Agamben, 1998). This exception is characterised by ‘unlimited authority’, and the possibility of suspending ‘the entire existing order’ (Jabri 2007; Vaughan-Williams 2009). It is this propensity to reduce the individuals to the form of bare that Agamben emphasises upon, and this, in turn, creates a clear distinction between those who have the right to live and those who can be killed – being segregated as the others. The cosmopolitan wars clearly manifest this distinction, wherein those who support the order – as envisaged by the sovereign authority as desirable – are seen as adhering to the idea of achieving the greater good.

Foucault’s concept of ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault, 1978) is close to the idea of ‘bare life’ that Agamben presents (Agamben, 1998). The difference, however, lies in the fact that while Foucault viewed the shift from politics to biopolitics as a ‘historical transformation’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2009), Agamben considers the political realm itself as ‘originally biopolitical’ (Agamben, 1998). By this, it is asserted that instead of understanding the process of change in the nature of politics, Agamben makes a stronger statement, that politics, by its very nature, is biopolitical. The biopolitical nature of politics is sustained through the practice of othering. Individuals are normalised through the techniques of governmentality, like ‘statistics, population studies, health and family policies, and welfare policies’ (Foucault, 2007).

The Practice of Othering

The contemporary drives toward fighting with justifications that are rooted in cosmopolitan ideals clearly exemplify such a construction of an enemy by ‘othering’. Such actions do not always proceed towards a spatially defined target, but are often directed towards a culturally specific racial other. The contemporary drive for cosmopolitan wars alludes to such a reduction of constructed others, and perpetuation of ideational hegemony. Cosmopolitanism, based on liberalism, provides the necessary legitimacy, owing to the fact that it appeals through the garb of justice. Construction of an enemy, undertaken by selectively picking up particular individuals and viewing their presence itself as a threat, defeats the very ‘idea of equal citizenship before the law’ (Jabri, 2006).

The contemporary drive towards fighting with justifications that are rooted in cosmopolitan ideals clearly exemplify such a construction of an enemy. It is to be noted that such actions do

not always proceed towards a spatially defined target, but are often directed towards a culturally specific racial other. The contemporary drive for cosmopolitan wars allude to such a reduction of constructed others, and ideological hegemony can be seen at play. In this regard, the 2011 case of Libya and the role of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) does provide for an illustration (Rabkin, 2011). Though NATO forces claimed to work under the authorisation of UN Security Council resolution 1973, the ultimate outcome clearly demonstrated a hegemonic aspiration. It ‘supplemented’ the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court by proceeding with extended bombings in Libya. However, NATO ultimately reached a stalemate after months of bombing in Libya, owing to the fact that it chose not to overstep, beyond a point, against international humanitarian law (Rabkin, 2001).

Earlier in 1999, NATO had conducted an ‘extended air war’ against Serbia without any authorization (Rabkin, 2011: 711). A certain model of governance – US-style liberal democracy in this case – is seen to be more appropriate than the existing model. The garb of humanitarian motive is used to perpetrate violence and undertake a sort of cosmopolitan war, which does convey the move towards ideational hegemony. The humanitarian motive was mixed with non-altruistic security imperatives in the case of Yugoslavia, when the major NATO states used force against it. This was owing to the fact that the West achieved a certain level of hegemonic ascendancy after the end of Cold War (Krasner, 1999).

Jabri uses these concepts of Agamben and Foucault and applies it to the transformed global polity. She outlines the dangers that the ‘liberal democratic polity’ faces when it institutionalises the practices that are meant to ‘target the cultural and racial other’, by drawing ‘violent racial boundaries’ (Jabri, 2007). Here, she uses Agamben’s ideas, arguing that such a reduction of the citizen as ‘racial other’ leads to what Agamben refers to as ‘bare life’ – a life that is purposely made ‘devoid of rights, of history and of the capacity to speak’ (Agamben, 1998; Jabri, 2007). For Jabri (2007), the transformed global polity practices ‘othering’ through cosmopolitan wars. She provides an analysis of wars in the transformed global polity from the critical-theoretical viewpoint. Using the ideas of Foucault and Agamben, Jabri (2007) applies it to the domain of global politics.

It is important to take into account the situational variations between the west and the rest. Ayoob (2002) presents an argument from the subaltern realist perspective about a certain trade off between order and justice when he argues that the while ‘the North’, which includes the developed nations, is interested in justice within the boundaries of the states and order among the territorially sovereign states, ‘the South’, consisting of the so-called developing and underdeveloped nations, is primarily concerned about maintenance of order within the states, and calls for justice among the territorially sovereign states (Ayoob, 2002). It is thus important to understand that by trying to impose a model that is typical of Western civilization, the West is culpable of undermining the demand of the so-called global South. The specificities of the countries that do not allude to the same ‘unquestioned’ liberal democracy cannot be discarded as being non-compliant to the global good.

The hegemonic aspirations of the existing power-wielders clearly demonstrate the existence of non-altruistic motives garbed in humanitarian cloaks. The process of creating racial others and then attributing on to them the ‘right to die’, by reducing them to the level of ‘bare life’ and ‘docile bodies’ is what the actual scenario demonstrates (Agamben, 1998; Foucault, 1978; Jabri, 2007). The global war on terror and the selective othering of Muslim populations is a case that exemplifies this argument. Post- September 11, Muslims have been seen with an eye of distrust. The notion of bringing justice has in fact led to a creation of ‘others’, who are tried,

detained and tortured, is no mystery. Regarding the situation post-9/11, Smith (2004) has argued that universal rationality has achieved undue significance. The disciplinary practices in academia have also helped in reinforcing the Western conceptions, by alluding to constructed categories that adhere to the Western discourses.

The problem is further amplified when a secular country like India also tries to emulate the Western notion of justice based on othering. Application of draconian laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act (UAPA) of 2004 demonstrates the inability of the state to deal with dissent and discontent through dialogue. The UAPA Act of 2004 provides for dealing with activities directed against the ‘integrity and sovereignty’ of India (MHA, 2004). In the name of effective law and order to fight separatism and terrorism, the state is culpable of major atrocities on innocent people. Under the UAPA and other draconian laws, the Indian government has arrested Maoist leaders, and also allegedly arrested young Muslim men as a preventive measure (Chakrabarty, 2012). Such acts by the government stand opposed to the very ideal of democracy, where everyone is guaranteed equality before law. By targeting particular communities, the security policies have in fact become modes of perpetrating insecurity. A recent instance pertains to the acquittal of seventeen young Muslim men, who were arrested 2008 for allegedly having links with terrorist organisations (Press Trust of India, 2015).

For Dillon and Reid (2009), the way liberal polities fight war is more about biopolitics than geopolitics. The demarcation between ‘good life’ and ‘bad life’ is what creates the ‘foreclosure of avenues of emancipation’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009). Innocent lives being lost at the hands of drones in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq clearly demonstrate the policy of the West based on ‘bare life’. Some lives are too unimportant to be seen beyond statistics. The argument is not that terrorism should not be fought. However, the othering of entire populations and killing people based merely on suspicion of having terrorist links is clearly not humanitarian. The predator drones strikes are carried out just on vague data available about potential terrorists, and have claimed more civilian casualties than its actual purpose of targeted killing (Zenko, 2012). It is for these reasons that even the perpetuation of international terrorism is seen as a ‘resistance’ to the ‘global regime of life’ (Beardsworth, 2011).

The process of othering is an exercise of biopolitics that is legitimised in the name of upholding cosmopolitan ideals. The episodes of intervention in the name of protecting the people when their own governments fail to do so does not really uphold justice. These exercises, legitimised through the terminology of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, claim to uphold human rights (Badescu, 2011). However, through the reduction of certain cultural groups as bare life and selectively targeting them, they do not in fact pursue an altruistic measure. The dominance of the ‘liberal’ West, instead, gets concretised. Norms are enforced by the hegemonic, powerful states. Had the West not achieved a hegemonic status post-Cold War, there would have been ‘no interventions in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Kosovo’ (Krasner, 1999). While biopower is a concept that has been used mostly in context of domestic polities that have a government, the present scenario clearly demonstrates the existence of such a power over life at the global stage.

Conclusion

The smokescreen of justice serves to legitimate the narrow self-interest of a few powerful countries. Borrowing the notion of ‘bare life’ from Agamben and ‘docile bodies’ from Foucault, this paper presented the argument that the selective exclusion of certain social and cultural communities transcends domestic polity. It is no longer the case that a sovereign

authority in a domestic polity has exclusive control over populations and regulates it. It is asserted here that even though there is no sovereign power at the international level, the hegemonic stature achieved by the liberal capitalist model is seen analogous. The pursuance of war in the name of upholding cosmopolitan ideals unsettles the foundation of morality itself. On one hand, the argument goes for supporting the notion of cosmopolitan citizens based on cosmopolitan morality, and transcending the boundaries to converge the compatriot versus non-compatriot barrier. On the other hand, the pursuit to paint the world in a single colour by forcibly installing a certain preferred government model takes place. Those who do not comply to such ideals are thereby relegated as non-compliant to the idea of a ‘global good’ (Choudhary, 2014).

The tendency to align to the general notion of what is right is seen in the case of a liberal democracy like India, which emulated the Western example of war on terror. Such a generalised trend is exemplary of the phenomenon that the paper equates with the perpetuation of biopower, on the basis of cosmopolitan ideals. By identifying the ‘enemy’ that is not limited to borders, the international community confirms to a cosmopolitan ideal. It thereby justifies the acts of undue suffering caused to a certain group of cultural others, targeted through the exercise of biopower. This paper, thus, validates the hypothesis that cosmopolitanism helps sustain a model based on biopower.

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Japan-China Game: Navigating through the Risk Zone

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Abstract

This research aims to analyze the recent developments in the strategic interactions between Japan and China over their territorial disputes in the East China Sea from the perspectives of statistical and game-theoretical modeling. Two linear regression models were run in scope of this study. The first model assesses the effect of political deterioration between the two nations on their economic relationship. The second model deals with the test of the relationship between the dynamics of public opinion of China shared by the Japanese people on the volume of Sino-Japanese trade.

The methodology of this study also includes application of a deterrence model to Sino-Japanese territorial disputes. By analyzing the case studies of incidents between Japan and China over the disputed islands in the East China Sea, this study tracks the evolution of strategies of different administrations both in Japan and China. The importance of the signaling is assessed. The paper concludes with the demonstration of the implications of the model for the understanding of the motivations behind the actions of Japanese and Chinese leaderships.

Keywords: China, Japan, game theory, Senkaku/Diaoyu, statistics

Introduction

In the wake of the 21st century, the relationship between the two Asian giants has been dynamic and puzzling at the same time. The geopolitical structure of the Northeast Asian sub-region has undergone tectonic shifts, mainly caused by China's economic and military rise. At the same time, the decades-long stagnation of the Japanese economy has only contributed to the rapid shuffle of the relative power potential of Japan and China. Thus, in the year 2000, Japanese GDP was 2.5 times larger than that of China; while in 2015, the Chinese economy exceeded its eastern competitor by the same margin. In the mentioned period, China has also overtaken Japan as the regional leader in terms of military spending, with Beijing's current military budget being more than a threefold of Tokyo's military expenditure.

Such kind of profound power transitions were echoed by the aggravation of the uneasy situation in the East China Sea. The historic conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which was overlooked for decades, has unwound in recent years, greatly spoiling the atmosphere of the relationship, and defacing public perceptions of each other. Currently, the grim sentiments on both sides are at a record high, reaching the point where more than 90% of the populations have a negative opinion vis-à-vis the other.

However, one aspect of the Sino-Japanese relations that has been on the rise is bilateral trade. The East Asian paradox of "cold politics-hot economics" persisted throughout the first decade of the 21st century. Nevertheless, the advent of the new phase of aggravation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2010, the application of economic leverage by China in the form of an embargo on rare ore following the detainment of a Chinese captain by Japanese officials, and the decline in investment between the two countries has led some authors (Chang, 2014) to announce the end of the "hot economics" era.

In this paper, the dynamics of contemporary Sino-Japanese relations are addressed, with the application of statistical and game theoretical models, with an attempt to reveal the motivations behind the administrations' decisions, and to figure out their interests and valuations in this conflict. In order to better understand their utility function, the following questions are answered:

What is the impact of the deterioration of political relations between China and Japan on their bilateral trade?

What is the impact of the deterioration of public perceptions of each other on bilateral trade?

In the next stage of analysis, the strategic interaction over the disputed islands is modeled, in the form of a dynamic game. The impact of several variables is assessed over time, and conclusions are drawn based on different response patterns of succeeding administrations.

Literature Review

The extensive literature on the Asia-Pacific region and China's role has been categorized (Evans, 2010) into three broad schools of thought: primacists, exceptionalists, and pragmatists. The first school (Aaron L. Friedberg, John J. Mearsheimer, Robyn Lim, Hugh White) is advancing the China threat theory and adheres to the (neo)-realist conceptual stream. The

second school of exceptionalists (David Kang, William H. Overholt, Kenneth D. Johnson and Edward Burman) propagates the exceptionalism of the East Asian region, and argues that China's rise has been possible so far and will be possible in the future. John Ikenberry's position (Ikenberry, 2005), underlying the importance of liberal world order as an environment of China's rise, which engages and constrains the latter by economic and other means of cooperation, is also somehow close to the exceptionalists' view. Finally, the pragmatists (Amitav Acharya, Muthiah Alagappa, Robert S. Ross, Ashlet Tellis and Michael Swaine and Avery Goldstein) combine "hard" alliance systems with soft projects of regional interdependence. Evelyn Goh (Goh, 2007/2008) even proposes the concept of "omnienmeshment policy".

More specifically, Sino-Japanese relations have undergone a transformation since the end of the Cold War, and the disintegration of the US-China-USSR triangle (Yunling, 1997). Currently, many scholars (Mochizuki, 2007; Terada, 2006; Rozman, 2007; Hughes, 2009; Sohn, 2010) see the logic of a balance of power as the backbone of the relationship. Yun Zhang (2013) emphasizes major power interactions as the determining force of Sino-Japanese relations, instead of a balance of power. Finally, other researchers (Bjorn & Hagstrom, 2012) argue there is Japan's accommodation policy towards the rising power of the PRC.

A specifically important aspect of Sino-Japanese relations is the interplay between economics and politics. While the effects of economic interdependence between Japan and China on political relations have been widely studied (Koo, 2009), the relationship between public opinion and trade has often been neglected. On one hand, it is argued by Victor Shih that "All kinds of policymaking, not just trade policy, are increasingly reactive to Internet opinion" (quoted in Bradsher, 2009). However, on the other hand, the "hot economics, cold politics" paradox, though questioned by some (Chang, 2014), is still a counterargument to that opinion applied to Sino-Japanese relations.

This literature review does not cover the arguments of all theories of international relations; rather some of them are systematized in the following table. Table 1 summarizes the debate between realism/neorealism and liberalism/neoliberalism applied to Sino-Japanese relations, in the form of a "draw". The peculiarity of the Sino-Japanese relationship is the intertwined nature of factors and processes that fall in the logic and worldview of both broad theoretical groups. This pretty much explains why there is no consensus between the two major International Relations theories concerning these puzzling interactions.

Table 1. Balance of Realism/Neorealism and Liberalism/Neoliberalism Arguments

Theory		Realism/Neorealism	Liberalism/Neoliberalism
Process/Factor	Maritime Conflicts	++	-
	Military Expenditure	+	-
	Economic Interdependence	-	++
	International Organizations	-	+
	US Involvement	+	+
		4/2	4/2

Much of the literature deals with investigating the effects of economic integration and engagement on political relationships, while the reverse connection of political climate on

economic and trade relations has been somewhat overlooked. The current research attempts to test for the relationship between political deterioration and trade turnover between Japan and China. Explanations for the aggravations in the Sino-Japanese relationship over the course of time and through different administrations in Tokyo are also proposed.

Methodology

This paper adopts a game theoretical approach to construct a model of interaction between Japan and China that would be explained in details in the Game section of this paper. One of the main assumptions analysts make about Sino-Japanese relations is that the challenge to the status quo is a tradeoff between economic (profit from trade) and political gains (the new or transformed status quo). It is argued that depending on the type of one of the two possible leaderships that differ in their valuation of political and economic gains, a respective decision (challenge-not, escalate-not escalate, etc.) is made. However, in this paper, before running a game theoretical model, the author aims to verify whether such a kind of tradeoff really exists, or political and economic gains can be obtained by the players independently of each other.

For that purpose, this study aims to empirically test for the existence of a relationship between public opinion and trade, as well as deterioration of the situation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and trade, in the case of Sino-Japanese relations in 1988-2013.

Two linear regression models were run. In both cases the bilateral trade volume was selected as the dependent variable. In the case of the first model, the independent variables of interest were the favorable opinion of China in Japan, and the unfavorable opinion of China in Japan. The GDP of China, GDP of Japan and economic crises were selected as the control variables influencing the level of trade between the two countries.

In the second model, the concept of deterioration of political situation over the disputed islands was operationalized as the number of major incidents over the disputed islands, including incursions by Chinese vessels into the territorial waters that are currently under Japanese control, political standoffs, detainment of Chinese captains, etc. The GDP of China, GDP of Japan and economic crises were again selected as the control variables.

The data for China's and Japan's GDPs were taken from World Bank's databases (World Bank). The data describing the bilateral trade level throughout the period of 1994-2013 were obtained from China Statistical Yearbooks (National Bureau of Statistics of China). The public opinion data was supplied by the polls conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, whereas the major incidents were recorded from the timeline of Senkakau/Diaoyu dispute provided by the Center for a New American Security (Center for a New American Security). On the next stage of analysis, a game theoretical model was applied which will be described later in this paper.

Data Analysis

The data were analyzed with the SPSS 20 (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software. First, the connections between the variables included in the first model are scrutinized. The correlational matrix is presented below.

Table 2. Correlational matrix

	Japan GDP	China GDP	Trade	Economic Crises	Opinion - Unfavorable	Opinion - Favorable
Japan GDP						

China GDP	0.687**					
Trade	0.624**	0.932**				
Economic Crises	-0.042	-0.043	-0.158			
Opinion - Unfavorable	0.727**	0.944**	0.957**	0.42		
Opinion – Favorable	-0.651**	-0.819**	-0.861**	-0.008	-0.927**	

** - Pearson correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Here the Japanese and Chinese GDPs are both positively correlated with the trade level between them, which is intuitive. However, the puzzling part is the statistically significant positive correlation between the percentage of the Japanese public that has unfavorable opinion of China and trade. At the same time, there is a significant negative correlation between the percentage of Japan's population that has favorable opinion of China and bilateral trade¹. In other words, the data suggest that years with higher percentages of unfavorable opinion correspond to higher levels of trade.

Naturally, this does not imply that there is a causal relationship between these two variables, while this would have been totally counterintuitive. Rather, this correlation occurred because of two sustained positive trends in both variables throughout the observed time period. Those trends had their separate causes (other variables). Thus, this positive correlation can be interpreted as the preliminary evidence of independence of these variables. However, it may be possible that controlling for the effects of other independent variables on trade, negative coefficients for the effects of "Opinion Unfavorable" variable could be derived. Therefore, the first linear regression model has been proposed. The output matrix for the model is presented in the following table.

Table 3. Effects of Public Opinion on Trade

	Unstandardized coefficients	Significance level
Constant	-18744193.992	.107
Economic Crises	.455	.658
China's GDP	.094	.959
Japan's GDP	-2006793.478	.369
Japanese Opinion (Unfavorable)	571116.566	.005

It occurred that the only significant variable was the level of unfavorable opinion of China in Japanese society. Again, the coefficient of the variable is positive, which is counterintuitive. This means that even controlling for the effect of other economic variables, the "Opinion Unfavorable" variable does not have a logically grounded influence on Sino-Japanese trade. On the other hand, the inclusion of this variable in the model cancelled out the effect of the economic variables that turned out to be statistically insignificant in this case. This is due to the high correlation between "Opinion Unfavorable", and those variables which causes

¹ The data for neutral opinion were not included.

multicollinearity when the results about any individual predictor may not be valid (as it is in this case).

Next, the relationship between the major incidents in the East China Sea that spoil the political atmosphere between the two countries and their level of trade is to be examined. The output table for the second model is presented below. The only variable that has a statistically significant effect on the level of trade is China's GDP, which sounds logical, because the booming Chinese economy led to increased levels of China's foreign trade, and namely the trade with Japan. On the contrary, Japan's GDP did not have any statistically significant impact captured by the model. This fact can be explained by the nation's long lasting stagnation, when the figures for GDP did not change dramatically, while trade with China boomed, mainly because of the latter's rapid economic growth.

Table 4. Effects of Crises on Trade

	Unstandardized coefficients	Significance level
Constant	9598908.905	.362
Economic Crises	-160453.038	.952
China's GDP	3.137	.000
Japan's GDP	-.893	.705
Incidents (Japan-China)	1283073.012	.193

Finally, our independent variable of interest, major incidents between Japan and China throughout the observed period, also did not have a significant impact on trade. This demonstrates that deterioration of the political climate between the two countries does not lead to the decline in their economic relations. Thus, the East Asian paradox of "cold politics-hot economics" is empirically sustained. This phenomenon presents great interest for the game theoretical modeling.

The Game

This paper applies the classical deterrence (Huth, 1999) model to the study of the Sino-Japanese dispute, making several adjustments and clarifications on the definitions of players' types and actions, broadly defined as "challenge (C)-not challenge (NC), resist (R)-accept (A), escalate (E)-not escalate (NE)".

First of all, the author assumes that the outcome of full-scale war between Japan and China, which happens after the terminal history "challenge, resist, escalate", is extremely unlikely. However, the model of gradual escalation (not necessarily to the stage of an all-out war) and backing captures the logic of strategic interaction between China and Japan, over challenging/preserving the status quo in East China Sea quite well.

Solution of the Game

The overall game tree is presented below:




Figure 1. Game tree

The condition for China choosing “Not Challenge” as the rational decision is represented by the following formula:

$$pW + (1-p)N_J - c_c < N_C$$

where p is the probability that China assigns to Japan playing escalate after the non-terminal history “Challenge-Resist-Escalate”, i.e. being of the “aggressive² type”; W is the payoff China obtains in case of final escalation by Japan, N_J is China’s payoff in case of Japan accepting the altered status quo after China’s challenging or after the terminal history “Challenge-Resist-Escalate-Back”; c_c is China’s costs of challenging the status quo.

From the previous formula it is obvious that the probability that China assigns to Japan playing escalate after the non-terminal history “Challenge-Resist-Escalate” should be:

$$p > (N_J - N_C - c_c) / (N_J - W)$$

for the inequality to hold. It can be observed that the costs of challenging for China “ c_c ” decreases over the course of time. China’s remarkable military and economic rise has transformed the country into a much more powerful one, and continues to do so. It is intuitive to argue that costs of challenging the status quo are less for a more powerful country than for a weaker one, which can face political isolation and decline in its geopolitical positions as a result of the countermeasures taken by the status quo nation. Thus the lower values of c_c vector in the inequality correspond to higher values of the overall expression on the right side of the inequality. This means that for China **not to challenge** the status quo, the probability that it assigns to Japan acting escalates at the final decision node should grow parallel to the decline of c_c . In other words, the more assured China is that Japan is “aggressive”, the less likely it is to challenge the status quo. The irony of the deterrence model applied to Sino-Japanese relations is that Japan needs to become more and more “aggressive” for the preservation of the status quo, because of the ever decreasing value of the costs for China.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that the value of W is not negatively influenced by the decline in trade, while the economic relationship between China and Japan is independent of the escalations of disputes in East China Sea. Therefore, the operationalization of W , i.e. the payoff China receives in case of the escalation by Japan at the final decision node, requires more precise understanding of the risks that China actually runs in any realistic scenario of limited

² Note that the term “aggressive” is used in the meaning of preferring the payoffs from escalating to the payoffs from backing at the final decision node. It is not used in the meaning assigned to the words “aggressor”, “aggression” in international law.

escalation. Let's assume that the value of W , i.e. the loss that Japan can infringe on China in a realistic scenario, is proportionate to Japan's potential and will to do so. While Japan's potential has remained nearly constant in post-Cold War period, because of the "lost decades" of Japanese economy, current humble GDP growth and an invariable amount of military expenditure, it can be argued that the W value is solely dependent on Japan's will to infringe loss on China. In its turn, that will is mainly stipulated by the ruling administration at the time. Therefore, several case studies of the game, which reveal some patterns of reaction by different administrations, are proposed.


Cases

In the incidents which occurred during the incumbency of Junichiro Koizumi, the Game mainly followed the pattern of Challenge-Resist-Not Escalate. This could have been due to Koizumi's harsh stance on China, and an unambiguous inclination to taking "aggressive" action for the second time, after the non-terminal history "challenge-aggressive-escalate" that was known to policy makers in Beijing.

On the contrary, Yasuo Fukuda's administration followed a different pattern, though not in a boat incident with China, but with Taiwan in 2008 (Hsiu-Chuan & Wang Flora, 2008). Yasuo Fukuda's administration backed down and apologized. Thus, the Game resulted in "challenge-aggressive-escalate-back".

Naoto Kan's administration followed the same strategy in the infamous 2010 fishing boat incident. Thus, the Game again took place in the form of "challenge-aggressive-escalate-back" terminal history.

An unusual role change occurred in 2012. This time, the Japanese side played as the challenger of the status quo, with the purchase of three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. China's "Resist" response phase was rather prolonged. An unprecedented wave of a number of incursions by Chinese vessels into the territorial waters surrounding Senkaku/Diaoyu islands began immediately after the purchase, and has lasted until now. However, Japan chose the action "escalate", without backing down and returning to the pre-purchase status quo, which in this case was the different legal status of the islands. China, in her turn, chose to back down. The last claim may sound somewhat arguable when examined against the background of severed rhetoric in official statements, as well as media and even academic narratives. However, the graph authored by the Japan Coast Guard (Japan Coast Guard, 2015) and presented below, shows a gradual trend of backing down.



Finally, the last case study of the Game is connected with the establishment of an Air-Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) by China over the East China Sea (Gladstone & Wald, 2013). This step, which was perceived in Tokyo as an unfriendly act targeted against Japan (Szechenyi, Cha, Glaser, Green, & Johnson, 2013), can be considered as a “challenge” action aimed at altering the status quo. Japan, in its turn, chose to play “Resist”, by ordering its commercial aircraft not to comply with the Chinese request of submitting planned flights schedules. Furthermore, the US and Japan sent jet fighters to fly over the newly established ADIZ, in complete disregard of Beijing’s new rules. We can claim that China reacted to these “violations” with an action “not escalate”, while measures were not taken against any of the “violating aircraft”.

Conclusions

First of all, it was demonstrated that the paradox “cold politics-hot economics” is sustained by empirical tests. The level of political crises does not have an impact on the trade between the two countries. Besides that, another factor that becomes more and more important, the unfavorable/favorable public opinion of China shared by the Japanese people is also independent of the economic relationship. The dynamics of deterioration of the political atmosphere over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands can be explained by the growing power of China, i.e. decreasing costs for challenging the status quo, and the effectiveness of Japanese deterrence. When speaking about deterrence, it should be noted that signaling a determination to escalate at the final decision node of the game and the perception of that determination by China is crucial in order for the deterrence to occur. That determination, as well as the deterrence itself, is mainly dependent on the incumbent administration. Different response patterns of several Japanese administrations ruling in the 21st century have been demonstrated.

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Yasukuni, The Soft Power of Clashing Identities

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Abstract

Yasukuni Jinja, or ‘Shrine for a Peaceful Nation’, was established in Tōkyō by Emperor Meiji to commemorate those who gave their lives for the nation. In our contemporary times Yasukuni has however become shrouded by an ideological aura of the pre-war system, where it became the “citadel of military ideology”, which it is perceived to glorify to this day. Consequently, when you visit Yasukuni the question arises “What do you actually commemorate?” And although the answer may be very clear to yourself, the action itself carries such great ambiguity that other’s preconceptions equally so define its interpretation. China in particular strongly protests against any visits by Japanese officials to Yasukuni, and even views it as a threat to the long treacherous path of reconciliation in East Asia, as each nation holds a distinct interpretation of its wartime past. Visits and offerings by current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has often been labelled as a hawkish nationalist conservative, have come under particular scrutiny as his image is perceived to enforce Yasukuni’s militaristic past. This research therefore sets out to clarify the role of Yasukuni within Chinese-Japanese relations under the prime-ministership of Shinzo Abe, by introducing the concept of assertive soft power, which seeks to avert another nations’ identity by endorsing its opposite.

Keywords: National identities, Soft Power, Sino-Japanese relations, Yasukuni Jinja

Introduction

“You and I are two cherry blossoms. Even if we fall apart.
The capital of flowers is Yasukuni Jinja. We meet each other in the treetops in spring”
– Lyrical extract of Doki no Sakura

Doki no Sakura, meaning ‘Cherry Blossoms of the same class’, is a song devoted to the selfless sacrifice of ‘kamikaze’ pilots who, like a cherry blossom, would bloom in their finest hour to die momentarily. Throughout the world, the act of offering your own life for another human being has been regarded as one of the most sacred acts. To commemorate such acts, Emperor Meiji founded Shōkonjo, which would later be renamed Yasukuni Jinja, meaning ‘Shrine for a Peaceful Nation’, in Tōkyō (Yasukuni Jinja, 2008) in 1869. In our contemporary times, Yasukuni has however become shrouded by an ideological aura of the pre-war system, where it became the “citadel of military ideology” (Ohnuki-Tierney, 2002, p. 82), which it is perceived to glorify to this day (Lai, 2014, p. 117). Consequently, when you visit Yasukuni the question arises, “What do you actually commemorate?” And although the answer may be very clear for yourself, the action itself carries such great ambiguity that other’s preconceptions equally so define its interpretation as the perceived identities of Yasukuni come to clash. Another layer of clashing identities appears if the person in question fulfils this visit while holding a public diplomatic function. Former Prime Minister (PM) Koizumi for example, visited Yasukuni shrine on an annual basis during his term in office between 2001 and 2006, claiming his visits were with the purpose of paying respect to those men and women who gave their lives, and to pray for peace (Breen, 2007, p. 53, 71 and 75).

These visits were nonetheless followed by strong protests by China, and tended to endanger the long treacherous path of reconciliation in East Asia, as each nation holds a distinct interpretation of its wartime past. Furthermore, one must not ignore the importance of the image the Japanese official has been assigned by the neighboring countries in shaping their perception of the visit. Visits and offerings by current PM Abe, who has often been labelled as a hawkish nationalist conservative who seems to firmly belief Japan was also a victim of World War II (Johnston, 2013), have come under particular scrutiny as his image enforces Yasukuni’s militaristic past. The figure shown below illustrates the clashes of the various identities Yasukuni is perceived to hold.




Figure 1: The Clashes of Identities

With these concepts in mind, this paper aims at answering the question: "What is the role of Yasukuni Jinja within Chinese-Japanese relations under the prime-ministership of Shinzo Abe (2006-2007 & 2012-present)?" Based on preliminary research this paper claims that under PM Abe Yasukuni’s clashing identities have been given a greater role as a place to

show assertive soft power towards China. The scope of this paper is limited to the specific role Yasukuni fulfils in Chinese-Japanese relations under the prime-ministership of Shinzo Abe (2006-2007 & 2012-present), as tensions between the two nations, as well as the presence of Yasukuni in political discourse has exceptionally increased during this timeframe. The relevance of this paper is to provide a multi-perspective characterization of Yasukuni's identities, and analyse its 'soft' power role in China-Japan relations during Abe's term in office. To achieve this goal, this paper is structured as follows: a brief introduction section on the concept of 'soft' power; followed by two interrelated sections on the shrine's identities; and finally an analysis of PM Abe in relation to his visits and offerings to Yasukuni.

The notion of 'soft' power

The notion of 'soft' co-optive power was introduced in 1990 as the counterpart of hard command power by Joseph S. Nye Jr., who is an American political scientist and former Dean at Harvard University. Hard power constitutes "the ability to change what others do" (Nye, 2004, p. 7) by "ordering others to do what it wants" (Nye, 1990, p. 166) while soft power "occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants" (Nye, 1990, p. 166), or in other words, "the ability to shape what others wants" (Nye, 2004, p. 7). As the table below illustrates, each of Nye's forms of power has distinct characteristics regarding behaviour, primary currencies and governmental policies.

Table 1: Characteristics of Nye's Hard versus Soft Power ¹

		<i>Behaviours</i>	<i>Primary currencies</i>	<i>Government policies</i>
Hard power	<i>Military power</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coercion - Deterrence - Protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Threats - Force 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coercive diplomacy - War - Alliance
	<i>Economic power</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inducement - Coercion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Payments - Sanctions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aid - Bribes - Sanctions
Soft power		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Attraction - Agenda setting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Values - Culture - Policies - Institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public diplomacy - Bilateral & multilateral diplomacy

According to Nye's characteristics, soft power depends upon respect and admiration, which requires a degree of mutual peace and trust among nations and flourishes when fear and threats are minimal (Arase & Akaha, 2011, p. 19). The naming as well as the above mentioned characterizations hold positive and negative connotations, while in reality, both powers hold a duality of positive and negative within themselves. Japan's foreign relations perfectly exemplify this duality, as its hard power is very much constrained, due to Japan's constitutional limitations as well as the prohibition to act 'aggressively'; yet Japan's armed forces have both domestically and abroad been involved in disaster relief and peacebuilding missions, contributing to Japan's positive image on the diplomatic stage. With regards to soft power, Tsuneo Akaha, who is director at the Center for East Asian Studies with the Monterey Institute of International Studies, acknowledged the presence of a "deficit of soft power", due

¹ Nye, 1990, p. 167; Nye, 2004, p. 31

to the conflicting historical interpretations and lack of trust between East-Asian nations (Arase & Akaha, 2011, p. 63).

These conflicting historical interpretations, or clashes of identity, in fact lie at the core of the lack of trust between East-Asian nations as their representatives at times endorse their nation's interpretation. If one regards soft power to also hold a duality, it would be fair to identify these endorsements as a display of assertive soft power. Whereas positive soft power seeks to attract other nations through its positive connotation, assertive soft power seeks to avert other nations' identity by endorsing a nation's own identity, or by even conveying the other's as a threat. The main difference with nationalism is the principle that assertive soft power does not merely directly speak to a domestic audience, but in fact speaks to both as it seeks to provoke a reaction by other nations. To enhance its effects, shows of assertive soft power are particularly undertaken during conflicting events, such as territorial disputes or tensions in the sphere of security, to heighten its provocative effectivity. Furthermore, depending on the nature of conflicting identities as well as the degree and manner of a nation's endorsement of its own identity, internationally shared norms and values of tolerance are at risk of being ignored. As this paper will exemplify through the Yasukuni controversy, assertive soft power has been a driving force behind the diplomatic stand-off between Japan and China under PM Abe in particular.

Commemoration and the Sacred

When Emperor Meiji founded Yasukuni, its goal was 'for the worship of the divine spirits of those who sacrificed themselves for the country', and equally so to be 'a place for the Japanese people to pray for peace' (Yasukuni Jinja, 2008). According to Kevin Doak, who advocates Yasukuni's religious role, to commemorate and show the outmost respect to the selfless actions of those enshrined in the form of prayers that transcend the earthly for the sacred world are essential (Doak, 2007, p. 54). In his view, Yasukuni can therefore be foremost regarded as a place of mourning (Breen, 2007, p. 55). One should, however, not ignore the fact that these souls have been enshrined obligatorily, as the shrine determined to do so without the need for the family's consent (Saaler, 2005, p. 95).

From a domestic political perspective, Yasukuni has been assigned distinct roles by two dominant groups: the rightists/nationalists, and pacifists/leftists. Daiki Shibuichi, who specializes in identity politics, states that the former consider Yasukuni as a "heart-warming symbol of self-sacrifice and patriotism", representing the essence of "Japan's historical identity as a modern nation-state" (Shibuichi, 2005, p. 199); while the latter regards it as "a symbol of cruel militarism and scoff at the notion that it honours the 'spirit of the fallen' " (Shibuichi, 2005, p. 203). At the core of the perception in which many scholars and much of the media portray the controversy surrounding Yasukuni emphasizes the presence of the 14 Class A War Criminals who were secretly enshrined there in 1978 (Lai, 2014, p. 117). When this was revealed later that year, it cascaded into domestic outrage, as well as the diplomatic row with China that continues to this day. They also weighed heavily on Emperor Hirohito, and led to his decision to no longer visit Yasukuni, a decision which Emperor Akihito has continued to uphold. This motive was however not public knowledge until 2007, when two diary fragments written by Ryogo Urabe, who served as the Emperor's chamberlain during this troubling period, were published by the Asahi Shinbun. In response to this unveiling, the Japan Society for the War Bereaved, who is the single largest sponsor of Yasukuni, set up a study group to examine the possibilities of removing and relocating those souls. This option proved religiously impossible, as according to the rituals at Yasukuni; "You can transfer the

flame of one candle to another, but the original candle continues to burn”, meaning that even if the paper which has the soul’s name inscribed upon it would be removed, the person’s soul would still remain with the shrine (Breen, 2007, p. 5-6).

Furthermore, one could shed doubt on its effectiveness in relations with China, as in the eyes of the Chinese, the Tokyo war trials were inadequate (Teo, 2007, p. 118). It is easily imaginable that to truly ‘purify’ Yasukuni, the past of every single enshrined soul would have to be closely scrutinized by standards which may (partially) be determined by China. Such a notion could only be perceived a grave loss of dignity for Japan as a sovereign nation (Breen, 2007, p. 63), and as such only worsen the relationship even further. Another issue arises due to the fact that Yasukuni has been a private organisation since 1952, through the separation of religion and government, meaning it acts outside of government control. A fair conclusion to make is that “the element of political ideology is too strong”, making Yasukuni “inappropriate for a religious institution” (Lai, 2014, p. 117), and state the same regarding its role as a place of mourning.

In much of the discourse regarding Yasukuni, alternative locations such as the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery, which commemorates the unknown soldiers of WWII, as well as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Memorials, which commemorate the victims of the atomic bombings, are often mentioned. The former, however, lacks public recognition, and has become more known as a place for *hanami*, cherry blossom viewing. In 2001, it only received 180,000 visitors, versus the over six million who visited Yasukuni (Saaler, 2005, p. 102). A reason for the lack of recognition is firstly due to the fact that it is officially labelled as a ‘park’ under the Ministry of Environment (Ministry of Environment, n.d.), and secondly, visits by high ranking officials, even members of the Imperial family, gain little attention in the media. PM Abe’s visit, together with Prince Akishino and his wife Princess Kiko on May 25th 2015, for example, only received a 100-word article on the JapanToday website (JapanToday, 2015, May 25th). It would therefore be adequate to state that Chidorigafuchi fulfils a complementary role to Yasukuni, for those who do not wish to avoid its clashes of identities, as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel did in 2013 (The Japan Times, 2013, October 3^d). Nonetheless, a key fact to always keep in mind is that Yasukuni does not merely commemorate WWII militarist fanatics, and some souls resting in the shrine are there by obligatory enshrinement. The clashes of identities within Yasukuni due to its religious constraint and unchangeable past, result in a vicious circle of it being a religious institution with a nationalistic past, yet with there being no suitable counterpart for people to turn to.

Vivid war memories

For the Chinese people, the aforementioned vicious circle constitutes Yasukuni as a physical embodiment of the painful memories of WWII, bringing forth another dimension to the clash of identities. In his PhD, Victor Teo EE-Leong, amongst others, provides an in-depth analysis of the role of memories in Chinese politics. According to Teo, these memories have become so ingrained in Chinese national identity that “its elites tend to utilize it as a deterrent to reconcile nationalistic expectations and protect the nation’s sovereignty, pride and dignity” (Teo, 2007, p. 110). These perceptions can be derived from the fact that the Communist Party portrays itself as the victorious party over the Nationalist Party (Taiwanese Kuomintang) and the Japanese Imperial Army. The former ceased to be a principal enemy when the U.S. and China normalized their relations in 1979, leaving only the victory over Japan the

Communists' historic pillar in saving the Chinese nation (Teo, 2007, p. 117). This victory, as well as its cost, is very much kept alive in Chinese national consciousness, as every year the Nanjing Massacre and the Japanese surrender are commemorated. New generations are taught in national museums such as the one at Tiananmen Square about the country's "unfortunate" or humiliating history (Teo, 2007, p. 123; Breen, 2007, p. 63).

Within these museums, Japan is portrayed from two perspectives in particular. The first views Japan as a cultural protégé, who "benefited tremendously from China's cultural advances and technological development for an immeasurably long time". The fact that the protégé turned against the teacher has led to the perspective that "Japanese people use hatred to repay debts of kindness" (Teo, 2007, p. 112), and creates a sense of moral "debt", or rather "debt of blood", owed to China by the Japanese (Teo, 2007, p. 114). The second view has been developing for decades as a process of "dehumanisation" has set in, whereby the Japanese Imperial forces have become 'horrors' in China's past. This perceived "horror" has become embedded at the core of Chinese identity, which consequently provides a moral judgment on the Japanese (Teo, 2007, 113), and perhaps even a sense of moral superiority. A degree of hypocrisy within this view may be observed, as while the Chinese government tends to propagate anti-Japanese sentiment within their national museums, they strongly condemn the exhibition of the privately owned Yūshūkan at Yasukuni (Breen, 2007, p. 63).

The Yūshūkan, being a non-governmental institution, is perceived to portray an 'affirmative' perspective of the war, whereby Japan fought a just war to liberate Asia from Western imperialism (Kingston, 2011, p. 187; Rose, 2015, p. 27-28). When interviewing several of the visitors to the Yūshūkan in early June, with regards to whether they recognized this 'affirmative' perspective, many of them answered negatively, yet did note that sensitive issues such as comfort women and Nanjing receive far too little attention (Koolen, observation, June 5-6, 2015). It is this very perspective of the war which clashes with China, as it induces Chinese memories of past humiliations and suffering, which consequently triggers a clash of identities (Lai, 2014, p. 118). Surprisingly, a key figure in post-1949 Chinese identity, Mao Zedong, himself had once made remarks to visiting Japanese delegates that "China should not seek reparations because it was due to Japanese aggression that the CCP was able to defeat the Nationalists" (Friedman, 2001, p. 106). Some scholars would however claim that the Chinese government has utilized this clash of identities to exert moral pressure as a diplomatic strategy, to obtain economic or diplomatic concessions (Teo, 2007, 114). Whether one agrees with this statement or not, it cannot be denied that memory politics has become one of the most critical foreign policy questions in East-Asia (Fukuoka, 2013, p. 28).

Yasukuni as a source of 'soft' power

Having established the various identities of Yasukuni as a religious institution, place of commemoration and embodiment of war memories, one starts to wonder how these clashes have become the major obstacle for Chinese-Japanese relations. The missing piece of this puzzle lies in the perception of the person visiting Yasukuni. According to Jeff Kingston, commemorating at Yasukuni means one embraces an affirmative war memory of Japan's actions during WWII (Kingston, 2011, p. 187). Such a narrow perception could be seen a direct insult to both those non-militarists enshrined at Yasukuni, as well as those who pay their respects there. The visitors to Yasukuni are in fact of a diverse nature, and encompass all layers of Japanese, and international, society and hold widespread political beliefs. They

visit the shrine for a variety of personal motives, including praying for their fallen family members, as well as genuinely praying for peace.

Nonetheless, because of the presence of these perceptions such as these, the profile of the person who visits Yasukuni is of far greater importance in terms of enforcing the Chinese-Japanese diplomatic ‘stand-off’, as well as the potential of visits serving as a show of assertive soft power. To present a thorough analysis in determining whether or not certain visits and offerings to Yasukuni by Abe constitute as assertive soft power, this section of the paper is divided into several subsections. The first subsection presents the timeframe before Abe took office as PM for his second term. The second subsection determines a pattern during this second term in office; while the subsequent subsections elaborate on those events which qualify as a show assertive soft power, considering the characteristics mentioned in the first section of this paper. It is, however, paramount to state that visits by officials tend to be shrouded in the ambiguity of whether they are performed in an official or private capacity. Although some may argue the capacity determines the transcendence of a person’s visit from a domestic to a diplomatic issue, yet for the Chinese, as shall be discussed in greater depth momentarily, capacity does not change the act.

From restraint to the clash

Before taking office for the first time as PM, Abe held the position of Chief Cabinet Secretary under PM Koizumi, and joined him in his final annual visit to Yasukuni in 2006, in the midst of heightened tensions with South Korea on territorial disputes. Koizumi’s visits were highly controversial amongst Japan’s neighbours, while domestically the following sentiment took root: “Japan has apologized for the war on many occasions... but the neighbours will never be satisfied” (Tamagi, 2009, p. 40). When Abe himself took office as PM of Japan for his first term in 2006, he seemed to break away from the controversy when he stated “I have no intention whatsoever to make a declaration that I will go to the shrine”, and in his view, “it is important that we can genuinely communicate in a future-oriented manner”(Tamagi, 2009, p. 43). Although Abe did not visit Yasukuni in his first term, he did not avoid the controversy entirely, due to his continuous association with the following political groups in particular:

Table 2: Shinzō Abe’s affiliations ²

Groups	Advocating
Jimintou rekishi kentou iinkai (Abe was a key founding member in 1993)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Affirmative representation of history. – Retraction of the Kono Statement on comfort women as well as PM Morihiro’s general apology to victims of Japanese aggression.
Nippon no zento to rekishi kyokasho wo kangaeru giin no kai	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Textbook revisions regarding issues such as Nanking and comfort women. – Cultivation of patriotic values.
Shintou seiji renmei kokkai giin kondankai	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – To “restore Japanese-ness” by promoting Shinto values. – Official visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine. – Opposed the construction of a non-religious site of war commemoration. – Opposed to the ‘removal’ of the spirits of war criminals from Yasukuni. – Patriotic and moral education.
Minna de Yasukuni Jinjya ni sanpai suru giin no kai	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Annual joint visits to Yasukuni to commemorate the war dead in August.

The first two groups are generally labelled as ‘revisionist’ groups, as they wish to reinterpret wartime memories, as well as several inheritances of the Occupation, such as the Constitution. Abe’s revisionist beliefs manifested itself when he published his book “*Utsukushii kuni e*”, which translates to “*Toward a Beautiful Country*” in English. In his book, Abe presents a revisionist claim regarding the unfairness of the Tokyo War Tribunals (Arase & Akaha, 2011, p. 64-65). These ‘revisionist’ interpretations of Japan’s wartime past lay at the core of the use of assertive soft power when they are challenged by China, as many of the conservative politicians believe that China uses wartime memories as a diplomatic strategy. Nonetheless, during his first term, Abe did set out to mend relations with China and South Korea, which was a reasonably popular policy amongst the Japanese public (Arase & Akaha, p. 78-79).

However, when looking back on his first term during his campaigning for the LDP presidency in 2012, Abe stated that he regretted not having visited Yasukuni at the time (Nakamoto, 2012). The tensions between Japan and China flared up during these times, as Japan bought out the private owner of the three Senkaku Islands it did not yet control. This action led to anti-Japanese riots throughout mainland China. Abe at the time strongly advocated taking a tough stand against China over this territorial dispute (McCurry, 2013). When he was elected by the LDP as party president, he kept both these promises by visiting Yasukuni for the first time since his visit under Koizumi in 2006. Having avoided a clash with China during his first term, it is undeniable that Abe knew all too well how this action would be perceived by China. His visit did therefore not merely serve to harness the endorsement of the revisionist LDP supporters, but also to show assertive soft power to China as a symbolic break from his former restraints, as well as his willingness to take a tough stand on conflicting issues.

² Japan Focus, 安倍内閣 所属団体を通してのイデオロギー的分析, 2013

The formation of an annual pattern

A few weeks later, the LDP regained its dominance in the Diet, and Abe became the next Prime Minister of Japan. In his victory speech, he again emphasized that regarding Chinese-Japanese relations, "We must strengthen our alliance with the US and also improve relations with China, with a strong determination that there is no change in the fact that the Senkaku Islands are our territory" (McCurry, 2013). Abe from this point onward would regularly send offerings to Yasukuni. These offerings are sent during key annual Yasukuni events, being the Spring Festival and the Memorial Service of the War Dead. Although some of these offerings are presented at times of heightened tensions between China and Japan over wartime inheritance issues, these dates do hold important religious and commemorative meanings. The former, for example, has a strong religious nature, as it is a type of festival common in Shintō, while the latter mostly carries a commemorative function. Since Abe presents these offerings on an annual basis, it more so presents his annual pattern of reaching out to Yasukuni. The offerings presented in April and August therefore do not hold a sense of irregularity to constitute them as a means of assertive soft power.

Nonetheless, reactions from both sides regarding these offerings have set a 'status quo' in their discourse on the issue. In April 2013, for example, after several members of Abe's cabinet visited the shrine, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated that it "doesn't matter how or in what role Japanese leaders visit the Yasukuni shrine ... We feel it is in essence a denial of Japan's history of militarist invasion". A few days later, during a parliamentary debate in the Japanese Diet, Abe stated that "It's only natural to honor the spirits of those who gave their lives for the country. Our ministers will not cave in to any threats" (Sekiguchi, 2013). This last remark in particular reveals that Abe perceives the visits as well as the offerings to Yasukuni as being a matter of showing the resolve of his cabinet.

The first clash

The offering presented a few months later, during Yasukuni's autumn festival in October 2013, is a first irregularity in Abe's pattern, as it has been the only reported offering from Abe for this festival. From a political perspective, one must consider it as an occasion for Abe to show assertive soft power at times when tensions with China are heightened, or in expectation of them becoming so. It is the latter which would fit to describe this offering, as Abe in an interview with *The Wall Street Journal* only a few days later would make the bold statement that Japan was ready to stand up against China. In this interview, he for example stated that "Japan is expected to exert leadership not just on the economic front, but also in the field of security in the Asia-Pacific", and that "there are concerns that China is attempting to change the status quo by force, rather than by rule of law. But if China opts to take that path, then it won't be able to emerge peacefully." (Baker & Nishiyama, 2013). By following up the irregular offering with such a bold statements, it revealed Abe's intended assertive soft power towards China; its specific message being that Abe's government will stand fast on their determination for Japan to play an increasing role, and even take up a leadership role in the security sphere in the Asia-Pacific.

The backlash

On December 26th 2013, to celebrate his Cabinet's first year in office Abe visited Yasukuni for the first time as PM, and also made it the first visit by a Japanese PM since Koizumi's last annual visit seven years before. As a surprise to Abe, his visit did not only stir up Japan's

relationship with China, but also caused a minor row with Japan's longstanding ally, the U.S. In response to the visit, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo stated that: "Japan is a valued ally and friend. Nevertheless, the United States is disappointed that Japan's leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan's neighbors". A senior fellow at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations added that the visit "will hurt Japan, especially since it came at a time when there were signs of improvement in Japan's future prospects". Furthermore, according to an article in *The Asahi Shimbun* on the matter, some specialists in the U.S. viewed the visit as "an intentional snub against the Obama administration" (Oshima, 2013). Abe's visit also resulted in numerous Chinese officials fiercely condemning his visit. China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the visit had pushed Japan in an "extremely dangerous" direction, and that "Japan must bear full responsibility for the serious political consequences".

The situation even led the Japanese embassy in Beijing to warn Japanese nationals "to stay away from any demonstrations and to not congregate in big groups", as well as issuing a surprisingly assertive message to Abe himself, stating that: "In dealing with Chinese people, pay attention to your behavior and your language." (Slodkowski & Sieg, 2013). This broad international critique truly came as a surprise, as Abe's special adviser Isao Iijima admitted in his book "Pressure Points in Politics" (*Seiji no Kyusho*), stating that at the time they were convinced that: "... Xi Jinping, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, is a leader who is beyond complaining about this and that over issues like these", and a visit could engage China in a bilateral dialogue (Hayashi, 2014). Using the visit to serve this purpose exemplifies the misconceived concept of soft power on these men's part, as after more than a decade of highly emotional bilateral dialogues, China's resolve on the issue should have been clear. Spokesperson Qin formulated this sentiment very clearly in his press conference, stating that due to "Abe's hypocrisy", it is "[i]n fact it is Abe himself who shuts the door on dialogue with Chinese leaders. The Chinese people do not welcome him" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – PRC, 2013).

The Chinese state news agency Xinhua even went further, claiming that: "Instead of a pledge against war, as Abe has claimed, the visit is a calculated provocation to stoke further tension." (Slodkowski & Sieg, 2013); or in other words, a show of assertive soft power. Perhaps in preparation to this international critique, or through early warning, Abe sought to defend his action by releasing a statement named "*Pledge for everlasting peace*" the same day. In his statement, Abe emphasized that his visit was to express his condolences, and renew his "determination ... to firmly uphold the pledge never to wage war again" (Kantei, 2013). Interestingly, he also mentioned that he visited Chinreisha, a small shrine to the south of Yasukuni's main hall which commemorates all war dead, regardless of their nationality. The existence of Chinreisha within the Yasukuni precinct is not well known, due to its somewhat 'hidden' location outside the main complex (Koolen, observation, June 5-6, 2015). In his closing remarks, Abe expressed that it is "regrettable" that visiting Yasukuni has become a diplomatic issue, but "[it] is not my intention at all the hurt the feelings of the Chinese and Korean people".

This statement, however, even worsened the situation further, as China reacted even more fiercely a few days later. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang in his regular press conference claimed that "Abe has been playing a double game in China-Japan relations ever since he took office", and that Abe's actions in fact "jeopardize the overall interests of China-Japan relations and hurt the feeling of the Chinese people" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – PRC, 2013). Although the fierce reaction from China as well as the U.S.' 'disappointment' did not bare any diplomatic consequences, they seemed to have convinced

Abe to be more careful in his visits. Up to this paper's time of writing, he has not made any visits to Yasukuni, or made any irregular offerings; yet only time will tell whether this a genuine sign of good fate, or a strategic choice to wait until the time is right.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the conflicting historical interpretations, or clashes of identity, which lie at the core of the troubled relationship between China and Japan, physically manifest themselves in Yasukuni Jinja. Once 'a place for the Japanese people to pray for peace', this identity clashes with its unchangeable wartime identity as 'a citadel of militarism'. Today this clash has become so fierce that Yasukuni to some has become inappropriate to fulfil a role as a religious institution or place of mourning. For those supporting an 'affirmative' interpretation of Japan's wartime history, Yasukuni remains a "heart-warming symbol of self-sacrifice and patriotism", while for the Chinese people the shrine induces painful memories of past humiliations and suffering. These memories have become ingrained in their own national identity, and are very much kept alive, which brings forth another clash of identities, whereby both China and Japan claim to be a victim of World War II. In Japan, some have even come to argue that the Chinese government has utilized this clash to exert moral pressure as a diplomatic strategy.

As this paper has however shown, the Japanese government under PM Abe has, through Yasukuni, used this very same clash to show assertive soft power towards China. When Abe took office as PM of Japan for his first term in 2006, he avoided visiting Yasukuni; yet his continuous association with 'revisionist' groups supporting the affirmative interpretation remained very much present, and continued to enforce his hawkish, nationalistic image. When looking back on his first term in 2012, Abe stated that he regretted not having visited Yasukuni at the time, and it would in fact be from this moment onward that Yasukuni became ever more incorporated in both his domestic and diplomatic strategy of showing assertive soft power. Whenever the tensions between Japan and China heightened, over for example territorial disputes or security issues, visits or offerings to Yasukuni symbolized Abe's willingness to take a tough stand on conflicting issues. These assertive manoeuvres tend to be followed by China's strong condemnation of any form of association with the above mentioned affirmative identity manifested in the shrine. The backlash of the December 26th 2013 visit, however, came as a surprise to Abe. Although he sought to defend his action with his "Pledge for everlasting peace"-statement, it only worsened the situation further, as for the Chinese it confirmed their perception of it being a show of assertive soft power against them. As the clashes between the identities of Yasukuni, China and Japan through assertive soft power take an ever-growing role on the diplomatic stage, the question remains whether China and Japan in their struggle choose to brush aside the internationally accepted value of tolerance amongst people.

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